of Ibn Taymiyya's criticism. A. also points to Ibn Taymiyya's strong opposition to Ibn Sīnā's doctrine of essence and accident when he affirms that to consider something to be either essential or to be accidental is nothing but a matter of convention. Equally radical is Ibn Taymiyya's rejection of Ibn Sīnā's realist theory of universals: for the former, contrary to the latter, universals do only exist in the mind. Although Ibn Taymiyya had undoubtedly direct knowledge of Ibn Sīnā's writings, the major source of his criticism against the (Aristotelico-)Avicennian realism appears to be Suhrawardi's nominalism. It may be noted that many references in the footnotes to the translation concern Avicennian works, or concepts.

Very valuable. A serious elucidation of the nature and background of Ibn Taymiyya's criticism against philosophical, i.e., Aristotelico-Avicennian logic.


A. points to the fact that the Latin Middle Ages considered al-Ghazālī to be aequus Avicennae, based on their (almost exclusive) knowledge of the Maqāṣid. Regarding this latter work, A. observes that it is never mentioned by al-Ghazālī in his other writings; that it is obviously not written as a preparatory study to the Tahāfut; the text of the preface seems to be a posterior addition (a large part of it corresponding to a passage in the Maqāṣid), and, last but not least, it being almost an Arabic version of Ibn Sīnā's Dānesh-Nāmeh. A. concludes that the Maqāṣid has to be qualified as an "Avicenna original"; and that al-Ghazālī was at most its translator. A. formulates a pertinent remark, which deserve full attention (unfortunately, I ignored his study, when publishing my: "Le Dānesh-Nāmeh d'Ibn Sīnā: un texte à revoir?, in: Bull. Philos. Méd., 28 (86), 163 - 177 (Bibli., 17), although his final conclusion may be in need of some revisions.


A. distinguishes two categories of logical works in al-Ghazālī, i.e. logical and theological works. Maqāṣid and Mi’yar al-'ilm are presented by A. as belonging to the former category. Regarding the former of the two, A. briefly summarizes his observation of his publication mentioned above. As to the Mi’yar, A. observes that its parts 1, 2 and 4 contain the text of the Maqāṣid, to which examples of grammar, fiqh and kalam have been added. As to its third part, it is almost identical with Ibn Sīnā's K. al-fudūd, amplified in the beginning with passages taken from the Shīfā, Najāt and Ishārat.

A very valuable preliminary study, but al-Ghazālī's sources of the Mi’yar are of a wider range than A. seems to believe.


After a brief review of Ibn Sīnā's theory of emanation, and al-Ghazālī's criticism against it, A. in a rather summary fashion, concentrates on al-Rāzī's objection against it (mainly based on the latter's commentary on the Ishārat, although also present in other of his works). It basically consists in proving that none of the attributes of the First Intelligence can be a cause, and in attacking Ibn Sīnā's assertion that the First Intelligence is composed of constituent parts. In his reply, al-Tūsi insists that the first effect is by no means identical with the First Intelligence itself, and moreover specifies which aspects of the First Intelligence are responsible for which effects, hereby indicating that the attributes of the First Intelligence are not causes, but conditions to cause.

A valuable case-study, opening perspectives for further investigation.


A. observes that Ibn Rushd particularly criticizes Ibn Sīnā's philosophy and (e.g., not al-Fārābī's). Acc. to A., this is due to the fact that al-Ghazālī, in his Tahāfut, considered Ibn Sīnā to represent philosophy as such. Ibn Rushd's critique is directed against the confusion of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas in Ibn Sīnā (as well as in al-Fārābī), although, as A. stresses, Ibn Rushd's attitude was not purely negative, since he accepted some particular Avicennian ideas. Hereafter, A. discusses in great detail some major items of Ibn Rushd's critique, e.g., Ibn Sīnā's famous contingency proof for the existence of God, and such basic issues as emanation, the very conception of natural philosophy and estimation. In all this, A. offers a rather conventional outline.

A valuable basic presentation, although A. does not always analyse Ibn Rushd's criticisms in a fully critical way.
A. first deals with the topic of miracles in Ibn Sinā, presenting here a brief basic outline of Ibn Sinā’s theory of knowledge. Acc. to A., Ibn Sinā affirms that man can break the natural order, insofar as his soul reaches a “divine state”. So, for Ibn Sinā such deeds are not by man’s own essence, but through an external divine action. A. moreover stresses that Ibn Sinā categorically rejects any unification with the Divine. Finally, the prophet is for Ibn Sinā not only a necessity from the sociopolitical view, but he is also a performer of miracles. As to Ibn Rushd’s opinions on these matters, they are utterly rationalistic. Hence, A. contrasts Ibn Rushd radically to Ibn Sinā, whom he compares with al-Ghazzālī.

Introductory. One wonders whether A. does not interpret Ibn Sinā’s thought in a far too “orthodox” way?


A. stresses that self-consciousness is self-evident in Ibn Sinā. Then he observes that, whereas in general cognition the object has to occur in the knowing subject as an internal object, in self-consciousness it is proper to its subject (A. hereby refers to passages from the Mubāhātāt and the Ta‘līqāt). Therefore, self-consciousness cannot be established through perceiving an effect of the self, or through one’s action, or through the consciousness of others. Further, acc. to A., Ibn Sinā distinguishes between two kinds of self-consciousness, i.e. the perception of one’s self, and the perception of one’s self perceiving something other. A. stresses that only the former kind is always in actuality, and, therefore, assures the continuance of self-consciousness after death. A. deals briefly with al-Suhrawardī’s theory. In the final conclusion, A. points to basic similarities between the theories of both authors, but for him al-Suhrawardī is much more consistent in his arguments than Ibn Sinā has been before him.

The paper offers some interesting basic materials, but seems to be open to further refinement.


With Gutas A. accepts that Ibn Sinā’s autobiography has to be read as being a defense of the “Aristotelian” doctrine, this latter offering the truth. In doing so, Ibn Sinā presents himself as a “genius”. A. shows through other examples that this idea of a “genius” was common in the Islamic cultural area of those days. Finally, A.
pays special attention to Ibn Khaldūn's autobiography, and remarks that, notwithstanding striking differences with Ibn Sinā's, in the ultimate analysis it also mirrors the own scientific conception of the author, i.e., Ibn Khaldūn himself.

A fine basic comparison between two major classical autobiographies.


A. first notes that Ḥāṣṣā in Ibn Ṭufayl, according to the classical interpretation, is the personification of the human active intellect. A. observes that Ibn Ṭufayl qualifies Ḥāṣṣā's action as an imitation of the heavenly bodies, hereby contributing to the preservation of the species. This form-preserving function is typical for the Agent Intellect of Ibn Sinā, so that A. inclines to the idea that Ibn Ṭufayl probably followed Ibn Sinā's interpretation, and only wanted to complete the latter's story.

A valuable suggestion, but compare above, 402.


As to A., for Mulla ʿṢadrāʾ al-Shāhrūzī Ibn Sinā's doctrine of the divine knowledge is essentially "Peripatetic", and hence, in the very same line as al-Fārābī's. However, the core of Mulla ʿṢadrāʾ's criticism against Ibn Sinā concerns the latter's depicting God's knowledge as active. But A., through an analysis of some of Ibn Sinā's major works, rejects that such a depiction implies a resemblance between God and man, as Mulla ʿṢadrāʾ suggests. On the contrary, Ibn Sinā stresses the independence of God's knowledge from things themselves. According to A., Mulla ʿṢadrāʾ and Ibn Sinā actually agree on defining God's knowledge as eternal, unchangeable, universal and intellectual. But they disagree as far as the relation of God's knowledge of all things outside His own essence is concerned. More specifically, Mulla ʿṢadrāʾ rejects Ibn Sinā's qualification of the forms of things as "posterior concomitants" of God's essence. A. observes that Mulla ʿṢadrāʾ does not purely reject the extreme criticisms of al-Suhrawardi and N.D. al-Ṭūsī against Ibn Sinā in this respect, but nevertheless accuses him of not having accepted the unification of the form and the perceivable, and of having stated that the forms are imprinted in God's essence. Thereafter, A. concentrates on al-Suhrawardi's doctrine, and Mulla ʿṢadrāʾ's criticism of it. A. concludes that Mulla ʿṢadrāʾ developed an eclectic theory of God's knowledge, deriving inter alia from Ibn Sinā the concept of "simple Being", and the idea of God's cognitive forms.

Very valuable. A pioneering study (at least in a Western language) on the relationship between Mulla ʿṢadrāʾ and Ibn Sinā.


Acc. to A., Ibn Ṭufayl, notwithstanding his admiration for Ibn Sinā, did not fully trust the latter's declaration on "Oriental philosophy", Ibn Ṭufayl insists that one has not only to read carefully the Shīrī, but also Aristotle's books.

An important observation, which deserves critical attention.


Having summarized the major differences between the world-views of Ibn Sinā and the kalām, A. observes that Ibn Sinā's criticism of kalām-ideas are very sporadic in his works, and rarely explicit. On the other hand, there are also indications that the kalām did influence Ibn Sinā.

A. deals in detail with three major doctrines in Ibn Sinā, i.e., origination, matter and resurrection. For all three of them, A. offers basic fragments, taken from different Avicennian works, and indicates what elements in each of them might be considered to have some reference to the kalām. E.g., Ibn Sinā's answering an objection against his affirmation that the essential cause necessitates its effect, and coexists with it, seems to be directed against some theologians. And a similar observation may be made with respect to Ibn Sinā's criticism of the third form of atomism, or of the theory of the actual infinite. And even when at first sight Ibn Sinā and the kalām agree, e.g., on the acceptance of self-knowledge as an immediate necessary truth, an in-depth analysis reveals almost always a radical difference, e.g., a radically opposed conception of the self.

A very valuable basic outline but in need of further elaboration.

A. first situates Ibn Sinà’s famous formulation of the “Flying Man”-argument, as formulated in the Ishàrât, in the broader context of the latter’s doctrine of self-awareness. Then A. deals in a detailed and systematic way with al-Razi’s criticism of this argument, as expressed in the comment on the Ishàrât-fragment. According to al-Razi, Ibn Sinà has neither proven that constant self-awareness is self-evident, nor demonstrated that we have such constant self-awareness. According to A., Ibn Sinà remains ambiguous by not arguing whether this self-awareness is either a contingent or a necessary fact. Interestingly enough, al-Razi himself elaborates two arguments in support of the notion of constant self-awareness. His disagreement with Ibn Sinà is therefore not on the notion itself, but on the understanding of the “self”. For al-Razi, contrary to Ibn Sinà, the self is material, although differing in quiddity from the body (al-Razi agreeing with Ibn Sinà in the disapproval of the kalam-theories, which did identify the self with the body, or something bodily).

Very valuable, clearly showing al-Razi’s complex attitude towards his Avicennian source.


A. stresses that for Ibn Sinà the soul uses the infra-spiritual level, not in order to elaborate on it, but in order to satisfy and, at once, “deviate” it (in French, A. refers to the notion of “dés-al térâtion” au sens étymologique). But, at the same time, in such cases a manifestation takes place, i.e., the lower levels symbolize the higher truth. Acc. to A., this double articulation of “dés-al térâtion” and manifestation even offers the key to explain the secret of creation in Ibn Sinà’s thought. A. analyses the Mevlevi-dance from an Avicennian point of view, linking its different phases with Avicennian ideas, for which concrete texts fragments are offered. In his conclusion, A. wonders whether the origination of the mystical samà in Islam has not been influenced by Avicennian ideas?

An interesting case study, opening perspectives for further examination on possible Avicennian influences on later Islamic mystical tradition(s).


A. insists that for al-Shahrastâni Ibn Sinà’s philosophy is not satisfactory from the religious point of view. Although recognizing the genius of Ibn Sinà, al-Shahrastâni rejects the latter’s philosophical approach of the religious phenomena. In the section on the Sábaeans, which A. believes to be a literary creation, al-Shahrastâni confronts once more the omnipresent Avicennism of his days. But in al-Shahrastâni’s own “hanifîte” position one cannot but detect some Avicennian elements. A. hereby mentions an islamisation of the Avicennism, noting that it seems as if the continuing Avicennism has formed - in a negative way - in the Islamic tradition. A. concludes that for al-Shahrastâni, Ibn Sinà was of much greater significance than Aristotle, since the former, in contrast to the latter, offered a real philosophy of prophecy. Very valuable basic elements are offered with respect to the relationship between al-Shahrastâni and Ibn Sinà.


A. inter alia observes that Ibn Taymiyya rightly distinguishes between al-Fâdi’s and Ibn Sinà’s prophetology, and that he fully agrees with Ibn Sinà that a kind of prophetic inspiration is open to all human Beings, although not the higher kinds (in this respect, Ibn Taymiyya fundamentally disagrees with Ibn Sinà). For critical evaluation, see below, 424.


Ibn Taymiyya, contrary to Ibn Sinà, detects in the cult of beautiful forms a means to deprivation. But, above all, A. insists that the former’s attitude toward the latter, although basically negative, is not totally negative, insofar as Ibn Taymiyya accepts a certain richness in Ibn Sinà’s synthesis, and the latter presents Muhammad’s Law as the highest possible Law. A. also cites some passages from Ibn Taymiyya, in which al-Ghazzâlî is criticized for the underlying Avicennism of some of his ideas. Valuable basic arguments regarding Ibn Taymiyya’s attitude toward Ibn Sinà.

A. insists that it is highly improbable that Ibn Ghaylān is a disciple of al-Lawkārī, a second or third generation student of Ibn Sīnā. But Ibn Ghaylān’s work shows perfectly the importance of Ibn Sīnā’s thought in the East at that time. Ibn Ghaylān vehemently rejected against Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy, which exerted a great influence on many religious minds, notwithstanding its containing affirmations contrary to the genuine Islamic belief. Especially in kalām and fiqh, Ibn Ghaylān couldn’t but observe a growing “Avicennizing” tendency. A. judiciously observes that even Ibn Ghaylān himself did not remain completely indifferent to Ibn Sīnā’s claims.

It may be mentioned that A. points to the presence in Ibn Ghaylān’s text of passages, almost verbatim taken from Ibn Sīnā’s Isḥārāt.

An innovative study, offering an important contribution to a better knowledge of the Avicennian influence in the Arabo-Islamic world, although in need of further elaboration (in the text, there are clearly more passages, taken from the Isḥārāt, present than the ones indicated by A.).


Ormsby notes that al-Ghazzālī’s reading of Ibn Sīnā was the most decisive and formative of his intellectual experiences.

As to Hardy, he stresses that Ibn Sīnā’s formulation of the qīdamhudūth and waṣiṣṭhunmakin distinctions points to the doctrine of the eternity of the world, and puts him therefore in disagreement with al-Ghazzālī. Moreover, where Ibn Sīnā conceives God’s relation to the world in essentially cognitive terms, al-Ghazzālī expresses it as a purely volunative way. A. also remarks that Ibn Sīnā, contrary to Ibn al-‘Arabī, defines God’s relation to the world as unilaterial in nature.

Valuable observations, but in need of further elaboration.


This paper in fact reproduces one page of A.’s edition of Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ’s fatwas and questions, entitled: Fatwān wa maslāl Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ fi ‘l-tafsīr wa ‘l-badūth wa ‘l-ṣiṣṭ wa ‘l-fiqh. Melkka, Tawzi’ āl-Yā琦 (ca. 1991). I was unable to find a copy of the book. The published fragment starts with the famous condemnation of Ibn Sīnā by Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, i.e. ‘Umar Taqī l-Din al-Shahrastānī.

Since no comment is present, the paper is only important as a testimony of the importance that Ibn Sīnā’s thought still had in the 13th. cent. Islamic world.


In the eight part of his Majmū‘ aṣīl al-dīn, the 13th century Coptic author al-‘Assāl, cites a fragment of a certain Najm al-dīn Abī al-‘Abbās, who is presented as being a disciple of Ibn Sīnā. In the sixth chapter of the concerned fragment (the edition of which is offered here by A.), one finds an explicit citation of a fragment, taken from Ibn Sīnā’s “al-Awṣaf” (Middle Commentary on Logic).

A most important piece of evidence for Ibn Sīnā’s major influence on Arabic (even Christian) thought after him (Comp. supra, 385).


A. observes that al-Hillī, a famous mu’tazilite theologian, adhered to Ibn Sīnā’s essence-existence distinction, but obviously to nothing else of the latter’s philosophical system. Moreover, among al-Hillī’s lost works, one seems to have dealt with Ibn Sīnā’s îshārāt.

An important piece of information, showing that Ibn Sīnā also influenced later mu’tazilite theology.


A. ascribes to Ibn Sīnā the use of a "methodological doubt". Furthermore, A. deals with the foundation and fundamentals of the different major sciences in Ibn Sīnā. In both cases, A. points to the presence of kūfīan influences on Ibn Sīnā. Finally, A. deals with al-Ghazālī's critical approach to Ibn Sīnā's theories mentioned above. Hereby, A. points inter alia to al-Ghazālī's defense of the use of dialectics, and to his making the Avicennian and the Ashʿarīite conceptions of "Sufficient Reason" almost equivalent.

No notes, nor references are given!

CHAPTER XIV
INFLUENCES

A. IBN ṢĪNĀ AND THE LATIN WEST


437. ID., L’introduction d’Avicenne en Occident, in: Revue du Caïre, 14, nr. 141 (51), 130 - 139 has been reprinted in: ibid., tr. II.

438. ID., Survivance et renaissance d’Avicenne à Venise et à Padoue, in: Venezia e l’Oriente fra tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento. Firenze, 1966, 75 - 102 has been reprinted in: ibid., tr. XV.

439. ID., Une rencontre symbolique de Jean Scot Eriûgena et d’Avicenne: notes sur le "Liber de causis primis et secundis et fluxu qui consequitur eis", in: J. J. O’MÉARA and L. BIÈLER (Eds), The Mind of Eriuggena. Dublin, Irish Univ. Press, 1973, 170 - 181 (Bibl. 251), has been reprinted in: ibid., tr. XI.


For A., it is almost natural that the Latin thinkers, as long as they were unaware of Ibn Rushd’s interpretation of Aristote, did discover close resemblances between the thoughts of Ibn Sīnā and Augustine, especially in view of the presence of some Platonic ideas in Ibn Sīnā. A. states that many ideas of that “early” period, although sustained with Ibn Sīnā’s authority, were not typical of the latter. Moreover, the very Avicennian “system” was never accepted by any Christian theologian. William of Auvergne adhered to the Avicenian idea of the soul as principle of movement of the auto-intellection and of the substantiality of the soul; of the “homo volans” argument and of natural love. But, on the other hand, he criticized Ibn Sīnā’s doctrines of the origin and the survival of the soul, and accused him of having confounded potentiality and possibility. Regarding Alexander of Hales, A. notes that he, following Ibn Sīnā, accepts the statement that God as efficient cause is also final cause. Moreover, he agrees with Ibn Sīnā that individuality derives from both matter and form, and he subscribes the latter’s theory of the five inner senses. But he, in strong opposition to Ibn Sīnā, categorically rejected the idea of a mediated creation, and the existence of a separate Agent Intellect. Finally, when dealing with Bacon, A. posits that the former, notwithstanding his rejection of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrines of emanation and the life in the hereafter, considered Ibn Sīnā to be a great interpreter of Aristotle, and also a founder of moral philosophy. A. also notes that Bacon regrets that Ibn Sīnā’s “Oriental philosophy” was not available. In all this, A. sees a clear indication that instead of an “augustinizing avicennism”, one better describes it as an “encounter” with Ibn Sīnā.

A very valuable, well-balanced contribution, offering a solid basis for further research.


Acc. to A., William defended an esoteric knowledge regarding the realities of hell and purgatory, adopting ideas drawn from Ibn Sīnā. The latter was perhaps William’s direct source regarding the affirmation that the punishment after death is the imposing by God of spiritual forms upon the “bad” souls. Moreover, A. notes that William and Ibn Sīnā treat in almost the same way mental images, although minor terminological differences are present. A very valuable observation.


A. notes that Nicholas of Lyra rejects Scotus’ claim that Being serves as a genus to the ten predicaments. In order to sustain his theory, Scotus had invoked Ibn Sīnā’s authority, i.e. the latter’s theory that the intention of Being is common to all the categories, and the very idea that ens and res are notions firstly impressed in the mind. According to Nicholas, Scotus has misinterpreted Ibn Sīnā. The two basic Avicennian ideas referred to, do not express an imperfect nature after the manner of a genus, but rather a commonness belonging to analogous terms. A very valuable note on the understanding, and use of Ibn Sīnā in the late Latin Middle Ages.


Daniel of Morley seems to be the first English scholar to cite an Avicennian, although in reality a pseudo-Avicennian, work, i.e., the De caelo et mundo. However, the first use of a genuine Avicennian work in Great Britain has to be ascribed to Alfred of Sareshel, who translated two chapters on minerals of the Meteorologica of the Sīnānī, but who is also clearly indebted to Ibn Sīnā, esp. his De Anima, in his work on the movement of the earth. Other early “Avicennists” are J. Blund (who in a qualified way showed sympathy with some of Ibn Sīnā’s major doctrines), and Alexander Nequam (who knew Ibn Sīnā’s De Anima first by mediation of J. Blund, but later in a direct way). A. concludes that Ibn Sīnā was already in the very beginnings of the 13th. cent. known in Great Britain, especially in circles connected with Oxford. A very valuable basic outline of the introduction of Ibn Sīnā in 13th. cent. Britain.

445. BURRELL, D. B., Aquinas and Islamic and Jewish Thinkers. II. Avicenna: The Distinction of Existing from Essence, in: N.

Starting from the Aristotelian aporia regarding the relationship of existing individuals to their intelligible natures, A. briefly shows how Neoplatonism (by introducing an emanation scheme) and Islamic philosophy (by making a distinction between what constitutes the individual, namely its existing, and what makes it to be the kind of thing it is) tried to resolve the concerned aporia. Ibn Sīnā tried to secure a notion of creation by distinguishing existing from essence. For him, essence taken by itself, without regard to existence, does exist in reality, even if not separately. This affirmation is easily understandable when one interprets "in reality" as "in sensibilis", as the medieval Latin translation proposes. Since essence in itself is indifferent to existence, or non-existence, actual existence needs for an ontologico-kinetic source, i.e., First Being. Hereby the notion of a radical contingency is developed. But Ibn Sīnā failed to formulate a theory of creation corresponding to so radical a contingency, nor was he able to identify what it was that united with essence. While for Ibn Sīnā, existence "comes to" essence (hereby, existence seems to be a "new" accident), Thomas took a radically new metaphysical step by removing esse from the entire state of Aristotelian categories, while understanding it in terms of the analogy of actuality/potentiality.

Very valuable, although one wonders whether A.'s interpretation of Ibn Sīnā is not (too much?) guided by a Thomistic inspired approach?


A. notes that Thomas Aquinas, like Ibn Sīnā, deals with a priori moments of knowledge, based on Aristotelian teachings. Then A. concentrates on complex a priori moments of knowledge, i.e., axioms, where Thomas, with Ibn Sīnā, not only presents the principle of contradiction, but also the principle that "the whole is greater than the part". But Thomas vehemently criticizes Ibn Sīnā for having placed the Agent Intellect outside of the human Being. Hereafter, A. reviews the simple a priori moments of knowledge, which relate to such notions as "being" and "thing". A. observes that they were properly founded in the Arabic interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics. Ibn Sīnā, in the very beginnings of his Metaphysics, I, c. 5, posits a basic statement in this respect. It is interpreted by A. in terms of modern logic: maw'jūd indicating that something exists ("Es gibt ein x"); and shay indicating of what kind that existing is ("Um was für ein x es handelt"). On the basis of the Latin translation, which is misleading, Thomas, in his De ente et essentia, interpreted ens (which figured as the Latin translation of maw'jūd) rather in terms of essence than of existence. However, in his De veritate, he offered the correct interpretation. But Thomas always did understand ens primarily as what can be divided according to the categories.

A most interesting study, although it is regretful that A. seems to be unfamiliar with J. JOLIVET, Aux origines de l'ontologie d'Ibn Sīnā, in: Études sur Avicenne. Paris, 1984, 19 - 88 (Bibl., 184).


Acc. to A., there is no major Avicennian influence on Western scholasticism regarding the issues of cosmology, or the Agent Intellect. However, one does find pivotal Avicennian elements in the anonymous De primum et secundum substantiae et de fluxu eorum, as well as in Gundissalinus' De Anima. Moreover, in 13th. cent., scholasticism, one comes across several authors who adhered to a transcendental construction of the Agent Intellect, in which Ibn Sīnā may have played a role.

Introductory.


A. characterizes Albert the Great's theories of the essence and of the degrees of the intellect as "Avicennian". He also points to the major significance the Avicennian notion of "complexisio" had in Albert. Ibn Sīnā may have played some role in its elaboration of Albert's conception of the essential cause. Some valuable basic observations regarding (possible) influences on major issues of Albert's philosophy.

A. notes that Albert accepted both Ibn Sīnā’s triple distinction regarding universals, and his doctrine of the Dataer Formarum. It may be added that the paper shows that Ibn Sīnā was not the direct source of Albert’s use of the three states of the universal, at least not in his non-logical works.

A limited, but most valuable piece of information.


A. states that for Albert the Great the Liber de Causis was a compilation of text-fragments, taken from Aristotle, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī. Regarding Aristotle, Albert refers to the Epistol on the Principle of the Universe, which he, based on a misunderstanding of Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics (due to the wording of the Avicenna Latinus), ascribed to the Stagirite (Cp. infra, 452). A. also insists that Albert’s goal in his commentary is almost similar to that of al-Ghazālī in his Flos Divinorum.

For critical evaluation, cf. infra, 452.


A. notes that the perception of Ibn Sīnā in the West was far from uniform, due to the fact that sometimes Ibn Sīnā was only known through the writings of Ibn Rushd; or to the fact that his theory was now linked to a Platonic position, then to an Aristotelian interpretation. A good illustration for such can be obtained through a survey of the medieval doctrine of the transcendent One. A. starts this survey by insisting that not only the metaphysical, but also the logical works of Ibn Sīnā (and Ibn Rushd) were of great importance for the Latin doctrine of the convertibility of the transcendentals. E.g., Nicholas of Paris’ analoga aequovoca are synonymous with Ibn Sīnā’s conveniens secundum ambiguitatem. As to the Metaphysics of the Avicenna Latinus, some of its passages seem to include the very notion of the transcendent One, but some other rather reduce all forms of the one to the numerical one. However, in the Latin tradition of the 13th - 14th cent., Ibn Sīnā is never presented as the father of the theory of transcendentals. Hereafter, A. offers some concrete examples of the use of Avician metaphysical themes regarding the “one” in sophistician or logical tracts of that tradition. Albert the Great, who seems to be the first author to cite explicitly Ibn Sīnā’s name, although in an indirect manner, ascribes the arguments of the sophistae for the rejection of the convertibility between ens and unum to the sole authority of Ibn Sīnā. But Albert contrary to the sophistae, “excuses” Ibn Sīnā’s sayings, and believes that the latter does not really contradict Aristotle. In dealing with all this, Albert was referring to a well defined source, i.e., the anonymous sophisma “Tantum unum est” (BN (coll. sec.), MS Lat. 16135), where it is explicitly affirmed that Ibn Sīnā categorically rejected the thesis of “Tantum unum est”, but holds that the one, as principle of the number, is convertible with Being in suppositis. Following Ibn Rushd, an anonymous author will later refute this Avicennian thesis. Although Jacob of Vitello does not simply place Ibn Sīnā between the adversaries of the convertibility thesis, he nevertheless opposes Ibn Sīnā for not having distinguished between the numerical one and the with Being convertible one. However, for Jacob, one may apply the Averroist argument regarding the one also to the very notion of ens. Hence it is important to understand correctly Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the accidentality of ens, which is cited by Jacob in his Averroistic reformulation. A. then shows how Jacob, by invoking the example of paronyms, “saved” Ibn Sīnā’s position, while misrepresenting Ibn Rushd’s criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of paronym. A. notes that most Latin authors did correctly understand Ibn Rushd’s criticism, and were always following the latter in formulating the so-called “Avicennian” position. Only Berthold of Moorburg seems to have offered a not “Averroistically mediated”, but Aristotelian reading of Ibn Sīnā. A. concludes that Ibn Sīnā’s reception in the Latin West was rather ambiguous, but that in general Ibn Sīnā received the place, which Ibn Rushd had designated to him.

A very fine paper, of utmost importance regarding the Latin interpretation of Ibn Sīnā.


A. notes that Ibn Sīnā (besides al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd) is one of the sources of the dictum: “Ex uno...”. But the “radical Aristotelians” (e.g., Siger of Brabant) ascribed it not only to Ibn Sīnā, but also to Aristotle, based on Maimonides’ Dux. Albert the Great, on the basis of Alexander of Aphrosias’ Epistile on the Principle of the Universe (although he probably had no direct knowledge of Alexander’s treatise), and having been influenced by his reading of Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics and Maimonides’ Dux, ascribed the dictum to Aristotle. A. also states that Albert’s association of the dictum: “Ex simplici...” and the dictum: “Ex uno...” has as its major source Maimonides, and, perhaps, al-Ghazālī.
CHAPTER XIV

A very valuable case-study, although A. seems not to be fully aware of the close link between al-Ghazâlî’s Maqāṣid and Ibn Sīnâ’s Dāneš-Nāmeh (the “Ex uno...”dictum being unmistakably Avicennian).


The book contains several brief references to Ibn Sīnâ’s influence, also in the East, but especially in the West. Among them, I may cite:

-Abî ‘l-Barakât al-Baghdâdî has developed a semantics, which is a genuine alternative for Ibn Sīnâ’s

-Ockham, in his theory of connotation, adhered to Ibn Sīnâ’s position regarding the distinction between signification in recto and signification in oblique.

-Ibn Sīnâ is one of the major sources for both Albert’s and Eckhart’s conceptions of the “divine man”.

-Bonaventure elaborated a synthesis between Avicennian and Denysian ideas.

-in Duns Scotus, one finds a radicalisation of Ibn Sīnâ’s idea of the indifference of Being with respect to singularity or universality.

There are a few other interesting remarks, but these have been developed in a more extensive way in other publications by A.

Valuable, although introductory (as is normal in a handbook intended for students).


Among A.’s remarks, I may cite:

-the medieval intentionistae, who show a great affinity with Meinong in their philosophical semantics, took Ibn Sīnâ’s doctrine of essence as a basic doctrine.

-Bacon characterizes the intentionistae, who claim that names are applied to the essence of Beings without any indication of time, “vulgar” rather than genuine Avicennians.

-Bacon rejects categorically the doctrine, defended by some intentionistae, according to which the name is referring to the esse essentiae (through which this theory seems to have its basis in Ibn Sīnâ’s idea of the indifference of the essence).

-Bacon rejects the introduction of Ibn Sīnâ’s theory of the “accidentality” of existence in the field of predication.

-Bacon opposes a realist interpretation of the Avicennian doctrine of the indifference of the essence, but A. observs that neither Bacon, nor his adversaries paid sufficient attention to Ibn Sīnâ’s own (logical) affirmation, and he moreover states that one may doubt whether the intentional notion of esse essentiae was still Avicennian in the usual practice of the disputations of the 13th cent.

-William of Sherwood seems to have been the first author to have generalized Ibn Sīnâ’s theory of the predications of universals.

A very valuable, pioneering study.


Among A.’s remarks, I may cite:

-the concept of analogy of Being, which was only formulated in the late Middle Ages, was partially based on the introduction of a new type of terms, i.e., the convenentia or ambigua terms, derived from Ibn Sīnâ and al-Ghazâlî.

-Albert the Great, in his Liber de praedicabilibus, appears to be the first Latin author, to have formulated this analogy-theory (Boethius having formulated a theory of analogy “without Being”).

-Albert recognizes the indebtedness to the ‘Arabs’, who are identified in his Liber de praedicamentis as Ibn Sīnâ and al-Ghazâlî (A. insists that the latter’s Logica is dependent upon Ibn Sīnâ, but he wrongly presents it as a summary of the logical parts of the Shifā’).

-Ibn Sīnâ’s Metaphysics, and especially the passage of I, c. 5 which founded the notion of convenentia secundum ambiguitatem, dominated the ontological “discours” for decades in the West (Ibn Sīnâ’s Metaphysics being known before Aristotle’s).

-Ibn Sīnâ’s “convenentia”-vocabulary has been reformulated by the Latins in the vocabulary of “analoga”, although the notion of convenentia coexisted a long time with that of analogia.

-the common Avicennian theory of the analogy of participation (although mostly combined with the Averroistic modes of analogy, but dismissing the Averroistic theory of accidents) has been opposed by the Averroistic inspired analogia attributionis, being based on the “non-being” of the accidentes (and exemplified in Dietrich of Freiburg and Eckhart).

-Eckhart’s notion of predicatio nominativa derived from Ibn Sīnâ’s Logica, has to be understood in the complex tradition of the Averroistic theory of accidents, and the ontological-Avicennian and theological-Aquinas theories of predication.

A very fine paper.


Already in 1210, Ibn Sinâ's works translated into Latin were extant in Paris. The condemnations of Aristotelian works of 1210 and 1215 soon also to include Ibn Sinâ's, who's importance at that time is well illustrated by William of Auvergne. A. further points to the existence of a "first" Averroism, which, in explicit opposition to Ibn Sinâ, considered the Agent Intellect to be a part of the soul (the "second" Averroism will defend the transcendality of both the active and the possible intellect). A. finally brings up the problem of a "Latin Avicennism", but for him this issue, contrary to that of the opposition between theologians and philosophers, is not really important.

Very relevant remarks.


In the first chapter of his Lacisator dubitabilium astronomarum-astrologian, Peter of Abano cites several passages of Ibn Sinâ's Metaphysics, dealing with the division of the sciences, and related topics. As to theoretical philosophy, Peter, following Ibn Sinâ, distinguishes between three modes, i.e., a divine, a mathematical and a natural. Acc. to A., Peter's conception of the theoretical sciences may somehow simplify Ibn Sinâ's complex theory, but it still remains faithful to the latter's basic inspiration. Hereafter, A. notes that Peter, in order to defend astronomy-astrology as a major science, once more invokes Ibn Sinâ's Metaphysics, and, more specifically, some of its basic ideas, as e.g., the doctrine of possibility and necessity, or that of the universal.

Very interesting, but A.'s presentation here is rather preliminary, and in serious need of further elaboration.


After having made some general remarks on two major phases one may distinguish in the 13th. cent. Latin Western philosophy, i.e., an Avicennian and an Averroistic (although in the latter, one still finds the presence of diverse Avicennian elements), A. surveys the contents of the anonymous Questiones, mentioned in the title of the paper. Regarding the description of the vegetative and the sensible soul, and regarding the theory of the inner senses A. detects an outspoken Avicennian influence. Ibn Sinâ's doctrine of the Agent Intellect, according to Blind's christianized interpretation, is presented as one among three possible doctrines. But A. observes that the anonymous writer, in q. 8, seems to fully adapt Ibn Sinâ's doctrine of the Agent Intellect, although he ascribes it to Ibn Rushd.

An important discovery, although one wonders whether A. has already identified all derivations from Ibn Sinâ (e.g., has the Qânîn been taken into account?).


Having noted Leibniz's explicit admiration of medieval philosophy, A. deals with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and the different interpretations which were given to it, but none of them, not even Couturat's, seems to be able to explain the very question why there is something rather than nothing? A. observes that Leibniz, notwithstanding his explicit criticism of Ibn Sinâ's doctrine of the Giver of Forms, seems to have in common with the latter the same philosophical purpose, i.e., the explanation of the arising of actual multiplicity from the pure unity of God by only two primitive principles, i.e., the principle of non-contradiction, and the principle of sufficient reason. The latter is interpreted by Ibn Sinâ in a clear ontological manner, being is better than non-being (and, acc. to A., Ibn Sinâ at the same time takes the essence/existence distinction to be a real, and not only a logical distinction). For A., it is certain that if one reads Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason in this Avicennian manner, it is obviously primarily ontological. A. concludes that Leibniz appears to be a reformer of Ibn Sinâ (the latter's emanation scheme becoming superfluous by the introduction of the principle of pre-established harmony).

A most interesting study, but in view of the importance of the conclusion undoubtedly in need of a more detailed, and substantial argumentation.

A. indicates that Albert the Great, in his *Comment on the Physics*, b. V, tr. 1, discusses, and rejects Ibn Sīnā’s acceptance of motion in the category of *situs*. Moreover, Ibn Sīnā considered an important source for Albert’s commentary in this tract. By concrete examples A. shows that Albert sometimes cites Ibn Sīnā’s *Physics and Metaphysics* without explicitly mentioning it. A. finally notes that Albert changed from an aristotelian-aemonic-avicianian-albertian physics (present in b. 1 - 4) to an aristotelian-aemonic-albertian physics (from b. 5 on). In the latter, he hardly developed any innovative philosophical idea.

Very valuable observations.


According to A., Albert the Great, in his logical views, was mainly influenced by Ibn Rushd, and had only an indirect knowledge of Ibn Sīnā’s writings in this field (A. seriously puts into question Grispaschi’s thesis, cf. supra, 35).

A brief, but useful piece of information.


Among A. ’s observations regarding Ibn Sīnā, I may cite:

-Albert the Great rejected Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics of “form” in the same way as he had rejected Plato’s theory of Ideas.

- According to Albert, Ibn Sīnā defended an outer link between matter and the substantial forms, and, therefore, held the theory of the Agent Intellect as the *Dator Formarum*.

- Albert states that Ibn Sīnā had improved the (al-)chemical knowledge by having given it a new philosophical basis.

- Albert highly appreciated Ibn Sīnā’s *De Congelatione*, and agreed with its major ideas.

Valuable, especially regarding Ibn Sīnā’s influence on Albert in (al-)chemical matters.


Among A. ’s many observations, I may cite:

- there is no straightforward equivalence between the Arabic and the Latin vocabularies, as becomes evident from e.g., Ibn Sīnā’s vocabulary of being; or his use of the couple *taqawwul/hadith*, or of the famous notion of *aniyya/amiyya*.

- In the field of metaphysics, the late 12th. cent. Latin world did not make use of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of the essence, indeterminate in itself in relation to existence and its modalities.

- Avicennian themes seem to be present in some particular works of the end of the 12th. century, but A. insists that great care is required in affirming a real or direct influence.

- In several of Gundissalinus’ works, one finds clear derivations from Ibn Sīnā, but the *De processione mundi* shows that Gundissalinus sometimes used a vocabulary different from that of the translations.

- Gundissalinus’ use of different terms for “matter” shows that he was already familiar with Ibn Sīnā’s *Physics*, at least book 1.

- Gundissalinus’ *De Anima* makes evident that he saw some advantage in the philosophical study of the soul for religion. The traditional Christian wisdom was hereby integrated into a secular office.

- John Blund’s *De Anima* contains many Avicennian ideas (A. observes that, although being dated of the beginning of the 13th. cent., it doctrinally still belongs to the 12th. cent.).

A concludes that rather than to speak of a “christianization” of the Arabic doctrines, the late 12th. century shows a clear tendency towards the secularisation of Christian wisdom.

A very fine, and indeed, stimulating study.


A. points to the fact that Galen was excluded in the 13th. cent., based on the “auctoritas Avicennae”, as can be shown in Alfred of Sareschel, Matthew of Aquaquarta, and the anonymous *De Anima* (*c. 1275). A more moderate attitude was present in Albert the Great and R. Bacon, although for both Ibn Sīnā’s *De Anima* remained an important source. A. concludes that the loss of the Galenic voice in the
thirteenth century is due to the success of the (relatively simple) *De Anima* of Ibn Sīnā.

A valuable observation, although one wonders whether doctrinal elements have not played a role as well?


Acc. to A., Piers Plowman, the famous medieval English poet, modelled his psychology of “imaginatio” upon Ibn Sīnā’s interpretation of Aristotle’s psychology of the imagination. A. convincingly shows how Ibn Sīnā’s depth psychology accounts well for the depth psychology of Piers Plowman in the first vision of the Vita. Special stress is laid on the topic of prophetic imagination (based on both Ibn Sīnā’s *Metaphysica* and *De Anima*). By mediation of the *virtus activa*, the lower power of prophecy in the *vis imaginativa* is elevated to the higher power of prophecy in the *sanctus intellectus* (but the means to it are formulated in Christian-Franciscan terms of the virtues of poverty and patience). In this context, A. also points to the Franciscan inspired interpretation of Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of the “two faces” of the soul (in terms of two “mirrors”), and of Ibn Sīnā’s threefold division of the appetite powers (in terms of a “tree of trinity”). Further, A. indicates, and discusses the presence of seven features of Ibn Sīnā’s psychology of the *vis imaginativa* in the B-text, and shows in detail how perfection of the naturally prophetic powers in the Augustinized *vis imaginativa secundum Avicennam* parallels Wyclif’s perfection, of the naturally prophetic powers in *imaginatio*, from passus 13 - 19 of the B-text. A few observations, selected out of the rich content of the work, deserve special mention:

- the clear presence in the B-text of Ibn Sīnā’s fundamental notion of *badis, insitation*
- the knowledge by Piers Plowman of Gundissalinus’ translation of Ibn Sīnā’s *De Anima*, or of the former’s Avicennian inspired *De Anima*
- the adherence by Piers Plowman of an “avicennismus avicennisant”, but for him the Avicennism is prior to the Augustinism (P.P. restores a large part of the Avicennism, hidden in Jean de la Rochelle’s “Avicennizing Augustinism”, notwithstanding his being dependent upon the later)
- the introduction in 13th, - 14th cent. England of an “Avicennizing Augustinism”, particularly illustrated by A. on basis of two manuscripts, i.e. Wroxter, Q 81 and F 57.

A very innovative, and valuable pioneering study, showing that Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical influence was not limited in the West to “professional” philosophers alone.


A. points to the presence of elements of Avicennian influence in some of Denys’s doctrines, such as his theories of knowledge; or of the growth, or immortality of the soul. But Denys was also criticizing some Avicennian ideas, as e.g. the famous principle “Ex uno...”, or the idea of an eternal, necessary emanation. A. stresses that for Denys Ibn Sīnā and the Neoplatonists are the “metaphysical” authors of the doctrine of the eternity of the world.

A very valuable supplement to the publication below.


Among A.’s observations with respect to Ibn Sīnā, I may cite:

- Denys accepts Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the two faces of the soul
- although rejecting Ibn Sīnā’s inference regarding causality, Denys accepts the mediation of the Higher Intelligences as far as there exists a natural contemplation of God
- Denys cites Ibn Sīnā among the holders of a negative theology
- the felicity of the separate soul implies for Denys a conversion to the light of the lowest Intelligence, as stated by Dionysius the Areopagite and Ibn Sīnā.

It may be mentioned that A. characterizes Denys as an example not of an ‘Avicennizing Augustinism’, but of an ‘Avicennizing Dionysianism’.

Very valuable, opening serious perspectives for further research.


Among A.’s observations, I may cite:

- Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the accidental (as opposed to the essential) predicate did significantly influence Spinoza, since for both the accidents is the substance, but in a particular way of being
CHAPTER XIV

... Thomas Aquinas, following Ibn Rushd, criticized vehemently Ibn Sīnā’s substantial approach of accidents (he insists on the being “inherent” of the accidents).

Ibn Sīnā’s “homo volans” argument shows that for him intellectual self-knowledge is not mediated in whatsoever a way.

The explicit knowledge of the human ego in Ibn Sīnā has de facto much in common with Plato’s theory of anamnesis.

In his analysis of res as a transcendental, Thomas Aquinas was clearly inspired by Ibn Sīnā’s conception of essence, and more particularly the latter’s distinction between essence and res.

Although for Ibn Sīnā the distinction between essence and existence is logical (“urteilslogisch”), Thomas, either consciously or unconsciously, adhered to an ontological interpretation of this distinction.

A. also, on at least two occasions, i.e., Ibn Sīnā theories of accidents, and of transcendentals, notes that the text of the Avicenna Latinus does not fully reflect all the implications of the original Arabic text.

Very valuable, although some of A.’s observations may be subject to discussion.


After a general survey of the introduction of Arabo-Islamic philosophy into the West, A. begins with the idea that Thomas Aquinas’ theory of the soul has much in common with that of Ibn Sīnā, at least as far as its prima facie major outlines are concerned. Also Thomas’ third argument for the existence of God is dependent upon Ibn Sīnā.

It has to be noted that some affirmations of A. are highly questionable, or simply wrong, e.g., when he presents William of Auvergne as an adversary of Ibn Sīnā, or when he claims that Thomas’ conception of the divine transcendence is in agreement with that of the mu‘tazilite theologians and the falsafīya of the Islamic world.

Of very limited value.


A. argues that Ibn Sīnā (p. 33 - 35) applied the model of scientific knowledge, which had been advocated by Aristotle in the Analytica Posteriora, to metaphysics.

Hereafter, A. indicates that for Ibn Sīnā the subject of metaphysics is being as being, whereas Ibn Rushd defines it as the study of the separate substances. Albert, in a passage of his commentary on Physics I, rejects Ibn Rushd’s criticism of Ibn Sīnā’s schema of metaphysics. A. then discusses into detail Albert’s notion of separation, and concludes that Albert, with Ibn Sīnā, argues that the existence of separate entities is proven in metaphysics, and that he conceives of being in a manner similar to that of Ibn Sīnā. However, Albert, in his Metaphysics, is, for his conception of being much more indebted to Neoplatonic sources than to Ibn Sīnā, notwithstanding his maintaining many Avicennian lines. Finally, A. remarks that Albert the Great tries to distinguish the metaphysical knowledge of God from that of the natural philosopher, where the former affirms God as the causa universae esse.

A very interesting, and stimulating study, although one wonders whether A.’s understanding of Ibn Rushd’s theory is fully adequate?


In the manuscript Selde supra 24, as well as in the Vatican ms. Urb. Lat. 206 one finds glosses, which were believed by its author to be on Aristotle’s Methea, but are in fact on Ibn Sīnā’s De Mineralibus. A. is convinced that they constitute one of the earliest works of Alfred of Sareshel, and develops some arguments in favour of this attribution.

It may be noted that a survey of the incipits and excipits of the glosses is given in an Appendix (109 - 111).

Very interesting, but in need of further development.


Acc. to A., Henry’s notion of esse essentiae is based on Ibn Sīnā’s idea of absolute essence. For Henry, Being considered in its absolute simplicity does not entail actuality, and all what follows it is accidental, not in a predemonstrative sense, but in its Avicennian acceptance of being outside the proper intentio. Moreover, Henry believes that Ibn Sīnā, in the first book of the Metaphysics, suggests a proof for God, not based on the creatures, but on the very first notions implanted in the soul (but A. himself observes that Ibn Sīnā’s text is far from clear). A. indicates that
for Henry Augustine’s ideas of truth and good prefigure the Avicennian primary concepts. Henry’s proof for the unity of God is also Avicennian inspired, being based as it is on the very idea of God as ens necessarium.

Valuable remarks, although in need of further elaboration.

474. ID., “Possibile ex se, necessarium ab alio”; Tommaso d’Aquino e Enrico di Gand, in: Medievo, 18 (92), 231 - 273, passim.

Regarding Ibn Sinà, I may cite A.’s following observations:

-Henry’s rejection of the mode “ex se formaliter ens, sed ab alio causative in aliena substantia”, is based on Ibn Sinā’s demonstration that there is only one “necessary Being”, but Henry, following Ibn Rushd, dismisses the Avicennian thesis that the “possible in se” is “necessary ab alio”

-acording to Henry, not Aristotle, but Ibn Sinà offered the basis for the affirmation of an “eternal creation”, by affirming that all Beings receive their being from God, and by allowing an eternal Being ex parte post

-Henry, contrary to Ibn Sinā, rejects the mode “ex se possibile esse, sed ab alio causative necesse esse”, both ex parte creaturae and ex parte Dei (Ibn Sinā seems to have been aware of some difficulty with the latter, and therefore to have made the eternal created Beings dependent upon the Divine science)

-both Thomas and Henry reject the Avicennian formula “possible ex se, necessarium ab alio”, although in a different way, the former according to an Aristotelian-Averroistic line of interpretation, the latter by giving preference to the possible, and, hence, hereby preparing the modern ontology of possibility.

Very valuable observations.


A. inter alia indicates which works of Ibn Sinā were available to the Latins at the end of the 12th cent., and by whom, or better, which team, the translation has been made. A. also points to a strong Avicennian influence on Gundissalbus, especially his De Animae and De processione mundi. A. finally stresses that Ibn Sinā did provide the Latin world with important elements for the doctrines of the soul and the intellect, but, above all, with an ontology, which was absent in Aristotle himself. But, acc. to A., this ontology only caused a fundamental change in the system itself at the time of Thomas Aquinas.

Useful, and, indeed, valuable notes, opening perspectives for further research.


At the background of the papal bull of Boniface VIII: “Destructa sunt species”, which requests a respect for the human corpse, A. sees specific philosophical doctrines, directly presented by Henry of Ghent and R. Bacon, who were great transmitters of Avicennian thought. As to the present problematic of the corpse, A. points to the fact that Henry’s basic theory of the complexio corporalis, whereby each body receives its soul, has a clear Avicennian basis, and that his insistence on the respect for the entire corpse is based on the fundamental respect of the universal order. This latter idea seems to be derived from Ibn Sinā’s Metaphysics, and, may-be, or even, perhaps, the latter’s De generatione et corruptione. That Boniface VIII had himself a great interest in Ibn Sinā’s thought, is shown by his preference for Avicennian inspired authors, as indicated above (A. moreover notes that Gundissalbus became cardinal in Tuscumb under Boniface’s Pontificate, but also from the doctrinal point of view: the “story of the body” has some striking similarities with Ibn Sinā’s De Anima, and some particular expressions, e.g., debeatum naturae solvit, appear also to be inspired by the latter work.

A very fine study, offering most interesting observations and suggestions.


A., based on the Avicenna Latinus, briefly presents Ibn Sinā’s theories of the distinction between essence and existence, and possible and necessary being, and of the three states of the universal. Henry of Ghent’s intentional understanding of the distinction between essence and existence is based on the Avicennian idea of the indissolubility of the pure essence to existance, or non-existence. With Ibn Sinā Henry accepts the identity in God between essence and existence, and the distinction between the being of essence and the being of actual existence, but, contrary to Ibn Sinā, Henry adheres to the idea of an analogy between the essential and the existential level, and defends an existential valorization of the essence/existnce distinction. Acc. to A., Henry rather followed Ibn Rushd than Ibn Sinā in his rejection of the real distinction between essence and existence. A. also notes that Henry, starting from a Porretan-Avicennian basis, moved towards the affirmation of a transcendental liberty.
A very valuable basic outline of Henry’s indebtedness to Ibn Sinâ regarding the problematic of the essence/existence distinction, although the latter’s doctrine seems to be presented in its Averroistic interpretation.


For a critical account of this work, I may refer the reader to G. STROHMAIER’s review of it in: Deutsches Dante Jahrbuch, 64 (89), 189 - 192 and 65 (90), 194.


A. briefly, but accurately presents Corbin’s conception of the rejection by the West of Ibn Sinâ’s thought, especially his angelology. The “Avicennizing Augustinism” is the only important form of Latin Avicennism, but it deformed Ibn Sinâ’s original thought by replacing the Angel of Revelation by God Himself. A valuable basic presentation of Corbin’s opinion on this matter.


A., in the line of his previous publications (see below, 482) presents Ibn Sinâ’s Hayy, and Ibn Ezra’s Hebrew version of it, as major sources of Dante’s Divine Comedy. However, this time A. offers several well-developed arguments in order to show that popular and mystical Arabic works on eschatology cannot be considered to have been sources of Dante. Furthermore, A. elaborates on some parallelsisms between Dante’s work and the two versions of Hayy, but always avoids oversimplification of the issue. Although A. admits that there is no “Islamic” influence on Dante, he affirms that Dante was indirectly influenced by Ibn Sinâ’s Neoplatonic cosmology with its somewhat astrological annotation, as well as Ibn Sinâ’s theory of the spiritual survival of the soul. A. seems to formulate here a very valuable final conclusion to his -also very valuable– previous studies in this respect.

482. ID., Ibn Sinâ’s Psychology and Dante’s Divine Comedy, in: JHASS, 9 (91), 107 - 111.

A., after a brief review of these elements of Avicennian influence on Dante which he has already discussed in earlier publications (see Bhl., 257 - 258), points to four more instances of such influence, concerning such issues as the rejection of the existence of three souls in man, the life in the hereafter, the becoming of a real human Being, and the circular movement of the ensouled heavenly spheres. A most valuable addition to A.’s previous publications on this matter.


A. inter alia notes that R. Grosseteste adopted Ibn Sinâ’s exposé of the five inner senses. In this, he was followed by R. Bacon, who however merged Ibn Sinâ’s and Ibn al-Haytham’s theories of vîrus distincive. Based on Ibn Sinâ’s doctrine of estimation, Bacon interpreted the three inferential perceptual processes of Ibn al-Haytham as “adjudicative” acts. With Bacon, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus (in his “De Anima” questions) accepted the notion of the sensible soul as capable of adjudicative acts. Even in a much later period several authors continued to accept non-intellectual cognition. E.g., Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini particularly insisted that the sensitive faculties of the soul are capable of adjudicative acts.

A. very valuable study, well illustrating how a particular Avicennian doctrine (although in combination with a theory derived from another source) has influenced the late Latin Middle Ages.


Among A.’s many observations, I may cite:
-William of Auvergne is most of the time dealing with Aristotelianism in its Avicennian version
- William rather faithfully follows Ibn Sinâ’s exposition of the terms of potency, power and possibility.
- William rejects the Avicennian principle that a creation in time or from time implies a change in the divine essence.
- William accepts Ibn Sinâ’s description of nature as a servant.
- For William, as for Ibn Sinâ, intellectual self-knowledge is both prior to external sensible knowledge, and independent of such knowledge.
- William agrees with Ibn Sinâ that a relation requires as its subject a substance or quantity or quality.
- William follows closely the style of the Latin translation of Ibn Sinâ’s *Metaphysics*.

A concludes that William’s metaphysics is a blend of Boethius and Ibn Sinâ, with the latter as the dominant influence. A very valuable outline of major elements of Avicennian influence on William of Auvergne.


Acc. to A., William of Auvergne developed the image of the will as king or ruler based on his Avicennian understanding of the soul-body relation (besides Aristotle’s statement that the soul commands the body; and Augustine’s views of the senses as messengers, and of the will as autonomous).

A valuable piece of information, but in need of further elaboration.


A. indicates that several ideas of the *De immortalitate animae* (A. offers serious arguments for attributing this work to William of Auvergne, and not to Gundissalinus) may well be the result of an Avicennian influence. Acc. to A., the author of the tract when dealing with the “erroneous philosophers” who have denied the immortality of the soul, probably considered Ibn Sinâ to be one of them, because of his positing matter as the only cause of plurality.

A. offers a very primary outline of possible Avicennian influences on the present work, and his identification of Ibn Sinâ as one of the philosophers who has denied the personal survival of the human soul is open to serious objection.


Acc. to A., William’s metaphysical arguments against the Manichees, or Cathars, show that Ibn Sinâ is one of his most important sources. To the first principle of the Manichean theory, as presented by William, i.e., that one contrary cannot arise from another, William replies by making the Aristotelian-Avicennian distinction between *per se* and *per accidens* causality. As to the second Manichean principle, i.e., the existence of a first evil, William rejects it by distinguishing between various kinds of evil (in this respect, there is no indication by A. of a specific Avicennian influence).

A. concludes that William’s argument against the Manicheans ultimately rests upon the Avicennian concept of being necessary through itself.

A useful addition to A.’s observations elsewhere regarding Ibn Sinâ’s influence on William.


In presenting the Peripatetic doctrine of the eternity of the world, William of Auvergne, in his *De Trinitate*, refers to different Avicennian principles, as e.g.: “possibility must be a relation of matter, and matter must be eternal”. A. notes that William, although he himself rejected this position, seems to think that Ibn Sinâ offers its best formulation. But in the *De Universo*, William does explicitly mention Ibn Sinâ, and discusses three of the latter’s arguments in favour of the eternity of the world. However, after careful examination, William once more rejects them.

Very valuable, showing the particularly great significance of Ibn Sinâ for William, even when the latter was opposing the former.


A. first points to the fact that William of Auvergne refers to the principle: “Ex Uno...” in different contexts, having derived the principle most probably from Ibn Sinâ’s *Metaphysics*. A. then notes a first use of the principle, i.e. in William’s exposé of the “Peripatetic” doctrine of the creation of the first Intelligence out of God’s intellect, as well as of the further emanation scheme linked with it. A. observes that William, notwithstanding his rejection of the emanation scheme, continues to accept the principle itself. A. further indicates that according to William the principle has been abused in the dualistic doctrine of the Cathars, as well as in the theory, which affirms the production of one single human soul by the Tenth
Intelligence. Finally, A. insists that William, in his teaching of the generation of the
Son from the Father in De Trinitate, both accepts and uses the principle, although
without making any reference to the philosophers.
A valuable case-study, although in need of development.

490. TORRALBA ROSELLO, FR., La relacion metafisica (sic!) entre la
Nr. 54. Número especial II: III. Congreso de cultura Andalusí.
Homenaje a Miguel Asin Palacios. 11 - 14 de Enero de 1992. Cairo,
Cairo Univ. Press, 1992, 121 - 142.

A., in a rather classical way, indicates that for Thomas and Ibn Sīnā being as being is
the first object of metaphysics, and also the first known notion. Moreover, both
thinkers accept that each Being is composed of essence and existence, and that real
knowledge concerns only the essence. However, a major difference with Thomas
appears, where Ibn Sīnā affirms the accidentality of existence, and hereby adheres to a
kind of essentialism, although in a qualified way. Acc. to A., Thomas surpasses Ibn
Sīnā in several respects.
A very conventional paper. A. seems to ignore the majority of recent publications on
Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics.

491. VERBEKE, G., Avicenna im Westen: eine historische Begegnung,
in: Acta Ant. Ac. Sc. Hung., 29 (81), 1 - 18 (Bibl., 242) has been
reprinted in: Actes du Colloque.

492. VERNIER, J.-M., La définition de l’âme chez Avicenne et S. Albert
le Grand, in: Rev. Sc. Philos. Théol., 76 (92), 255 - 278, 279 (Fr. and
Engl. Summ.).

A. offers a brief outline of both Aristotle’s and Ibn Sīnā’s De Anima. Having
presented a French translation of b. I, c. 1 (see supra, 14), A. indicates that
Aristotle’s De Anima B, c. 2 is its major source, but at the same time points to
some divergences between Ibn Sīnā and the Stagirite, especially regarding their views
on the link between the soul and the body. On this later matter, Ibn Sīnā clearly held
a looser vision than Aristotle’s. Albert the Great, in his De Anima, tr. I, I, II, c. 1,
rejects the idea of an accidental inherence of the soul in the body, hereby moving
towards the Avicennian affirmation of the substantiality of the soul. This fact is
confirmed by Albert’s Dissections, where he uses for his concept of man Ibn Sīnā as
his major source.

An interesting paper, but one wonders whether Albert’s dependence upon Ibn Sīnā in
the matter under discussion is not of a much more complicated nature than suggested
by A.?

493. WIPPEL, J. F., The Latin Avicenna as a Source for Thomas

Having briefly, and in rather conventional terms reviewed Aristotle’s and Ibn Sīnā’s
conceptions of the proper object of Metaphysics, A. notes that Thomas Aquinas
agreed with Ibn Sīnā, but seems to go beyond him where he states that God is not
included under the very subject of metaphysics, i.e., being as being. For Thomas, as
well as for Ibn Sīnā, “being” is what is first known to the intellect. But Thomas
seems to distinguish between the ordinary premetaphysical grasp of being, on the one
hand, and the genuine metaphysical knowledge of being as being, which appeals to a
negative judgment, characterized by him as “separation”, on the other hand. Acc. to
A., Thomas’ position is a further development of the Avicennian theory that the
existence of a substance, insofar as it is a substance, does not depend upon matter.
Then A. concentrates on the famous essence/existence distinction. First of all, he
notes that Thomas was justifiably in deriving from the Avicenna Lateins a threefold
distinction of essence, and the acceptance of a not merely conceptual distinction
between essence and existence. A. stresses that the Latin text of Ibn Sīnā’s
Metaphysics invited most of its readers, and among them Thomas, to understand
existence as an accident superadded to the essence, even if Ibn Sīnā may-be did not
really intend to treat existence that way. Finally, A. deals with Thomas’ rejection of
Ibn Sīnā’s theory of emanation in almost classical terms.
A valuable, although not really innovative paper.

494. WOOD, R., Richard Rufus: Physics at Paris before 1240, in:
Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, V (94), 87 - 127
esp. 111 - 112, 117 and 126.

According to A., Richard Rufus might have been influenced by Ibn Sīnā’s idea that the
relation between the centre of the universe and the sphere of the fixed stars allows
to determine the direction of motion. So, Rufus’ relational concept of place may
ultimately stem from Ibn Sīnā. However, Rufus rejected Ibn Sīnā’s distinction
between utramque situs. Moreover states that Thomas Aquinas’ theory of place may
also have originated from Ibn Sīnā, although it probably had its direct source in
Rufus and Bacon.
Valuable statements, but in need of further elaboration.
B. Ibn Sīnā AND JEWISH THOUGHT


Acc. to A., J. Hallevi, in his presentation of the philosopher’s cosmology and psychology, uses features distinctive to Ibn Sīnā, e.g. the Ex Uno—principle, or the proof for the substantiality of the soul, but also elements different from Ibn Sīnā (and then derived from al-Fārābī). Hallevi did largely criticize the philosopher’s emanation theory, but he continued to incorporate many elements of Arabic Aristotelianism, and especially of Ibn Sīnā, malakī fals. Abraham Ibn Daud, in his presentation of the philosopher’s emanation scheme, adheres to the three-fold scheme of Ibn Sīnā, although he describes the aspects somewhat differently from the latter. A. also indicates the presence of Avicennian elements in Ibn Daud’s theories of the universe and the intellect. Also for Maimonides’ description of the emanation scheme, Arabic Aristotelianism, and particularly Ibn Sīnā, functioned as a major source. But A. insists that Maimonides, in the same vein as al-Ghazzālī, rejected the emanation theory. Maimonides, on the contrary, completely followed Ibn Sīnā, where he defined human knowledge in terms of a conjunction with the Agent Intellect. Finally, regarding prophecy, he took some elements of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of intellectual prophecy, but added peculiarities of his own. After the three mentioned authors, who probably read Ibn Sīnā in Arabic, Jewish philosophy was undertaken almost exclusively in Hebrew. Despite the almost complete absence of Hebrew translations of Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical works, the latter continued to exercise a major influence, but by mediation of the works of our three authors (A. hereof offers some concrete examples).

A very valuable, and, as far as I can see, a pioneering basic survey of Ibn Sīnā’s (and al-Fārābī’s) influence on medieval Jewish Thought.


Acc. to A., for both Maimonides and Ibn Sīnā possible existents are real, subsisting in a state of being prior to their actualization as “existent” Beings. Hereby, A. points to Ibn Sīnā’s identification between possible per see and necessary per se, and to his identification of the Necessary Existent with pure existence. Therefore, for A. Ibn Sīnā should be prepared to posit (tacitly, if not openly) that the essential natures of the only possible existents is their own, and, hence, that God is not the Creator of the Universe in its fullest sense. For A., it is also clear that in the very same Avicennian perspective, matter is its own reality, alien to God. In Ibn Sīnā, matter and the possible existents represent respectively the indeterminate and non-necessary aspects of this world. A. concludes that Ibn Sīnā as well as Plotinus was unsuccessful in bridging the gap from the One to the many. Maimonides, notwithstanding his minimization of Ibn Sīnā’s contribution to philosophy, seems to have held the very same Neoplatonic doctrines.

A very provocative paper, which undoubtedly deserves serious attention, but also seems to be subject to serious objections.


498. RAVITZKY, A., Hebrew Quotations from the Lost Arabic Recension of the Parva Naturalia, in: JSAT, 3 (81), 191 - 202, esp. 191; 197 ff.

A. shows that both Ibn Sīnā, in his R. al-manāmiyya, and R. Zeraḥyah (a 12th cent. Spanish-Jewish philosopher), in his Commentary on Maimonides’ Guide, have used a common version of the Parva Naturalia, which is different from the extant Greek version. They present some similar ideas which are absent in the latter. However, by textual comparison, A. makes clear that Zeraḥyah’s quotations are independent from Ibn Sīnā’s formulation.

An interesting piece of information.


Among A.’s many observations, I may cite:

- Ibn Sīnā gave the idea that a noble human soul may act upon nature and work miracles a theoretical formulation, and hereby developed a naturalistic explanation of miracles.
C. IBN SINĀ AND SYRIAN THOUGHT


A. points to the fact that Barhebraeus' division of knowledge into theoretical and practical seems to be dependent upon Ibn Sinā. He also notes that the former made use of the latter's description of the pleasure of listening to music. Very useful, but primary indications, however opening perspectives for further research on Ibn Sinā's influence on Barhebraeus.


A. states that Immanuel ha-Romi (13-14th, cent.), probably influenced by Dante, places a lot of philosophers, among whom Ibn Sinā, in Hell. Ibn Sinā, notwithstanding his affirmation of God as the source of existence of all Beings, is condemned for his belief in the eternity of the world. However, Immanuel's objection against the possibility of the generation of a human Being in the absence of another human Being, is against Ibn Tufayl's, and not Ibn Sinā's concept of Hāyy. Finally, A. indicates that Immanuel finds Ibn Sinā's natural (and A. judiciously interprets: scientific) explanation of the formation of mountains to be in direct contradiction with the belief in God's omnipotent creativity. As usual with A., an interesting case-study (somehow supplementing his studies on Ibn Sinā and Dante).

503. ARIEW, R., Fossils in Medieval and Early Modern Geology, in: *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy,* III, 566 - 573, esp. 569 - 570.

A. notes that Ibn Sīnā, as well as Albert the Great, held the theory that fossils are the remains of animals, which were turned into stone by the power of the petrifying place. Kircher and Becher even more emphatically insisted that fossils are the creation of the power of the place, but by “mimicking” animals. Steno, Scilla, and Leibniz, on the contrary, returned to the theory of fossils as remains of animals, but offered a mechanistic account for the process of petrification. Interesting, but in need of more detailed elaboration.


In this study, A. offers a basic presentation of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of time, mainly based on *Shīb.* *Physics,* b. II, ch. 11 - 13, as well as on the section on time of the *Najāt.* A. hereby tries to give some basic elucidations, e.g., the identification of an author, or a school, which holds a particular view on time, criticized and/or refuted by Ibn Sīnā. Moreover, A. insists that for Ibn Sīnā time is continuous, and that, generally speaking, Ibn Sīnā’s conception of time is very modern (A. even presents a comparison between Kant’s and Ibn Sīnā’s theories of time). Further, when dealing with the moment of the “now”, a psychological dimension is introduced by Ibn Sīnā. Finally, A., in rather conventional terms, subscribes to Ibn Sīnā the theory of an eternal origination of the world. A. detects in several items of Ibn Sīnā’s view, a clear anti-kalam tendency, and now and then also finds traces of a strong Neoplatonic influence. Worth mentioning is also that A. often refers to later commentators, such as A. B. al-Rāghibī, F. D. al-Rāżī, N. D. al-Ṭūsī and M. Ş. al-Shirāzī.
The work contains some interesting and valuable ideas, but some of A.'s interpretations are open to serious questioning, such as e.g., the affirmation of a "modern" conception of time in Ibn Sīnā in an almost unqualified way.


A. summarizes in a systematic way the different chapters of the Book of Music of the Shīfi. He also briefly evokes the musical section of the Dāneš-Nāma. Finally, A. in a qualified way, points to some of Ibn Sīnā's major contributions to the science of music, as well as to some later authors, such as Ibn Zayla, Qub al-din al-Shirāzī and al-Murāghī, who underwent Ibn Sīnā's influence in this particular field.


Having indicated that both adversaries and defenders of Aristotle's theory of the eternity of the world relied on observable geological facts, i.e. erosion, respectively generative geological processes, A. insists that Ibn Sīnā was the first thinker in history who provided a theoretical explanation in favour of that theory, specifically by a particular use of the notion of unctuous moisture. After a brief historical survey of the topic of geology and the eternity of the world in Greek and Arabic thinking, A. deals in detail with Ibn Sīnā's innovative contribution. A fine summary of that position had already been made in the 19th century by the famous Jewish scholar Ibn Tibbōn. Hence, A. does not hesitate to cite large extracts of it. A. also refers to Ibn Sīnā's own works, e.g., in order to show Ibn Sīnā's familiarly with the chemical notion of unctuous moisture, A. refers to the expose on the formation of coal in the Qādān, and he concludes that this theoretical basis allowed Ibn Sīnā to explain the petrisification of clay, and how this petrisological theory, in its turn, easily permitted him to afford an account of orogeny, and hence to succeed where Theophrastus had failed. But, above all, A. stresses that Ibn Sīnā's intentions in elaborating this theory were primarily metaphysical.

Very valuable.


Mainly based on the Shīfi; A. deals with the major theories of Ibn Sīnā in the natural domain, including psychology. A. hereby presents Ibn Sīnā as a natural philosopher in the line of Aristotle, but also as a scientist, who, due to his spirit of observation and experimentation, did arrive at some innovative views. A. however avoids overemphasis of Ibn Sīnā's contribution in the domain of the natural sciences. As to the latter's psychology, A. stresses that it was not based on observation, but was, on the contrary, closely linked with Ibn Sīnā's metaphysical speculations.

Introducory, but valuable.


Based on the Avicenna Latinsus, A. shows that whereas Ibn Sīnā in his Metaphysics presents time as an intention intelligibilis, he, in his Physics, adheres to a different view. There, he first presents two theories, the one based on a comparison-model, the other on an aggregation-model, which places the very theory of time in the soul. However, Ibn Sīnā rejects both theories, since they necessitate the acceptance of a "discretum" in time. But time is a real continuum, and hence Ibn Sīnā defends the
notion of "real" time. For him, changeability, and not a psychological existence is the conditio sine qua non of the existence of time. A. moreover notes that this
Aviceenian theory was used in the 13th century by several Latin authors. The most
famous of them is undoubtedly Albert the Great (esp. pp. 240-43), who already in
such an early work as the De quattuor causae consists made use of Ibn Sinâ's theory for
his interpretation of Aristotle's theory, and who in his later Physics always moved
between Ibn Sinâ and Ibn Rushd. But also other Latin authors adhered to Ibn Sinâ's
theory, such as Ulrich of Strasbourg (esp. pp. 289-295), who explicitly identified Ibn
Sinâ as the founder of the thesis of "real" time, or P. Olivi (esp. pp. 404, 427), who
moreover interpreted Augustine's theory of time according to the aggregation-model,
as opposed by Ibn Sinâ. R. Kilwardby (pp. 281, 286) interpreted Aristotele according
to the "slightly modified" version of the comparison model, and also Henry of Ghent (pp.
371-72) made use of this latter when dealing with Augustine's theory. However,
where the latter clearly rejects Ibn Sinâ's conception of real time, one cannot but
discover at the background of the former's complex argumentation Ibn Sinâ's very
theory of real time.
An innovative, and, indeed, very valuable study, both regarding Ibn Sinâ's
conception of time (although in this respect in need of some more detailed
elaboration), and its reception in the Latin world.

512. KÄHYA, E., Ibn Sinâ's Scientific Contribution, in: Ibnî Sîna, 64 -
67 (Tu).

513. KRUK, R., Aristoteles, Avicenna, Albertus, en de locusta maris,
in: A. M. J. VAN BUUREN e.a. (Uitg.), Tussentijds. Bundel studies
aangeboden aan W. P. Gerrissen ter gelegenheid van zijn vijftigste
verjaardag (Utrechtse Bijdragen tot de Mediëvistiek, V), Utrecht, Hes,
1985, 147 - 156.

A. observes that the translations of Aristotle's zoological works in the Middle Ages,
first into Arabic, and later into Latin by mediation of the Arabic, posed serious
problems, and inevitably lead to some misunderstandings. In order to show that this
was not simply due to medieval ignorance, A. points to misreadings in the Cairo,
1970-editions, due to a lack of knowledge of the editors of Greek and Persian. A.
insists that for Ibn Sinâ zoology was not a really important matter, and that his
exposé remains rather faithful to Aristotle's, except for a few issues, which are of a
more outspoken medical nature. However, Ibn Sinâ tried always to understand
correctly the transmitted information. Therefore, when due to a translating error in the
Arabic translation he read that the crayfish may come forth from the eggs of squids,
he tried to explain it by affirming that the crayfish has its own eggs, but that it may
as well be born from the eggs of other animals. Finally, A. observes how Albert the
Great, who used M. Scot's Latin translation of Aristotle's and Ibn Sinâ's texts,
affirmed that crayfishe are generated from the eggs of the crab (Lat. Haliçeco), and
that the absence of any hesitation in Albert, when giving this information, shows
that he felt assured by Ibn Sinâ's "authoritative" explanation.
A very fine case-study, not only offering as an important piece of zoological
information, but indicating substantial problems regarding ancient translations (as
well as their contemporary editions).

514. ID., Conflicting Zoological Views of Aristotle and Avicenna as
Treated by Albertus Magnus, in: G. ENDRESS, unter Mitwirkung von
M. SCHMEINK (Hrsg.), Symposium Graeco-Arabicum. II. Akten des
März 1987, mit einer Synopse des Symposium Graeco-Arabicum I.
- 31.

In addition to the above-mentioned paper, A. examines Albert's attitude towards the
authorities of Aristotle and Ibn Sinâ. Based on some concrete examples in the
zoological field, A. shows that Albert kept an independent judgment, and did not
hesitate to contradict either Aristotle or Ibn Sinâ, or even both (even if Albert, due to
some textual errors, was sometimes wrong in his attribution of an opinion to either
the Stagirete or Ibn Sinâ).
A brief, but valuable complement to the preceding paper.

515. LETTINCK, P., Problems in Aristotle's, Physics I, 1 and Their
Discussion by Arab Commentators, in: JHAS, 101-2 (92-94), 91 -109,
passim.

Although the paper mainly deals with Ibn Bajjâ and Ibn Rushd, a few important
remarks regarding Ibn Sinâ are made, i.e.: -Ibn Sinâ does not distinguish between the notions of mahâdî`, asâbîh and 'ilâl in his
natural theory
-Although Ibn Sinâ, like Philoponus, does recognize two senses of the general, i.e.,
one in the sense of a genus, and one in the sense of an unanalyzed and unspecified
concrete object, it is far from sure that the former did really know the latter's
commentary on the Physics
-Ibn Sinâ, in the very same line as Aristotle and al-Flîrîbî, distinguishes between the
demonstration of existence and the demonstration of cause
A few interesting remarks.


A. offers a basic outline of Ibn Sīnā’s major mathematical ideas, and deals in a very brief way with some of the latter’s major physical ideas. At most, introductory.


A. discusses in a rather conventional way such issues as the doctrine of matter and form; the internal and external principles of composed bodies; the topics of matter, movement, time, place and void. Particular emphasis is laid by A. on the teleological character of Ibn Sīnā’s natural philosophy. Introductory.


A., in a very conventional way, presents the Peripatetic theory of motion, as exposed by Ibn Sīnā, more specifically in the Najjār, and al-Ghazzālī’s well-known criticism against it. Of very limited value.


Unfortunately, it escaped my attention that the reference to the original French publication is missing in my Bibliography, p. 270, sub 5, although my annotation was based on it, and not on the English translation (in which the notes are lacking), published in Ustavaranus Ibn Sīnā Sempozymu. Ankara, Başbakanlık Basım ve, 1984, 131 - 138.

522. RAWI (AL-) (RAVEN?), M. M., Geological Foundations in Ibn Sīnā’s “Minerals and Celestial Influences”, in: Majallat ma’had al-makhfūṣ, N.S., 28 (84), 547 - 564 (Ar).

A. surveys in detail the very first chapter of b. 1 of the Meteorologica of the Shīfi’. He not only relies on the printed edition of Cairo, but also makes use of one supplementary manuscript. He concentrates on such topics as e.g., Ibn Sīnā’s distinction of kinds of stones, fossilization, stratigraphic sequence, originisation of mountains and geological catastrophes. Although A. clearly avoids ascribing too contemporary ideas to Ibn Sīnā, he nevertheless detects in him a great innovative thinker as far as geology is concerned. A valuable contribution, although one may regret that A. does not pay any attention to Ibn Sīnā’s predecessors, and, therefore, maybe overemphasises somewhat the innovative character of the latter’s contribution.


A. points to the fact that Ibn Sīnā, in his K. al-bayawan of the Shīfi’, mentioned squinantum, which is a porcine throat-disease. Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā derived his
information from Aristotle, and his description is less complete than that of the
Stagirite.
A useful, although limited piece of information, showing that Ibn Sīnā, at least in
some biological matters, just reproduced (and even in an incomplete way) his Greek
source.

525. STROYLS, J., see: 508.

526. TA‘I (AL-), F. A., Ibn Sīnā and (AL-)Chemny, in: Majallat al-majmū‘
al-‘ilmī al-triqī, 28 (77), 91 - 116 and 29 (78), 59 - 70 (Ar).

In the first part of the paper, A. gives a rather conventional bio-bibliographical
outline (it has to be said that there are many mistakes in the references to Western
works). In the second part of the paper, A. deals with Ibn Sīnā’s ideas on chemistry
and alchemy. Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā closely, although not in every respect, follows
Jābir ibn Hayyān, as far as the generation of minerals is concerned. Alchemy is
categorically rejected by Ibn Sīnā. A. cites large fragments in Arabic translation from
a book by Holmyard on alchemy, published in 1957. A. terminates his paper with
some remarks, and stories regarding Ibn Sīnā’s personality.
Introductory, at most.

527. VERBEKE, G., La nature dans une perspective nouvelle, in: S.
VAN RIET (Éd.), Avicenna Latinus. Liber primus Naturalium. Tractatus
primus. De causis et principiis naturalium. Louvain-la-Neuve, Peeters;

A. insists that Ibn Sīnā does not limit himself to a commentary on the Physics of
Aristotle, but introduces a fundamentally new perspective by making the study of
nature dependent upon his metaphysics. Hence, Ibn Sīnā agrees with Aristotle that a
scientific study of the material world is possible, but he insists, contrary to the
Stagirite, that the latter is a direct emanation of the Higher Intelligences. Moreover,
Ibn Sīnā excludes from the study of physics such items as the existence of the first
cause, or of the hylomorphic structure of the material Beings. Albert the Great agreed
with Ibn Sīnā, and therefore rejected Ibn Rushd’s criticisms against Ibn Sīnā.
Furthermore, A. pays special attention to the problematic of teleology, concentrating
inter alia on the question when is a movement natural, or not? For Ibn Sīnā, nature is
an essential cause of movement; it is also an internal principle, which causes
changes, and it is even the essence of all things. Herein Ibn Sīnā remains faithful to a
basic Aristotelian perspective, but A. once more stresses that the role of the natural
things of this world is more limited in Ibn Sīnā than it was in Aristotle. Finally, A.
CHAPTER XVI

MEDICINE

A. GENERAL STUDIES

528. ABÛ SHAWIRAB, 'A., Medical Prescriptions of Ibn Sinâ, in: Al-
jadhrûr, 6, nr. 25 (92), 92 - 95 (Ar) (N.C.)

529. ANI (AL-), SAMI-ALI, Ibn Sinâ. His Contribution to Medicine, in:
The Arab Review, 2, 2 (93), 29 - 35.

A rather general paper, in which A. pays special attention to Ibn Sinâ's innovative
medical views, but not in a really critical way.
Of limited value.

530. CHÊHADÉ, A., Avicenne, Médecin, in: Acts (Ankara), 315 - 325;
Bildiriler, 347 - 356 (Cev. R. DURAN).

A. offers a basic presentation of the Qānûn and the Poem on Medicine, and points to
some of Ibn Sinâ's major contributions in the medical field.
Introductory.

531. DAWSON, J.B., Avicenna, the Prince of Physicians, in: The
Medical Journal of Australia, 2 (28), 750 - 755 has been reprinted in:
Beiträge, Bd. 4, 5, pp. 449 - 453.

532. DE VRIES, A., Concrete and Abstract in Medicine: The Case of Ibn

A. stresses that Ibn Sinâ was above all an "abstract" physician, i.e., a physician who
worked on the basis of what he has read, and who possessed only a limited medical
practice. These few observations form the background for a general discussion of
medical strategy.
As far as Ibn Sinâ is concerned, of limited value.
533. DUCASTEL, G., Un médecin-philosophe: Avicenne, in: La vie médicale, 10 (29), 911 - 912, has been reprinted in: Beiträge, Bd. 4, 6, pp. 111 - 112.

534. FAYAD, S., Ibn Sinā, the Father of Medicine, in: Al-mawqif (Beirut), nr. 99 (93), 50 - 53 (Ar).

A vulgarizing paper (very similar to his booklett (see infra, 606), but, this time addressed to an adult audience).

Introductory.


A rather conventional outline of Ibn Sinā’s medical works and ideas.

Of no real value.

536. GAVUZOGLU, M. K., Ibn Sinā and Medicine, in: Ibnī Sīna, 97 - 107 (Tu).

537. IBRAHIM, H., Ibn Sinā, the Physician. Where was he mistaken, and where right?, in: M. Majnū’ al-lughat al-‘arab., 47 (81), 58 - 63 (Ar).

A presents particular items of Ibn Sinā’s medical doctrine, regarding such various topics as e.g., preventive medicine, respiration, the pulse and urine, and which are still valid in our time. But A. stresses that Ibn Sinā, in his exposit on other medical items, as e.g., anatomy, the brain and the circulation of the blood, bold views which no longer can be accepted. For A., it is certain that in these latter cases Ibn Sinā always remained too dependent upon his Greek sources.

Valuable, although A.’s judgment regarding Greek medicine is in need of qualification.


Authors stress that Ibn Sinā is a philosopher rather than a physician, and that his medical knowledge is predominantly theoretical. The success of the Qānūn is due to its presenting medicine as a rational science, based on causal explanation. But authors insist that Ibn Sinā’s desire for logical explanation sometimes devolves into a dogmatic and sterile thinking, and that observation rather than experimentation is preeminent in his methodology. As to the Latin translation of the Qānūn, authors note that part of it may have been done by Gerard of Cremona himself, but that other parts are probably the work of the latter’s associates. Authors also briefly, but significantly deal with Alpago’s later “corrections” of the Latin translation. They moreover point to the fact that the Qānūn received special attention not only in medical, but also in “encyclopaedical” circles in the West. Finally, authors observe that from a presence of a transliterated term in the Latin text, one cannot infer that it was not understood by the author. Some of them are just due to a sense of “philological accuracy”.

Valuable, although introductory.

539. J.S.P. (sicl), Avicena (980 - 1037), in: Gaceta Medica de Mexico, 1275 (91), 409 - 410.

Very brief and general. Of no value.


A very brief and classical presentation of Ibn Sinā’s medical works and ideas.

Introductory.


544. MICHEAU, FR., see: 538
545. SAPOV, U. T., see: 540


A. indicates that Ibn Sinā not only wanted to integrate medical knowledge in an Arabic, but also in a Greco-Semitic context. Moreover, A. admits that Ibn Sinā introduced some innovations in his Qānūn, but he stresses that the main objective of the latter was to “organize” medicine (at that time the positivist sense of scientific progress did not yet exist). Further, A. observes that Ibn Sinā’s medical formation was atypical, since it seems not to have taken place in a school, or a medical institution. Finally, A. detects in the summa-character of the Qānūn an indication that in Ibn Sinā’s time one has to do with a period of stabilisation in medical science. A. concludes that the Qānūn promotes rationality, and hereby opens, although not presents the way to a more experimental approach. Very valuable.


A. concentrates on the “context” in which Ibn Sinā elaborated his Qānūn, pointing inter alia to the scientific interest of the Samanid rulers, the multi-cultural aspect of the Khurāsān of that time, and the presence of important libraries in the cities. Regarding the scientific terminology, used in the Qānūn, A. points to the presence of a large, newly created vocabulary, due to the translation-movement of 9th. cent. Baghdad, but, at the same time, observes also the creation of some new terms by Ibn Sinā himself. Moreover, A. indicates that Ibn Sinā’s conceptualisation, based on Aristotle, consisted in a systematic classification of the rational sciences, and that herewith medical knowledge received a logical organisation. A particular stress is laid by A. on the very concept of intuition in Ibn Sinā’s epistemology. A. concludes that Ibn Sinā was not a great thinker in isolation, but that he was a brilliant mind who always was in discussion with others, and, as such, may be considered to have been a real “humanist”.
A very fine paper.


A. refers to the presence in the Library of the University of Düsseldorf of a 1486-printed edition of the commentary by Gentile da Foligno on the fourth book of Ibn Sinā’s Qānūn. Furthermore, A. deals with some general aspects of Ibn Sinā’s life and medical thought. He characterizes in a qualified way Ibn Sinā as a theoretical physician, and he discusses a few items of the latter’s medical thought. Useful, but some issues are in need of further elaboration.


A. remarks that Ibn Sinā found a special relationship between music and medicine, i.e., a combination between rhythm, consonances and pulse as indicators of good health. For Ibn Sinā, the order of music reflects the order existing in the human body. Valuable indications, but in need of more substantial development.


A very general paper, (over-)stressing Ibn Sinā’s originality.
Of no value.

551. VIESCA TREVIÑO, C., La medicina de Avicena, in: Med. Trad. (Mexico), 11 (80), 45 - 51 (Bibl., 300).

A. offers a basic presentation of the major ideas of the Qānūn. Introductory. A. clearly overemphasises the systematic aspect of the Qānūn.
B. SPECIALISED ITEMS (Including Sources)


Authors rightly stress that the identification of some of the drugs, mentioned by Ibn Sīnā in the second book of his Ḍiqān, is rather difficult, notwithstanding the fact that Ibn Sīnā always tried to present the common nomenclature of his time. Authors present a list of 123 such “controversial” drugs. A preparatory study, but, as such, valuable.

553. ‘ĀNĪ (AL-), M. SH., Al-shaykh al-ra’īs Ibn Sīnā, the Ophthalmologue, in *Millénaire d’Avicenne. Congrès de Bagdad*, Cairo, 1952, 146 - 161 has been reprinted in: *Al-Kaḥḥāl*, 2(82), 193 - 209 (Ar).


I looked in vain for a copy of it.

555. BATHIGATE, R. H., sec: 567


A. briefly surveys Ibn Sīnā’s views on dieterics in the Qānūn. Acc. to A., it was important for Ibn Sīnā to take into account the patient’s lifestyle and habitat. This is illustrated by a passage taken from an historical novel by N. Gordon on Ibn Sīnā (Bibl., 344).

Of almost no value.

559. CREUTZ, R., Der persische Arztphilosoph Avicenna (980 bis 1037) über Kunsthilfe bei Geburten und Fehlgeburten, in: *Die Medizinische Welt (Berlin)*, 12(38), 1582 - 1583 has been reprinted in: *Beiträge*, Bd. 4, 8, pp. 345 - 348.


The present study constitutes a major project, in which A. wants to deal with the totality of the pharmacological terminology which is present in the Qānūn. In the first of the so far published pars, A. indicates that some of the terms used by Ibn Sīnā are genuinely Arabic, while others are derived from ancient Arabic, or even have a clearly non-Arabic origin. Regarding the latter, A. points to some specificities regarding their transliteration, since no uniform rule for transliterating existed at that time. This very fact poses a problem with respect to the classification of some items. A. always respects Ibn Sīnā’s choices, but, he, at the same time, offers, when existing, the variant forms in alphabetical order. To arrive at a as correct as possible understanding of Ibn Sīnā’s terminology, A. makes use of a wide range of classical medical works, and refers to them, whenever necessary, to elucidate difficult issues. A. always indicates all the occurences of a term in the Qānūn, and specifies the locations where it is used in a particular combination. Although A. is still dealing with the letter alif, it may already be stated that his pioneering study constitutes a most valuable contribution to a more precise understanding of the Qānūn.


This paper may be considered to be a preliminary study to A.’s book (see next item).

A., based on the Qānūn, discusses various types of inflammation of the brain, among which strānīn and sādārī receive particular attention. A. also deals with Ibn Sīnā's theoretical exposé of mental illnesses, and more specifically with mania, melancholy and love-sickness. A. indicates that Ibn Sīnā's exposé is largely based on Paul of Aegina's Epitome medicæ, which, in its turn, leaned on Galen and later Greek physicians. However, Ibn Sīnā put a greater emphasis on humoral pathology, and added one significant topic, i.e., that of nāhīs. A. concludes by putting to the fore three major features of Ibn Sīnā's account of mental disease: 1. an unrelenting adherence to humoral pathology as the cause of mental disorders (Ibn Sīnā hereby follows Galen, although he seems to have made some concessions to the Aristotelian physiology); 2. the creation of an intricate nosology according to syndromes that were derived from observable facts; 3. a particular emphasis on treatment, prepared by such Hellenistic authors as e.g., Alexander of Tralles. In a later part of the work, A. concentrates on Ibn Sīnā's so-called "psychomatic" stories. A. seriously doubts their historicity, and insists that they are not atypical, when compared to Rufus or Galen. Very valuable observations, especially regarding Ibn Sīnā's dependence on some specific Greek sources, mainly in the Galenic tradition.


A. states that Ibn Sīnā probably carried out dissection, since he mentioned the trigeminal nerve. Further, he indicates that Ibn Sīnā, in agreement with Galen, recognised the existence of nine pairs of cranial nerves. Finally, A. affirms that Ibn Sīnā's description of the recurrent laryngeal nerve corresponds to our actual knowledge (but he uses as textual basis Ibn al-Nafīf Commentary on the Qānūn). Of rather limited value.

565. FAROOQI, A. H., see: 552

566. HAMANEH, N., Examination of the Teaching of Ophthalmology in the Qānūn, in: Al-Kahbâl, 23 (82), 138 - 154 (Ar).

After some rather general remarks, A. points to the importance of Hirschberg's contribution to the study of Arabic ophthalmology, including that of Ibn Sīnā. A. observes that in view of the many new ophthalmic works now available some of Hirschberg's judgments are in need of qualification, or correction. Hereafter, A. poses more critical questions, such as: What is the exact nature of Ibn Sīnā's contribution in this field? Does his work offer fundamental new insights? How much is he indebted to his predecessors? Which sources had he at his disposal? A. moreover formulates pertinent remarks regarding the existing printed editions of the Qānūn. Valuable, especially, since A.'s questions are fundamental.


Although Ibn Sīnā was not the first physician to mention diabetes, he, of the older physicians, is probably the one who provided its complete description. Based on Dīnluqi's 1913 French translation of Qānūn, b. III, F. 19, Tr. II, e. 17 (of which authors offer an English translation), authors stress the almost physiological way in which Ibn Sīnā traces the relation between the functions of the kidneys and the liver. Acc. to authors, it is also striking that for Ibn Sīnā the nervous system as well as the liver do play a role in the pathogenesis of diabetes. But, whereas Dīnluqi's translation suggests the existence of a neurogenic cause in the case of diabetes, no trace of it is found when compared with the new English translation, based on the Rome, 1593-edition (see supra, 74), or even with Gerard of Cremona's Latin translation.

An interesting case-study.


Based on the Urdu, 1929 translation of the Qānūn, A. presents Ibn Sīnā's major views regarding the etiological factors, treatment and prevention of emaciation. A. always discovers very contemporary views, especially regarding the former.

At most introductory.
