A. basically distinguishes between Ibn Siná’s “Oriental” works and his “Peripatetic” writings.

In this exposé, which contains many long fragments of Avicennian texts in Latin translation, no really innovative ideas come to the fore. A. follows more or less Corbin, where he characterizes Ibn Siná’s system as an elaboration of Fātābí’s along the lines of an Iranian angelology. It may also be noted that A. detects in Ibn Siná’s mystical writings an isma’i’lī spirituality, combined with Platonic reminiscences.

A valuable, although introductory, study, if one agrees with A.’s basic proposition.


A. discusses now and then different aspects of Ibn Siná’s works and thought. Intra alia, he insists that Ibn Siná developed his own philosophy, placing politics in the margin and considering philosophy to be the religion of the intellectual élite. However, acc. to A. the later shi’ite theology integrated Ibn Siná’s thought in the Farabian model of politics. Also, A. observes that Ibn Siná presented a new theory of science, based on his famous distinction between three kinds of universals, and that he consciously eliminated many philosophical ideas, present in the classical philosophical prolegomena from his medical writings. A. also deals with the reception of Ibn Siná’s medical and musical theories in the Arabo-Islamic world, and offers a detailed survey of the different literary genres present in the works of Ibn Siná.

Very valuable, especially as a basis for further research.


A. presents Ibn Siná as a genius, who in many respects superseded Greek philosophy. Among the original contributions, ascribed by A. to Ibn Siná, I may mention:
- a clear distinction between theology and ontology in metaphysics
- the transformation of the angel of Revelation into a modified version of Aristotle’s active principle of understanding
- a clear distinction between essence and existence, and herein implied the transformation of the concept of analogy in the sense of the Iranian theory of participation
- the introduction of a priori aspects of thought
- the (at least, looked for) realisation of an harmony between religion and philosophy.

Valuable, although rather introductory.


A very brief, but valuable reflection on Ibn Siná’s life, thought and influence.


A rather classical exposé of the major ideas of Ibn Siná on logic, metaphysics and psychology, preceded by the usual bio-bibliographical outline. It may be noted that acc. to A. Ibn Siná just develops in a somewhat more profound way the basic ideas
already laid down by al-Fārābī, and that one finds in Ibn Sinā strong (Neo)Platonic elements, which sometimes eclipse his Aristotelianism. Introductory.

233. KARAM, A. GH., see: 245.


Of almost no value.


A first presents a very serious bio-bibliographical outline, taking into account also the important Western publications. A. deals with the usual metaphysical, psychological and epistemological items, common to most expositors on Ibn Sinā’s philosophy. However, his presentation of these items shows great familiarity with Ibn Sinā’s thought. Reference is made to a wide range of primary texts, although sometimes in a (too?) paraphrasical way. Special attention may be paid to A.’s stressing of the primacy of mental existence in Ibn Sinā (in the line of the “Iranian” tradition), and to his identification of the notion of annîyya with the Greek ɛînai. A very valuable encyclopaedic article.


A classical outline, inspired by the Marxist ideology.


A very valuable encyclopaedic article. Due to its very nature it is rather of an introductory kind.

238. MECKEL, W., Avicenna (d.i. Ibn Sina), in: B. LUTZ (Hrsg.), Metzler Philosophen Lexicon. Dreihundert biographisch-


Of rather limited value - Ibn Sinā being too much interpreted in the light of later Latin scholasticism.


A. first concentrates on Ibn Sinā’s so-called mysticism. A. observes an ambiguity in the latter’s attitude towards mysticism, which is reflected in both the later Arabo-Islamic tradition and the contemporary Western interpretation of Ibn Sinā. Acc. to A., Ibn Sinā only dealt in a theoretical way with sufism, notwithstanding the presence of fundamental mystical topics in some of his writings. Then A. pays attention to the different literary genres one finds in Ibn Sinā’s works, and offers a systematic, rather detailed survey of the Tr. On Phonetics. Finally, A. deals in a somewhat conventional manner with the Persian works of Ibn Sinā, and the latter’s creation of a new technical vocabulary in modern Persian. Valuable, although one may wonder why such heterogenous topics have been brought together under one single heading?


The bibliography (L.S.: p. 309 - 312) has once more been updated.


Introductory.


Very brief, mainly bio-bibliographical piece. Of no value.
243. Saleem, M. A., sec: 234


Authors present in a very conventional way the major items of Ibn Sīnā’s thought (metaphysics, psychology, etc.). Afterwards (pp. 532 - 574) a selection of text-fragments is given (mainly taken from Najāt (or Ahwāl-al nafs) and al-Siyāsā), which is provided with basic explanatory notes by the authors.

Introductory.

C. GENERAL PAPERS


Based on some crucial text-fragments, i.e. the Prologues of the Shīfiʿ and the Manṭiq al-Mashāriqiyin, on the one hand, and the three “classical” Avicennian tales together with the Poem On the Soul, on the other, A. criticizes both the characterization of Ibn Sīnā’s thought as purely Peripatetic (Goichon-Gutas) and its characterization as fundamentally Iranian-Islamic (Corbin). A. however does recognize that Ibn Sīnā clearly adheres to the Peripatetic tradition, although not in a slavish, but in a personal-critical way. For A., the fundamental unity of Ibn Sīnā’s thought is not really open to questioning. He insists that the tales and the poem seem to have a basic terminology and very old roots, and that their basis lies in a sapiential meditation of religiosity. Their final objective is no other than the liberation of the soul in view of its unification with God. But precisely as far as human destiny is concerned, the common people cannot grasp this higher truth, and therefore Ibn Sīnā developed his theory of the “imaginal” resurrection.

A fine, and stimulating paper, inviting further reflection on Ibn Sīnā’s basic attitude.


A. deals with different aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s thought. He characterizes the latter as intellectualistic and realistic. A. strongly emphasises Ibn Sīnā’s superiority over Aristotle. Based on secondary sources, he also pays attention to Ibn Sīnā’s influence on the West.

The English abstract gives no real idea of the contents of the paper.

Introductory.


After a brief, but perspicacious description of Ibn Sīnā’s life and works, A. deals with different aspects of the former’s thought. A. pays special attention to Ibn Sīnā’s actual division of the sciences, stressing inter alia the replacements effected by Ibn Sīnā in the Aristotelian scheme of the natural books. He also offers an excellent basic presentation of Ibn Sīnā’s complex theory of syllogism, and further shows how the latter adopted Philoponus’ theory of the inspecus, although in a very modified way. Finally, A. calls attention to Ibn Sīnā’s fundamental distinction between the metaphysica generalis and the metaphysica specialis.

Although introductory by its very nature, this paper contains many very valuable insights, and suggestions.


250. Marmura, M. E., Plotting the Course of Avicenna’s Thought, in: JAOl, 111 (91), 333 - 342.

A. offers a comprehensive Critical Review of D. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Leiden, Brill, 1988 (Bibl., 217). Among A.’s major objections, I may cite:

-Gutas overrates the significance of the notion of ḥads (intuition), at least where he makes it the “ulterior motive” of the autobiography

-Gutas’ incomplete analysis of Ibn Sīnā’s theory of intuition, e.g., ignoring Avicennian texts affirming that intuition may follow reflection; or his omission of a direct examination of the link between intuition and natural intelligence
-Gutas' too narrow interpretation of al-bikna al-dhawqiyya. In this respect, Gutas has unjustly neglected the ninth Namaz of the Ishtah, and its relation to Aristotelianism. Gutas makes the victim of a too rigorous unilateral interpretation of some of the technical terms.

A., notwithstanding his criticisms, underlines the importance of Gutas' work. Very valuable objections, which deserve full attention.


A rather conventional paper, stressing the innovative nature of Ibn Sinâ's thought. According to A., Ibn Sinâ did not completely succeed in combining his religious belief with his philosophy. Introductory. The text is written in very poor English.


A. deals in a brief way with Ibn Sinâ's life, works, medical ideas and (mystical) stories, and with his influence, mainly based on outdated sources. Of no real value.


CHAPTER VI

LOGIC - NOETICS - DIVISION OF THE SCIENCES

255. BÄCK, A., Avicenna's Conception of the Modalities, in: Vivarium, 30 (92), 217 - 255.

A. first notes that Ibn Sinâ, unlike Aristotle, does not accept a temporal view of modality, although he tries to accomodate the Aristotelian linkage of modality to time. In order to substantiate his interpretation, A. offers a detailed analysis of the most important Avicennan texts on modality. Among A.'s many observations, I may cite:

-Ibn Sinâ's distinguishes six ways in which a predication may be necessary
-Philoponus is besides Aristotle one of the major sources of Ibn Sinâ regarding this topic

-Ibn Sinâ's considers necessary propositions to be very similar with, although not identical to, their categorical, non-medical counterparts
-Ibn Sinâ's keeps away the modal specification from the subject
-Ibn Sinâ's makes a de re - de dicto-distinction of modality
-Ibn Sinâ's adheres to the weaker version of plenitude, i.e. all that is possible must exist in intellect
-Ibn Sinâ's determines modalities on the level of qualitities in themselves
-the existential import in modal propositions is not by the modality, but by the propositional context.

A very fine, and, indeed, rich paper.


For Ibn Sinâ, one has always to consider with respect to inferences involving complex predication the context of the speech act and the intention of the speaker. Nevertheless, Ibn Sinâ does not completely reject Aristotle's rules regarding such inferences. He, in fact, accepts that these rules may be useful for setting standards for an ideal, protocol language suitable for philosophy and science, and hence to be distinguished from ordinary language. Acc. to A., R. Bacon seems to have held a position very similar to Ibn Sinâ's.

Very valuable, opening perspectives for further research.

A. affirms that for Ibn Sīnā logic is both a part of wisdom and an instrument for other sciences. A. deals with the four basic questions of the Isagoge. He insists that only the “what”-question offers us a way to the (logical) essence of the thing. Finally, A. formulates basic observations regarding Ibn Sīnā’s theory of definition. The English translation is very weak. Valuable, although introductory.


A. insists that for Ibn Sīnā, contrary to al-Fārābī, speech cannot be part of the object matter of logic, since it is entirely accidental to the activities of the intellect. Hence, logic remains only accidentally a linguistic art. However, Ibn Sīnā, with al-Fārābī, stresses the logician’s prominent concern with questions of language as a means to contribute to the ultimate goal of discerning truth from falsity in the realm of intelligibles. Once more in agreement with al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā gives to indefinable nouns the force of a single noun, although he, contrary to the former, accepts that the indefinite noun is also in its signification in some sense composite, and hence it is not a noun in its fullest sense. On this issue, Ibn Sīnā’s position resembles the common position of the later Latin authors, but, contrary to them, he assumes that Aristotle’s remarks on this topic have a grammatical, rather than a logical import. When dealing with the inflected noun, Ibn Sīnā once more stresses that some basic grammatical features of a language are relevant to the expressions of thought in language, while al-Fārābī had stated that the grammar of a particular language, when falling short of logical perspicacity, can be modified accordingly. A very fine study.

259. ID., Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions, in: Dialogue, 32 (93), 219 - 258 (see infra, 300).


Among the multitude of A.’s remarks about Ibn Sīnā, I may refer to:
- while Ibn Sīnā does admit that both the vocal and the intelligible word together constitute the genus of the syllogism, the priority accorded to the intelligible aspects of the syllogism is unmistakable
- the emphasis in assent is on the way in which the cognition itself is accepted by the knower (A. hereby refers to a possibly mu‘azzilite origin)
- Ibn Sīnā rejects truth-value criteria as a genuine basis for dividing the subject-matter of the logical arts
- Ibn Sīnā adheres to Aristotle’s view on the ethical utility of rhetorics, but does in no way accept the identification of rhetorics with phronesis

According to Ibn Sīnā the example argument (tsamīhi) is a more potential tool for evoking assent than the enthymeme.

Ibn Sīnā is the only Arabic author to have provided the poetical syllogistic with a proper formal structure (but A. points to a serious problem in Ibn Sīnā’s account, i.e., regarding the universal character of the major premise)

Ibn Sīnā, in accordance with al-Fārābī, stresses that poetic statements are effective tools for provoking human actions. Many very valuable insights are offered, which are worthy of serious consideration.


The part on Ibn Sīnā is based on a close examination of the rhetorical part of the Philosophy for ‘Arabī. A. first stresses that Ibn Sīnā gives an immediate impression of concreteness in his rhetorics. In fact, Ibn Sīnā was, above all, interested in the political character of rhetorical art. Therefore, he, in sharp contrast with al-Fārābī, kept the thoughtful man at the level of political life. Hence, Ibn Sīnā wanted to broaden the scope of (classical) rhetoric, but without forsaking the city. He excluded
the divine and natural matters from the rhetorician’s compass. However, he did not reject the Islamic rhetoric, because of its neglect of arfīl proof, but corrected it by the introduction of some minor modifications. Moreover, he limited rhetorical investigation of law and the lawgiving to regimes, i.e., the end of lawgiving. Finally, he clearly distinguished between the written and the unwritten law, but factually restricted his discussions to the immediate concerns. A. in a much qualified way, concludes that Ibn Sīnā, in his early work, perhaps presented a corrected version of Al-Fārābī’s doctrine on rhetoric. A very fine study.

263. CEYLAN, Y., A Kantian Approach to the Avicennian Doctrine of Abstraction. in: Isl. Stud., 31 (92), 71 - 82. A. believes there do exist some striking similarities between Ibn Sīnā’s scheme of the inner senses and Kant’s scheme of the process of human understanding. However, A. himself often observes that a tremendous gap separates the medieval Ibn Sīnā from the modern Kant. A.’s exposé of the internal senses in Ibn Sīnā is almost exclusively based on Rahman’s translation of the psychological part of the Naḥṭī. Of very limited value. One wonders whether A. is not much more familiar with Kant than with Ibn Sīnā?

264. DAG, M., Some Notes on Avicenna’s Epistemology, in: Acts (Ankara), 125 - 133; Bildiriler, 153 - 161 (Tu). A. describes Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the acquisition of knowledge in a brief, rather classical way. However, A.’s claim that the Ashīrite theologians of Ibn Sīnā’s time had a conception of perception very similar to the latter’s, notwithstanding a major difference in vocabulary, sounds original. Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā held that animal behaviour was subject to divine inspiration. Interesting, especially where the rapprochment with the kalām is concerned, although one wonders whether A. is not interpreting Ibn Sīnā in a too religious sense?

265. DAVIDSON, H. A., Avicenna on Emanation, the Active Intellect, and Human Intellect, in: H. A. DAVIDSON, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect. Oxford, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1992, 74 - 126. The basis of the present chapter is already present in: H.A. DAVIDSON, Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect, in: Viator, 3 (72), 109 - 178 (Bibli., 224 - 225), but one finds important additional remarks. Among the additions, I may cite: -the famous principle “From the One only the one” seems to be original, at least as far as its explicit formulation is concerned, with Ibn Sīnā. -Alexander’s De Anima and De Intellectu are designated as the specific sources of Ibn Sīnā’s notion of the acquired intellect. -Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between two phases of thought is described in a much more elaborated way. -the physical character of the cognitive faculty is particularly stressed. -the observation by A. that it looks as if Ibn Sīnā takes the souls of the spheres, and not the Agent Intellect, to be the source of the human knowledge of future events. Very valuable additions.


267. EHRIG-EGERT, C., Zur Analyse von Modalaussagen bei Avicenna und Averroes, in: ZDMG, Suppl. VI: W. RÖLLIG (Hrsg.) XXII. deutscher Orientalistentag. Vom 21. bis 25. März 1983 in Tübingen. Stuttgart, Fr. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1985, 195 - 199. After a brief outline of Aristotle’s interpretation of modal functions, A. points to the fact that Yahyā ibn ‘Adi and Al-Fārābī – following Ammonius and Theophrastus – offered an interpretation somewhat different from that of the Stagirite, insofar as they, in a way very similar to Boethius, interpreted the relationship between subject and predicate in intensive rather than extensive terms. Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā tried to systematize this latter interpretation, especially in his Isḥāqī. It is striking that Ibn Sīnā attributes a modal status to assertoric statements, and introduces two further modalities regarding the modes of possibility. Although Ibn Sīnā might have been inspired by Theophrastus, A. is convinced that these ideas are original with him. An interesting case-study, but in need of further elaboration.

A more elementary version of the paper below (some fragments are almost verbatim the same).


A. first stresses the importance of experience as basis for the rational sciences in classical Islam. For Ibn Sinā, experience is all knowledge acquired by reason, and socially preserved, although it sometimes may also refer to practical aspects of perception. A. further insists that for Ibn Sinā the principle of science cannot be separated from the principle of religious truth, since everything, included human knowledge, ultimately derives from God. Therefore, knowledge has to be in accordance with the "truth", and hence there is the necessity of a correct methodology of reasoning, i.e., logic. However, since in Ibn Sinā's time general principles constituted the object of the scientific investigation, one easily understands the former's stress on the search for the middle term in the basic syllogistic structure of the quest of knowledge. Nevertheless, one sometimes, although not often, encounters in his works instances of a more modern, i.e., experimental approach. More specifically, thought-experiments were enlarged, and the logical method of \textit{reductio ad absurdum} was used several times. In this sense, Ibn Sinā somehow prefigured the "modern" science.

A very valuable paper, offering a most qualified judgment of Ibn Sinā's basic scientific attitude.


It has to be noted that the name of the author is spelled here YE. FROLOVA.

The basic content of this paper is very similar to the preceding's one, but in a less well developed way.


Having given a survey of Greek thought on definition (the usual philosophers, but also Euclides), as well as one of Ibn Sinā's Arabic predecessors in this respect, A. deals in detailed way with Ibn Sinā's theory. He treats such topics as the essence, conditions, kinds and role of definition. His analysis is mainly based on the \textit{Fihrist}, sometimes supplemented with the \textit{K. al-Burāq} of the \textit{Shifā}. In all this, one finds a serious basic presentation, but no really innovative interpretation, except for A.'s contention that Euclides together with Aristotle formed a major source for Ibn Sinā's theory.

Valuable, especially as a basic introduction.


A. first stresses that Ibn Sinā effected a revolution in the content as well as in the form of his philosophical works by refusing to write commentaries ad litteram. Further, he points to the existence of no less than nine literary genres in the logical works of Ibn Sinā. Finally, A. observes that Ibn Sinā's logical texts replaced Aristotle's almost completely in the later Arabo-Islamic tradition. Al-Ghazzālī was the first theologian to introduce the "new" logical method in his works, thus finding himself able to argue with and against the philosophers, and also creating a useful instrument for theological and juristic exposition.

Very valuable information regarding the literary genres of Ibn Sinā's logical works.


Acc. to A., Ibn Sinā somehow prefigured the idea of "knowledge by presence", i.e. a kind of intuitive knowledge. Especially in the latter's description of God's knowledge - both His self-knowledge and His knowledge of things in connection with His emanation - fits the basic characteristics of knowledge by presence (this very fact not having been understood by Thomas Aquinas). A. also notes that Ibn Sinā, herein following Plotinus' distinction between knowledge and apprehension, accepted on the one hand the identity between knower and the known, insofar as the philosophical concept of knowledge is concerned, but admits on the other hand the
unfathomable mystical unity of the agent of apprehension and the Unity apprehended. Finally, A. affirms that Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical interpretation of the Light Verse formed the intellectual source of inspiration for al-Ghazzālī’s conception of mysticism.

Some interesting ideas, which from the purely historical point of view are subject to serious discussion, but which testify that Ibn Sīnā is still a living authority in actual Iranian-Islamic philosophical thinking.


Besides some scattered remarks about Ibn Sīnā’s conception of philosophy, and more specifically his theory of the division of the sciences, A. deals in detail (p. 199 ff.) with Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between fundamental and derived parts in the different sciences. A. observes that Ibn Sīnā’s conception of mathematics is not found in al-Fārābī. A. also points to Ibn Sīnā’s influence on several later Arabo-Islamic authors up to the 18th century. As to the other brief observations, mention may be made of the statement that Ibn Sīnā adopted the late ancient division of practical philosophy, and that there is no sign of any influence of “Prolegomena” to Aristotle’s philosophy in the Categories of his Shīfā.

Valuable observations, although in need of further elaboration.

275. ‘ISAWI (AL-), ’A., The Method of Knowledge in Psychological Medicine, according to Ibn Sīnā, in: Ilm al-nafs, 8, nr. 32 (94), 151 - 154 (Ar) (N.C.)


A preliminary study, when compared to A.’s later publications on the same topic (see Bibl. 135-136 and below, 270-71).


Arch., 14 ( 88 - 89), Microfiche Suppl., 20 - 122 (Bibl., 135 - 136, but the cited texts-fragments are much more limited, and there are some displacements.


A slightly reworked version of -once more!- A.’s “Medieval Arabic Poetics... (see above, 277), except for the final part (253 ff.), where A. argues that Ibn Sīnā’s theory of poetry seems to defend a strict relation between Beauty, Goodness and Truth. This last idea is worthy of further investigation.


A first notes that Ibn Sīnā normally distinguishes between the quiddity considered in itself and the universal. However, in some cases Ibn Sīnā uses the term “universal” to characterize quiddities, but then he always clarifies the two senses in which he uses this term. For him, the universal as such exists only in the mind, and consists of two things, i.e., the quiddity and the accident of universality. This theory of the universal was developed by Ibn Sīnā in order to resolve a logical problem, i.e., of predicating a quiddity of a subject, as well as a metaphysical problem, i.e., of the one and the many. A. notes that the logical problem has also an epistemological side, i.e., universality and particularity (in predication), which Ibn Sīnā maintains exist only in the mind, have a foundation in extramental existence. But A. points also to fundamental ambiguities in Ibn Sīnā’s writings regarding the relation of the quiddity in itself to mental existence, e.g., (to mention only one example presented by A.). Ibn Sīnā uses the “in itself”, when referring to quiddities, on some occasions in an absolute sense, and on some other as synonymous with “by itself”, but not always distinguishes between these two non-identical senses.

A very fine study.

281. ID., The Fortuna of the Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages, in: Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy, 1, 85 - 103, esp. 89 - 98.
Having first dealt with the Arabic translation (especially its peculiarities) of the *Posterior Analytics*, and its reception in al-Fārābī, A. shows by two examples taken from the metaphysics (one in connection with God’s knowledge of particulars, the other regarding the proof from contingency for God’s existence) that Ibn Sīnā was clearly influenced by the readings of the Arabic translator. Further, A. shows that for medieval Islamic philosophy, and not at least for Ibn Sīnā, the *Posterior Analytics* were considered to be the perfection of syllogistic reasoning. However, Aristotle himself, notwithstanding his acceptance of stringent conditions for realizing scientific knowledge, formulated some statements suggestive of flexibility. The Islamic philosophers expanded on these latter, and extended the range of premises admissible in demonstration to include assertions of particular experiential facts, as can be shown by Ibn Sīnā’s discussion of the “demonstration of the fact” (burdith inaa). Moreover, Ibn Sīnā clearly rejects the thesis that necessary premises alone can provide demonstrative syllogisms. In this rejection, Ibn Sīnā may have been influenced by al-Shārī’s kalam, although he always insisted that sensation has to be accompanied by judgment. A. hereby pays also attention to Ibn Sīnā’s treatment of experienced and intuited premises. In the last part of his paper, A. deals with Ghazālī’s theory. A very stimulating study.


Among A.’s many observations regarding Ibn Sīnā, I may cite:

-when dealing with the four questions of the *Esagoge*, Ibn Sīnā does not follow the Stoas, but remains inside the Aristotelian-Neoplatonic tradition
- Ibn Sīnā, herein clearly differing from Ibn Rushd, divides the four questions of the *An. Post.* into two groups, according to the fundamental distinction between *taṣawwur*, conception and *taṣdiq*, assent
- in Ibn Sīnā, more than in any other thinker of the Arabic tradition, definition is closely linked to demonstration
- developing further the Neoplatonic theory of axioms, Ibn Sīnā distinguishes between an absolutely necessary principle, which cannot be proven, and a relatively necessary principle, i.e., a “thesis” which can be demonstrated in a higher science
- Ibn Sīnā’s system of the division of the sciences has its source in Neoplatonic, esp. Proclian metaphysics
- for Ibn Sīnā the *Topika* offered a demonstrative *tekhē*, the latter having however only an instrumental, not a syllogistic value.

Very valuable, not at least with respect to Ibn Sīnā’s precise Greek sources


A preliminary study for A.’s book (see 282), although very valuable in itself.


Mainly based on Ibn Sīnā’s writings, A. offers a basic survey of the three kind of premises, i.e. the categorical, the hypothetical and the disjunctive, which the Arabic logicians did distinguish with respect to syllogisms.

Valuable as an introduction.


A. briefly refers to Ibn Sīnā, as one of the first scholars, who was giving a self-description of problem solving during sleep.

Of limited value.

A. posits that the notion of *intention* in Ibn Sīnā has a more extended reference than in al-Fārābī, and somehow marks the beginning of the "Apprehensio ab initio". However as far as the *Avicenna Latins* is concerned, no sharp distinction is drawn between *intention*, *forma* and *intelligibile* in intellectual cognition. Moreover, only the initial degrees of abstraction can be attributed to the soul, whereas its ultimate degree consists in the reception of a form given by the Agent Intellect. A. concludes that Ibn Sīnā's theory of perception exerted a strong influence upon medieval and Renaissance Western thinkers.

Introductory.


In the first part of the book (1 - 132), A. deals with the major aspects of rhetorics, as developed in the Arabo-Islamic philosophical tradition, and especially in Ibn Sīnā, and pays special attention to Ibn Sīnā's technique of paraphrasing. Then, she offers a German annotated translation of I of Ibn Sīnā's commentary on the *Rhetorics* (see supra, 7). From the doctrinal point of view, A. concentrates on such basic terms as *ligā* and *tadālq*, showing that the former has a more general sense than the latter. Further, she pays close attention to the rhetorical syllogistics and induction, and hence to the enthymeme and the paradigma, as well as regarding the technical and non-technical arts of conviction. In all this, she not only presents Ibn Sīnā's doctrine, but also al-Fārābī's and Ibn Rushd's. Generally speaking, she detects a close resemblance between al-Fārābī's and Ibn Sīnā's approach, notwithstanding the presence of some differences, as e.g., Ibn Sīnā's only admitting of assertoric, and thus not of hypothetical and disjunctive premises in rhetorics, and his insistence on the very fact that the omitted premise in the enthymeme is based on falsity. A. always indicates the (minor) differences which one finds between Ibn Sīnā's different works on rhetorics. Finally, A. deals with Ibn Sīnā's obvious technique of paraphrasing, hereby *inter alia* indicating how Ibn Sīnā was influenced by the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Rhetorics*.

A. formulates some very valuable insights, but one may wonder whether she underestimates Ibn Sīnā's originality, at least in some respects.

CHAPTER VII
Linguistics - Terminology - Poetry


A first observes that both al-Kindi and Ibn Sinâ seem to have assumed the semantic instability of the term (al-Fltrîlî and Ibn Rushd having neutralized it). In Ibn Sinâ, A. posits three ways of use:
1. Logical, and then either signifying the factual character of a judgment, or meaning "truth’’;
2. Metaphysical, and hereby referring to the particular ontological status of God;
3. Psychological, and thus indicating the constitutive essence of the subject.
A. also briefly recalls the later Latin tradition regarding this notion.
Most valuable. A very fine basic outline.


A. presents Ibn Sinâ as the first real phonetical scientist. According to A., Ibn Sinâ already introduced a distinction between pitch, loudness and sound quality, and A. insists that Ibn Sinâ established a direct linkage between frequency and pitch, intensity and loudness, and waveform and sound quality. A. also offers a basic outline of Ibn Sinâ’s acoustics, as well as of the anatomy of the throat. However, A. interprets Ibn Sinâ’s contributions in a far too modern way. This is again evident, when A. claims that Ibn Sinâ was not only aware of the existing opposition between phonemes and allophones, but also of related phenomena such as neutralisation, assimilation and dissimilation.
Although meritorious, the work looses much of its value because of A.’s (unwarranted) tendency to ascribe (too) modern views to Ibn Sinâ.


A. first surveys the use of anitas in the translations of Gerard of Cremona and Dominicus Gundissalinus. Although it sometimes was used to render hāliyya, it most of the time stood for anniyya. Its first occurrence seems to be in Gundissalinus’ translation of al-Ghazzālī’s Maqāṣid. A. however notes that Gundissalinus seems to have hesitated to use this neologism. It looks as if he adopted it only for the sake of brevity. It is most striking that in the translations of the De Anima and the Isagoge, the expression of anitas is never used in order to translate anniyya. As to Gerard’s translation of the Qānūn, hāliyya is not rendered by anitas, but by the complex formula of utrum sint vel non sint. A. observes that Alpago’s Renaissance transmssion of anitas by alunia only vaguely reflects the original notion of Ibn Sinā. Acc. to A., the latter indicates a kind of mystical intuition of one’s own individuality.

An interesting case-study, especially regarding the Latin tradition.

CHAPTER VIII

PSYCHOLOGY - PAEDAGOGICS


A. points to the passive role of the senses in perception, and evokes Ibn Sinā’s notion of istiqlāl, i.e. the realization of a second entelechy. A. offers a basic discussion of the unity of the soul, as well as of the five external senses, his main basis being Ibn Sinā’s Shifā (supplemented with some elements taken from the “Avicennian inspired” Abū ‘l-Barrakāt al-Baghdādī and F.D. al-Rāzi).

Valuable as an introduction.


A. stresses Ibn Sinā’s independence from the “Hellenistic” tradition, by pointing to the latter’s theory of the rational soul, especially the related topics of intuition, bads, and resurrection, ma’ād. A. concludes that Ibn Sinā was the first Arabo-Islamic author to fuse religious and philosophical themes.

Valuable, although not really innovative, and in need of much more detailed development.


A. examines in great detail the problem of estimation in Ibn Sinā, not only inside the framework of the inner senses, but within different contexts in different works.

A. first deals with the classical, i.e., “canonical” account, while paying special attention to al-Ghazzālī’s and Ibn Rushd’s critiques of it. Then A., within the broader context of Ibn Sinā’s psychological works, concentrates on four areas within which estimation is assigned a more complex psychological role, i.e.: the link between estimation and incidental perception; estimation’s status as the judgmental faculty within the animal soul; its role in the creation of fictional ideas; and the identification of a special class of estimative judgments upon which Ibn Sinā bases
his notion of estimative propositions in his logical works. Further, A. discusses the estimative premises in Ibn Sīnā’s logical works, and notes that the erroneous estimative judgments are proper to the human estimative faculty. A. hereby observes that according to Ibn Sīnā each faculty, when operating in isolation, will simply assert to what is in harmony with its own perceptual abilities, but that thereby some serious problems do arise in Ibn Sīnā’s system, basically due to his body-soul dualism. Then A. shows that for Ibn Sīnā one cannot pursue the studies of physics and mathematics without ascending to the level of estimation. Finally, A. treats two aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s application of the notion of an estimative faculty to epistemological problems, i.e.: the role of estimation in apperception (it being the basis of self-awareness in animals), and its bearing upon ethical judgments (A. insists that Ibn Sīnā takes into consideration the conventional societal structures, and therefore qualifies Ibn Taymiyya’s criticism against Ibn Sīnā as unjustified).

A very fine paper.


A. stresses that in Ibn Sīnā one finds a Neoplatonic psychological dualism, which is completely absent in Aristotle. A. discusses in a rather classical way the famous argument of the homo velans; and Ibn Sīnā’s description of the soul, and its faculties. A. posits inter alia that Nemesius of Emesa and John of Damascus laid down the basis for Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of memory, and he presents Ibn Sīnā as the first author who included the common sense in the category of the internal senses.

Finally, A. points to a basic distinction in Ibn Sīnā between recordatio, i.e., a disciplined and conscious recollective search, and discere, i.e. a power of knowing/learning new things. A. concludes that Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of the inner senses implies a conceptualisation, forming the basis for man’s morality and creativity, but in a social milieu.

A valuable basic presentation, based on the Avicenna Latinus.


A. briefly, but accurately presents Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of the degrees of the intellect, and its link with the symbolism of the Light Verse of the Qur’ān.

A valuable basic outline.


Authors deal in a very general way with Ibn Sīnā’s influence, writings and personality, before they briefly discuss his conception of education. Regarding the latter, they detect in Ibn Sīnā a strong personalism, based on a combination of Socratic self-knowledge and revelational self-affection (in Iqbal’s sense!). They even qualify Ibn Sīnā as a biologist-theologian, prefiguring Darwin and de Chardin.

Of no value.


A. basically affirms that Ibn Sīnā was a physician rather than a philosopher. He discusses Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the diverse outer and inner faculties of the organic Beings. Attention is also paid to such topics as the relationship between the physical and the psychical, cognition, or emotions. In all this, A. points to differences between the writings of the Qānūn and of the Nāṣīḥūd. Rather introductory, and the basic thesis of A. is subject to serious questioning.


After a survey of well-known metaphysical and epistemological ideas of Ibn Sīnā, the latter’s proper pedagogical views are discussed, and even then in a rather brief way. The reader is only struck by some ideas of A., such as: Ibn Sīnā is at once an Earth-centered, an Other-world-centered and a Man-centered philosopher; or: Ibn Sīnā is a precursor of T. Parsons (a 20th.c. sociologist!).

Of very limited value.

Having offered a brief conventional review of Ibn Sinā’s (spiritual) theory of the soul, A. deals with Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn al-Qayyım’s more corporal conceptions of the soul, but without developing a systematic comparison between both opposite approaches.

As far as Ibn Sinā is concerned, of very limited value.

307. MARḤABA, M., Psychological Death according to Ibn Sinā, in: Al-thaqafa al-nafsiyya, 2, nr. 6 (91), 108 - 114 (Ar) (N.C.).


According to A., the idea that soul is a perfection, or form is affirmed in Ibn Sinā in a methodological way. But for Ibn Sinā, contrary to the common Peripatetic opinion, perfection does not express the essence of the soul. It, in fact, concerns the relationship of the soul with the body, since the soul is only acting through the body. However, regarding intellectual perfection, which is derived from outside, i.e., the Agent Intellect, the body is no longer involved, and therefore the soul appears to be an entity separate from the body, and hence having its own substantiality. In all this, A. detects a serious tension and, at the same time, discovers a close parallelism between the action-essence distinction, present in Ibn Sinā’s psychology, on the one hand, and the existence-essence distinction, which prevails in his metaphysics, on the other hand. While trying to harmonise Plato and Aristotle, Ibn Sinā adhered to the idea of “separate perfection”. A. also offers a detailed, although in a rather conventional way, description of the different degrees of the human intellect.

The basic thesis, but somewhat more developed, as in A.’s “The Role of the Concept of the Perfect in the Characterization of the Soul between Aristotle and Ibn Sinā” (Bišā, 162 - 163).


The work is based on lectures, given by A. in Riad during the years 1984 - 1987. As one may expect in such cases, one is faced with an introductory presentation, giving the essential outlines of the concerned doctrine. A. presents the classical description of the soul, and its powers, and he also points to some pedagogical ideas of Ibn Sinā, as well as to his doctrine of the life in the hereafter (but also in these cases, no real innovative views are offered).

A valuable introduction to Ibn Sinā’s psychological doctrine, although one wonders whether A. does not interpret some of its aspects in a far too modern way?


Having dealt in a rather general way with Ibn Sinā’s conceptions of man, society, knowledge and ethics, A. presents in a more detailed way Ibn Sinā’s basic views on education, insisting essentially on Ibn Sinā’s theory of the specific methods of teaching according to the different age groups.

Introductory.


Having discussed some elements of the wider context of Ibn Sinā’s philosophy, A. concentrates on his doctrine of the soul. This presentation concerns the classical topics, and is of a rather conventional kind, except for A.’s insistence on Ibn Sinā’s basic inclination towards a fundamentally materialistic point of view. It may also be mentioned that acc. to A. Ibn Sinā seriously moved into the direction of the experimental method of modern science, although A. admits that Ibn Sinā did not fully master it.

Introductory. Undoubtedly A. interprets Ibn Sinā’s thought in a too outspoken materialistic way.


After a rather long introduction, in which A. states the major doctrines of the knowledge of the soul in classical Greek thought, A. points that Ibn Sinā agrees with Plotinus in the acceptance of an intellectual self-knowledge, and disagrees with Aristotle regarding the possibility of a sensible self-knowledge. Based on the two versions of the "Flying Man"-argument, present in the De Anima of the Avicenna Latinus, A. offers a basic outline of Ibn Sinā’s theory of self-knowledge in a rather conventional way.

At most introductory.


A. gives a basic presentation of the fourth chapter of the R. al-siyâsa. A. affirms that this treatise is different from Ibn Sinâ’s other works, but does not question its authenticity. A. points to the presence of influences of Quinultianus and Cicero in the present chapter. A. also indicates several similarities between al-Ghazzâlî’s and Ibn Sinâ’s paedagogical conceptions. The latter are often compared to later paedagogical theories. Rather introductory.


A. offers a rather conventional outline of Ibn Sinâ’s doctrine of the substantiability of the soul. Introductory.


CHAPTER IX
POLITICS - ETHICS


Acc. to A., action for Ibn Sinâ is always linked with the individual. Furthermore, Ibn Sinâ fundamentally distinguishes between natural and voluntary action, the latter being limited to man and God. A. examines Ibn Sinâ’s theory of the motives of human action, while insisting that no realization of any human action is possible without the presence of a factor of preponderance. Moreover, he notes that for Ibn Sinâ human action can always be changed, and is subject to interruption, contrary to that of God. Finally, A. stresses that Ibn Sinâ sees no other perfection for the human action than in accepting the order as issued by God’s action, and therefore to open itself to the illumination of the “Giver of the Forms”. A. concludes that Ibn Sinâ’s theory escapes some difficulties inherent in that of his mûrjânit contemporaries. It has to be noted that the Ta’lîfî formed the main basis for A.’s analysis. Some very valuable ideas are present, but they are still in need of further development.


A. discusses Ibn Sinâ’s theory of the division of the sciences, while paying special attention to the fact that Ibn Sinâ abruptly introduces the topics of ethics and politics at the end of the Metaphysics of the Shi‘âh’. Acc. to A., this introduction is not fortuitous, but due to Ibn Sinâ’s conviction that both disciplines belong to the divine lawgiving shari‘a, and thus offer the practical confirmation of what is demonstrated by the divine science. On basis of the Tr. on the Division of the Sciences, A. rather convincingly shows that for Ibn Sinâ there is no contradiction between pagan, i.e., Greek philosophy and religion, i.e., Islamic Revelation. A. further gives in a detailed, although somewhat paraphrastic way, the last parts of the Metaphysics of the Shi‘âh, insisting on the primacy which Ibn Sinâ ascribed to the prophet as a guide for mankind, both in its social and its individual components. A. observes how Ibn Sinâ in all this implicitly refers to Aristotle and Plato, but also to
particular items of the Islamic shari‘a. A. concludes that although Ibn Sīnā only offers a propositional political theory, it however entails important questions. Very valuable, opening serious perspectives for further investigation.


Mainly based on the R. al-Akhḍār, A. offers a brief survey of Ibn Sīnā’s major ethical ideas. Introductory.


Having presented the major alternative systems to Ibn Sīnā’s in the latter’s own days, and having pointed to the influence of the latter’s system on later Arabo-Islamic thought, A. concentrates on Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of prophecy. A. insists that for Ibn Sīnā the accomplished philosopher possesses sufficient demonstrative knowledge to understand the intended meaning of any prophetic utterance. A. observes that Ibn Sīnā tried to convince his audience of the fundamental accord between religion and philosophy, but, as the same time, seems to have intentionally left many things unrevealed. A. also pays attention to Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between religious beliefs and actions, having political or social aims, and religious beliefs or symbols, corresponding to demonstrative truths, and being reserved for the happy “few”. Acc. to A., the absence of any explicit work on practical philosophy by Ibn Sīnā is due to a fundamental philosophical position. Moreover, Ibn Sīnā was convinced of the indispensable role of philosophy in separating demonstrative truth from all wrong sorts of “visionaries”. Acc. to A., al-Fārābī’s political philosophy provides the missing link in all of this. In his conclusion, A. ascribes to Ibn Sīnā an elaborate rhetorical strategy in order to posit philosophy as the rational guide for interpreting the prophetic legacy.

A very interesting paper, although some of A.’s interpretations are rather questionable.


A. deals with the problem of personal income, which according to Ibn Sīnā may be obtained either by trade, or by a professional activity of whatever kind, i.e., intellectual, literal or handicraft. For Ibn Sīnā saving or spending money should be done in conformity with moral and religious prescriptions. A. stresses that for Ibn Sīnā, contrary to al-Fārābī and the Ḥikmān al-ṣafā‘, householding has nothing to do with one’s personal care for oneself. In the second part of his paper, A. concentrates on the city, and some macro-economical aspects. A. herein observes that Ibn Sīnā, following Plato and Pythagoras, defends a tri-partite hierarchical social order (similar to that of the soul). For Ibn Sīnā, every citizen has his place and his task, according to his personal capacities. As to the income of the state, Ibn Sīnā’s theory reflects a basically Aristotelian attitude, although also religious elements are clearly present. A very valuable, and, undoubtedly, innovative study.
CHAPTER X

METAPHYSICS


After a rather long (p. 1-74) lexicographical and historical presentation of the notion of finality, A. deals with the various aspects of Ibn Sinā’s thought in which the idea of finality plays an important role. Among A.’s many observations, I may cite:

- the existence of a direct relationship between God and the supralunar souls, as far as their origination is concerned
- Ibn Sinā’s conception of God’s “being necessary” differs from the muʿtazilite’s, insofar as it has its very basis in the idea of finality
- Ibn Sinā somehow prefigures the scholastic project of the later Latin West
- for Ibn Sinā the world is eternal, but preceded by an essential non-Being
- Ibn Sinā’s theory of divine action, and related topics, reveals agreements and disagreements both with ashʿarism and muʿtazilism
- chance is considered by Ibn Sinā to be a cause (in the physical realm)
- contrary to Democritus, Ibn Sinā ascribes each natural thing a cause
- diverse goals determine diverse actions, which is most evident in human voluntary action

It has to be noted that A.’s analysis is based on a wide range of primary texts, among which some lesser known ones (A. sometimes paraphrases rather than interprets them).

A very valuable study, although one wonders whether A. is not interpreting some aspects of Ibn Sinā’s thought in a too religious way?


Having presented Aristotle’s theory of individuation, A. states that Ibn Sinā seems to endorse a bundle theory of individuation. However, Ibn Sinā clearly does not hold that an individual is an individual in virtue of its accidents. Then A., after a brief
evocation of Ibn Sīnā's famous "three respectus"-theory, observes that for the latter individual substances of the same species differ from one another by virtue of their quiddity's having a material existence. In the formation of a sensible individual, the quiddity of corporeity is added to a quiddity from the category of substance. A. hereby points to obscurities in Ibn Sīnā's account of corporeity. Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā follows Philoponus' dimensional conception of corporeity, but does not make "three-dimensional" part of the definition of corporeity. However, one of the major problems of Ibn Sīnā's interpretation is the very fact that it recognizes a genus body in both categories of substance and corporeity. Nonetheless, it is clear that Ibn Sīnā considers corporeity to be only a *proprium* of material substances. For him, the individual seems therefore to be a bundle of Forms put into complex combination. Notwithstanding the Platonic outlook of this latter idea, Ibn Sīnā does not adhere to the Platonic view, as is convincingly shown by A. Finally, A. insists that for Ibn Sīnā only a definite description, but not a definition of the individual is possible, and that the knowledge of the latter has to be through direct, immediate intuition. Very valuable.


Although having been published later, this paper was written previously to the paper, mentioned above. Its content is almost identical as far as the exposition on Ibn Sīnā is concerned, except for some remarks on the notion of corporeity, which are less precise in this contribution. However, in the present paper one finds additions which concern, on the one hand, Ibn Rushd's criticism of Ibn Sīnā's account of the priority of corporeity, and of his conception of the one; and, on the other hand, the characterization of Thomas Aquinas' position on individuation as mainly Avicennian. The same evaluation as above, although one wonders why A., since the publication of the present volume seems to have been postponed several times, has not reworked his observations on Ibn Sīnā's conception of corporeity?


Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā's world view is neither mechanistic nor deterministic, since he affirms the primacy of the final cause. A. moreover insists that Ibn Sīnā has a real notion of contingency.

These basic affirmations are not devoid of interest, but are in need of a much more substantial argumentation and development than those offered by A.


For A., Ibn Sīnā undeniably derived the distinction between essence and existence from al-Fārābi. Further, he presents a classical summary of Ibn Sīnā's doctrine, and vehemently criticizes it.

This paper is more devoted to A.'s own philosophical opinions than to the historical Ibn Sīnā. However, one wonders whether A. fully understood the latter?


Very brief, but significant presentation of Ibn Sīnā's major contribution to metaphysics, pointing both to its sources and its innovative elements. A. stresses the tremendous impact Ibn Sīnā's encyclopaedical works had in the later Arabic tradition.

Valuable as introduction.


As usual A., in the line of the later Iranian tradition, stresses that Ibn Sīnā's theory of the so-called "accidental" of existence constituted the epistemological basis for the later doctrine of the "Unity of Being" (as interpreted by M. S. Shirzād and Ibn al-'Arabi). A. explicitly indicates that such an interpretation of Ibn Sīnā is almost diametrically opposed to that of Latin scholasticism.

Interesting, but one wonders why A. does not offer a more solid textual basis in Ibn Sīnā himself in order to make the "Iranian" interpretation more acceptable?

331. GAMARRA, D. O., Esencia y posibilidad según Avicena, o la raíz de un problema gnoseológico; La esencia tema de la objetividad.
In the first chapter of this work, A. presents a rather conventional outline of the major items of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics, such as the primacy of the notion of Being, the distinction possible-necessary, etc. In the second chapter, A. mainly discusses three scholastic authors, who further elaborated on the Avicennian inspired idea of the objectivity of essence, i.e., Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus. In this latter case, A. mainly leans on a few secondary sources, which are most of the time rather outdated.

Of no real importance.


A. first briefly indicates the different terms of emanation in Ibn Sīnā, and the contexts in which they are used. Further, he offers a basic, but significant outline of Ibn Sīnā’s system of emanation, adding specific remarks, among which I may cite the two following ones: the emanation processus is a processus sui generis, being neither voluntary nor natural; the ‘a priori’ derivation of the multitude from the One, is a genesis oriented by the already inferred constitution of the “world”. A. enumerates basic differences between Ibn Sīnā’s system, on the one hand, and al-Fārābī’s (and Ibn Rushd’s), on the other hand, pointing inter alia to Ibn Sīnā ascribing not only a natural, but also an ontological consequence to the creation of the First Intellect. Finally, A., in rather classical terms, evokes al-Ghazālī’s and Ibn Rushd’s criticisms against Ibn Sīnā’s emanation theory.

A most valuable outline, offering a solid basis for further investigation.


A. observes that for Ibn Sīnā existence is not an accident in the usual sense. As to A., Ibn Sīnā adheres to a real distinction between essence and existence, although inside an essentialistic framework. Finally, A. ascribes to Ibn Sīnā a panexistentialism, which, in view of a few texts, sometimes corrects itself into a panexistentialism.

A.’s analysis is based on the Venice, 1495-ed. of the Avicenna Latinus.

Of very limited value, since A. ignores many important recent studies.


A. offers an outline of Ibn Sīnā’s proof for God’s existence ex ratione causa efficientis. A. insists on Ibn Sīnā’s identification between the possible, as realized, and the necessary ab also. For A., it is certain that Ibn Sīnā adhered to a monism. Regarding the distinction between essence and existence, A. stresses that both al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā gave essence priority.

At most introductory.

335. ID., art. Wuǧūd (existence, le fait d’être), in: ibid., 2771 - 2772.

A. insists that for Ibn Sīnā Being surpasses all categorical divisions, and that for him existence is “as” (“comme”) an accident. But Ibn Sīnā had no notion whatsoever of the contingent.

Introductory.


Having made some observations on Aristotle’s principle of (non-)contradiction, A. observes that for Ibn Sīnā, in full agreement with the Stagirite, “Being as Being” is the proper subject of metaphysics, but that Ibn Sīnā understands this being in a totally un-Aristotelian way, i.e., as synonymous with the “ens commune”. For Ibn Sīnā, metaphysics is the most universal, and hence highest science, its object being the consequence of common being, i.e., the ten categories, and the pairs: possible-necessary, potency-act, universal-particular and one-many. Or to put it briefly: the Aristotelian predicates viewed from a peculiar perspective. A. particularly stresses that Ibn Sīnā lists all the inquirabilia of his ontology. As to the principles of metaphysics, three are mentioned by Ibn Sīnā, i.e., res, ens and necessa. A. concludes that Ibn Sīnā gives a systematically complete elucidation of the three components of the science of metaphysics, but hereby puts the principle of (non-)contradiction outside of the three basic points. Nevertheless, for Ibn Sīnā this principle is both certain and true. Moreover, by presenting it, in a way different from Aristotle’s, as the law of the excluded middle, Ibn Sīnā makes it directly applicable to arguments. Finally, Ibn Sīnā widens its application to every “thing” or “natur”, considered in abstraction from being. A. concludes that for Ibn Sīnā the principle is absolutely universal.

It should be mentioned that the study is based on the Avicenna Latinus.

A stimulating study.

A. offers a rather general outline of Ibn Sinā’s doctrine of Being, indicating both parallelisms and differences with al-Fārābī. Of limited value.


For A., it is certain that Ibn Sinā refuted the idea of emanation, and accepted the very idea of a creatio ex nihilo. In order to substantify this conclusion, A. deals with such basic notions as substance, act, time and continuous creation, stressing that the specific meaning they have in Ibn Sinā is quite different from their Greek counterparts. The paper is written in poor English. Of limited value.


Acc. to A., Ibn Sinā is dependent upon the kalam as far as its affirmation states that the possible for its actualization is in need of an agent, and as far as its famous distinction between essence and existence is concerned. Moreover, Ibn Sinā’s theory of the three “respectus” of the universal is presented by A. as an attempt to harmonize the conceptions of being with that of unity of testimony, the former having its source rather in Peripatetic thought, and in the, to it, somehow related murtazism, whereas the latter derives from sufism, to which the ash‘arites did adhere. A. insists that Ibn Sinā is neither an Aristotelian, nor a Platonic thinker, pointing *inter alia* to Ibn Sinā’s rejection of the Platonistic ideas, and his having prepared an analogical concept of Being, as becomes evident in Sahrawardi. Rather, one does find in Ibn Sinā an elaboration of a synthesis between Peripatetic and sufiistic thought, as becomes evident in the theory of the “accidentality” of existence, and the related issue of the status of the non-existent essence. Acc. to A., the

qualities in themselves are for Ibn Sinā neither existent, nor non-existent, and it is due to “something other”, i.e., divine Providence that the possible becomes necessary ab alic. This latter fact guarantees at once the possibility for the human being to know “universals”, albeit in a limited and relative way. Very interesting, although A.’s basic position is open to serious questioning.


Having briefly outlined the realist and nominalist versions of instance ontology, or particularism, A. presents two arguments in Ibn Sinā (one derived from the Dāneš-Nāmeh, the other from the *Metaphysics of the Shifā*) for the existence of property instances. Ibn Sinā herein clearly adheres to a moderate realism. However, his arguments, which are based on dubious Aristotelian premises, do not offer a compelling argument for instance ontology. Therefore, A. brings a modern reformulation of them. Although it looks as if A. is using Ibn Sinā to defend his own philosophical options, his thesis cannot be rejected without having examined in detail both passages in Ibn Sinā.


Having offered a brief survey of the ontological argument, and its formulations in Western thought, A. concentrates on Ibn Sinā’s famous proof for God’s existence in the *Fāshār*. For A., it is rather obvious that this text of Ibn Sinā is too vague to be accepted as a genuine formulation of the ontological argument. Ibn Sinā’s other writings also fail to construe a really ontological argument, although all the elements needed are present in the Avicennian system, as becomes evident in F.D. al-Rāzī’s version of the ontological argument in his *Oriental Questions*. It is an “Avicennian” version, based on the idea of “being necessary”, and, as such, not adhered to by al-Rāzī himself. Interesting, but one wonders why al-Rāzī would have been more “Avicennian” than Ibn Sinā himself?

A. offers a detailed, but essentially classical outline of the diverse aspects of Ibn Sinà's metaphysics, such as his theories of Being, the unity and oneness of God, divine knowledge, the relation between God and the world, and divine providence (and the related topics of prophecy and karâ). According to A., Ibn Sinà in all this closely follows al-Fârâbî, although his exposition possessed more clarity and a more demonstrative force than the latter's. A. concludes that Ibn Sinà, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully, tried to combine religion with philosophy. A valuable introduction, but not really innovative.


A. first considers the importance of the all doctrine of the essence-existence distinction for the whole history of Islamic philosophy. The basic elements of this doctrine are given by A. according to Ibn Sinà's well-known formulation. A. pays special attention to the so-called accidentality of existence. He insists that this accidentality has to be understood in a very particular way, and refers in this respect to a most relevant passage in the Ta'liqât, as well as to a passage taken from N. D. Tusi's commentary on the Isharat. A. also underlines the importance of Ibn Sinà's formulations of the doctrines of the universal (and the related triple distinction) and of the possible, necessary and impossible. After having dealt with the problematic of existence in later Islamic thought, A. names Ibn Sinà as the first philosopher who presented the hierarchical order of the "great chain of Being" in one single work, and who moreover adhered to the priority of essence, notwithstanding his stressing -from the outside- to subscribe to the priority of existence.

A. very stimulating, and, in some respects, very provocative paper, which deserves one's attention, even if one cannot agree with all of A.'s statements.


A. stresses that Ibn Sinà was the first philosopher to formulate explicitly the concept of contingency in order to introduce a radical distinction between God and the world.
CHAPTER XI

RELIGIOUS THEMES AND MYSTICISM


A. offers a rather conventional outline of Ibn Sinā's theory of the soul in its various aspects, such as: the existence and the nature of the soul, its relationship with the body, and its life in the hereafter. A. concludes that Ibn Sinā was moved by a genuinely religious spirit, and that for Ibn Sinā there did not exist any fundamental difference between the truth of religion and that of philosophy.

A valuable introduction.


A. distinguishes two major positions, as far as Ibn Sinā's theory of resurrection is concerned: 1. the affirmation of both a spiritual and a bodily resurrection (and present in different Avicennan works); and 2. the negation of bodily resurrection, although no explicit defense of a belief in such is given, since Ibn Sinā only rejects some of the fundamentals on which such a belief is based (present in the Adḥawīyya-Treatise). A. deals with al-Ghazzālī's criticism of Ibn Sinā's doctrine in rather classical terms. However, A. insists that al-Ghazzālī criticizes Ibn Sinā's concept of spiritual resurrection only in a very moderate way, i. e., by emphasizing that the divine recompense has not to concern the soul alone. Furthermore, A. always directly compares Ibn Sinā's affirmations in the Adḥawīyya with al-Ghazzālī's statements in the Tahāfūt.

A valuable introduction, although in need of further refinements.

349. 'ALAWĪ (AL-), A., Criticism of Conceptualism, in: Majallat Kulliyāt al-ādāb wa l-ʿulūm al-insāniyya, 17 (92), 9 - 38, esp. 9 - 22 (Ar).
Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā’s theory of conceptualization is closely related to Plotinus’s. For him, there exists a parallelism between Ibn Sīnā’s theory of the degrees of intellect and Plotinus’s distinction between different levels of reality. Moreover, what Ibn Sīnā calls pure intellect, and what Plotinus calls “above-Being”, are just different nominations, which however can be assembled under the common appellation of “Reaon”. Acc. to A., such a philosophical approach cannot explain acquired knowledge, i.e., knowledge received by Revelation. In a similar vain, A. opposes Ibn Sīnā’s dualism between soul and body.
As far as the historical Ibn Sīnā is concerned, of no value.


A. offers a brief survey of the last parts of the Isbābāt, and characterizes Ibn Sīnā’s mysticism in terms which clearly remind one of Gardot’s.
At most introductory.

351. ‘ĀSFI, H., With Ibn Sīnā on Sura “The Most High” (s. 87), in: Al-Ma‘ārij, 1, nr. 5 (91), 57 - 61 (Arv) (N.C.)


Notwithstanding its voluminous character, the work does not offer many innovative views. The first part gives basic considerations about mysticism and Oriental wisdom with respect to Ibn Sīnā; the latter’s relationship with Shi‘ism, esp. the Īkhwān al-Ṣafā‘ī (in a rather vague way!); the works of Ibn Sīnā revealing “Oriental” influences, and their sources of inspiration. The second part of the work deals with two major doctrines: 1. knowledge (intellectual, illuminative and mystical); and 2. theology (God and emanation). In all this, A. is using rather old Western sources, although, as far as Arabic secondary sources are concerned, one finds references to more recent ones. A. does not always take sufficient account of their specific nature and context when dealing with primary texts.
At most introductory.


The text of an unedited conference held by A. at Chambéry in 1973 is published here. As far as Ibn Sīnā is concerned, one finds A.’s usual interpretation of the former’s “mystical” tales.
For scholarly research on Ibn Sīnā, the paper offers no really new information.


After a general review of the introduction of philosophy both in the Greek and in the Islamic world, A. briefly deals with Ibn Sīnā’s “Oriental” philosophy (indicating that it presents no new ideas when compared to Ibn Sīnā’s other works), as well as his symbolic tales (insisting that they are the expression of an intellectualist mysticism). For Suhrawardī, A., in a qualified way, admits the existence of new elements in the former’s interpretation of Ibn Sīnā.
Introductory, but, as such, valuable.


Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā agrees with al-Fārābī that religion is an imitation of philosophy. But for Ibn Sīnā, contrary to the latter, religion is only a symbolic language, which the prophet receives from the “Active Angel”, and which cannot be transmitted in every case to the people. Probably influenced by the Īkhwān al-Ṣafā‘ī’, Ibn Sīnā accepts the presence of a mystical dimension in philosophy. Al-Ghazzālī accepted philosophical logic as a tool, but rejected Ibn Sīnā’s mystical elevation of the soul. This latter doctrine was further elaborated by Ibn Bajjā, and in Ibn Tufayl one even finds an outspoken Avicennian theory of mystical contemplation. Ibn Rushd accepted the Farabi-avicennian idea of philosophy as being the deeper meaning of revelation, but he developed his own thesis of philosophical knowledge.
Very valuable, although one wonders whether Ibn Sīnā is subscribing al-Fārābī’s basic perspective?

A. presents in a rather conventional way the major ideas of Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī, but, whenever necessary, A. clearly distinguishes between their theories on metaphysics and psychology, which may be contrary to what the title of his exposé suggests. A. always indicates to what extent these ideas can, or cannot be accepted by genuine Islam. For the problem of freedom or determinism, A. ascribes an absolute determinism to Ibn Sīnā. Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā accepted the Stoic idea of the immutability of God's decrees. However, A. stresses that Ibn Sīnā's understanding of God's knowledge is essentially the same as Aristotle's. Finally, A. states that Ibn Sīnā ascribed existence to privative Being.

Interesting, insofar a critical contemporary "Islamic" judgment of several of Ibn Sīnās major ideas is given, although one wonders whether A. always interprets Ibn Sīnā correctly?


After al-Fārābī had posed the basic premises, Ibn Sīnā developed the theory of prophecy, declaring it to be a political necessity. Ibn Ṭayyīrīya vehemently rejected this theory, since it reduced prophecy to the natural order, while Ibn Rushd did not accept it because of its having linked prophecy with the question of intellectual knowledge. A. also shows that Ibn Sīnā, on basis of three psychological premises, distinguishes three natural qualities in the soul of the prophet.

Valuable as introduction.


Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā developed philosophy as a rational metaphor of Islam purely and simply. A. stresses that for Ibn Sīnā there is a perfect harmony between revelation and reason, since he conceives philosophy to be the religion of the intellectuals.

Hence, Ibn Sīnā's philosophy is neither a "Greek" philosophy, nor in need of any defence: it is his own "Islamic" philosophy. A. concludes that its influence was so great that Aristotle, and both his Greek and Arabic commentators, felt almost into oblivion in the East. A. states elsewhere in his paper that Ibn Sīnā made possible the interpretation of kalam and faṣāda, and that Ibn Rushd's criticisms of Ibn Sīnā are often based on misinformations. Valuable as introduction, but one wonders whether Ibn Sīnā's theory regarding the relation between reason and revelation is not more complex than suggested by A.?


Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā, by adapting al-Fārābī's emanation theory, and by adding to it a clear ontological distinction between God and the world, did satisfy both Greek philosophical thought and the Islamic vision of Reality. Also in Ibn Sīnā's theory of God's knowledge of particulars, one sees a clear tendency to harmonize religion and philosophy, although Ibn Sīnā's solution is not completely satisfactory. Finally, A. notes that after Ibn Sīnā, rationalistic philosophy became more and more replaced by mystical philosophy, al-Ghazzālī being the first exponent of this new philosophical tendency.

Introductory.


Regarding the translation, see supra, 159.

In the first two parts of the book (1 - 106), A. offers a general introduction, containing basic considerations about: allegory in Islamic thought; Ibn Sīnā as courtier, physician and philosopher; and basic ideas of Ibn Sīnā's cosmology, theory of the soul and theory of knowledge. As A. admits himself these presentations are of a rather conventional kind. However, A. shows a certain familiarity with the most important secondary studies of the last years. More significant is part four of the book (145 - 190), where A. deals with allegory in Ibn Sīnā's project. A. thereby first points to the fact that the "lesser" arts of logic are important, insofar as they can serve the aims of philosophy, especially practical philosophy, the goal of which is to promote virtue. Because the majority of humans are not ruled by pure intellect, they have to be addressed in rhetorical terms. According to A., Ibn Sīnā was unable to
express the full emotive scope of his philosophical vision by a logos exposition alone. He therefore became attracted to use innovative mythic forms of discourse, which he used not as a rhetorical mean to address the masses, but as a way to give expression to his inner philosophical vision. A notes that Ibn Sinā’s allegories confine themselves to issues pertinent to the “metaphysics of the rational soul”, more specifically the issue of ma‘ād, i.e., the “journey of the alone to the alone” in its Plotinian sense. Hence, allegories serve a heuristic function correlative to that of Ibn Sinā’s philosophical discourse itself. In a final part, A concentrates in detail on Ibn Sinā’s praxis of allegory and allegorization.

A most interesting study, worth of serious consideration, although A’s basic thesis seems to be based (at least, partially) on some very spurious works.


In the first part of the paper, A offers a rather conventional outline of Ibn Sinā’s conception of philosophy, but he stresses that the latter had already completed his philosophical program when he started to compose his allegories. In them the focus is almost completely directed to the rational soul, the progression (or lack of progression) of which is described in terms of cosmological movement. The whole story of the soul’s descent into the material world, and its subsequent ascent toward the perfection of spiritual release, is never present in one work, but has to be reconstructed from Ibn Sinā’s three narrative stories, as well as his poem on the soul and the Ninth Name of the Ishārāt. A actually effectuates such a reconstruction. Acc. to A, only the use of allegories allowed Ibn Sinā to present the movement of the soul in dynamic terms. It permitted him to express what cannot be expressed in pure philosophical terminology, and to vitalize the meaning of the conclusions of his philosophy.

In the same line as A’s book. Interesting, but now one wonders whether Ibn Sinā himself did give any hint for the proposed reconstruction of the soul’s story?


A first surveys a large number of treatises of, or, at least, ascribed to Ibn Sinā, and looks for mystical elements in them. A concludes that one finds all major mystical ideas in Ibn Sinā’s Ishārāt, and, therefore, offers a detailed analysis of its last parts. However, A insists that there is no fundamental change in Ibn Sinā’s thought. Nevertheless, A, following Ibn Rushd, criticizes Ibn Sinā for not having been a consequent rationalist, more specifically for his having adhered some ah’ārīte ideas. This work is based on A’s university lectures. Some valuable introductory observations, but A’s criticism against Ibn Sinā is subject to serious questioning.


A presents Ibn Sinā as a follower of al-Fārābī from the metaphysical point of view. However, from the “ideological” point of view the former’s thought is quite different from the latter’s. The perfect state is no longer considered by Ibn Sinā as an ideological utopia, but is placed on the very level of pure knowledge, and, hence, in a static way. Ibn Sinā’s “Oriental” philosophy, is a further elaboration of ideas already present in al-Fārābī’s system, although introducing also some changes, e.g., the introduction of a duality between the celestial and the terrestrial realms, as well as between soul and body; the ontologisation of the notion of possible in se, etc. A concludes that where al-Fārābī is the philosopher of the aql (intellect), Ibn Sinā is the philosopher of the rūḥ (spirits). As to the later interpretations of Ibn Sinā’s “Oriental” philosophy, Ibn Rushd saw its basis in the affirmation that the celestial bodies are divine in nature, while Ibn Taimiyya believed that its ultimate secret consisted in the possibility for man to educate himself, and therefore the non-necessary character of prophecy. Regarding the sources of Ibn Sinā’s “Oriental” philosophy, A points to the school of Ḥarrān, and the Eastern Islamic Neoplatonism. Ibn Sinā, following al-Baṣkhtī and al-ʿAmīrī, and in opposition to the school of Baghdad, stressed the unity of philosophy and religion. His intellectualistic philosophy differs radically from Aristotle’s “materialistic” philosophy, and involves a return to Plato. Hereby, Ibn Sinā consciously concealed the ideological context of his philosophy, and, acc. to A., it is obvious that his “Oriental” philosophy was the cause of the dismissal of intellectual research in the Islamic world for centuries.
A.'s interpretation of Ibn Sīnā's thought is clearly based on ideological motives ("Western Maghribism") instead of on objective historical research. However, some of his remarks are worthy of attention.

NOTE:
MĀHMŪD, Y., Al-Jābirī and the so-called Rift between Western and Eastern Thought, in: *Al-fīrār al-'arabī*, 15, nr. 76 (94), 22 - 59 (Ar) elaborates a detailed refutation of al-Jābirī's basic thesis, indicating *inter alia* that on such basic issues as the origination of the world, the rejection of an actual infinity, the possible *in se*, or the emanation scheme Ibn Sīnā is always giving pure philosophical arguments for his opinions. Even if they are opposed by Ibn Rushd (by other philosophical arguments), one cannot but detect the same "philosophical" attitude in both thinkers, which reveals itself at best in their very same basic conception of causality. Valuable, especially for its placing the differences between Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sīnā in the correct perspective.


In this very brief paper, A. mainly presents al-Ghazālī's criticism of Ibn Sīnā, and concludes that the latter's thought does not fit "orthodox" Islam. At most introductory.


A. deals in very conventional terms with such issues as providence and the life in the hereafter.
Introductory, at most.


After having exposed al-Kindī's and al-Fārābī's philosophical explanations of Muhammad's prophetic mission, A. shows that Ibn Sīnā demonstrates the necessity of prophecy on the basis of his practical philosophy. Ibn Sīnā, contrary to al-Fārābī, accords to the prophet a practical-social function, referring in no way to any ideal state. The prophet's theoretical mission is very limited, notwithstanding the vastness of the prophet's own knowledge. That the topic of prophecy is nevertheless worked out at the end of the highest theoretical sience, i.e., metaphysics, is, acc. to A., due to Ibn Sīnā's placing of prophecy in the context of the structure of the universe, having at its basis a necessary emanation. In this very context, practical philosophy appears to be the perfect conclusion of theoretical philosophy. Finally, A. notes that for Ibn Sīnā metaphysics is, above all, theology, and, therefore, in his thought "being as being" is almost synonymous with God.

An interesting paper, although one wonders whether A. does justice to the complexity of Ibn Sīnā's metaphysical system?


A. presents Corbin's famous analysis of Ibn Sīnā's "Oriental" philosophy, and indicates that for Suhrawardi (and Corbin) Ibn Sīnā did never discover the real "Oriental" source.
A valuable basic presentation of Corbin's point of view.


A. surveys Ibn Sīnā's "three" stories (but regarding Šahānshāh and Alā'ī, see supra, 152), paying special attention to their literary background, and their reception in the later tradition. For A., it is obvious that Ibn Sīnā created a new literary form. A. rejects both the allegorized interpretation, as given by Ibn Sīnā's immediate disciples, and, in our time, by Goichon and Gustas, and the spiritual interpretation, typical of Corbin. A. insists that the correct understanding has to be derived from Ibn Sīnā's interpretation of Aristotle's *Poetics*. Like the plot in the Stagirite's view of Greek tragedy, the Avicennian "story" is meant to lead the listener along a way that in theory is familiar to him, but that in practice may be hard to follow when guided by reflection alone. A. concludes that Ibn Sīnā intended his stories to be what we may call "Aristotelian dramaturgy", his ḥiṣās having a mimetic, although not visionary role.

An interesting paper, but one may wonder why Ibn Sīnā's immediate disciples seem to have been completely unaware of this "correct" way of understanding?
370. TÜRKER-KÜYEL, M., Avicenna and “Siyāḥa”, in: Erdem, 5 (89), 419 - 430 (Engl.), 431 - 462 (Tu).

Acc. to A., siyāḥa in Ibn Sinā has to be understood as synonymous with hijān, and, hence, means the travel of the human soul during this life. The knowledge of God constitutes the highest goal of the soul’s travelling. Then, A. opposes Gotthoin’s and Corbin’s interpretations of Ḥāyī Ḥa Yaqūṭ. For her, they both overlooked two major facts: 1. Ibn Sinā, writing in prison, sees the only salvation in philosophy as sapientia perennis; 2. the presence of striking similarities between some basic ideas of the story and Sumerian wisdom. Regarding these latter, A. inter alia identifies the role of the Active Intellect in Ibn Sinā with that of the God Enki in Sumerian thought, and discovers a similarity between Ibn Sinā’s notion of ḫud (intuition) and Ziusudra’s suddenly leaving the gods. A. finally describes what she characterizes as the three travels of the soul.

It has to be mentioned that the Turkish version has much more elaborated notes than the English.

Notwithstanding the presence of valuable ideas, the paper is open to serious objection regarding its basic affirmation of a possible Sumerian origin for some of Ibn Sinā’s ideas (one wonders whether this is not the result of a “Turkish” ideology?).

371. ‘UDRAH, H., The Narrative Mode in Ibn Sinā’s Treatises, in: Al-
Fayṣal, 16, nr. 181 (92), 92 - 94 (Ar).

According to A., Ibn Sinā’s literary skill was significantly greater than al-Ḥarāthī’s. A. concentrates on Ibn Sinā’s narrative stories (Ḥāyī Ḥa Yaqūṭ, The Bird, Salāmān and Abīṣīf, Al-Qadār), A. states that the method used in this treatise is allegorical, and he offers a brief basic explanation of the symbols present in the tales. A. also notes that these tales are written in the same spirit as al-Ḥamadānī’s Maṣābih, and that therefore Ibn Sinā might have been influenced by the latter. Finally, A. insists that the very same truth is expressed in them as in Ibn Sinā’s major encyclopaedical works.

Interesting, but clearly in need of a more substantial development.

372. ĀL-ŶASĪN, J., An Intellectual Mysticism, in: J. ĀL-ŶASĪN,

Having offered a survey of the classical Arabic, as well as of the contemporary Western opinions regarding Ibn Sinā’s “Oriental” philosophy, A. concentrates on the very nature of Ibn Sinā’s mysticism. A. shows how this mysticism is fundamentally
CHAPTER XII

SOURCES (Greek)


According to A., Ibn Sinâ did not consider the categories, at least not insofar as they are the highest species, to be part of the Organon. In fact, Ibn Sinâ inclined to link the topic of the categories with metaphysics, psychology and linguistics rather than with pure logic. A. refers to problems surrounding Aristotle’s text of the Categories, as well as its fixation by Andronicus. Further, A. insists that one cannot but take into account the existence of similarities between Aristotle’s Categories and book Delta of his Metaphysics. However, A. detects in the latter an outspoken ontological dimension, which is not present in the former. Therefore, he cannot accept Ibn Sinâ’s interpretation. The last part of the paper discusses a possible link between the categories and dialectics in Aristotle, but offers no reference to Ibn Sinâ.

Interesting, but as far as Ibn Sinâ is concerned in need of a more substantial elaboration.


Although Ibn Sinâ did not adhere to al-Fârâbî’s political project, he did accept the latter’s idea of philosophy as the supreme demonstration of truth. In this sense, Ibn Sinâ calls Aristotle “the first Master”, Plato being explicitly accused by him of not having offered a “mature” philosophy. A. insists that also a strong anti-Porphyrian tendency is present in Ibn Sinâ. However, Ibn Sinâ does not simply repeat Aristotle, but he only maintains the Stagirite’s methodology. After Ibn Sinâ, till the 16th-cent. school of Isfahân, no attention was paid to pre-Avicennan philosophy, his system being conceived to be almost synonymous with “philosophy”.

Introductory, but valuable.

375. FAHRY, M., The Contemplative Ideal in Islamic Philosophy: Aristotle and Avicenna, in: J. Hist. Philos., 14 (76), 137 - 145 (Bibl. 216) has been reprinted in: M. FAHRY, Philosophy, Dogma and the


After having indicated that in al-Fārābī one already finds a confusion between Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism, although the Aristotelian perspective remains predominant, A. stresses that in Ibn Sinā the Aristotelian approach to metaphysics, without really disappearing, becomes less apparent. However, notwithstanding Ibn Sinā making a distinction between possible and necessary existence, and his affirming that there is no primordial stage of subsistence for the created essences, the Avicennian God, in accordance with Aristotle’s perspective, is not the creator of the Universe in the fullest sense of the term. And notwithstanding Ibn Sinā’s efforts to bring matter within the divine purview, he, just as Aristotle, did not succeed in relating God to the world, even if one has to recognize an explicit will in the former to do so.

Valuable, although rather introductory.


Having reviewed briefly, but very accurately Aristotle’s theory of the four causes, A. deals in great detail with Ibn Sinā’s exposé, or better: exposés. A. surveys the doctrine in all major philosophical encyclopedias of Ibn Sinā, i.e. *Shīfā*, *Hidāya*, *Najāt*, *Dāneš-Nāmeh*, *Uyūn al-bikmah*, *Iskhāq*. A. observes that, where Aristotle based his division of the causes on the ontological distinction between matter and form, Ibn Sinā, in the *Shīfā*, divides the causes into internal causes (matter and form) and external causes (agent and final cause), thereby paying special attention to the existence of the things. This different approach implies *inter alia* that for Ibn Sinā God is explicitly the efficient cause of the world, and that all what exists after having been a non-Being is radically contingent, i.e., it needs not only a cause for its coming-into-being, but also for its subsistence. A. concludes that Ibn Sinā did not elaborate his causal theory in a natural or technical perspective as Aristotle had done before him, but, on the contrary, in the perspective of a creationistic metaphysics. Ibn Sinā’s other works contain no major deviation from this basic doctrine, although they afford some clarifications, or even small additions. E.g. in the *Najāt*, Ibn Sinā attributes a double role to the form, whereby the scheme of potency and act becomes more explicit, while in the *Iskhāq* the distinction between essence and existence functions as a major theme in the articulation of causality.

A very fine paper.


For A., Ibn Sinā is the major representative of the first of three schools which one may distinguish in (Irano-) Islamic philosophy regarding the problem of Being and existence. According to this school, the very problem of Being and existence may be discussed in the realm of actual existents by means of an empirical inquiry, and in the realm of conceptual essences by means of logical and linguistic distinctions. As far as the transmitted technical vocabulary is concerned, A. stresses Ibn Sinā’s independence vis-à-vis all his Greek sources. Regarding the introduction of Porphyry’s theory of predicables, A. insists that Ibn Sinā expanded on the *Isagōg* in his own proper way. A. ascribes a two-fold method of analysis to what he calls Ibn Sinā’s “analytical” school, i.e., syntactical and empirical inquiry. Further, A. observes that Ibn Sinā, from a methodological point of view, distinguished between theoretical and sensible justification, as well as between essential and actual existent. According to A., Ibn Sinā’s concept of Necessary Existent is neither Neoplatonic nor Aristotelian, but has to be interpreted inside Ibn Sinā’s “mystical” system. Although very valuable ideas are presented, the basic option is in complete conformity with A.’s usual, but particular understanding of Ibn Sinā’s system.


Acc. to A., Ibn Sinā is an adequate representative of a mainstream of Islamic mysticism. A. notes a close resemblance between Ibn Sinā’s depiction of the Necessary Existent and Plotinus’ notion of the One. With Plato and Neoplatonism, Ibn Sinā adheres to the idea that the ultimate Being is the sustainer of the individuals. For Ibn Sinā, contrary to Plotinus, the Necessary Existent is not above Being. According to A., the Necessary Existent is not systematically a primitive concept in Ibn Sinā’s metaphysical language. Hereafter, A. presents his well-known formulation of mystical union in terms of process language, and (re-)affirms that a
correspondence theory between the two worlds of the sensible and the intelligible replaced the dualistic theory of Neoplatonism. Finally, A. insists that the identification of the extreme points of the ethical and the aesthetic norms, initiated by Plotinus, and developed by Neoplatonism, has been adopted by Islamic mysticism, as can be exemplified in Ibn Sīnā, especially in his theory of self-realization, and the related idea of the mediating figure of the Sage. A. concludes that the metaphysics of ultimate Being in Islam is a modification, not a deduction of Neoplatonism.

Interesting, insofar as a serious basic view on A.'s (particular) interpretation of Ibn Sīnā's thought can be gained.


A. first wonders whether Ibn Sīnā still remains Aristotelian when he makes religious belief a part of the dialectical approach to metaphysics. Especially by placing everything under one efficient cause forms an idea absent in the Stagirite. This search for a unique source of all being is clearly Neoplatonic in spirit, but Ibn Sīnā, contrary to Neoplatonism, places the source not above and beyond being. Ibn Sīnā's theory in this respect seems therefore to be his own innovation, and was as such recognized by the later Latin scholastics, especially Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus. Moreover, his theory made possible to view the Plotinian intelligible's being apart from the existence bestowed by the One, enabling hereby philosophy to bear directly on human ideas, and not on real things. A. concludes that besides Aristotelianism and Islam also Neoplatonism marked Ibn Sīnā's philosophy.

Very valuable, although not really innovative.


A. insists that Ibn Sīnā, in his conception of the brain, was rather Galenic. In order to be able to "situate" the five inner senses, Ibn Sīnā divided the brain into three parts. A. shows how a tendency to multiply the inner senses was already present in Galen, and he indicates particular topics in Galen's writings, which are, in content, and, sometimes, even expression very similar to Ibn Sīnā's. Regarding the specific three-division of the brain, A. points to some later Hellenistic physicians, but he wonders whether the young Galen does not constitute its ultimate source? A. also stresses that the theory of the inner senses was not of great importance for Ibn Sīnā himself, since he believed in an "outer illumination", and that Ibn Sīnā, notwithstanding the presence of this Galenic elements in his thought, adhered to a basic Aristotelian cardiocentrism.

A very fine paper.


Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā, in contrast with Plato and Plotinus, includes in self-knowledge an active involvement of a Supreme Entity, to which the soul wants to ascend, i.e., the Agent Intellect. Hence, the import of self-knowledge is not so important in Ibn Sīnā. Ibn Sīnā envisages great differences in self-knowing among different persons, an affirmation which might be somewhat in accordance with Plato, but surely not with Plotinus. Rather introductory. One wonders whether self-knowledge is not of greater importance for Ibn Sīnā than suggested by A.?


A. agrees with Pines that Ibn Sīnā's *mayān*-theory resembles the so-called *impetus*-theory of Philoponus. A. illustrates this by offering an analysis of al-Ghazālī's account of this topic in his *Maqāṣid* (acc. to A., the latter offers an abstract of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy). Although Ibn Sīnā (as well as Ibn Rājī) probably was familiar with Philoponus' commentary on the Physics, he (nor Ibn Rājī) never mentioned Philoponus as the explicit source. Acc. to A., Ibn Sīnā probably considered the issue of *impetus* not to be a central one. Since Philoponus's name did not inspire his trust, Ibn Sīnā therefore could adopt the former's position, without having to advertise the fact. Moreover, Ibn Sīnā had reason to believe that the Arabic notion of *mayān* was a perfect translation of the authentic Aristotelian term of *rhōpē*. In a final remark, A. stresses that the Latin Middle Ages probably based their theory of *impetus* on Ibn Sīnā's concept of inclination (they were aware of it through al-Ghazālī, or may be some Jewish accounts).

Very valuable, although some statements need further investigation.
CHAPTER XIII

IBN SINĀ AND OTHER ARABIC THINKERS

384. ABRAHAMOV, B., Ibn Sinā’s Influence on al-Ghazālī’s Non-Philosophical Works, in: Ahr Nahrain, 29 (91), 1 - 17.

Based on secondary sources, A. points to several items of Avicennian influence on al-Ghazālī, and then A. indicates the following three: the division of the rational soul, man’s knowledge and love of God, and man’s felicity. He discusses them in detail, and points out similarities and dissimilarities between al-Ghazālī’s and Ibn Sinā’s theories. He also notes that in some cases, al-Ghazālī almost verbatim copies Ibn Sinā.

An important case-study, constituting a partial, but, nonetheless, very valuable contribution to the major problem of the exact nature of Ibn Sinā’s influence on al-Ghazālī.


Among the Islamic sources of the Mağmū‘ uṣūl al-dīn of al-’Assāl, a 13th. cent. Coptic author, A. mentions Ibn Sinā as one of the two more important ones (F.D. al-Rāzī being the other). A. indicates that Ibn Sinā is cited in at least five chapters. An important, although preliminary note, stating that Ibn Sinā had also influence on later Christian Arabic thinking (see also below, 429).


Among A.’s many observations, I may cite:
- al-Ghazzālī’s basic conception of the soul is highly Avicennian inspired, but the former does not follow the latter as far as the characterization of the soul as “form” of the body is concerned
- al-Ghazzālī almost verbatim repeats Ibn Sinā’s proofs for the existence of the soul (but he adds to them a religious proof)
A very valuable outline regarding Ibn Sinā’s basic influence on F.D. al-Rāzī’s doctrine of the soul, based on a wide range of primary texts.

388. 


A indicates that Gundissalinus, in collaboration with “Johannes” (acc. to A., probably “Johannes magister scholarum”), is mentioned as the translator of the Maqṣṣīd. A recognizes that the latter work is highly dependent upon Ibn Sinā’s Dānesh-Nāma, although, acc. to A., also the Metaphysics of the Shiṭī has been used in its elaboration. As far as the logical part is concerned, A. detects a great fidelity to Ibn Sinā’s original thought, notwithstanding some intelligible reworkings. There is a more important use of the Shiṭī in the metaphysical and the physical parts (unfortunately, A. offers no direct indication in this sense). However, in absence of any translation of its introduction (except BN, MS Latin 16906), the medieval readers completely misunderstood al-Ghazzālī’s work, at least its proper nature. A. finally notes that Robert of Anjou, notwithstanding that he knew Ibn Rushd’s Tahāfut al-tāḥafūt, continued to consider al-Ghazzālī as a disciple of Ibn Sinā.

Valuable observations, based on the Latin tradition, although one wonders whether A. is fully aware of all the difficulties surrounding the Maqṣṣīd, even in the Arabic tradition?

A. opposes Ibn Sinā’s view of metaphysics to that of Ibn Rushd. While the former identifies metaphysics with what is beyond (au-delà) physics, the latter considers it to be what comes after physics. For Ibn Sinā Being is the most common notion, whereas for Ibn Rushd this is primarily said of the substance. Because of this basic conception, Ibn Rushd had to limit himself to the very affirmation of a substantial universe, directed by the unmoved Mover, where Ibn Sinā, for whom all the determinations of Being are accidental, was able to affirm the existence of a first uncaused Cause, and thus to open the way for the religious idea of creation. In a first period, the Latin West adhered to Ibn Sinā’s position. Later, Averroism became predominant, although Ibn Sinā was never completely absent.

A basic, but most valuable description of the difference between Ibn Sinā’s and Ibn Rushd’s conceptions of metaphysics.


Acc. to A., al-Ghazālī’s Maqāsid uses Ibn Sinā’s Dānish-Nāmeth (among other works) just as a philosophical framework, reworking it in a substantial way by the introduction of elements of kalam and fiqh. In order to illustrate this, A. formulates systematic criticism of my paper: Le Dānish-Nāmeth d’Ibn Sinā: un texte à revoir?, in: Bull. Philos. Méd., 28 (86), 163 - 177 (Bibl., 17). A. points to the fact that al-Ghazālī’s examples differ many times from Ibn Sinā’s in a very substantial way, implying e.g., a clear affirmation of contingency (acc. to A., typical of the kalam).

Moreover, for A. al-Ghazālī often replaces typical notions of the falsa by concepts derived from the usūl al-falāshīf (A. insists that both the falsa and the ma’āznīs adhered to the thesis of the positivity of non-existence). Further, A. believed that al-Ghazālī made fundamental doctrinal changes, e.g., where he replaces the Aristotelian notion of potency by that of the possibility which may be realized by a realizer.

Finally, the very fact that al-Ghazālī incorporated § 24 of the logical part of the Dānish-Nāmeth into § 25 (a fact indeed overlooked by me), shows, acc. to A., a rehabilitation of the reasoning by analogy in his thought. A. concludes that the Maqāsid only offer a doctrinal introduction to the Tātabā’ī.

Some of A.’s observations are completely justified, but her basic option remains subject to serious questioning.


A. offers a brief, but significant survey of Ibn Rushd’s main criticisms against Ibn Sinā, and indicates which seem to be sound, and which mistaken. A. also cites in Spanish translation the basic passages of Ibn Rushd, in which criticisms against Ibn Sinā are formulated.

A. gives a very valuable basis for further research.


A. notes that, although Ibn Bajjī seems to have ignored the Avicennian corpus, the De Anima was already translated into Latin in the beginnings of the 12th century. In classical Islamic Andalusia, only Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Rushd seem to refer in a detailed way to Ibn Sinā, and only the former in an obviously positive fashion.

Introductory, but as such, valuable.


A. deals in detail with the reception of Ibn Sinā’s thought in the later Arabo-Islamic tradition. A. first points to some “pseudo-Farabian” works, as e.g. the ‘Uyun al-ma’dūd. For al-Ghazālī, A. pays particular attention to his comment on the Light Verses in the Miskāt, insisting that it is similar, although not completely identical with that of Ibn Sinā in the Istahhar. A. evokes inter alia Ghazālī’s equation of the souls of the spheres and of the incorporeal Intelligences with the angels of religious nomenclature, and his use of the notion of the holy prophetic spirit as proofs for the presence of a rather strong Avicennian influence. A. also deals with al-Ghazālī’s
basic criticism of Ibn Sīnā as formulated in the Taḥāfūţ. However, A. insists that al-Ghazzālī is not rejecting the structure of the universe depicted by Ibn Sīnā, but merely the latter's explanation of the emanation process. Further, A. refers to Ibn Bajjā (acc. to A., closer to al-Fārābī than to Ibn Sīnā) and to Ibn Tufayl (his Ḥayy having nothing in common with Ibn Sīnā's), although Ibn Tufayl do offer an -one among several possible explanation of Ibn Sīnā's system). Finally, A. deals with Abū al-Barkātāl-Baghdādī (who presents a looser version of Ibn Sīnā's system, with a host of new non-physical entities squeezed in) and al-Suhrawardi (who seems to have gradually deviated from the Avicennian system).

It may be added that as far as Ibn Rushd is concerned (pp. 220 - 356), A. observes that he, in his early period, closely followed al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā on the issues of the causal relations obtaining within the supernal hierarchy, and of the Agent Intellect's role as a cause of existence in the sublunar world. With respect to the former of these two items, Ibn Rushd however rejected the existence of an outermost diurnal sphere empty of stars, and also the emanation of the bodies of the celestial spheres. Where the latter is concerned, he does not go so far as Ibn Sīnā does, since he states that sublunar matter has no cause. But A. remarks that Ibn Rushd, in his later works, rejected both theses. Furthermore, Ibn Rushd always preferred al-Fārābī's account on human intellect over Ibn Sīnā's. Regarding prophecy, he however was closest to Ibn Bajjā.

Most of the time very valuable observations, although sometimes in need of further refinement.


A. observes that al-Suhrawardi shares with the "later" Ibn Sīnā a dissatisfaction with Peripateticism. Among al-Suhrawardi's criticism against the Peripateticists, A. points to his strong rejection of the Farabian-Avicennian theory that knowledge consists in an act of conjunction with the Active Intellect. But, acc. to A., al-Suhrawardi accepted Ibn Sīnā's (and Plotinus') view of the self-knowledge of the soul. And it is certain according to A. that al-Suhrawardi used many key-concepts which have their counterpart in Ibn Sīnā's metaphysics and cosmology. A. concludes that al-Suhrawardi's anti-Peripateticism is rather verbal than real. Interesting, but in need of more substantial elaboration.


A. several times designates an explicit use of Avicennian vocabulary by al-Ghazzālī. Moreover, he points to the fact that on such important doctrinal issues as e.g., demonstration, or the powers of the soul, al-Ghazzālī follows Ibn Sīnā. A. also judiciously remarks that the very fact that al-Ghazzālī does not adhere to the kalam theory of accidents, does not necessarily indicate that he espoused the Avicennian conception of accident (and substance) completely. A very valuable complement to A.'s other publications (cf. infra, 399 - 401).


In several footnotes, A. explicitly indicates striking similarities between al-Ghazzālī's and Ibn Sīnā's thought on such matters as estimation, wahm: the acceptance of a ḫāṭa of the soul, and the notion of a Casuist of the causes, muṣḥīb al-asbāb. A. moreover states that al-Ghazzālī criticizes most professional theologians for not having penetrated beyond the limits defined by wahm, in a way similar to Ibn Sīnā's criticism of the Peripatetics. It is also worth mentioning that A. characterizes al-Ghazzālī's description of theology, as formulated in the introduction to his Muṣāfa, as being done in terms appropriate to first philosophy. Important remarks, which cannot be neglected in the examination of the complex relationship between al-Ghazzālī and Ibn Sīnā.


A. first indicates that al-Ghazzālī both borrowed and appropriated elements of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy. Then he shows how already before al-Ghazzālī one was moving towards a synthesis of jurisprudence, theology and orthodox sufism, especially in ash'arite circles. As to al-Ghazzālī, he integrated also philosophical, read: Avicennian elements. But where the introduction of Aristotelian logic seems not to guarantee that al-Ghazzālī's theological reasoning is any more rigorous than that of his predecessors, his use of Ibn Sīnā's metaphysics, on the contrary, undoubtedly had a profound effect on his theology. Evidence herefore is given by A. on the basis of two fragments of the al-Maṣaḥād. A. insists that al-Ghazzālī seems to have failed to establish for himself a clearly consistent theoretical framework. Moreover, on several occasions al-Ghazzālī really seems to break with tradition, e.g., when he absolutes
the essences of created Beings, so that creation becomes rather creation ex possible than ex nihil. A. concludes that al-Ghazzālī was often ambiguous in his statement and exposition of the fundamental dogma’s, and that he was probably unaware of how much of Ibn Sinā’s philosophy be himself had uncritically received. Very valuable, offering once more important elements for further research on the relationship between al-Ghazzālī and Ibn Sinā.


The basic thesis of this booklet consists in the conclusion that al-Ghazzālī, while rejecting significant elements of Ibn Sinā’s cosmology, on the one hand, accepted several of its basic principles, on the other hand. In doing so, al-Ghazzālī moreover set his theology in fundamental opposition to that of the classical Ashʿarite tradition. In order to substantiate this basic claim, A. deals in a detailed way with the cosmologies of both al-Ghazzālī and Ibn Sinā. Out of the rich content, and among A.’s many observations, I may cite:

- there is no clear explanation by al-Ghazzālī regarding the way according to which the causes are conditions of their effects, but his identification of cause with murajih evokes both in its conception and its language Ibn Sinā.
- the angels of al-Ghazzālī’s intelligible world correspond to the separated intelligences and souls of Ibn Sinā’s universe.
- Ibn Sinā’s identification of God’s knowledge and will with His essence is categorically rejected by al-Ghazzālī.
- with Ibn Sinā, al-Ghazzālī understands miracles and wonders as extra-ordinary occurrences taking place within the lawful operation of the universal system.
- following Ibn Sinā, al-Ghazzālī considers existence to be an accident of essence.
- both al-Ghazzālī and Ibn Sinā assert that the existence and the order of the universe are the product of God. However, whereas the former specifies the divine will, the latter mentions the divine knowledge.
A. concludes that where the theses of Ibn Sinā which al-Ghazzālī rejects, are relatively tame, those in which he follows the former, are rather important.

A very important study, which deserves full attention.

Note
It may be noted that M. E. MARMURA, Ghazalian Causes and Intermediaries, in: JOAS, 115 (95), 89 – 100 offers an extensive critical review of this work. A. presents a fundamentally different interpretation of al-Ghazzālī’s theory, more specifically his theory of causes. In order to decide which of the two interpretations is probably the most “correct” one, I think a most profound examination of all the aspects of the concerned problematic is needed.


A. convincingly shows that Ibn Ṭufayl definitely knew Ibn Sinā’s Shī‘ī, Isḥāqī, and Ḥāfiẓ ibn Yaḥyāf and/or R. al-Qudrat. Regarding Ibn Ṭufayl’s interpretation of Ibn Sinā’s “Eastern philosophy”, A. observes that the former, in a first reference both misquotes and misinterprets Ibn Sinā’s statement in the prologue of the Shī‘ī, while he, in a second reference, correctly quotes, but still misinterprets it. So, for Ibn Ṭufayl there does exist a fundamental difference between Ibn Sinā’s Peripatetic writings and his “Eastern” works. For him, Ibn Sinā’s Eastern philosophy deals primarily, or even exclusively, with the state of the esoteric vision of God, and the way to it. It alone contains the truth, and inevitable appears to be mystical or esoteric in nature. Whereas Ibn Rushd seems to have been aware of Ibn Ṭufayl’s fiction, it exercised on the contrary a great influence on modern Western Orientalists, as e.g., Mehra, Corbin, Nader, et al. As to Ibn Ṭufayl’s modus operandi, it was probably suggested by a passage in the Isḥāqī, where Ibn Sinā commands his reader to elaborate on the allegory of Ṣāliḥ and Abūl. It is certain that Ibn Ṭufayl borrowed his epistemological scheme from Ibn Sinā. But A. insists that the changes, purposely effected upon this scheme by Ibn Ṭufayl, are equally striking. A. concludes that Ibn Ṭufayl tries to present philosophy as a complete system. Since Ibn Sinā was the dominant figure of Islamic philosophy at that time, he bases his exposé on the latter’s system, although modified according to some of al-Ghazzālī’s objections.

A very fine paper, although one wonders whether Ibn Sinā was already the dominant philosopher in the Western Arabic period or the Islamic world at the time of Ibn Ṭufayl?


A. stresses that Ibn Taymiyya’s attacks were directed against everything which was derived from the ancient sciences, even if the writings of Ibn Sinā (and Ibn al-ʿArabī) may constitute their only direct object. The logic of Aristotle, which was not only followed by Ibn Sinā, and the falsafa, but also by adepts of various Islamic sciences, appeared for Ibn Taymiyya to be the ultimate culprit. A. shows how Arabic logicians, especially Ibn Sinā, developed a logic in which the categorical syllogism and the definition occupied a most primary force, both becoming the explicit target.