The title is somewhat misleading. In fact, A. discusses the presence of a mysticism in I.S. (presenting a significant overview of interpretations by such authors as Corbin, Massigon, Badawi, Garedt, Elwany and Goich). Moreover, he mentions not only I.S.’s “mystical” influence on Muslim Andalusia (discussing two major tendencies in its reception, shown by Ibn Rushd and Ibn `Arabi), but also on the Eastern Islamic world (also deterring in that case two different ways of reception, now demonstrated by al-Ghazzali and Sahnuradi). He even points to I.S.’s “illuminationist” influence on the Latin Middle Ages - in both currents of “augustinisme avicennaisant” and “Latins Avicenniens”. For A. it is almost a given fact that I.S. systematized mysticism. He even believes that I.S.’s twofold theory of cognition (for it, A. leans heavily on Elwany) contains the real roots of a mysticism in I.S. (the last chapters of the Ishârât constituting the locus classicus for it). So, acc. to A., I.S. adopted a kind of Neo-Platonic (however not a Greek, but of an Iranian origin) mysticism. But one looks in vain for some solid arguments in this respect! A. leans on secondary sources. As to his more personal ideas, they are in need of some more substantial arguments.

A. declares I.S.’s system rationalistic and self-consistent, and therefore free from any mystical or esoteric aspect - even though I.S. upholds the validity of Sufism (and of other manifestations of Islamic religious life). The pivotal concept of I.S.’s epistemology is the concept of hikîd, i.e. the capacity to hit spontaneously upon the middle term in any syllogism (a concept, directly derived from Aristotle’s euathoia - An. Post., 69 b 10-11), to which is added Galen’s idea that the different degrees of acumen in people are related to the temperament of the body. Therefore, one should strive to acquire a balanced temperament, or, in religious terminology, a pure soul. Now, religious life, all in its functions, enables people to purify their souls (hence its practices are beneficial also for the philosophers, especially when they are faced with a difficulty). The variety of styles among I.S.’s different works has also a similar ‘pedagogical’ function. Instead of mystical treatises, one would in his case better speak of works concerning the metaphysics of the rational soul. Moreover by his theory of hikîd, I.S. arrived at a progressive view of the history of philosophy - following a course increasingly more independent from the transmitted formats of exposition and discussion in the Graeco-Arabic Aristotelian tradition (although he considered it the most worthy of adherence). This becomes exemplified in his texts on the Eastern philosophy and the Easteners - which present a later, but temporary stage in his development (A. hereby offers an overview of the relevant texts). The chosen name of East reflected appropriately I.S.’s background in the East of the Islamic world, i.e. Khurasan. But this idea received little approval, and I.S. quickly abandoned it.
An utmost significant contribution. A. most convincingly shows that I.S.’s “Eastern works” have nothing in common with the so-called “Oriental mysticism” (this latter being a false problem with respect to him!). Moreover, his suggestion to replace ‘mysticism’ in I.S. by ‘Metaphysics of the rational soul’ may be quite to the point, and, at least, deserves full attention!
third kind, i.e. the mystical. He refers to I.S.’s emanative scheme (presenting it as dyadic), and his theory of the mystical return of the creatures to the ultimate Being (although as recognized by A. himself, this theory fails in e.g. the Shi‘a). I.S.’s adherence to the reality of a mystical union becomes more evident in his doctrine of a purely intellectual afterlife - but A. formulates some reserve against his own interpretation (invoking the almost total absence of critical editions of I.S.’s texts).

An interesting paper - but compare with supra, 11 (where a totally different interpretation is offered - a thorough investigation is undoubtedly required in order to choose between both interpretations), and also with supra 2.


The book offers a lot of information on symbolism, both on a general plane (A. cites various Western reference works) and on its particular importance in Persia (A. presents in this respect material derived from theology, poetry, and philosophy). Although Sohravardī occupies by and large the first place in A.’s analysis (many of his works being examined in great detail), I.S. also receives some attention (in several places, and not really in a unified way). A. ascribes to I.S. a mystical philosophy, especially in his later works - laying at its basis the foundation of the possible junction of the rational soul with the Agent Intellect, and the other higher Intelligences. Moreover, A. detects in I.S. an inclination towards a symbolic exegesis of the Qur’an. Finally, A. accepts the presence in I.S. of elements of Oriental wisdom (his arguments are mainly based on secondary sources). It may be noted that in a separate appendix A. provides a summary of I.S.’s three symbolic tales.

A well-documented book - but, as to its interpretation of I.S. not really original, and, insofar as it subscribes to Corbin’s point of view, open to the severe criticism of 11.


A. believes that I.S. in his later life was living a crisis of conscience, but did not accept its full consequences. He offers a partial English translation of Manṭiq at-tahišqiyin, Logic of Orientals (based on Nasr’s Persian translation), as well as a selective bibliography of French and English works on the topic of I.S. and sufism.

Of a rather limited value.


Acc. to A., I.S.’s theory of ‘ishā. love, reveals an Islamic inspiration, and hence is quite different from superficially comparable doctrines in Greek thought. I.S. comes even close to ‘orthodox’ Islamic mysticism, insofar as he rejects the very ideas of tīrīḥā, unification and hulūl, incarnation. A. offers a lot of other information about what he considers to be I.S.’s mystical works, or I.S.’s mystical influence (as to the latter, he distinguishes no less than three currents: hikmat ḍhawali, wisdom of ‘intuition’ (e.g. Ghazzāli), Oriental wisdom (e.g. Sohravardī) and mystical poetry (e.g. the wise Sinā, and also Attār, Rūmī, Jāmī and even M. ‘Iqbal) - the given information being of a quite different nature of value, and mostly being based on secondary sources.

A. clearly exaggerates the mystical aspect of I.S.’s thought.

(18) SABRI, T., Avicenne, philosophe et mystique dans le miroir de trois récits : Hây b. Yaqzân, L’Oiseau, Salâmân et Ahsâf, in: Arabic, 27 (80), 257-274.

A. first insists on the importance of both the Christian and the Muslim Orient in the transmission of the Greek heritage. After this general remark, A. summarizes the main content of I.S.’s three tales, and briefly analyzes a few basic themes in them, i.e. prophecy, ma’ād (resurrection), self-knowledge, matter-form, the human Being, the act of knowledge and God. As to the human Being, I.S. places at the summit both the prophet and the philosopher, and declares the latter superior to the former in his knowledge of eternal values. While treating the proper place for the philosopher, A. remarks moreover that I.S. replaced the Aristotelian realism by a Platonizing realism. A. concludes that mystics in I.S. is a natural religion. Consequently, symbols have to be used. So, for I.S. mystical life is a way of profound intuitive knowledge (being totally independent of religious convictions or practices). A. makes extensive use of Corbin - clearly ignoring Goichon’s study on Hây ibn Yaqzân (Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1959). As to a basic criticism of his kind of interpretation, see 11.


The title is highly misleading. A., in fact, presents a classical survey of I.S.’s doctrine of Being, and an even more classical account of the way in which al-Fārābī tries to harmonize Aristotle with Plato. As to I.S.’s ‘mysticism’, he seems to understand it as the latter’s Hegel-like synthesis between man and God! A rather confused study. Of not great value.

(20) SARANYANA, J., De la teología a la mistica pasando por la filosofía. Sobre el itinerario intelectual de Avicena, in: Alma Filos., 21 (88), 85-95.

The famous axiom of the three first notions, present in every human soul from the very beginnings of its existence, proves that I.S. intends to philosophize departing from religious problems. A., however, suggests that I.S. is above all a theologian - philosophy being for him no more than ancilla theologae. In order
to substantialize his view, he presents I.S.’s theory of *Metaphysics*, b. IX-X, as a serious attempt to solve the central problem of the new Islamic credo, i.e., the reconciliation of God’s absolute necessity with the possibility of prophecy and *creatio ex nihilo*. In this theory, I.S. places side by side, in a kind of Neo-Platonic inspired orthodox gnostic, the necessities of God, emanation and prophecy. However, by contrasting God, the absolute Necessary Being, with matter as an absolute possibility, I.S. is no longer able to secure the link between God and the world. Willing to solve this latter a priori, he introduces an esoteric rupture - following old Iranian traditions, and inaugurating a new, imaginary kind of mysticism. A.’s basic assumption about the nature of I.S.’s evolution is highly questionable - not only out of 11, but also because of his interpreting I.S. too much in terms of Christian scholastics.

For A., I.S. agrees with the Islamic tradition in his adherence to two - in fact, distinguishable - ways of knowledge: *ʿilm*, scientific knowledge, based on universal judgments, and *ʿefal*, inspired knowledge, revealing something ‘wonderful’ - or, to put it in other words: Occidental and Oriental wisdom. As to I.S.’s explanation of how to acquire inspired knowledge, A. refers to some verses of the *Poem on the Soul* and a Persian poem, ascribed to I.S.
A.’s thesis is based on very weak grounds: a few poetic verses belonging to works classified among the *dabās*!

A Persian translation by Ravān Farhādi of a paper written in French (or C.R.?) by Ülken, probably many years ago, however, the original publication was not identified.

(23) ZAYED, S., The Problem of Intellectual Exegesis (*taʾwil*) in Islamic Thinkers of the Orient, Especially Ibn Sīnā, in: *Hašliyyat Kulliyyyat al-adāb* (Kuwait), 6 (85), N. 28, 3-103 (Ar); 104 (Engl S.).
After a discussion of the distinction between *taʾwil* and *tafsīr*, A. surveys the different methods used by the classical Islamic thinkers (both theologians and philosophers) in the developing of their Qur’anic exegeses. Regarding I.S., A. affirms that he accepts a concordance between the Truth of Revelation and the truth of philosophy by means of an intellectual interpretation, or by means of the subjugation of the religious truth to the philosophical point of view. To substantiate his basic thesis, A. refers to such classical topics as I.S.’s doctrines of the soul, the divine attributes, the eternity of the world, etc. (mainly based on the *Metaphysics* of the *Shiḥi*, and from the interpretation of secondary sources). Regarding proper elements of Qur’anic exegesis, A. always refers first to Nasīf’s explanation, before he properly deals with I.S.’s (and often one looks in vain for a real comparison).
Of very limited value. A. is clearly unaware of ʿAšr, see supra, 2.

A. distinguishes three kinds of mysticism in Ibn Sīnā:
1. Philosophical mysticism (A. pointing to I.S.’s emanationism and his theory of *‘ishq*, love, both in the perspective of generation (cf. *Ihār*) and the perspective of return (cf. R. Fī ʿl-‘ishq, Tr. On Love);
2. A reflection on his mystical practice (A. citing large extracts of the last chapters of the *Ihār*);
3. Oriental philosophy (present in I.S.’s so-called esoteric writings, A. leans heavily on Nasīr in this part).
A. concludes that I.S.’s mysticism represents a philosophical or intellectualistic mysticism.
Not very original, and highly questionable, cf. supra, 11.
Chapter XII

Sources (Greek)

See also:
I, C - j 2 (Pines)
V, A 29 (Sabeans); V, B 7 (Zoroastrianism)
VI, A 7, 11, 21, 22; VI, B 2, 5; VI C 4
VIII, 16, 24
IX, 1, 6, 7, 13, 18
X, 15, 36, 47 (Zoroastrianism), 64-66
XI, C 9, 13, 14 (Zoroastrianism), 18
XIII, 6, 11, 16
XIV, A-II, 8
XV, A 6 (Indian), 14, 24, 28-29; XV, B 1, 2 (Indian), 6; XV, B 2, 1, 2 (Iranian), 9;
XV, D 3

Acc. to A., I.S. showed respect for the “radical” interpretation of Aristotle, and even wished to clarify and develop it. Having discerned three ontological orientations in I.S., A. concentrates on I.S.’s re-arrangement of Aristotle’s aporetic ontology, mainly based on the Isagôgê of the Stift. A. shows how I.S. unproblematically works out the aporetic distance between the factor of universality in the individual and the factor of True Individuality (referring hereby to I.S.’s distinction between the logical and physical conceptions of the essential), A. moreover remarks that I.S.’s categorization didn’t protect the logical constructions from being severed from the reality to which they were supposed to refer (A. speaks in this context of I.S.’s “proto-scholasticism”). A. finally evokes the crucial role accorded by I.S. to the species - because it permits the relation between logical and physical genera (but Aristotle’s aporetic of Met. VII automatically comes to the fore here). A. “radical” Aristotelianism is also observed by A. in I.S.’s Plato-critique - but the presence of more outspoken Neo-Platonic themes is recognized by him where it regards the ontology of some other Avicennian works (Iskârât, Remarks and Admonitions; Dânestâ-Nâmeh, B. of Science, and the Comm. on the TheoL. Arist.).

A significant contribution, although one may wonder whether A. is not overemphasizing somewhat the presence of a “radical” Aristotelianism in I.S.?  


Referring to I., A. states that the solution of Aristotle’s aporia about the (existing) individual - distinguishing the individual, namely its existing from the kind that it is - was rooted in Arabic philosophy, argued in al-Fârâbî, and clearly, yet not coherently, in I.S. The latter tried to characterize essences so that their existence in things may properly be explained - essence being the starting point, probably out of I.S.’s standing in the Neo-Platonic tradition. But A. insists that Aristotle’s aporia, and its giving primacy to existing individuals, motivated, but did not structure I.S.’s thought. Further, A. carefully observes that the factor “existence” is isolated as a distinct factor in I.S., and that essence cannot account for the existence of the individual thing, since it is prior to universality or particularity, without any conditions at all. That existence requires for its explanation a reference to the First Being, whose very essence would be to exist. A. however notes that I.S. doesn’t succeed in formulating a notion of creation corresponding to a radical contingency. A. concludes that I.S. offers only an interim-solution, mainly because of the latter’s failure to characterize in a proper way existence’s being accidental to essence (but A. rejects categorically the view that I.S. posits existence as an accident in the usual significance).

A valuable paper, not really innovative, but offering a good synthesis.

For his evaluation of mathematics, I.S. expanded on Aristotle, criticizing Plato and the Pythagoreans. He raised objections against atomism (acc. to A., not the Greek atomism, but the one having an Indian origin). He identified the mathematical and physical structures of matter, and borrowed Proclus’ idea of the necessity of matter (hereby giving matter importance in a pantheistic way).

A good paper, but in need of some further development, esp. as far as it concerns I.S.’s concept of matter.


A. first discusses Aristotle’s ethical intellectualism. As to I.S., he defined the ideal of human contemplation as the conjunction with the Agent Intellect - the soul becoming a mirror of the world. Notwithstanding I.S.’s struggle to reconcile the Aristotelian visionary or contemplative ideal with the Plotinian unitary idea, his sympathies were distinctly on the side of the former. Acc. to A., I.S. was thus inclined to a humanism (which tends to bypass the otherworldly ideal of Islam). Only with Thomas Aquinas could a real harmonization be realized between the contemplative ideal and the spiritual aspirations to be assimilated to God. In the appendix, A. offers a valuable translation of an extract of I.S.’s R. fi ‘Ighaf, Tr. On the Soul (AN. 77; M. 121, part of ch. 15).

Very interesting - although the precise significance of I.S.’s attention to the Plotinian unitary ideal appears in need of some further clarification.


A. believes that I.S., in his defining of the subject-matter of metaphysics, follows a more independent line from Aristotle than al-Fārābī did before him. I.S. practically limits that subject-matter to being and its attributes - paying little attention to the ‘first principles’ of demonstration, and redefining cause as the principle of existence instead as being the principle of motion (al-Kindī and may-be al-Fārābī also) having prepared the way for such train of thought). Moreover, the inclusion of such themes as providence and prophecy can be traced back to the Pseudo-Theology. Finally, the presence of Islamic subjects can only be justified out of Aristotle’s most comprehensive definition of metaphysics.

A good paper, but for a much more detailed, and in some respects somewhat corrective view, see infra, 6, esp. 237ff.


The first part of the book contains a critical English translation of 14 texts, or text-fragments by I.S. and his disciples on his relation to the Aristotelian tradition (for more details, see ch. I, passim), and an overview of I.S.’s major philosophical works, with particular attention to their organisation and contents (once more in relation to the Aristotelian tradition), and to their relative chronology. As to the second part, it contains a systematic study of I.S.’s reception of the Aristotelian tradition. Among the many striking insights of A., we may cite:

1. I.S.’s acceptance of the existence of two ways to acquire knowledge of intelligible matters, i.e., fuḍūd, intuition and instruction - the former being the most fundamental, since the latter is ultimately reducible to it. This is considered by A. to be a basic fact in I.S.’s system, and it forms the corner-stone of his interpretation. Acc. to him, it enabled I.S. to posit the ontological reality per se as the object of knowledge and to bridge the gap between paedagogy, epistemology and ontology. Moreover, it freed him from slavish adherence to a school tradition, as well as from excessive book reading. Finally, it explains his use of varying methods in different works - each audience having its own capacity for intuition.

2. The classification of the sciences in the Alexandrian-Islamic Aristotelian tradition represents for I.S. two mots al-ilm, absolute knowledge;

3. I.S.’s attachment to an objective verification of acquired knowledge (A. discussing in this respect such terms as Taḥqīq, verification, Inād, following Authority uncritically, and Inād, impartial judgment);

4. I.S.’s creation of a coherent account of human knowledge, through his defending (in the line of late Alexandrian Aristotelianism) above all the acquisition of Truth (thus taking a critical, but constructive stand vis-à-vis Aristotle);

5. I.S.’s great indebtedness to al-Fārābī’s Fl Aghār..., On the Intentions of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (as stated by I.S. in his Auto-biography) - this text making clear to him that metaphysics does not only concern Ilm al-tawḥīd, science of the Divine One (in a certain tradition - al-Kindī belonging to it - affirms it), but that it also implies the study of ‘being as being’, and of ‘first philosophy’. But I.S. conceded to the Kindian tradition that ‘theology’ is the highest and most noble part of metaphysics. He added moreover a new fourth part to the previous three of the Aristotelian tradition, i.e. the metaphysics of the rational soul;

6. I.S.’s attitude toward Aristotle never changed in its essence but only in its expression. I.S. considering himself more and more as another Aristotle (no longer a commentator);

7. The use by I.S. of three different methods: symbolic, indicative, and demonstrative. The first, he derived from Greek traditions about allegorical writing, the other two ultimately from Aristotle (al-Fārābī playing in all three cases a mediative role). The first method enables the Philosopher to present the Truth (A. insists: the same Truth) to the masses. The second method, on the contrary, has an obfuscatory function for the common people, but a didactic for
the philosopher.
A very important monograph - clarifying several essential issues - but one may wonder whether A. does not underestimate the significance of the Islamic impact on I.S.'s thought (maybe by being too confident in Goichon's interpretation)?
Regarding the proposed chronology of I.S.'s works, it has to be handled with caution (more substantial arguments are needed than the ones given).

(7) ID., Philo and Avicenna on the Separability of the Intellect.
The problem of the separability of the intellect arose with Aristotle’s famous De Anima, 429 a 10-12. Having outlined its major interpretations in Greek thought (Alexander of Aphrodisias; Plutarch and Stephano; Simplicius), A. observes that I.S. (according to his Marginal Notes on De Anima), like Philo and possibly using the latter’s Comment - notwithstanding the prima facie absence of any reference to it in the ancient Arab bibliographies), represents a further shift in interpretation. Both Philo and I.S. partly return to Alexander by stating that the separability of the intellect is from the body, but they stress it concerns the "entire" intellect, and consider it in terms of separability in essence or in theory, not in terms of actuality and potentiality. A. concludes that this shift can easily be understood out of a religious concern regarding the possibility of a future life.
A fine paper. The problem of possible direct knowledge by I.S. of Philo’s Comment is worth further investigation.

Compared with Plotinus’ emanative system, I.S.’s entails, acc. to A., three fundamental changes:
1. God is no longer ‘above’ existence;
2. God’s emanation occurs through rational necessity;
3. A complete union with God no longer constitutes the basis of the survival of the human soul. But also this corrected emanative view is rejected by A., partaking in this Ghazālī’s line of critique!
A very conventional paper.

The R. al-Ma‘namiyya, Tr. On Interpretation of Dreams, may be considered to be an authentic work by I.S. - notwithstanding the fact that it is not mentioned in the most ancient lists of his works. One of its central notions, esp. in the chapters 6-9, is that of “Divine Force”. Although A. accepts that some Islamic additions have been introduced, he believes, and convincingly shows, that one has to accept an ultimate Greek source. He specifies the Greek’s influence as Stoic, but also probably entailing some Peripatetic-derived (however not Aristotelian) materials (A. more specifically refers to Cratippos). Hereafter, in what appears to be a second part, A. compares the so-called citation of Aristotle’s Parva Naturall in this Risāla with its version in Averroes’ Epitome, contrasting both of them with the known Greek recension. In his well-known prudent way, A. concludes that there may have existed another Greek recension of the Parva Naturall, to be ascribed possibly to the young Aristotle, or, more probably, to a Stoic (or relatively late Peripatetic) adaption of the Treatise, or to an Hellenistic substitution of it. The Arabic philosophers considered this other version no doubt to be genuinely Aristotelian, as is proved by Averroes’ unreserved commitment to it, or by al-Fārābī’s theory of veridical dreams and prophecy. It has to be noted that A. offers an excellent translation (based on MS. Brit. Mus. Arabic 978) of the ch. 6-9, 15, 25 and 39 of I.S.’s treatise.
A most remarkable paper!

A. offers a detailed survey of the different opinions expressed by 19th and 20th C. commentators, regarding the origin of the theories of the intellect upheld by the three major representatives of the classical Oriental jahāna, i.e. al-Kindī, al-Fārābī and I.S. A. detects in a first period a growing tendency to consider Alexander of Aphrodisias, and especially his Per Noē as the source of all these Arabic doctrines. Gilson fully endorsed this thesis, especially in the framework of his introduction of the notion of “agustinismo avicenizante”. Acc. to Gilson, the Arabs had confused Averroes, the supposed teacher of Alexander, with Aristotle, and became moreover victim of many misreadings and errors. In recent times, different authors, e.g. Jolivet, Badawi and Laccheta, have challenged Gilson’s thesis. A. concludes that in the actual state of affairs no definite solution for this problem can be given (in full agreement with J. Jolivet).
A useful status quaestionis of an important problem.

Chapters 4-6 (pp. 81-144) deal explicitly with I.S.

For Aristotle, metaphysics was an ontology, an archeology, an ousiologia and a theology. I.S. did not reject this Aristotelian view, but A. detects in I.S. a much greater systematization, and an outspoken identification of metaphysics with ontology - its archeological and theological functions being made secondary to this primordial ontological function. This option enabled I.S. to separate physics clearly from metaphysics (in Aristotle physics tended to become a metaphysics of the sensible world). I.S. moreover surpassed the Stagirite by positing a transcendental analogy of Being. He also deviated from him by claiming existence to be an accident on the ontological level (logical and ontological orders being perfectly parallel). But his main difference with Aristotle lies within the introduction of God as a creative cause, who knows Himself, as well as all Being of which He is the creator.

A good summary of some of the basic insights of A.'s Metaphysics, 65-66, with a few additions.

Chapter XIII

Ibn Sinâ and other Arabic thinkers

See also:
I, A-III, 3 St. 2; I, A-III, 12, St.;
I, C-m (Michot)
VI, A 3; VI, B 7; VI, C 2
VIII, 8
IX, 6, 7
X, 3, 8, 15, 27, 30, 40, 61, 67
XI, A 6; XI, C, 2, 4, 5, 10, 12, 13
XII, 9
XIV, A-I, 2, 4, 13; XIV, A-II, 8, 14;
XIV, A-IV, 2
XV, A 4, 8, 18; XV, B-I, 2, 5; XV, B-II, 12;
XV, C 12; XV, D, 5, 6; XV, E, 3

A presents a comprehensive picture of the way in which I.S.’s works were received, and judged, in Muslim Spain of the 12th and early 13th C. In general, a strong negative attitude towards the Avicennian heritage is manifest, as may be illustrated by Ibn Zuhr’s contempt of the Canons in medical circles, and Ibn Rushd’s multiple and severe criticism on philosophical ideas. As to Ibn Bajjah, one cannot but notice the total absence of any Avicennian element in his thought (A. notes that it is possible, though not certain that I.S.’s works were not yet introduced in Spain in Ibn Bajjah’s lifetime). Ibn Ṭufayl, however, certainly knew I.S.’s major philosophical writings. Although he took a rather neutral stand towards I.S.’s major thoughts, he did not avoid delivering harsh criticism with respect to some particular points of the Avicennian doctrine. Only in literary circles, a genuine Avicennian current developed. Abū Ḥāzm al-Qurtubī is considered by A. as its most typical exponent.
A valuable sketch of I.S.’s thought in 12th C. and early 13th C. Muslim Spain.

(3) BAYRAKDJAR, M., Concerning the Ontological Argument in Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, in: Ibn Sīnā. Doğumunu, 461-470 (Tu).


A. first points to the ambiguity surrounding the concept of nature in its Aristotelian formulation, insofar as it postes nature as purposive, although having no rational choice, nor reflection. Alexander of Aphrodisias did not expose Galen’s (and Porphyry’s) criticism of Aristotle in this respect, but he made Aristotle’s account of nature more comprehensible by presenting it as an efficient rather than as a final cause. This last interpretation was adopted by the 10th-C. Christian philosophers of Baghdad, inter alia Yahyā ibn ʿAdī and Abū ʿI-
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Faraj ibn al-Ṭayyib. Abū Bīr Mattā, who was a disciple of Yahyā, went even further, and posited not only the principle of motion in the particular thing but also an immanent creative being - Active Nature. I.S., however, firmly rejected such an interpretation - accepting only God as the real cause for the being of everything in the world, hence nature being no agent at all. Acc. to A., this “different attitude” toward nature may be one of the things that provoked I.S.’s violent attacks on the “philosophers of the West.” A serious study about significant historical developments in Aristotle’s concept of nature (in Greek as well as in Arabic philosophy), but is this sufficient to support A.’s final conclusion about the “orientalism” of I.S.?


The central issue of this paper consists in the question whether I.S. accepted the real distinction between essence and existence, and whether in that respect he was criticized by Ibn Rushd? A. first observes that the Latin Averroes condemns the Latin Avicennian view that ‘one’ and ‘Being’ are additions to a thing’s essence. Hereafter, he analyzes some 100 years of studies on Latin Averroism and Avicennism, esp. on Thomas’ relationship with I.S. as far as it deals with the ‘real’ distinction. However, A. finds no reason to ascribe to Thomas this real distinction - Giles of Rome being in fact its innovator, but even for him it was nothing else but a universal hypomorphism under a new name (at the end of the paper, A. mentions that John Quisbert of Paris seems to be the first author, who explicitly linked the introduction of the real distinction with the name of I.S.). Consequently, for A. Ibn Rushd’s attack on I.S. was neither inspired by the latter’s asserting the real distinction, nor by his establishing an independent order of possibilities. But it was related to I.S.’s explanation of the difference between ens and unus as a difference in comprehension, not as a difference in our modes of understanding. So, Ibn Rushd refused I.S.’s addition of a new positive intelligible note to the essence of a thing.

A somewhat provocative paper, but with some solid grounds, although one may suspect that A.’s formulation is somewhat exaggerated, since it is the result of an open hostility against contemporary Thomistic interpretations of this matter. For an interesting retort, see Zedler (Metapysics, 68).


A. rightly presents Bahmanyar as a commentator and transmitter of I.S.’s philosophy, although he differed from his master in his teaching on the soul in the afterlife. A. also offers important bibliographical considerations, not at least concerning such works as the Marhabat, Disqocussions and the Ta’ifik Notes, which, at least partly, result from Bahmanyar’s discussions with I.S. A fine article.

(9) DAVIDSON, H., Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect, in: Viator, Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 3 (72), 109-178.

A. most accurately shows that the famous problem of the nous politikos arises out of Aristotle’s De Anima, Bk. 3. Further on, he discusses the antecedents of al-Fārābī’s and I.S.’s solutions for it. Hereby, he concentrates on four topics:

1. The type of entity the Active Intellect is (for both Arabic authors, it is the last of the celestial Intelligences - I.S. stresses that this particular interpretation is totally original in al-Fārābī);
2. The manner in which it serves as a cause for human thought (with special attention to the notion of acquired intellect);
3. The manner in which it serves as a source for the existence of the whole or of a part of our world, and
4. The manner in which it causes certain religious phenomena.

Out of a profound analysis of these four major points, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plotinus and al-Kinḍī (and to a lesser extent Themistius and the Arabic treatise On the Soul, attributed to Porphyry) are revealed to be of a particular historical significance for the Farabian-Avicennian doctrine of the Active Intellect. Then, A. examines in detail, but separately, al-Fārābī’s and I.S.’s opinions. As to the former, we may note here inter alia that A. distinguishes no less than three views within al-Fārābī’s different works, that A. characterizes al-Fārābī’s declaration of the heavens as emanating the matter of this world as original in al-Fārābī, and that A. makes it obvious that al-Fārābī excludes a strict individual survival (at most, he accepts the immortality of the acquired intellect, but in his lost Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics al-Fārābī would even have rejected any kind of human survival after death). As to I.S., we notice the following items:

1. Prime matter is emanated by the Active Intellect, together with the aid of the movements of the celestial sphere - on this point, A. stresses the existential impact of I.S.’s considerations;
2. Moreover, the Active Intellect emanates the forms appearing in matter as well as the individual human souls;
3. Further, it is the direct source of human thought (the human intellect being typified by a fourfold division) - acc. to A., I.S. goes beyond al-Fārābī in this respect, and takes a position close to Plotinus’ view;
4. The human intellect may have a conjunction with it - through it I.S. assures the individual immortality of each human being, and also the phenomenon of prophecy (A. stressing however that it concerns an intellectual type of prophecy).

A most essential study (almost a monograph!) of one of the very central issues of I.S.’s philosophy, including a highly illuminating comparison with the latter’s famous predecessor al-Fārābī.


A. offers some very rudimentary considerations about both authors, and their respective versions of Ḥāyy ibn Yaqqān. Of almost no value.

The study focuses on I.S. and al-Ghazzâlî. Out of the latter’s texts, one has the impression that the Arab philosophers insist on the independence of the human soul from the human body. So, A. first searches for the origin of this problem in Greek thought, esp. in Plato and Aristotle. Then, she concentrates on I.S. She points to the latter’s dualism (in the Platonic line). I.S.’s dualism is however lessened by the unique natural desire which links each soul to the particular body which individuates it. But this does not imply that the body is a necessary and indispensable tool for all the activities of the soul. This may be clarified by the sharp contrast posited by I.S. between imagination and intellect. The former can only prepare the soul for the latter. The flying man-argument even seems to exclude any need for the former, because in it self-awareness is immediate. Now, al-Ghazzâlî offers a definite Aristotelian critique of I.S.’s Platonic view. By enhancing the connection between imagination and intellect, he enhances also the connection between soul and body. A. observes however that al-Ghazzâlî seems to accept, at least to some extent, I.S.’s basic claim of the substantiality of the soul. A very fine paper - showing how the debate between al-Ghazzâlî and I.S., at least on the particular problem of the soul-body relation, may be considered as a further elaboration of the problem, and the two involved antagonistic points of view, as yet originally present in Greek thought.


Although A. specifies in the title of his paper: “Avicena and Averroes Latinos”, his analysis and interpretation are based on some unknown works to the Latin Middle Ages. As to I.S., A. presents his theory of essence in a rather conventional way (evoking particularly the famous triplex respectus essentiae) - ascribing also to I.S. the theory of the accidentality of existence, as well as the real distinction between essence and existence. As to Averroes, A. stresses his anti-Avicennian attitude, and also offers in this case a rather conventional survey of Averroes’ main contentions.

A. does not go beyond a preliminary presentation of Averroes’ criticism of I.S.’s doctrine of Being.
blind (and hence how to explain justice in the retribution of the hereafter?); 2. A replacement from the Deity to the celestial souls as concerns the problem of omniscience in relation to future contingents (acc. to A., I.S.'s and al-Fārizī's solutions are almost similar in this respect). The major part of A.'s contribution is however devoted to Ibn Rushd, who, by separating the philosophical and the theological aspects of the problem, elaborated a fundamentally different solution.

A good paper, but A.'s observations about I.S. are (too?) heavily dependent upon Marmura's interpretation.


A. offers some primary analysis of Shahrūstānī's al-Muṣūra'a, the Wrestling, and its critique by Tūsī, based on Tehran Univ. Ms. 269. Five questions predominate in it: the division of being, the proof of God's existence, the divine unity, God's knowledge and the eternity of the world. (A. remarks that Shahrūstānī does not finish the work according to its original plan, because of some particular circumstances.) I.S.'s acceptance of Being as a general category, his use of an analogical concept of Being (in order to separate God from the contingent Beings) are discussed, and most severely criticized by Shahrūstānī, who defends an equivocity between God and the concept of creature - originating out of a Neo-Platonic, Islamic theology and cosmology. Tūsī, however, vehemently reacted against Shahrūstānī's rejection of these Avicennian ideas (which may indicate Tūsī's rupture with the Ismailism he adhered previously).

Although the main significance of the paper concerns Shahrūstānī and Tūsī (and is indeed of high relevance with respect to them), it also contains interesting ideas with respect to I.S., esp. on his theory of Being.


I.S. and Al-Bīrūnī are presented by A. as two high-peaks of the golden age of Islam, the first as a great physician and an outstanding philosopher, the second as an extraordinary mathematician and astronomer. They both show by their works an open, encyclopaedic and tolerant mind.

A good, but general, introductory paper.

(23) MAMEDOV, Z., Bahmanyar, a Brilliant Disciple of Ibn Sinā, in: Ibn Sinā..., 120-127 (Ru).


Ghazalī's refusal of the ninth proof of the philosophers for the existence of an immaterial soul (proof which states that the human self remains the same notwithstanding all bodily changes) consists of two parts, as is most convincingly shown by A. The first part compares animal and vegetative Beings (whose growing old does not prove that they have an existence other than body). As to the second part, it concerns the retention of the forms in the imagination (how may these forms be retained in the brain, while they are material?). But Ghazalī's criticisms, cogent as they are, do not cover all the facets of the philosophical argument, as can be seen by a critical examination of I.S.'s own two versions of the proof, in his Mašā'ihāt, Investigations (however, A. stresses several obscurities in its actual formulation) and in his R. fi muṣā'ifat al-nafs al-nāfīq wa al-wūdiyyāt, Treatise on Knowing the Rational Soul and its States. In fact, one misses the notion of one's awareness of self-identity, which is clearly implied in these texts, esp. the latter.

One cannot but hope that this study will function as a model for further detailed analysis of Ghazalī's different criticisms of several philosophical theses (derived mainly from I.S.'s works) as formulated in his Taḥdīf al-Falākūn, The Incoherence of the Philosophers.


A. points to the existence of two parallel fragments found in both I.S.'s R. afšawiyā fī l'ma'ād. Tr. on Resurrection, and the K. al-maḏrūn. Book of what has to be preserved, ascribed to al-Ghazâlî. He observes that these common fragments are ascribed by I.S. to some learned men (so a third work may be the common source for both I.S. and al-Ghazâlî), and that in both works the idea of an 'imaginal' resurrection is present. He concludes that the authorship of the K. al-maḏrūn cannot be solved definitively by a comparison of these parallels, although they show that the attribution to al-Ghazâlî is not quite impossible. But, two major questions arise: to what extent did I.S. try to explain Muslim dogmas on the level of reason, and to what extent did al-Ghazâlî reject philosophy?

A. offers clear and useful information in order to grasp more precisely the delicate problem of al-Ghazâlî's dependence on I.S.

(26) MILLÀ, A., Al-ṭaṣīda al-a'qīnīyya, or the Rational Soul, by Ibn Sinā, and the (manuscript) Maṣūla 'l-nafs of Ibn Hazm, in: Fikr wa-fann, 19, 80, 30-38 (Ar).

Having presented the texts (in a rather uncritical way) of both I.S.'s Poems on the Soul and Ibn Hazm's Knowledge of the Soul (acc. to the unique Istanbul-ms,
2704 (the first is enlarged with a few footnotes, the second with a brief introduction on the life and works of Ibn Hazm). A. briefly compares some major doctrinal points implied by both texts. They reveal a fundamental difference in approach. Whereas I.S. starts from a philosophical (metaphysical) point of view, Ibn Hazm adheres to a religious point of departure.

A rather superficial paper.


A. examines an exemplary case of Avicennian influence on Mīr Dāmād: the doctrine of the becoming of the world. Before dealing with this topic, A. insists that Mīr Dāmād, notwithstanding his knowledge of I.S.'s illuminative philosophy, relied heavily on the latter's Occidental philosophy of existence. As to the problem of the origin of the world, Mīr Dāmād took as its starting point the Avicennian doctrine that it is a dialectical problem of two extremes. However, Mīr Dāmād tried to bridge these extremes by introducing the notion of an eternal innovation (hudūd 'adhār) in an "imaginary time" (by this solution, he came close to the kalām). A. hereby summarizes the main premises of the theory of Mīr Dāmād. Then, he presents a survey of several of Mīr Dāmād's citations of I.S., in relation to the concepts of time and eternity, and in particular in relation to the problem of origin. Finally, A. discusses the Platonic and Aristotelian origin of I.S.'s theory in this field, as reviewed by Mīr Dāmād. A very interesting paper, revealing one of the high points of Avicennian influence, although one may wonder whether I.S. himself ever endorsed any other philosophy than "a Occidental philosophy of existence" (as called by A.).


Having indicated some difficulties surrounding Aristotle's concept of substance, A. points to both al-Fārābī and I.S.'s contributions in order to clarify these problems. Then, he concentrates on Tūsī's doctrine of substance, as given in his Aāsid al-ītībās, Principles of Inference. He evokes Avicennian influences with respect to Tūsī's theory on Being (A. states that both philosophers adhere to a syntactical rather than an epistemological sense of priority of Being), his interpretation of the categories and of the very nature of categorical investigation (the study of the categories being placed in the field of logic), and his elaboration of the very notion of substance itself (Ṭūṣī continuing I.S.'s doctrine). A. concludes that both I.S. and Tūsī, by developing a syntactical construction of the concept of substance, attempt to distinguish between philosophy and science. But A. also stresses that this is not their only use of substance, since there exists a totally different, non-Aristotelian one in their "mystical" writings.

No doubt, the paper contains valuable insights. However, we cannot but maintain our usual reservation about A.'s use of contemporary philosophical ideas in his analysis of classical texts (see Metaphysics, 43), as well as his sharp distinction between I.S.'s different works (see Metaphysics, 47).


After I.S., many great thinkers in Islam, esp. in Iran, undertook the study of Being and gradually arrived at a theory, which proclaims the spiritual experience of pure existence, and ultimately of Being itself. Among them, one finds such great names as Suhrawardi, Ibn 'Arabi, Ṭūṣī, Mīr Dāmād and Mullā Sadrā. Acc. to A., al-Fārābī and I.S. elaborated the conceptual framework for these latter developments, although new meanings were very often given to the terms and concepts they had established.

A. offers a sound basis for further detailed investigation on the theory of Being, as developed in the Islamic world after I.S.

(30) NASRYOV, R., see: FAIZULLAEV A.

(31) OLGUNER, F., Existence in Ibn Sīnā's Thought, and Objections against it by F.D. Răzi, in: Ustūr. I.S. Semp., 333-339 (Tu).


Turkish translation of Pines' well-known paper, originally published in Revue des études islamiques, 19 (51), 121-124.


The place mystical science occupies in Ghazzālī's classification of the sciences, as stated in the Marvels of the Heart (Ithār, III, 1), cannot but evoke I.S.'s opinion on it, as formulated in the Iskā, Remarks and Admonitions, II, 9-10. Besides this major idea, A. points also to the presence of a refutation of I.S.'s theory of the eternity of the world a parte ante in Ghazzālī's Book of the Foundations of the Faith (Ithār, 1, 2) quite comparable to the one in his Tahāfut. Incoherence of the Philosophers. It has to be noted that A. presents Ghazzālī's Mašā'īd, Intentions of the Philosophers, as a faithful summary of I.S.'s system, as developed in the Shīfā (but see Works, A III, 3, St. 2, which shows it to be an almost pure translation of the latter's Dānesh-Nāmeh, Book of Science).
A (too?) limited, but useful piece of information about Ghazzālī’s knowledge (and use) of I.S.’s thought.

Comparing I.S. and Miskawayh, A. refers to their common encyclopaedial mind, and stresses also the presence in both of a tendency to harmonize religion and philosophy (acc. to A., in a secularizing way).
A general paper, clearly based on Marxist premises.

Having outlined Aristotle’s arguments in favour of the eternity of the world, and Philoponus’ reaction against it, A. shows how I.S. introduces a subtle but important change vis-à-vis Aristotle, by positing the existence of Beings outside God as possible - making the heavens not intrinsically different from any other body in the world. Moreover, I.S. did consider the body of the heavens as eternal, without, as A. judiciously observes, offering any justification for this claim. Among the many Islamic thinkers, who took into consideration this problematic, A. concentrates more specifically on Ghazzālī, F.D. Rāzū, Abū ‘l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Suhrawardī and Muḥammad Sadrā.
A. offers a brief, but accurate synthesis of the different positions of the authors he takes into consideration.

(36) RAHMAN, M., Avicenna and his Contemporaries, in: Indo-Iranica, 34 (81-82), 75-87.
A. enumerates 11 personalities with whom I.S. would have been in touch, at least according to some older sources, and also reviews the list of I.S.’s disciples. Although the paper contains some valuable information, its use is very difficult, due to the lack of critical evaluation by A. of the material presented, and of the sources from which it originated.

Acc. to A., the 10th C. - Ṣamā‘īlit movement contributed to the development of materialistic pantheism – and, as such, formed one of the theories attacked by I.S. Of no real significance.

precious (although not always very precise), and, as he himself suspected far from complete. Some further investigation permitted me to discover fragments, derived from other Avicennian works, but also a lot of texts, which are paralleled in Ghazallian works. Hence, the problem of the attribution of the work is much more complicated than suspected by A. (I am preparing a publication on this topic).

I.S.'s thought was criticized in many respects by Islamic authors of all walks of life in his own and later times. A. offers a well-documented survey of the most significant criticisms, and their representatives. Besides the more familiar names (and their well-known objections), e.g. Ghauszâli, Ibn Ruzhd, Ibn Taymiyya, al-Birûnî, Miskawayh, etc. A. pays special attention to what he calls the intelligentsia of Shiraz: al-Kirmânî, Abû 'l-Khayr and Ibn Sabîn. On the basis of a manuscript, he translates (or paraphrases?) I.S.'s (supposed?) answers to Kirmânî (out of this, appears some kind of difference in the method of investigation and argumentation - logic versus linguistic analysis). Also on the basis of a manuscript, he summarizes I.S.'s discussion with Abû 'l-Khayr. A. mentions also some later authors, almost unacknowledged in the West, as e.g. Kamâl al-din ibn Yunus, Zâhâyir al-din Bayhaqi or Muh. Baqir Khwânsârî - providing always useful information.
A significant survey of the main objectors, and objections against I.S., although sometimes a little 'rough' (esp. with respect to the 'great names').

Chapter XIV

Influences

A. IBN SINÃ AND THE LATIN WEST
   I. General
   II. Thomas Aquinas
   III. Other Medieval Authors
   IV. Renaissance and Modern Age

B. IBN SINÃ AND JEWISH THOUGHT

C. IBN SINÃ AND INDIAN THOUGHT

See also:
X, 3
XI, B II, 6
XIII, 2
 XV, A 18; XV, C 9, 10, 18; XV, D, 1, 2
A. Ibn Sīnā and the Latin West

I. GENERAL.


The history of the introduction of I.S. in late medieval Italy forms the proper object of this study. A. starts her investigation in Spanish Toledo of the second half of the 12th C. She mentions briefly Gundissalinus (and his translation of some parts of the Shīfā), but pays special attention to Gerard of Cremona (and his translation of the Canon). Now, in the Toledo of these days one can easily detect the presence of scolares, i.e. itinerate scholars - Gerard e.g. seems to have made some philosophical (non-Avicennian) translations on request. Some of them probably came from Italy, but the majority consisted of Spanish clergymen, who intended to make a career in foreign studia, e.g. Bologna. So, already in the very beginnings of the 13th C., one finds indications of some knowledge in Italy of either the Canon or parts of I.S.'s philosophical encyclopedia. A certain Upro de Lado testifies to the former, while an anonymous treatise (Paris, BN, Lat. 3256 A), which was probably written in Bologna, illustrates the latter. Still in the first half of the 13th C., Michael Scot (establishing the Latin translation of the De Animalibus) and Roland of Cremona (offering many citations of I.S. in his De Universo and in his Comment on the Book of Job) bear testimony to a lively interest in Italy for I.S.'s work. After the 1250's, the number of copies of, and comments on the Canon grows increasingly - but it has to be noted that philosophical items were always incorporated into medicine. In this respect, A. surveys a list prepared in the 15th C. and edited and annotated by E. WICKENHEIMER, in: Janus, 34 (30), 33-37 - A, supplementing significant information. At the end, A. offers a brief description of some well-illuminated manuscrits of the Canon, and presents a list of manuscripts, containing philosophical texts of I.S. in Latin, whose origin is almost certainly, or most probably Italian.

A rich, and well-documented study - completing somehow A.'s basic studies on the Avicenna Latinus - see Works, A II, Av. Lat.


The entire first part of the paper is devoted to a detailed and critical survey of the various opinions given on the existence of a Latin Avicennism in the Middle
Ages by such great scholars as R. de Vaux, E. Gilson, M. Gorce, A. Massignon, M. de Wulf, F. Van Steenberghen or Vicoire de Contenson. The second part starts with an accurate and systematic analysis of some medieval Latin works. Out of this analysis, A. derives that I.S. most certainly played a fundamental role in the beginning of the 13th century, influencing directly such major metaphysical or psychological doctrines, e.g. the distinction between essence and existence, or the substantiality of the soul. Hence, for him, the presence of a Latin Avicennism in that time is confirmed. But it may not be conceived in the same way as the Latin Averroism, because its delimitation is not possible on behalf of one single doctrinal point, such as the unity of the possible intellect which was typical for the latter. Moreover, the Latin Avicennism never seems to have introduced elements of the original Avicennian system, which clearly contradict the basic tenets of religious belief. However, A. categorically rejects Gilson’s distinction between a religious (Muslim) Avicenna and a (rational) philosopher Averroes, placing religion totally outside philosophy. As to Gilson’s discernment of a special current of thought, characterized by him as “Augustinisme avicennisant”, A. admits its reality, but indicates that only one doctrinal point is involved in this current, while many more and larger influences are detectable in the broad movement of the Latin Avicennism.

A. offers a well-documented status quaestionis concerning the problem of the existence of a Latin Avicennism, and seems to propose a valuable solution for this rather complex problem.


A., one of the most leading authorities on the history of medieval philosophy, exposes four main themes concerning the reception of I.S. in the Latin Middle Ages : 1. I.S. and Latin scholasticism; 2. I.S. and Christian religion; 3. particular cases of Avicennian influence; and 4. the question whether there existed a Latin Avicennism, or not? Among his many observations, we may briefly mention:

1. I.S.’s particular method and style, as found in his great philosophical encyclopedia, the Shihab, and expressing a very personal input in his thought, were imitated by several medieval authors, i.e. Gundissalium, Guillaume de Auvergne, R. Bacon and Albert the Great;

2. I.S.’s philosophy, notwithstanding its being based on Aristotelian techniques, supports Qur’anic teaching, and therefore is in this respect a ‘religious’ (Muslim) philosophy. As such it had a great influence on both theologians and philosophers of the end of the 12th C. and the beginning of the 13th C. Then, the introduction of Averroes eclipsed the Avicennian impact for a while, but I.S., or at least the ‘Avicennian Aristotel’ regained his influence at the end of the 13th C., as is best illustrated in Henry of Ghent;

3. A. discusses mainly three cases : 1. The identification of I.S.’s Agent Intellect with the illuminating God of S. Augustine (giving rise to the movement of the “augustinisme avicennisant”); 2. The durable (but extremely difficult to determine) influence of I.S.’s metaphysical system on Thomas Aquinas, esp. on his metaphysics of Being (A. clearly recalls the specific problems surrounding Thomas’ citations of I.S.); 3. The particular significance of I.S.’s doctrine of the natura communio for Duns Scotus’ theory of the universality of Being.

A. denies the existence of a true Latin Avicennism. Since I.S.’s thought was too intimately linked with religion, but, at the same time, defended views which were in vehement contradiction with Revelation. No medieval Christian author was able to entirely accept this method and system of philosophizing (contrary to the Averroists, who could easily accept the entire philosophical thought of their master, insofar as they sharply distinguished between their philosophical project and their religious belief).

A paper, which completely justifies the fame of its author, proposing many valuable insights for further investigation, but see 2 for a somewhat different approach.


Reprint of AHDLMA, 4 (29-30), 5-149.


A. briefly discusses the introduction of I.S.’s thought in medieval Andalusia (paying special attention to Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Rushd). Hereafter, he points out that I.S. was considered by several Latin authors to be a thinker of Spanish origin. Finally, A. presents a basic outline of I.S.’s influence on the West (in the domains of philosophy, science and medicine).

Good, but introductory.

(7) GUASHOV, A., Ibn Sinà’s Influence on the West, in : Ibn Sinà... 153-166 (Ru).

(8) KARLIGA, B., L’influence de la philosophie avicennienne sur la philosophie occidentale, in : U/osl. I.S. Semp., 433-440 (Tu); 441-442 (Fr S.).

Out of S, a superficial survey of the translations of I.S.’s works into Latin, and of the great outlines of his philosophical influence.


A. offers a detailed survey of I.S.’s influence on the Latin Middle Ages, but offers almost no new insights. Sometimes, one finds outdated ideas. A. seems to be
unaware of the most important studies of the last twenty years in the field - for example she ignores such a major project as the edition of the Avicenna Latinus. The very fact that most of the secondary literature, cited by A., date from (long) before 1960 seems to us highly relevant in this respect.

At most, a very first introduction to the problematic of I.S.'s influence on the Latin West, but in several respects out-dated.


Previously in the introduction to her edition and translation of I.S.'s Treatise on Resurrection (Padova, 1969), A. had presented a kind of double truth in I.S. In this paper, she somehow corrects that view by declaring that I.S. in fact defended the existence of one single truth, but that he made a distinction between the intellectual truth, reserved to the elite, and a political-practical truth, destined to the masses. But, above all, A. adds some considerations about the introduction, and the influence of the Tr. on Resurrection in the West. She first notes that I.S.'s negation of the resurrection of the body seems to have been acknowledged by the Franciscan school of Oxford, and esp. Henry of Ghent. However, the work itself remained unknown till Alpago's translation in the beginning of the 16th C. A. considers in detail the circumstances surrounding that translation - stressing the underlying philosophical and theological motives for it. A. finds a last echo of I.S.'s so-called "theory of the double truth" in G. Bruno. A fine paper - esp. relevant with respect to Alpago's translation of the Ris. Adhawiyya, and providing an important precision with respect to I.S.'s concept of the Truth.

(11) PANJIGUA, S., Avicena Latino y la cuestión teleológica en la fenomenología de Husserl, in: Stiromata, 35 (79), 101-104.

Acc. to A., the great "metaphysical confusion" was created by I.S., because he mixed up Aristotle's study of Being as Being and Platonism's study of pure Being. Proceeding in this way, I.S. deprived metaphysics of the proper telos it had in Aristotle. The confusion became complete when the Latin Middle Ages identified I.S.'s metaphysics with Aristotle's metaphysics. One has to wait till Husserl for the restoration of the original Aristotelian project. A highly disputable thesis - simplifying to the extreme the history of metaphysics!


A. distinguishes four tendencies in the reception of I.S.'s metaphysics in the West: Latin Avicennism; Avicenna-inspired Augustinism; Thomas (esp. his

theory of the real distinction between essence and existence) and Duns Scotus. Rather insignificant.

(13) RUIJO, L., Cuatro pensadores musulmanes: Al Kindi, Al Farabi, Avicena (Ibn Sina) y Al Gazali (Alpazari), a los dos lados de la frontera cristiano-islámica en el siglo XII y parte del XII, in: La Ciudad de Dios, 102 (88), 323-339.

After a preliminary outline of the political and cultural situation of Andalusia during the 12th and 13th centuries, A. discusses the major facts of the introduction into medieval Spain of the works and ideas of the four great Eastern Muslim thinkers of the classical period, i.e. al-Kindi, al-Farabi, I.S. and al-Ghazali. A. states that the real penetration of their ideas, at least in the philosophical field (their medical or scientific opinions causing no problem whatsoever), only occurred in Muslim Andalusia at the end of the 12th and in the beginning of the 13th C. due to the predominance of the conservative Malekite school of jurisprudence. Much earlier their works had been translated into Latin in Christian Toledo (A. surveys in detail these translations - but exclusively based on secondary Spanish sources).

Introductory. Comp. Ibn Tânh and other Arabic thinkers, 2 for the part regarding Muslim Spain.

(14) SHAYMUHABETOVA, G., The Problem of the Universal in Apriorianmatics, and Medieval Philosophy, in: Ibn Sina..., 89-103 (Ru).


A. surveys in much detail the medieval Latin translations of different parts of the Shif, the Cure - giving place and date of the translation, as well as the name of the translator himself (and indicating the missing parts with respect to the original Arabic text). She also points to the famous De medicinis cordialibus, and to two minor citations by R. Martin, taken from the Ishbili wa-Tanzhibii, Remarks and Admonitions, and from the Najât, the Salvation. Moreover, A. sketches the great currents of Avicennian influence in the 12th and 13th C. In the 12th C. a tendency to keep I.S.'s translated writings together with texts of Christian and Neo-Platonic authors predominated, whereas in the 13th C. I.S. was considered to be an Aristotel-interpreter. Albertus Magnus adhered to a Neo-Platonic, and above all Avicennian Aristotelianism; Thomas Aquinas discussed several important theses of I.S.; and later authors, who made large-scale syntheses, engulft I.S.'s texts in a mass of texts by other authors.

A very valuable basic outline for further investigation on the Avicenna Latinus, both in its sources and in its impact.
A. points to the fact that the 12th C. Latin West looked for a rational proof of the existence of the soul - as is proven by the almost simultaneous translation of both I.S.’s and Aristotle’s De Anima. A. hereby stresses that I.S. was not just considered as a mediator of Aristotle’s thought - I.S.’s originality was fully recognized! In this respect, special attention was paid inter alia to his spiritualistic, but dualistic psychology (the Christian medieval authors tried to combine it with Aristotle’s entelechy-concept), his acceptance of a transcendental intellect (raising the problem of the individuality of the human Being - the West developed its theory in contradistinction to I.S.) and his development of a proper metaphysical system, based on the distinction necessary-possible, and implying a necessary emanation, i.e. a mediated creation (the West accepted the idea of the dependence of the creatures upon their Creator, but rejected mediated creation).
A. offers a general, but significant overview of I.S.’s influence on the medieval Latin West.

A. concentrates on one central topic of I.S.’s metaphysics: creation. Having clarified the precise nature of the conception of I.S.’s theory of creation with Plotinus’ conception of creation (A. indicating both resemblances and incongruities), A. specifies the proper significance of I.S.’s theory of creation for the Latin Middle Ages by examining the doctrines of two major authors, whose relevance in this respect is not doubted: Guillaume of Auvergne and Thomas Aquinas. The former refutes I.S.’s argument against creation in time, not, however, without presenting it in an objective way, while the latter accepts I.S.’s idea of God as a permanent source of Being, but criticizes him heavily for not having conceived the creative act as a free (divine) initiative - I.S. having introduced an element of chance in the arrangement of the universe by conferring creative activity to the higher Intelligences.
A well-documented and clarifying paper.

This paper has many common points with 16, but also contains some refinements and additions.

A. concentrates mostly, although not exclusively, on two authors: R. Kilwardby and Albert the Great. He carefully scrutinizes their concepts on the division of the sciences, and indicates the following elements as revealing a profound

INFLUENCES

Avicennian influence:
1. The division between theoretical and practical science (being based on the division between what is not and what is related to us and to our action);
2. The attribution of the perfection of the soul to speculative knowledge as such;
3. The epistemological foundation of the tripartition of the theoretical sciences (A. refers in this respect to Thomas’ Comment on Boethius’ De Trinitate, but seems to be unaware of Wippel, see infra, II 17);
4. The further elaboration of Aristotle’s subdivision of the physical sciences;
5. The idea of a close ‘collaboration’ between the three speculative sciences;
6. The adopted noetics in Albert (Kilwardby clearly differs with I.S., and prefers to adhere to the Augustinian tradition).
A. concludes that the history of this influence shows that I.S. was not just a Neo-Platonic, but, above all, an original thinker, and that it makes the thesis of an “augustinismo aviccennisante” rather suspect.
A well prepared paper, highly significant with respect to the theory of the division of the sciences in the midst of the 13th C., however, one may wonder if A.’s criticism concerning Gilson’s discernment of an “augustinismo aviccennisante” is not too overhasty?

A. first outlines the philosophical theory on prophecy of al-Kindi, al-Fārābī and I.S., the first three important representatives of the falsafa-movement. In this respect, he leans heavily on secondary sources, esp. Rahman’s Prophecy in Islam. In a second, much more personal part, A. investigates the repercussion of I.S.’s idea of ‘transitive imagination’ (and the involved psychosomatics) on the magical theories of such medieval and early renaissance authors as Guillaume of Auvergne, R. Bacon, Albert the Great, Ockham, Galileo Mazzio, Andrea Cattani, Ficinus and Pomponazzi.
A. opens perspectives for further investigation in the field, but a closer scrutiny of the Latin translations of classical Arabic (philosophical and medical) texts seems desirable.
II. THOMAS AQUINAS

(1) ABDUL, M., Essence and Existence in Relation to God: A Comparative Note between Avicenna and S. Thomas Aquinas, in: ORITA, 131 (81), 50-57.
A. briefly describes the essence-existence problematic in both I.S. and Thomas Aquinas - stressing their different evaluations of existence.
A good, but almost conventional paper.

Having outlined the general framework of I.S.'s philosophy, A. offers a succinct, but significant survey of the major terms of I.S.'s psychological theory, stressing inter alia that for I.S. the soul is entelechy of the body insomuch as it is activity, and almost not insofar as it is substance, and that for I.S. there exists no substantial union between soul and body. Then A. presents a much detailed comparison on all major items between I.S. and Thomas Aquinas - A. himself recognizes his great indebtedness in this respect to the Granada, 1957-doctoral thesis of A. Lobata. Thomas' rejection of an external agent as source for the proper act of human knowledge, and his acceptance of a substantial unity between the soul and the body, reveal themselves as major break-points with I.S.
Although not really original, the paper remains valuable, insofar as it contains an enlightened summary of the 'classical' view on this topic.

A. first lists the main studies undertaken in the West up to ± 1960 on the relationship between I.S. and Thomas. Secondly, he evokes in a most significant way some basic elements one should not neglect in order to establish a fruitful comparison between the philosophical systems of both authors. Then, A. enumerates a multitude of notions, definitions, and distinctions in the domains of metaphysics, which, being original with I.S., were accepted by Thomas (A. however points in a precise manner to some evolutions in the latter's thought). Finally, A. develops Thomas' main criticism of I.S., while concluding that the former rejected most categorically the latter's essentialism, although he did in fact introduce many concepts directly derived from the latter.
A very fine paper.

A. focuses on the problem of the 'distinction' between God and the world as the central issue of philosophical theology, and more specifically on the scheme, elaborated and shared by Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinkers up to the 13th C. Now, the mentioned 'distinction' can only be conceived of in a valid way, through the acceptance of a fundamental distinction between essence and existence. Acc. to A., I.S. offered the basis for it, although he still considered existence to be a kind of super-attribute. Thomas ennemated this view by his formulation of existence as actus essendi. This 'correction' permitted Thomas moreover to show how the identification in God of essence with existence, which I.S. had already presented, in fact meant a perfection in the divinity. It further allowed him to adhere a semantics that rendered possible the acceptance of positive attributes in God. As to the question how to relate God to the world, Thomas relied on an intentional mode of causality (borrowing in this respect from Maimonides), and avoided as such the inevitable restrictions implied by I.S.'s necessary emanationistic scheme. So, Thomas, in contradistinction with I.S., was able to defend God's knowledge of all particular beings, as well as God's providence towards each of them. A. concludes that Thomas did discover in I.S.'s introduction of the essence-existence distinction a new sense of contingency. An interesting booklet, although A.'s interpretation of I.S. may be questioned in several respects, e.g. as to the affirmation of existence as a super-attribute (see Metaphysics, 52), or as to his placing I.S. in the same line as al-Fārābī (see Politics and Ethics, 7).

A. distinguishes in I.S. (two ways of searching the knowledge of Being: one by intuition (based on the flying man-argument), and another out of abstraction by the intellect of the sensible data. Acc. to him, I.S. accepts in the latter case the pre-existence of the essence in almost the same way as Plato's theory of ideas (A. seems to ignore completely I.S.'s criticism of this Platonic theory!). As to Thomas, A. describes his further elaboration of I.S.'s basic distinction between essence and existence in almost classical terms, stressing the particular significance of the notion of participation for Thomas' own doctrine of Being. A. appears to be a good Thomas-scholar, but his knowledge of I.S. is fragmentary, clearly incomplete, and sometimes evidently mistaken.

(6) COLISH, M., Avicenna's Theory of Efficient Causation and its Influence on St. Thomas Aquinas, in: Tommaso d'Agino... (see 5), I, 296-308.
Having enumerated a list of differences and similarities between Thomas
Aquinas and I.S. concentrate on one particular point of doctrine: the distinction between physical and metaphysical efficient causation. In I.S., the physical agent cause is the finite principle of motion (an idea, inherited from Aristotle), whereas the metaphysical agent cause is the infinite principle of Being (this latter principle having to be identified with the Muslim Creator God). But I.S. did not fully exploit this interesting distinction in order to resolve the problem of creation, nor that of freedom and determinism - both problems dominating the theological and philosophical debates of his days. Thomas on the contrary brought the concerned distinction to its plain fruition. A. concludes that Thomas uses the distinction both to defend I.S., as far as it concerns the necessary dependence of all creatures on God, and to attack him, insofar as he adheres to the theories of the eternity of matter and emanationism.

An original and well founded study, although the identification of I.S.'s infinite principle of Being with the Muslim Creator God remains rather unwarranted by A.


Acc. to A., Thomas agreed with I.S., at least in his Shi'i, the Caire (this work being the only one known in the Latin Middle Ages), about the following items concerning God:
1. The need for proving the divine existence by way of causality (but for I.S. the more appropriate way is to proceed from universal, self-evident principles - an idea clearly dismissed by Thomas);
2. The absolute simplicity of the divine Being (God being no substance);
3. God having no essence other than His existence (acc. to A., Thomas would not have fully understood I.S. on this topic).

Thomas however disagreed with I.S. on the doctrines of divine attributes, emanation and God's knowledge of particulars. A. discusses Thomas' criticisms in an utmost classical way.

A rather conventional paper, which moreover appears to be rather questionable in its (few) original ideas.

(8) GIACON, C., La distinzione tra l'essenza e l'esistenza in Avicenna e in S. Tommaso, in: Doctor Communis, 27 (74), 30-45.

Out of the observation that Thomas was less dependent upon I.S. in his late works than in his early ones, A. wonders whether he really derived the distinction between essence and existence from I.S.? In order to solve this problem, he examines I.S.'s theory of the necessary existence. As its source, he indicates Aristotle's Met., Δ, 5, and, even more significantly, al-Fārābī's Gemstones of Wisdom. In this latter work, one finds an undoubtedly pure logical distinction between quiddity (universal essence) and ippity (individual essence), and the relationship between ippity and existence is not discussed in it. Now, I.S. developed this Farabian point of view in a more ample and a more systematic way, although without changing its main content. A. analyzes in this respect some significant text-fragments in the Nafisi (according to Carame's 1926-Latin translation). A. concludes that I.S. never reaches an ontological distinction between essence and existence, contrary to Thomas (Guillaume of Auvergne having somehow prepared the way for the latter's asserting of the ontological distinction). So, I.S.'s real 'disciple' in the Latin West in this respect was Suarez, who simply shared the logical view on the distinction.

A. may be right in his rejection of attributing the ontological distinction between essence and existence to I.S. himself, but one may wonder if the latter just considers it so unqualifiedly purely logical as A. suggests? It has to be noted also that the authorship of the Gemstones of Wisdom is a subject of discussion among scholars!


Almost verbatim the same as 8, adding Aristotle's denial in the An. Post. of the possibility to deduce the existence of a thing from its essence, or vice-versa, to I.S.'s sources, and omitting the consideration on Suarez.


In this extensive case-study A. shows the existence of a remarkable parallelism between Thomas' Summa contra Gentiles, ch. 25-27 and I.S.'s Metaphysics of the Shi'i, VIII, concerning the doctrine of divine simplicity, (Thomas himself offers no indication whatsoever, which may lead one to suspect a deep dependence upon I.S.)

After a general introduction, which contains a brief biography of I.S., a selective list of contemporary publications on him and a survey of some major steps in the reception of his metaphysics in the medieval Latin West; a more specific introduction is given in the form of a succinct, but sharp analysis of both the Avicennian and the Thomistic context.

As to the proper comparison, A. presents the texts in parallel columns. Then he proceeds to the main ideas of the source, he lists the most significant points of contact between I.S. and Thomas, and invariably ends with a much detailed examination of Thomas' own version. No doubt in order to facilitate the reading, he divides the text into five parts: sections A and B concern God's essence or quiddity; section C has as its object the distinction between the divine Being and abstract common being, and sections D and E have as their specific topic God's not being in any genus. A. is always prudent, and most of the time very subtle in establishing parallels or differences. So, A. concludes that the presence of many similarities between I.S.'s and Thomas' doctrines on divine simplicity does not mean a complete dependence of the latter on the former. In fact, Thomas' more positive evaluation of existence, clearly proves such was not the case.

A most interesting, almost pioneering study - although the Latin text of I.S.'s Metaphysics, as given by him in the appendix on the basis of a collation of the Venetian, 1495 and 1508-edicions, appears defective in some crucial places when
compared to the critical edition of the *Avicenna Latamin*, and so may have misled A., in his interpretation (see *Metaphysics*, 33).


A. describes briefly the proper method and tendencies of Thomas’ philosophy, in contradistinction to I.S. and Ibn Rushd. She tries to show how the Aquinian in an eclectic way makes use of both Avicennian and Averroistic elements. For this purpose, she points to three so-called exemplary cases of the Thomistic doctrine, but their actual formulation by A. is surrounded by a profound ambiguity (maybe due to the use of poor French). A rather general, and, indeed, confused paper.

(12) LEE, P., St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Agent Intellect, in: *The Thomist*, 45 (81), 41-61.

A.’s point of departure is the distinction between three landmarks in the history of Aristotelianism:
1. Its Neo-Platonic transformation by I.S.;
2. Averroes’ attempt to resolve all the inconsistencies in the Aristotelian psychology, on purely Aristotelian grounds;
3. Thomas’ enterprise to remove these same inconsistencies by moving beyond Aristotelian.

By way of illustration A. concentrates on the theory of the Agent Intellect (however paying little attention to landmark 2). In this respect, he offers a succinct, but valuable summary of I.S.’s theory of knowledge (based on the critical edition of the *De Anima* of the *Avicenna Latinus*). He observes that I.S.’s doctrine, although Aristotelian in language and inspiration, turns out to be more Neo-Platonic in a larger frame. He even remarks most significantly that I.S.’s Aristotelianism slides back by its own momentum into a Platonic view of man. More specifically the spirituality of the intellect pushed I.S. to ‘platonize man’. Thomas rejected this Avicennian step. By placing the Agent Intellect inside man, Thomas arrived at the inclusion of matter inside intelligibility. Although not really innovative, a most valuable paper, insofar as it synthesizes the most essential features.

(13) ROUSSEAU, M., Avicenna and Aquinas on Incorruptibility, in: *New Scholast.*, 51 (77), 524-536.

A. argues that Thomas’ argument for the incorruptibility of the human soul (*Summa Theologiae*, I, 75, 6) is based on I.S. (*De Anima*, V, 4), notwithstanding the absence of any explicit reference in Thomas’ text to I.S. To substantize her view, A. invokes resemblances in structure (basically the argument is developed according to a two-fold pattern), as well as in contents (e.g. the arguing from the operations of the soul to its attributes; the analysis of abstract intellelction as the premise for establishing the immateriality and the incorruptibility of the soul; the acceptance of the soul’s substantiality and simplicity). However, she is not blind to the evident differences that separate Thomas from I.S., especially since they concern such important topics as the soul-body relation, or the very idea of abstraction.

A valuable case study of Avicennian influence on Thomas (not supported by explicit references), although one may wonder whether A. does not underestimate the real significance of the tremendous distance that separates Thomas’ fundamental concept of man from I.S.’s point of view in this matter?


After a long introduction treating Thomas’ dependence on previous Arabic (and Jewish) thought, A. discusses in more detail the relationship of the Aquitan with I.S., and, in an even more laborious way, Averroes. His views are almost exclusively based on secondary literature (of which he seems to have a good knowledge, although he clearly ignores such an important contribution as Vansteenkiste’s, concerning the Avicenna-citations in Thomas, in: *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, 15 (53), 457-507).

A good, but rather unscholarly paper.


Having opposed the so-called Avicennian essentialism and the Thomistic exsistentiation, A. offers a brief description of their respective concepts of man. A rather insignificant paper, lacking originality.


A. notes: ‘Thomas’ theory of the unity of the substantial form implicates an overestimation of the role of form inside the hylomorphic doctrine. Thomas would have derived this “formalism” from I.S., who defended the unity of the soul out of a transcendental idealism. Good, but A. offers no single reference to a basic text.

One finds in Thomas a triple denomination of the metaphysical science: theology, metaphysics and first philosophy. The latter refers to the fact that the other sciences derive their principles from it. But, A. asks, whether metaphysics should not be placed before the other sciences? Thomas himself was well aware of this problem. In replying to it, he clearly parallels I.S.'s Metaphysics, I, 3, as is shown in a convincing way by A. (who observes that the Thomistic distinction naturaliter - quod nos seems implicitly present in I.S.'s thought on this matter).

So, Thomas demonstrates that metaphysics is in some way dependent upon natural sciences as well as upon mathematics. But does this not involve a circular reasoning? Confronted with this new difficulty, Thomas elaborates a further, but very ambiguous solution, which permits of two essentially different readings. A. carefully analyzes each of them, and offers some strong arguments in favour of what he considers to be the second version - esp. based on a comparison with I.S. A. concludes that Thomas closely follows I.S., although most of the time he shortens the latter's arguments.

A most accurate presentation of a significant case of Avicennian influence on Thomas, although one gets the impression that A. sometimes overvalues I.S.'s impact on Thomas.

III. OTHER MEDIEVAL AUTHORS

(1) ABU SHANAB, R., Avicenna and Ockham on the Problem of Universals, in: Pakistan Philos. J., 11 (73), 1-14. A. shows how, and to what extent Ockham's discussion of the problem of universals is based on I.S.'s proposed solution for that problem. With E. Moody, he recognizes three different positions in Ockham concerning the nature of the concept or intention. The Avicennian origin of the first - which declares the concept a real quality in the soul - is certain, since Ockham himself often attributes it to I.S. Also the second - stating that a concept is a mental fiction - calls for an Avicennian inspiration, insofar as Ockham and I.S. seem to agree that the idea of universality is not an actual existent except in thought. The third, which is Ockham's preferred position, views the universal as nothing other than the set of understandings. E. Moody, A. points to some similarities, but, at the same time, some dissimilarities with I.S.'s discussion in this respect. Probably the first systematic study on the presence of an Avicennian influence in Ockham, and, as such, very meritorious, but one wonders whether Ockham did undergo this influence directly, or indirectly, and if other aspects of his thought are traceable to I.S.?

(2) D'ALVERNY, M.-TH., Une rencontre symbolique de Jean Scot Erigène et d'Avicenne. Notes sur, le De Causis. Primis et Secundis et Fluxu qui consequerit eis, in : S. O'MEARA and C. BIETER (Eds.), The Mind of Eriugena. Dublin, Irish Univ. Press, 1973, 170-181. A. presents the De Causis... as a remarkable synthesis of three different Neo-Platonic systems : the Procean, according to its version in the Liber de Causis, the Avicennian and the Scotian. The (well reasoned) choice of text fragments in the De Causis... reveals that its main purpose is to establish a connection between Eriugena's idea of 'exemplar' and the emanative system of the Arabic sources. However, a full coherence in this respect was never realized. Moreover, A. preoccupies herself with the delicate problem of its datation (for her, most probably in the beginning of the 13th C.) and its authorship (A. presents strong evidence that it was someone belonging to the circle of the naturalists). The extant manuscripts, of which A. gives a complete list and a detailed description confirm the particular role played by the British intelligensia of the 13th C. in reintroducing the work. Besides, A. discusses in a most enlightened way how one can conceive its attribution to I.S. - in spite of the presence of large extracts of Christian authors!

A very fine study, finally establishing the origin of the De Causis... and offering precious insights regarding its contents.

(3) BIRKENMAYER, A., Avicenna und Roger Bacon, in: Etudes d'Histoire des Sciences et de la Philosophie du Moyen Age (Studia
Repr. of A.’s paper from the Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie, XXXVI (34), 303-320, where its title more significantly ran: Avicenna’s Vorrede zum Liber Sufficienctiae und Roger Bacon.

(4) CORTABARRIA, A., Avicenna dans le “Pugio Fidei” de R. Martin, in: MIDEO. 19 (89), 8-16.
A. briefly presents citations from I.S.’s Ishārāt (2 x), Naṣīḥāt (1 x) and 2 other unattributed ones (A. points to the De Anima for one of them, but this is obviously mistaken) in the Pugio Fidei.
Interesting, but limited to a very primary outline (see also supra. I 15).

Repr. of: AHDILMA. 1 (26), 5-127 and 2 (27), 89-149.

A. examines in detail Gundissalinus’ theory on the division of the sciences, according to the De divisione philosophiae - omitting however the discussion of the division of the practical sciences. Aside the kephalaia of the Neo-Platonic introductions to philosophy, and al-Fārābī (whose De Scientiis was translated by Gundissalinus himself), I.S. appears as one of the major sources of that theory.
This is proven by the presence in the middle of the treatise of a Latin translation of K. al-Burhān, Book of Demonstration, V, 8, of the Shīfā (it has to be noted that this seems to be the only extant fragment of a translation into Latin of that logical work of I.S.). Further, the evidence of a strong Avicennian (and, acc. to A., also Ghazalian) input in Gundissalinus’ tripartite division of the theoretical philosophy points a new confirmation of a real Avicennian influence (as Gundissalinus’ changing attitude towards the sciences also does). Finally, the fact that Gundissalinus based the classification of the sciences on the proper ‘subject-matter’ of each science, and the way in which he conceived the subordination between the different sciences, also point in the same direction.
A very fundamental paper.

The same as 87.

A. focuses on Gilbertus Anglicus, and his Compendium medicinae. One of the major aims of this work seems to have been the bridging of the gap between the Platonist-Augustinian and the Aristotelian-Peripatetic theories of the soul. An important role was accorded hereby to I.S.’s De Anima, and most specifically to the latter’s theory of the two faces of the soul - Gilbertus concentrating above all on the lower face. Moreover, Gilbertus was undergoing some indirect Avicennian influence through his main source, the Quaestiones Nicolai peripatetici (at almost an equal level, one also finds Averroistic elements in both the Quaestiones and Gilbertus’ Compendium).
An interesting study - showing that I.S.’s (and Ibn Rushd’s) influence was not limited to philosophical literature only, even in the period immediately after the introduction of their works in the Latin Middle Ages.

A. points to the existence of several citations of I.S. in the “Regimen...” of the late medieval author F. Exeimenis, most of them deriving from Metaphysica. X.
An accurate analysis shows that Exeimenis adopts them sometimes, but clearly not always, in his own theory. However, A. detects a more significant Avicennian influence in Exeimenis’ idea that justice constitutes the highest principle of order in the state. But A. also insists that I.S. is not the only source of Exeimenis, and even not the most important one.
An honest paper, which proves that even in late medieval political thinking I.S. was not completely ignored (the paper justifies in our view no stronger conclusion).

(10) MACKEN, R., Avicenna’s Auffassung von der Schöpfung der Welt und ihre Umbildung in der Philosophie des Heinrich von Gent, in: J. BECKMAN, L. HOOFELDER, G. SCHIRMPF u. G. WIELAND (Hg.), Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen. Hamburg, F. Meiner, 1987, 245-257. After a brief survey of I.S.’s theory of creation, A. points to the fact that Henry of Ghent recognizes in I.S. a kind of mediary position regarding the non-being in creatures. But, whereas I.S. limits himself to the acceptance of a sole mental non-being, Henry goes further and defends a real non-being - mainly in order to safeguard the temporal beginning of the world. With respect to this latter idea, Henry believes contrary to Thomas Aquinas and Aegidius Romanus, that it could even be proven by reason, based on a consideration both ex创造了(A.
points to Henry's theory of metaphysical transformation) and ex creatoris (A. refers to Henry's doctrine of predestination).
A very fine paper, indicating the specific, but well delimited significance of I.S. for Henry of Ghent, at least in this particular field.

After some general remarks on I.S.'s influence on medieval Christian thought, A. concentrates on the reception of I.S. by Henry of Ghent. He particularly stresses the fact that Henry did understand the distinction between essence and existence as an intentional (therefore, not real) distinction. Regarding Henry's spiritualistic concept of man (which also derived from I.S.), A. remarks that Henry in his later years replaced the idea of the unity of the substantial form by that of differentism (a concept particular to him). Finally, in Henry's poetics, A. observes an evolution from the usual scholastic doctrine towards a more spiritual, illuminative doctrine (in the way of I.S., but Henry stresses the human will and freedom more than I.S.).
An interesting paper, but in need of some further development.

A. convincingly demonstrates that Albert the Great did not undergo any Avicennian influence in the proper construction of his paraphrase of Aristotle's Metaphysics (Albert being rather indebted to Averroes in this respect). For A., one finds at most some elements of Avicennian inspiration regarding some particular items - and even then almost never in an unmodified way!
A succinct, but significant clarification of the significance of I.S. for Albert.

Acc. to A., Gregory of Rimini's gnoseology respires a profound anti-Ockhamian character, and has Augustine as its main source. However, Gregory's theory of the intellectual cognition of the sensible singular, reveals a secondary influence of Averroes, and also, to a lesser extent, of I.S. This fact becomes evident by the explicit presence of references to both Arabic authors in the Comments on the Librum Sententiarum. Moreover, I.S. appears as an explicit source of Gregory's doctrine on practical cognition - but A. offers no detailed analysis of this particular influence.
A rather preliminary study - indicating possible loci of Avicennian influence on Gregory of Rimini.

IV. RENAISSANCE AND THE MODERN AGE

(1) ARNALDEZ, R., Un précédent avicennien du cogito cartésien?, in: Annales Islamologiques, 19 (72), 341-349.
In the beginnings of I.S.'s De Anima a most difficult aporia concerning the proper nature of the soul appears. A. convincingly shows that I.S. consciously elaborates on it. Thus he arrives at the conclusion that the physical method, which only allows of a knowledge "with respect to", cannot solve the question of what the soul really is. Consequently, I.S. radically changes his method - considering the soul in its essence, but at the same time limiting his inquiry to the human soul. This resulted in the famous argument of the 'flying man'. It reveals that I.S. has recognized the intuitions of thought by itself, although not in the inductible way of the Cartesian cogito. A. rightly observes that I.S. adhered to medieval roots, which prevented him in discovering the Cartesian soluiton - his main interest consisting in opening a perspective for the resurrection of the soul.
A most serious and valuable study, but to be complemented by 3.

(2) ARSLAN, A., Das Problem der Beziehungen zwischen Philosophie und Religion bei Ibn Sīnā und Spinoza, in: Uslul. I.S. Semp., 377-411 (Tu); 412-413 (Germ S.).
Acc. to S., A. considers I.S.'s theory on the relation between philosophy and religion as a further development of al-Fārābī's conception of this topic. Moreover, he detects several affinities (notwithstanding crucial differences) between Spinoza's idea in this field and the Farabian-Avicennian view, enumerating the following ones: The essentially moral-practical value of Revelation; The metaphorical expression by Revelation of the essential philosophical truths on the level of the masses; The existence of a particular intellectual faculty in the prophet; The radical distinction between imagination and intelligence; And the privilege of the intellectual elite not to observe the prescriptions of religious law. At first sight, an interesting paper, but one may wonder whether there is really such a profound continuity between I.S. and al-Fārābī on this particular matter?

A. carefully compares Descartes' idea of the cogito with I.S.'s 'Flying Man' argument. In both cases, the method of access of the human soul, or of the
human mind, to itself is some kind of process of self-reflection that uncovers something already present, but hidden. In both cases, the unity of consciousness is also corroborated, albeit in a somewhat different way: I.S. shows by an imaginary experiment that the consciousness of oneself does not depend on the body, or even on different human faculties, whereas Descartes makes sensation, imagination and will into different aspects of the thought process, of the same thinking being qua thinking. In both cases, moving from a distinction of reason to a real distinction does justify the claim that the soul is distinct from the body (but Descartes, contrary to I.S., cannot automatically sustain this - he first needs to prove the existence of God). Finally, both authors affirm the immateriality and the immortality of the soul (although only I.S. truly offers a proof for the latter). A. concludes that both I.S. and Descartes adhered to a dualistic conception of man, but rejected a strict dualism by accepting a connection between soul and body. But whereas for Descartes this connection was rather natural, and hence the distinction of the soul from the body rather problematic, quite the contrary is true concerning I.S. - the distinction being basic and the connection quite uncertain.

A very fine, and highly significant paper.

McTighe’s remarks are rather of a secondary kind, expressing a more personal view, with one exception: his remark that Descartes considered the soul exclusively as a substantial reality, and no longer, as in I.S., as both substance and form.


A. tries to demonstrate that the astronomical theory of Copernicus took its point of departure in Neo-Platonic metaphysics - its basic idea being the perfect order of the Kosmos. A. makes only one brief reference to I.S.’s theory of the higher Intelligences. Hereby, A. seems to consider I.S. as a typical instance of Neo-

Platonic metaphysics.

A quite interesting paper, but without importance as far as one is concerned with the study of I.S.


A. argues that I.S.’s psychology, mediated by Ibn Tufayl’s Ḥāyy ibn Yaḥqāzân, had a great influence on 17th and 18th C. European thought, due especially to Pocock’s Latin translation of Tufayl’s work. Such thinkers as Leibniz and Locke expressed their great admiration for Tufayl’s tale. A. situates the impact of Ḥāyy also inside the wider cultural context of both centuries (the becoming aware of the perfectibility of human nature).

A good paper, but precisely to what extent does Tufayl’s Ḥāyy reflect the basic psychological insights of I.S.?
(11) ID., Chaj ben Mekitz - die unbekannte Quelle der Divina Commedia, in: Deutsches Dante Jahrbuch, 55/56 (80-81), 191-207.


(10-12): A. presents I.S.'s Hayy, but even more Ibn Ezra's elaboration of it, as the original model for Dante's Commedia (11 pays attention to the specificity of Ibn Ezra's version, and its proper significance for Dante). Among the most striking similarities, A. evokes Beatrice, in the Comedia an earthly person who possesses cosmological knowledge - clearly corresponding with Hayy, The Agent Intelect; the division of the Universe in an Eastern and a Western region; the linkage of human 'groups' with the celestial spheres, and the presence of the sphere of fire above the purgatory. But, above all, there are the three animals of the first song of the Inferno - representing the three Platonic parts of the soul. Now, I.S.'s tale clearly implies a Platonist psychology although in a somewhat modified, or even corrected form - I.S. replacing the hierarchical structure which Plato had established between the different parts of the soul, by a more harmonic model (A. notes that I.S. categorically rejects the ultra-Platonic, Isalmatic theory of three different souls inside a human being).

An excellent case-study, especially when one takes the three papers together - they being rather complementary than overlapping.


A. indicates the existence of a more or less important Avicennian influence on such thinkers as Hugues of Benzi and Ficinus, especially on the particular item of the classification of the internal senses (A., in this context, briefly evokes also the anti-Avicennian reaction, incarnated by Paracelsus). But, on the philosophical side, I.S.'s major influence concerned metaphysics. A. observes a growing tendency to interpret his essence-existence distinction in an essentialist way (a fact shown by Scotism, but also by such a Thomistic author as Cajetan). He moreover detects in the Latin Avicennism a move from metaphysical potentiality to logical possibility.
A good introductory paper - mainly based on (valuable) secondary sources.

B. Ibn Sinâ and Jewish thought


Both authors present I.S.'s major contributions in the philosophical and medical fields respectively, before discussing the ancient Hebrew translations of I.S.'s works in each of the two fields. As far as philosophy is concerned, Pines presents concrete elements of Avicennian influence in Jewish thinkers, especially in Maimonides (but A. warns of a too Avicennian interpretation of Maimonides' philosophy) and in Abraham ibn Daud.

A useful basic outline for further research.


Reprint of Revue Thomiste, 48 (48), 480-508.
C. Ibn Sīnā and Indian Thought


Having reviewed the vehement struggle against Rationalists and Scientists by both theologians and mystics in classical Islamic times, A. points out that I.S.’s thought always remained influential, even in the Indian subcontinent. Especially during the 15th and 16th centuries, a vivid interest existed in that area regarding I.S.’s medical, scientific and philosophical ideas (e.g. Miyān Bīnā, Sultan Sikandar Lodī, Khāṭīb Abūl-Fazl, Fathīr-l-ḥāb Shirāzī). Even in the 17th-19th centuries, one still finds elements of Avicennian influence, as it shown by A.

A very interesting paper, especially since it enlightens us on an unexplored domain of Avicennian influence - but still in need of a more detailed presentation.

Chapter XV

Sciences

A. GENERAL
B. 1. MATHEMATICS
   2. MUSIC
C. PHYSICS
D. OPTICS
E. ASTRONOMY AND ASTROLOGY
F. CHEMISTRY AND ALCHEMY
G. GEOLOGY AND GEOGRAPHY
H. APPLIED SCIENCES
See also:
I, A II, Tr. II, St. 1
IV, A 14 (nr. 5-6)
XI, A 1; XI, C 3
XII, 3
XVI, A 36 (Biology)

A. General


A. presents a basic outline of I.S.'s most important scientific ideas, i.e. body, movement, time-space and the classification of the sciences. Valuable, although introductory.

(3) ID., Ibn Sīnā's Contribution to the Development of the Sciences, in: *Al-turāth al-ʿarabī*, 2, 48 (81), 16-42 (Ar); also in: *Al-shaykh al-ʿaṭīs*, 52-86 (Ar).
A. enumerates and also analyzes three particularly original characteristics of Ibn Sīnā's scientific method: an extraneous power of observation, an inclination towards the investigation of practical experiences, and a critical examination of the existing scientific theories. A. stresses that I.S. still did understand science in its Aristotelian form as the knowledge of a thing by its causes. Out of this fundamental perspective one has to understand I.S.'s division of the sciences, of which A. offers a detailed description. To conclude A. outlines I.S.'s major influences in the scientific field, esp. in medicine, upon the West. The paper offers a good introduction to I.S.'s general scientific attitude.

A. convincingly demonstrates that I.S. did believe in the ideal of the 'philosophia perennis', which had to furnish the ontological framework for the whole universe, as well as the epistemological framework for the universal thought. So, I.S. was more interested in universal theoretical ideas than in concrete facts. A. sustains this interpretation by referring to some medical concepts of I.S. Acc. to A., in all this I.S. is diametrically opposed to al-Bīrūnī, who he considers to be a kind of predecessor of modern mathematical science. A very fine analysis of I.S.'s basic scientific attitude.

Acc. to A., Ayurvedic medical works, as well as Indian mathematical and astronomical writings were available to I.S., and somewhat influenced his scientific thought. A. gives a few concrete indications of such influence, as e.g. I.S.'s acceptance of the method of testing the simplest function by using the number 9. An interesting case-study on one of I.S.'s sources in the scientific-medical field, although one may wonder whether A. does not overrate its significance?

A brief enumeration of different scientific topics and/or observations in I.S. Honest, but of no great importance.

A. analyzes the questions 4 (divisibility of bodies), 2 (eternity of the world and perfection of the heavens) and 5 (plurality of worlds) of the famous al-Aṣīlah wa l-ajwābāh (Answers and Questions), which reflect an exchange of ideas between al-Bīrūnī and I.S. Hereby, A. shows the empiricist mentality of al-Bīrūnī, which sharply contrasts with the purely theoretical adherence of I.S. to the Aristotelian logic and physics. A. concludes that the former did seriously challenge the generally accepted Neo-Platonic-Aristotelian system, and arrived at an interesting combination of empirium and demythologized "religion". An interesting paper, almost in the same line as 3, but paying more specific attention to al-Bīrūnī.

A. characterizes I.S.'s scientific attitude as basically Aristotelian, although there are also some Neo-Platonic influences detectable. She summarizes I.S.'s main ideas in the physical and mathematical domains. Hereby, she always indicates I.S.'s sources (Greek and/or Arabic), but also stresses his innovative ideas (showing a slight tendency to overemphasize them).
A good introductory paper - although A. seems sometimes to become victim of her inclination to detect - wherever 'possible' (?) - pre-materialistic conceptions in I.S.

(12) FARUKH, M., Ibn Sīnā, the Scientist, in: Al-dhihr..., 41-58; also in: Qaṣīdā' arābiyya, 9, (82), 31-39.
I.S. was not a slavish follower of the Greeks, as al-Ghazzālī, Ibn Ṭūfayl and Ibn Rushd already admitted. Instead, he was the Islamic Aristotele - although he did not attain the same originality as the Stagirite. In order to demonstrate the validity of this claim, A. evokes I.S.'s general contribution to the progress of human knowledge, and, more specifically, to the development of the sciences. The larger part of A.'s paper is devoted to a few concrete examples in this latter respect, i.e.: I.S.'s theory of mutual attraction (acc. to A., it somehow prefigures Newton - but I.S.'s approach, notwithstanding its great ingenuity, remains theoretical-philosophical); some of I.S.'s opinions linked with the opposed couple heat-cold, or with the senses of hearing and seeing (A. always distinguishes between correct and erroneous opinions); and, finally, I.S.'s chemical doctrine (A. insists that it is basically a theory of coloration, and that I.S. rejects any substantial change). It has to be noted that A. always uses primary text-fragments from various works of I.S. Notwithstanding its introductory character, a very fine study.

(13) HOMI, W., Ibn Sīnā and Western Historians of Science, in: Isl. Q., 25 (81), 75-85.
A. uses I.S. just as an example case in order to demonstrate that ancient scientists were either ignored (esp. in the 17th C.), or looked upon with disdain (esp. in the 19th C.) by Western historians of science. A. suggests that ancient thinkers have to be studied in their own right.
The basic assumption of A. is right, but almost trivial!

Books 1-3 of the Natural Sciences of the Shīţa, The Care, form the main source for A.'s basic overview of the central issues of I.S.'s natural philosophy. So, after an analysis of some fundamental preliminary notions, such as substance, matter, form or cause, special attention is paid to the main physical issues: movement, time, place, the void, and the structures of the infra- and the supra-lunar worlds.
Among A.'s most significant insights, we may cite the following:
1. The existential, not essential need of the corporeal form for prime matter (in