the kind of community and moral validity sustained by poetic validity. It is almost impossible to give a complete survey of the rich content of this paper, but, by way of illustration, we mention a few ideas:

- The images of poetic imagination are grasped by reference to the relationships among the parts of the utterance and by reference to the subjects (poet and audience), who create and understand these compositions;
- The imagined proposition is tested by a comparison within the proposition (a subversion of the traditional poetic way);
- All meaningful figurative language is constructed out of the five poetic forms;
- In the poetic syllogism, in spite of the absence of principles and axioms, the pleasure evoked by harmony guards against incompleteness by showing that the forms and terms must be finite;
- The relational and intentional components make pleasure in poetry intersubjective;
- The constructive aspect of poetry (although not explicitly discussed by I.S.) himself proves the completeness of the poetic syllogism;
- I.S.'s concern deals with general arguments about poetry rather than with particular analysis of poetic works.

A valuable detailed paper, although some of A.'s interpretations (esp. those based on extrapolations) are open to discussion.

(18) MADKOURE, I., Avicenniana. Le Livre de l'Interprétation du Shīfā, in: MIDEO, 10 (1970), 749-258. Reprint of A.'s introduction to the edition of Shīfā, al-Thāira (see Works, A11). A. offers a brief, but significant description of the historical background, as well as a basic outline of the work, paying special attention to the most important deviations from Aristotle.

A valuable basic introduction to the text.


A. states that in his later works I.S. develops a new logic, which is clearly linked to his project for an Eastern philosophy. Then A. enumerates, and discusses the specificities of I.S.'s logic. We may cite:

- I.S.'s opinion that the discussion of the primary categories belongs to metaphysics;
- I.S.'s limitation of the proper subject of logic to definition and demonstrative reasoning (except in the Shīfā);
- I.S.'s acceptance of a close link between logic and grammar;
- The accidentality of existence, but, acc. to A., the question of an eventual priority of essence over existence (or vice-versa) did not arise in I.S. (it only occurred in later philosophy);
- I.S.'s many additions to Aristotle's logic of propositions, e.g. regarding modalities;
- I.S.'s exigence that the quality required for the qualification of the subject by the predicate in affirmative propositions has to reside in act, not in potential (as in al-Fārābī);
- The introduction by I.S. of the connective hypothetical syllogism, as well as of the exclusive syllogism.

A. also presents in detail the great influence I.S.'s logic had on later Persian thinkers. Finally, regarding Rāzi's criticism of I.S.'s logical ideas, and Tāfṣīr's response, A. gives no fewer than 13 particular items.

A well-documented and very interesting introduction, although A.'s acceptance of a specific "Oriental philosophy" in the late I.S. is questionable, see Religious Themes and Mysticism, C. 11.


Based on a critical translation of Shīfā, al-Madkhal (Isagoge), b. 1, ch. 12 (see Works, A II), A. views I.S.'s theory of the universal as a variation on Aristotle's realism. He explains why the inclusion of metaphysical considerations in this context, should not be seen as the result of a fundamental confusion between metaphysical and logical investigation on the part of I.S. Finally, A. suggests that the distinction between what a thing is and that it exists in the mind probably underlies I.S.'s all-theory on predicates. It has to be noted that A. pays much attention to the basic terminology, and its underlying difficulties.

A very fine analysis of a significant text-fragment.


The main part of the paper is devoted to the study of the difference between Aristotle's definition of topics and that of Theophrastus (A. also develops this topic, later, for authors such as Cicero, Boethius and Cassiodorus). In the final part, completely devoted to I.S., A. indicates three sources for I.S.'s theory of topics: Aristotle, Theophrastus and an unknown Oriental source. A. emphasizes that I.S. opts for a deductive model of science (induction just being a dialectical method, and, as such, belonging to the field of topics).

A good paper, containing elements essential to a basic understanding of I.S.'s Topics.


The title does not cover the contents. In fact, A. deals in a comprehensive way with the overall development of the Peripatetic propositional logic. I.S. is only treated as one of the great representatives of this tradition (such as
Theophrastus, Galen or Boethius). Nevertheless, A.'s (scattered) remarks on I.S.'s propositional logic are worth considering. Let us cite:

- I.S.'s twofold division of conjunctive conditional statements into absolute and real (similar to Boethius);
- The reducibility of disjunction to subjunction (in agreement with Galen);
- I.S.'s synthesis between two Peripatetic traditions: one dealing with propositions which have no perfect consequents, the other dealing with propositions which have perfect consequents;
- I.S.'s acceptance of the soundness of Theophrastus' idea of *meidainabonomenon*, notwithstanding the fact that I.S.'s accentuation of the relation between propositions has no counterpart in Theophrastus;
- The belief that connectives expressing complete implication allow the deduction of the antecedent from the consequent (contrary to Galen);
- The development of the conjunctive composed syllogism of composed consequents from simple facts (contrary to the Stoics, but similar to Boethius);
- I.S.'s adherence to the "Eastern school", while al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd represent the "Occidental school" (which showed less interest in propositional logic than the former).

But, above all, there is A.'s major thesis that I.S.'s propositional logic is not the result of a Stoic influence, but remains faithful to the Peripatetic tradition (Shehaby *infra*, 33) already defended this view. Moreover, A. believes that I.S. had at his disposal Peripatetic works, which are no longer in existence. Certainly, a very stimulating study, although A. introduces a lot of (unwarranted?) extrapolations.


After a rather conventional introduction on I.S.'s theory of the inner senses, A. states that for I.S. the poetical imagination works with the images of the imaginative power - poetical imagination being directly linked with dramatic art. The poet is not searching for any verification of his sayings - he just wants to impress his audience. However, I.S. stresses that the poet should guide the behaviour of his audience in a positive direction, and that the subject of the poetical imitation should be identifiable in reality (contrary to Aristotle). Moreover, A. concentrates on poetical utterances (having stimulative principles and sensitive principles). While paying special attention to the characteristics, through which they differ from rhetorical utterances, A. concludes that although I.S.'s theory has a historical precedent in several respects, it is at the same time very innovative, especially insofar as it systematizes all the various elements in a very critical fashion.

Valuable, a serious basic outline of I.S.'s theory of poetry.


A. to A. the question whether logic is an instrument for philosophy, or a part of philosophy is for I.S. both false and futile. I.S. defined logic as an inquiry into concepts, and into their properties, insofar as they may lead to the knowledge of the unknown. So, the secondary intelligibles are the proper object of logic for I.S. (A. sets this doctrine in its historical context - evoking such names as Porphyry, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīwâr and Ibn al-Taṣīyîbî). Moreover, logic, being concerned with the appropriate means of acquiring knowledge, was divided by I.S. into two parts: a theory of definition and a theory of proof (A. hereby examines in some detail the famous distinction between aṣâr, conception, and taṣdîq, assertion, or judgment). Finally, A. observes that I.S. seems to consider logic to be an inquiry primarily concerned with language - I.S. stating that conceptual modifications are brought about by modifications in the utterance. It has to be noted that A.'s analysis is primarily based on Şîrâzî, *al-Muqtabas*, b. 1, ch. 2-4. A very fine paper, very precisely delineating I.S.'s opinion by contrasting it with both prior and posterior theories.


Having outlined I.S.'s general concept of logic, and its specific place in the history of Arabic logic, A. points to some of I.S.'s logical doctrines: those which deviated from Aristotle, and those which may be considered innovations with respect to the Stagirite. A. points to such items as the conditional syllogism, the two types of absolute propositions, the contradiction between absolute propositions, the conversion of necessary propositions, and the introduction of a temporal quantifier with respect to propositions (A. relies heavily on the *İshâra, Remarks and Admonitions* - most of the time paraphrasing the text of Târî's *Comment*). A. concludes with a comment about the Logic of Orientals. Mainly introductory, offering a basic list of possible logical innovations in I.S.


After a general introduction, A. concentrates on I.S.’s and al-Fārābī’s theories of the poetical syllogism. Inter alia, A. notes that for I.S., the poetical premises are more important than the poetical syllogism itself; that I.S. always evokes an image in the listener directly with the arousing of admiration (a fact unknown to al-Fārābī); that for I.S. not all poetical premises are “imitations” (contrary to al-Fārābī); and that I.S. always claims that poetical statements may be true or not. A. concludes that the Arabic theory of the poetical syllogism is basically Aristotelian, although Aristotle himself did not explicitly mention such kind of syllogism.

A valuable and very interesting study. For a somewhat different interpretation, see supra, 3 and 17.

(32) SHAPIROV, A., Ibn Sinā on the Relation between Logic and Poetry, in: Machnawi Filologiyi, Mahkolahkoo Aspirantkoo Fak. Fil. Tadj. Dushanbe, Ak-Tadj., 1971, 3-7 (Tadj., or Rus?).


A. stresses I.S.’s literary style, which is characterized by the objection-answer form of his writing. Regarding I.S.’s sources, A. points to the later Peripatetics (rather than the Stoics). Notwithstanding the great similarity in vocabulary with al-Fārābī, context-wise there exist important divergences between I.S. and his immediate predecessor. Hereafter, A. presents a basic outline of I.S.’s theory of conditional propositions and syllogisms. A. remarks that I.S.’s logic is concerned with facts rather than with words. In the commentary, A. provides some interesting clarifications, e.g., regarding many termini technici.

Valuable, but compare also 11 and 22.


A. presents a basic summary of all the parts of logic, as distinguished by I.S. Although the nine books of the logical part of the Shībī constitute the basic source for his exposū, A. also makes use of I.S.’s other logical works (however for a few smaller treatises (still unpublished), he had to consult some ms.). A. always carefully indicates what may be new in I.S., without exaggerating I.S.’s contributions, or value. Among A.’s many observations, we may cite:

1. I.S.’s logical analysis of the manner of division by way of genus, species or differentia specifica;
2. I.S.’s recognition of six ways to characterize a thing;
3. I.S.’s insistence that the setting of the number of categories is not the role of the logician, but the responsibility of the metaphysician;
4. The positiv by I.S. of some kind of connection between logical and linguistic concepts;
5. The introduction by I.S. of a clear distinction between simple and complex categorical syllogisms;
6. I.S.’s (rather surprising) opinion that induction does not necessitate true science;
7. I.S.’s final reduction of demonstration into two basic types: existential and explicative;
8. I.S.’s consideration of sophistics as a logical art, similar to inverted syllogisms (an innovative idea with respect to his source Aristotle);
9. The special place conscience, or the human mind, occupies in I.S.’s rhetoric;
10. I.S.’s fundamental dependence upon Greek thought and literature in his poetics and the possibilities Arabic poetry might have offered, if I.S. had studied them instead.

At the end of his study, A. adds a useful English-Arabic lexicon of logical terms.

A valuable pioneering work.
LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY

progressive deification of the Agent Intellect. A insists that I.S.'s ideas are evolutionary in this respect, due to the fact that he considers the growth of ability to abstract 'ideas' to be analogous to the growth of ability to receive the 'forms' of the Agent Intellect. I.S. moreover had no eye whatsoever for the secularizing tendency inherent in Aristotle's epistemology, but simply adopts the Platonic 'way' of diapheresis, hence defending a contemplative, non-discursive conception of knowledge, as well as the existence of separated ideas that are not reflected by sensible objects. This becomes very evident in I.S.'s so-called mystical writings - but A. stresses that this 'mysticism' can at most signify the kind of mysticism one may also ascribe to Plato.

A good paper, but does A. not interpret I.S.'s theory too exclusively in the light of Greek thought?

(3) BAZAN, B., La noética de Avicena, in: Revista de Filosofía (Maracaibo), 3 (80), 115-138.

Having briefly outlined the metaphysical content of I.S.'s noetica, A. analyzes (in much more detail) its psychological outlook (based on the De Anima, IV-V), according to the critical edition of the Avicenna Latina (Leiden, Brill; Louvain, Ed. Orient., 1968). A. hereby relies heavily on Verbeke's doctrinal introduction. A. concentrates on such topics as the spirituality and the substantiality of the soul; soul and body; the immortality of the soul; and the states of the human intellect or the act of intellec.

Good, but introductory and not original.


A. first enumerates the major difficulties involved in I.S.'s (and already Aristotle's) noetica. Then, he starts a proper examination of I.S.'s noetica on the metaphysical plane. He deals in conventional terms with God being pure Intellect, His emanating by thought the first Intelligence, and, further on, the triadic emanative structure. Once arrived at the reditus-movement, A. feels obliged to turn his attention to I.S.'s psychology, and more particularly to the part concerning the human intellect. Its functionings, and its multiple divisions, are described in great detail. A. develops significant historical considerations with respect to I.S.'s theory, or parts of it (they concern its sources and its influences, especially in the Latin Middle Ages). Special emphasis is laid by A. on the fact that I.S. did not consider human knowledge to be purely illuminative.

A.'s observations that the 'holo intellect' with respect to prophecy implies rather an ethnal perfection, and with respect to wisdom implies rather a cognitive perfection, and that the intellectus adepsus has to be identified with the intellexus acquisitus, both reflecting Alexander of Aphrodisias's nous thuraiten, qualify the general outlook of the final part of this paper.

A scholarly paper, esp. on psychological matters, which offers an extensive range of valuable details.

B. Noetics


A. deals in detail with the various aspects of I.S.'s theory of knowledge. He starts from a basic distinction between three kinds of knowledge: sensitive, intellectual and mystical. As far as sensory perception is concerned, A. presents a rather classical outline of the external and the internal senses. Nevertheless, he stresses that I.S.'s common sense somehow replaces Aristotle's phantasia, and pays attention to Rāzī's criticism of various aspects of I.S.'s doctrine of the internal senses. But of utmost importance is his opinion that I.S. is neither a materialistic nor an idealistic thinker (sensory perception being for him the starting point of the process of abstraction). Regarding intellectual knowledge A. deals, once more in a rather conventional manner, with such items as the substantiality of the soul (but A. multiplies its proofs in a somewhat artificial way), the universal form, or the Agent Intellect. For A., the basic perspective remains Aristotelian, notwithstanding the introduction of many Neo-Platonic elements. Worth mentioning is A.'s remark that I.S.'s defines the role of the intellect in very similar terms to 'Abd al-Jabbār as the verification of the sensible data. As to mystical knowledge, A. detects an intellectual mysticism in I.S. (in the same way as Gardeil). It may be indicated that in this part A. especially stresses I.S.'s notion of hadī, intuition. In a final chapter A. discusses the influence of I.S.'s theory of knowledge both in the East and the West (however mainly based on secondary sources). A.'s use of some of the lesser known I.S.'s texts does deserve special attention.

Very meritorious, probably the first really encompassing study on this particular topic, although it is not profoundly innovative, and, above all, does not really resolve the obvious difficulties in I.S.'s theory of knowledge.


After a brief discussion of Aristotle's theory of the Agent Intellect, A. presents I.S.'s theory on this topic as basically Aristotelian (but Aristotle's epistemology is interpreted in a rather strong Platonic way, no doubt influenced by the Neo-Platonic commentators). Acc. to A., I.S. unequivocally accepted abstraction. As to the need for the conjunction with the Agent Intellect, it is interpreted by A. in the pure Platonic perspective of 'reminiscence'. Such a Platonic interpretation was facilitated by Aristotle himself, insofar as he offered no precise characterization of the intellect and the act of intellec, and, moreover, as he explained them in terms of light and vision. This metaphor even contributed to a
(5) JABRE, F., Le sens de l'abstraction chez Avicenne, in: Mél. Univ.
St. Joseph (Beirut), 50 (84), vol. 1, 281-310.
The Arabic philosophers were faced with a serious problem in translating the
Greek word ἀπαθετικός (there existed no standard Arabic equivalent for it)
comparable to e.g. istiqlāl for the Greek epagenē). Al-Fāraḥī, and also I.S.,
rather to words derived from the root J R D which was not without
some ambiguity, since they also meant the Greek chōristos. and, as such, were
synonymous with Arabic (M) F R Q. Acc. to A, it is rather doubtful whether I.S.
understood abstraction in the usual Western sense, because of his wide-ranging
terminology in this respect. This suspicion is strengthened by two passages
in the Shāfī, Kal-Burhān (Curs. Anal. Post.), in which I.S. discusses Aristotle
(Anal. Post. I 74a35-3b4 and 81b1-9). Having carefully studied the basic
materials (the original Greek text (in Tricot’s French version) slightly revised);
the Arabic translation of this Greek original (according to the edition of Ibn
Sūrāj) and I.S.’s paraphrase (in critical French translation by A. himself), A,
convincingly demonstrates that induction in I.S. is no longer an integral part
of abstraction as it was in Aristotle. For I.S. the intelligible reality of an object is
perceived at the occurrence of its perception by the senses, but is nowhere
directly derived from the sensible! Sure, the intellect ‘divests’ the essentially
sensible things from their material accidents in order to arrive at the ma‘ād,
intention. Nevertheless there exists no more than an accidental link between
the acquisition of the intelligible, on the one hand, and the presence of sensible or
imaginary facts, on the other. Induction is no longer the principle of the
universal. Acc. to A, I.S. somehow prefigures modern empiricism (I.S.’s primary
concern being not the problem of abstraction as such, but the problem of the
immortality of the soul).
A very fine paper!

In some sense, this paper may be considered to be a primary basis for S. A.
offers a general outline, as well as the basic principles of I.S.’s theory of the
human intellect (based on Ishārāt, Remarks and Admonitions; Naqāt, Salvation,
and R. & f l ‘-īthāq, Tr. On Love). Then, he concentrates on the theory of
intellection. A. presents a rather detailed analysis of Ṣifā, De Anima, V, 5 and
6. He points inter alia to the grasp by the intellect of the ‘intention’ of the
particulars in the imagination, to the fact that intellection is the search for the
middle term in a syllogism, to the ‘āqil hast’, simple intellect, which may bring
the soul to the state of intellect in act, namely when the soul has the truth in
itself; and to the acquired intellect and the act of the dhulān, ratio, by which the
middle term is rigorously captured. A. stresses also the central place that
the notion of intuition, hadād, occupies in I.S.’s theory of knowledge, especially
on the level of the acquired intellect. Finally, A. wonders whether one may find in
I.S.’s system an act of intuition without any direct contact with the Agent
Intellect. His answer is positive, because there is a way leading from the
material intellect, together with intellection and intuition, to abstraction, and
hence not to the Agent Intellect.

(7) NUSEIBEH, S., Al-‘aqāl al-qudāt: Avicenna’s Subjective Theory of
Knowledge, in: Studia Islamica, 69 (89), 39-54.
A. tries to show that I.S. did not hold knowledge to be empirically or objectively
verifiable (based on Shāfī, De Anima and Analytica Posteriora). A. observes that
I.S.’s theory of knowledge is fundamentally based on the intuition of middle
terms, since it excludes the existence of quiddities / intelligibles in the external
world (contrary to al-Fāraḥī!). Quiddities or essences, considered in themselves,
substans rather than exist. Specificities and accidents only come to appertain to
quiddities in existence, while unity (and all descriptions and relations following
up unity) do not appertain to quiddities in subsistence. Therefore, there exists no
means to verify one’s knowledge. A. concludes that there is a striking similarity
between I.S. and al-Ghazzālī in this respect.
Interesting, but such a far-reaching conclusion is no doubt in need of further
 textual support.
C. Divisions of the sciences

A states that the precise meaning of ḥikma, wisdom, always depends on which division of science it is used in. Therefore, A examines the question whether I.S. considers logic to be a part of wisdom or to be just an instrument for it. From an analysis of I.S.’s different works, A concludes that logic is both instrument for and part of wisdom. A also pays special attention to the division of the sciences in the K. al-Hādīya-Book of Guidance.
Valuable, especially as an introduction to the edition of the Book of Guidance.

(2) KHAIROULLAEV, M., The Problem of the Classification of the Scientific Knowledge in the Near and Middle East during the Middle Ages (Fārābī - Khwārezmī - Ibn Sīnā), in: Al-turāth al-ʿarabī, 2, 5-6 (81), 193-203 (Ar).
After a long introduction on the new developments in science in the Near and Middle East during the 7th-10th centuries, A concentrates on some essays of classification of the (old and new) sciences in the same period (especially those of al-Fārābī, al-Khwārezmī and I.S.). A long citation of Ibn Khaldūn’s Prolegomena precedes the proper, but very summary analysis of (and comparison between) these classifications.
Introductory.

A points out that I.S.’s Isagōgē largely goes beyond its historical source, especially in offering a foundation for metaphysics. In this very same vein an ontological criterion for ascertaining the place of logic within the sciences is developed in the Isagōgē. One does not find one in I.S.’s other expositions on the classification of the sciences. Commenting on b. 1, ch. 2 (of which A offers a critical translation, see Works, III), A. inter alia stresses the modal aspects of theoretical philosophy, and the independence of logic from ontology, its proper concern being predicates inasmuch as they are subjects, predicates etc.
A profound and accurate analysis of a significant chapter taken from one of the books of the Shīfi.

A. indicates that I.S.’s hierarchical structure of the sciences deviates from Aristotle, and Philo-ponos - albeit I.S. accepts with the latter the primacy of metaphysics. Hence, acc. to A. the Tabula Porphyrians and the Liber de Causis are the real sources for I.S.’s structure. Finally, A. remarks that the same rules dominate I.S.’s theory of sciences and his Neo-Platonic concept of the Universe.
A brief, but interesting paper.

For A. a strong parallel exists in I.S. between metaphysics (as distinguished from Divine sciences) as the basis for all theoretical sciences, on the one hand, and prophecy as the basis for all practical sciences, on the other. Moreover, I.S. considered logic to be a pure instrumental science, and derived the contents of the theoretical sciences mainly from Aristotle, while he derived the contents of the practical sciences mainly from Islamic religion. To conclude, A. compares I.S.’s concept of scientific investigation with his contemporaries. A observes fundamental differences, but also points out possible similarities.
A rather general and superficial exposition of I.S.’s concept of science, mainly concentrated on the division of the sciences.

(6) UĞUR, A., Ibn Sīnā’s Classification of Sciences, in: Ulusl. I.S. Sempo, 443-444 (Tu); 445 (Engl S.),
Acc. to S., a very general paper, almost without value.

Chapter VII

Linguistics,
Terminology,
Poetry

See also:
I, A-II, Av. Lat. (Van Riet);
I, B-I, Lat. Tr., St. 2
III, 23
VI, A-I, 25
(1) ABADANI, F., Avicenna and the Persian Language, in: Indo-Iranica, 26 (73), 27-30; also in: Milla wa-milla, 7 (67), 49-52. A. points to the 'great performance' of I.S. in the domains of philosophy, medicine and poetry, both in his Arabic and Persian works. Of no real value.

(2) AHMAD, N., Ibn Sīnā's Contribution to Persian Language and Literature (A Study based on the Dānesh-Nāma-i-Ala'il), in: Indo-Iranica, 34 (81), 1-17. Of the Persian works ascribed to I.S. only two are certainly authentic; the Dānesh-Nāme, Book of Science, and the R-i-rag šinās, Tr. on the Explanation of the Pulse. Moreover, the title of the first is problematic. After his introductory remarks, A. analyzes I.S.'s Persian vocabulary, much in the same way as Mo'īn, however showing that words Mo'īn believed to be original in I.S. were used by earlier authors. The style, both with respect to its qualities and its defects, as well as the grammatical peculiarities are discussed with great clarity. A. discovers no less than eleven peculiarities in I.S.'s Persian writings. A fundamental paper, important for the study of I.S.'s Persian works.


(4) 'AMMAR, A., Efforts of Ibn Sīnā with Respect to Language and Sounds, in: M. al-buḏt al-'ilmi wa l-turāšt al-islāmi (Mekka), 5 (1402-1403 H.), 115-132 (Ar). A. first concentrates on the two works, written by I.S. on the subject of language: Ashbāb hadith al-huruf, On Phonetics, and the R. Nuyūrīya, The New Year Treatise offering some details of editions, translations and manuscripts. Hereafter, he elaborates a rather systematic exposition of I.S.'s theory of sounds (Shīb, Canon and On Phonetics are the sources of A.'s analysis). I.S.'s most important sentences on this matter are brought together by A., his comments here are very succinct. However, I.S.'s classification of the Arabic sounds is discussed in detail. A. presents a comparison with some major ancient Arabic grammarians (and stresses the many differences). A. offers no personal judgment on the difficulties surrounding some anatomical aspects of I.S.'s theory of voice and speech. A rather introductory paper, but offering valuable information as to the classification of sounds, both in I.S. and his contemporary Arabic grammarians.

(5) 'AYĀN, R., Ibn Sīnā, Who wrote Persian Tetrasichs out of an Intellectual Aim, in: Indo-Iranica, 34, 4 (81), 44-50 (Pers). A. says that I.S. was as great a poet as he was a philosopher or a physician! He discovers a philosophical-intellectualistic input in I.S.'s tetrasichs (as to the

Of no value.


The title of the paper is not really descriptive of the contents. In fact, A. deals with the basic requirements (i.e. the establishment of a lexicon, and of an exhaustive index of philosophical concepts) one has to fulfill in order to begin to make a serious contribution to the study of I.S. In this respect, A. points to some works, which have already been undertaken in this direction (i.e. by Goichon, d'Alverny and Van Riet).

(8) DIRIÖZ, M., Literary Personality of Ibn Sinā, in : Kayseri Kongr., 363-384 (Tu).


A. distinguishes two fundamental approaches to the study of I.S. in the Latin Middle Ages. The first approach is characterized by a great fidelity to the technical vocabulary of I.S., although critical of it due to religious considerations. William of Auvergne, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus are its main representatives. In contrast, the second approach as shown by Thomas Aquinas 'rethought' the new vocabulary, A., then, gives concrete examples in order to prove the validity of his hypothesis (e.g. Ar. wujūd. Latin : both exi and esse. even esseur and sometimes, mistakenly, essentia).

A very interesting paper opening a most valuable perspective for further investigation.


(14) MASADI (AL-'), 'A., Regarding the Linguistical Meanings in the Heritage of Ibn Sinā, in : Pensée arabe..., 27-46 (Ar).

A. deals with various aspects of I.S.'s opinions on language, and related topics (mainly based on the logical parts of the Skī,fā, and on the Treatise on Phonetics). A. pays special attention to I.S.'s theory of signification, and presents some basic materials in this respect.

Valuable, although A. sometimes ascribes too modern views to I.S.


(15-16: Although I.S.'s Treatise on Phonetics forms the principal object of investigation, A. also makes use of many other Avicennian texts. He does not intend a complete analysis of the Treatise, but limits himself to some significant items. He first examines the problem of (physical) sound (and odination), observing in I.S. a growing dissatisfaction with 'sudden separation' as a source for sounds, comparing it to the thoughts of al-Fārābī. Then A. investigates the phenomenon of the voice and of phonation. He pays particular attention to I.S.'s description of the larynx, and tries to find a plausible explanation for the use of 'body that resembles the tongue of a pipe' (and which plays an essential role in phonation). He indicates Galen as the most probable source of the famous phrase, but remarks that I.S. no more than any of his Arabic predecessors understood the exact structure of the larynx (I.S.'s different descriptions of the larynx as well as of the tongue turn out to be excerpts from Galen - albeit less precise than the original). I.S. seems to have been the first Arabic author who systematically examines the exact mechanism of the production of sounds. In the second paper, A. concentrates on still another important factor of I.S.'s theory of phonation, rūthā. A. convincingly shows that I.S. in this particular context uses it in the sense of saliva (taking into account I.S.'s total system, A. prefers moisture, although in a qualified way, in order to render rūthā).
astonishing fact that I.S.'s attributes to saliva so paramount an importance, is explained by A. as the probable result of entirely theoretical considerations, which may have been inspired by some passage in Galen. On the whole, A. clearly believes that I.S.'s originality consists in having developed a treatise on the topic of phonetics - Galen being his major source, a source which sometimes remains superior to I.S.'s own ideas. Utmost enlightening papers!

For A., it is evident that I.S.'s approach to speech phenomena is positively empirical, and that its presentation is revealingly functional. After a brief summary on the Tr. on Phonetics, A. deals with some particular ideas, e.g. the description of the immediate cause of sound, the formation of speech sounds, etc.
Some interesting ideas, although A. overemphasizes I.S.'s originality.

A. offers a rather detailed survey of the main topics of the Treatise on Phonetics. A. stresses that I.S. sets up his theory based on his own scientific and medical investigations, as well as on his practical observations. He also does not hesitate to state that some of I.S.'s views are almost in agreement with contemporary linguistic theories.
Rather introductory, clearly exaggerating I.S.'s own input, see 15-16.

Having said that there exists no evidence that during the translation movement Greek or Indian grammatical works were made accessible to the Arabs but admitting that there might have been an indirect knowledge of Greek or Indian grammatical ideas, A. offers a brief summary of I.S.'s *Makhārij al-ḥurāf. Tr. On Phonetics*. Hereafter, he also briefly mentions Greek (esp. Thrax) and Indian phonetics, and then proceeds to a comparison with I.S.'s theory, noticing that there is almost nothing in common between them. A. points out *inter alia* that I.S. ignores the syllable and the diphthongs (contrary to Thrax), and also ignores the function of the glottis in speech, and hence the distinction between voiced and voiceless sounds (contrary to Indian phonetics). A. considers I.S.'s anatomical descriptions of the larynx and the tongue to be highly original contributions (but see 15-16).
From the pure grammatical point of view, the paper contains some interesting observations, although the complexity of the problem involved no doubt requires much more investigation.

(20) SMIRNOVA, L., see: *LiVŠITZ, V.*


Chapter VIII

Psychology and Paedagogics

See also:
I, B-II, St. 2
VI, B 4, 6
XI, B-II, 8, 10, 11
XIII, 15, 24
XIV, A-II, 2, 13, 15, 16;
XIV, A-IV, 1, 3, 9, 10-12
(and the totality of XVI, C-I: psychosomatics)
(1) AKYÜZ, Y., Les contributions d’Ibn Sinâ à la science de l’éducation et sa place dans l’histoire de l’éducation turque et dans celle de l’éducation mondiale, in: Ulusl. I.S. Semp., 227-237 (Tu); 238-239 (Fr S.).
Acc. to S., A. considers I.S. as one of the greatest pedagogical scientists, in world history up to now!

(2) ALTINTAŞ, H., La théorie de l’âme chez Avicenne, in: Ulusl. I.S. Semp., 241-253 (Tu); 254-255 (Fr S.).
Acc. to S., A. offers a correct, but rather general description of I.S.’s theory on the soul.

The work is divided into two major parts. In the first part, a general evaluation of the role of psychology in the Islamic world is given together with a classical survey of I.S.’s life and works. The second part is devoted to the study of I.S.’s psychological and pedagogical ideas. It contains many long citations of well-known Avicennian texts - but no substantial analysis is presented. The book may be considered at most as a basic, and even then rather superficial introduction to I.S.’s major psychological and pedagogical doctrines.

Acc. to S., A. compares I.S. with Bergson, with respect to some psychological ideas.

(5) CRUZ HERNANDEZ, M., Révision de la théorie avicennienne de l’âme, in: Pensée arabe..., 561-548.
This paper offers fragments from A.’s Historia (see General Studies, B 5) regarding I.S.’s concepts of the soul and the intellect (Historia, I 234-239) as well as Ibn Rushd’s criticism of I.S.’s psychological doctrine (Historia, II, 187-188). These fragments are given in Spanish, while the introduction and the conclusion of the paper are given in French (one wonders whether this “lecture” was intended by A. to be published as such?). Valuable, although introductory.

A. stresses the importance I.S. attributed to convenient philosophical as well as psychological insights into the fundamental nature of man in order to ensure human health. Then he offers a concise, almost classical description of I.S.'s view on man, from the psychological, metaphysical and medical points of view.
However, the problem of the soul is analyzed in a much more detailed way.
When discussing the ultimate goal of human life, A. begins to develop an original solution to the problem of freedom and determinism in I.S. A. suggests that the yearning of the soul for perfection (as expressed in I.S.'s so-called 'esoteric writings') could mediate between the determinism of men's lives resulting from their being created, and man's ability to choose the "right path".
On the whole, a rather introductory paper, although a more profound view is expressed concerning the determinism-free will tension in I.S.

Acc. to A., both I.S. and Ibn Rushd agree with Aristotle that the objects of memory and remembrance are of a particular, individual nature. But they both deviate from the Stagirite by introducing a new key-concept, i.e. that of ma'na, inenio (A. hereby refers to I.S.'s notion of wahn, vie aestimatio, or existimatio). However, A. is not unaware of the differences, which exist between I.S.'s and Ibn Rushd's respective theories. Therefore, he offers a separate account of each of them (although his major attention is going to Ibn Rushd's theory). In the appendix, he offers a partial German translation of Ibn Rushd's Episteme of Aristotele's Para Naturalis.
A valuable paper, but in need of further development.

A. argues that I.S. has effectively, or at least prepared, a radical transformation of the Islamic philosophical tradition by abandoning pure Aristotelianism. Instead, I.S. offered a para-scientific, for a highly illuminative system of knowledge, one which was much more adopted to the Islamic milieu. As to the driving force behind that transformation, A. indicates I.S.'s psychological doctrine of the soul, and the related topics of the right knowledge and the right belief. Now, in order to demonstrate this general statement, A. analyzes some particular doctrinal points: the ensoulment of the human embryo, and the question of the empirical basis of knowledge - both being closely linked with I.S.'s theory of individual immortality. We cannot enter into the many details of A.'s analysis of these points, but we may evoke a few particularly interesting features among them:
1. I.S.'s replacement of Aristotle's nous thurasiôn by two entities from without,
2. I.S.'s extreme efforts to save empiricism;
3. the very special attention paid by I.S. to the wahn, aestimatio and its object, the ma'na, intentions, I.S. elaborating a whole system of mediation between sensation and intellect;
4. the complexity of the process of iqaliba abstraction (A. offering in this respect a most significant analysis of Shifil, K. al-Burhân, esp. III, 5 and IV, 10), which plays a very useful role in the acquisition of knowledge, in spite of not being an original source for 'bn, knowledge.
A. concludes that I.S.'s illuminationist theory of knowledge diminishes the desirability of natural philosophy and mathematized sciences. It has also to be noted that A. makes some pertinent remarks concerning the proper reading of I.S. Aside more obvious remarks A. points judiciously to the inevitability of serious lexicological analysis, requiring extreme care in equating unqualifiedly Avicennian terms with their so-called Greek counterparts.
A very significant paper, which deserves due attention.


After a general introduction, A. proceeds to a brief presentation of Canon, b. 1, F. 3, T. 1, ch. 1-4 (presenting long citations from ch. 1-2, and summarizing ch. 3-4). Hereafter, A. offers a more systematic analysis of I.S.'s psychological doctrine, presenting the well-known basic ideas (e.g. the 'good example', etc.) in the conventional way. In the final part of his paper, A. emphasizes the proper evolution of the science of pedagogics from the Islamic perspective, and evaluates I.S.'s contribution in this respect.

Introductory.

A. sharply distinguishes between I.S.'s "Occidental" and his "Oriental" philosophy. He points out that the formulation of I.S.'s division of the sciences in the Orient Loge is quite different from that of the famous Treatise, entitled On the Division of Sciences. A. characterizes the difference as one between
idealistic and realistic. Thereafter, A. deals in a rather classical way with I.S.'s theory of the soul. However, A. brings some original interpretation to the fore by stressing the definite Islamic (and Platonic) character of I.S.'s famous "flying man"-argument, at least in its İshârât-version. A. finishes his work with a very detailed, and well presented analysis of the Poem on the Soul (using several older commentaries). It has to be noted that after examination A. does not doubt I.S.'s authorship of the Poem. Although A.'s extreme Islamic (Platonic) interpretation of I.S. is open to question, his study is worth considering.

A. surveys the major elements of I.S.'s psychological doctrine (i.e. the proof for the existence of the soul; the soul's unity and immortality; the intellectual powers of the soul, etc.). However, he limits himself to I.S.'s major works, and, at the same time, gives the impression that he is the very first to investigate this topic. Unfortunately, his personal interpretations lack serious foundation. Almost of no value.

A. argues that I.S.'s "flying man"-argument is not intended to be an absolute basis on which one may build a metaphysical system. One of the points involved is the fact that we have constant, intimate knowledge of our individual selves, which was also part of the soul-conception of the theologians. However, I.S. disagreed with them on the question of the nature of the self-positioning, in contrast to their mainly materialistic-atomistic concept of the soul, a pronounced spiritual concept. In order to substantiate these basic ideas, A. critically examines the three known versions of the "flying man"-argument (two in the De Anima of the Shi'ite and one in the İshârât). A. concludes that the argument was not intended by I.S. as a rigorous proof of the immateriality of the soul; but that it was considered by him as a mean of "alerting or reminding" those, who really know, of the existence of their immaterial soul, and thus of their 'I' as being totally different from their body. A very fine study.

(16) MEṢBAḤĪ (AL-), M., The Role of the Concept of 'Perfect' in the Characterization of the Soul between Aristotle and Ibn Sinâ, in: M. Kull. al-adâb wa 'l-ulum al-insân, fi-Fâs, 4-5 (60-81), 121-147; also in: Pensée arabe..., 427-450 (Ar).
A. first offers a classical summary of Aristotle's doctrine on the perfection of the soul. Then he points out that I.S., in order to be able to explain the soul's immortality, introduced the new notion of 'separate perfection'. Acc. to A., I.S. distinguished between a passive perfection, linked with the practical intellecution of the soul, and an active perfection, linked with the theoretical face of the soul.

As to the vegetative and animal soul, their perfection is defined by I.S. as natural, and therefore, linked with the body. Nevertheless, I.S. declares them to be immortal (A. finds no satisfactory explanation for this affirmation). Finally, A. stresses the strong dualism which characterizes I.S.'s doctrine of the soul (it having a definite Platonic stamp, despite an Aristotelian vocabulary).

Good, but in need of further development.

A. establishes the existence of a remarkable parallel between I.S.'s comprehension of cultish and magical acts, on the one hand, and the role I.S. attributes to the imaginary faculty in the act of intellecction, on the other hand. In both cases, the major significance of these acts is of a negative, preparatory kind. But this in no way implies that one can simply annihilate them. Although purely preparatory, this type of action remains necessary. Out of this fact, it becomes clear that notwithstanding his full adherence to a spiritual vision of man, I.S. values to some extent, man's bodily aspects. This may reflect I.S.'s general cosmological perception.

An innovative, and extremely interesting paper.

A. points out some striking differences between I.S.'s and Aristotle's concept of the soul, before he offers a basic description of what he considers to be I.S.'s arguments for the substantiality of the soul. In fact, A. hereby gives an introduction to L. GOODMAN's paper: A Note on Avicenna's Theory of the Substantiality of the Soul, in: Philos. Forum, 1 (69), 347-554 (app. 355-363), of which he presents a Persian translation (pp. 36-66).
Good, but as far as concerns A.'s own introduction not really innovative.

This third revised ediction contains only two minor additions with respect to the previous edition. They consist in offering more elements of comparison with present-day psychology.

A. characterizes I.S.'s paedagogical doctrine as 'philosophic-Islamic'. In the first
part of his study, he offers a classical survey of I.S.'s life and times, and of some central issues of I.S.'s psychological, political and moral theories. The second part of the study, addresses I.S.'s pedagogical insights, as well as I.S.'s theory on the division of the sciences. As to pedagogics, A. concentrates on the way in which I.S. defines its goal, and consequently spells out the different methods of education required by the different age groups. In this respect, A. cites some contemporary pedagogical doctrines, declaring most of the time that I.S. was the first to prescribe them. A. offers a very general introduction to I.S.'s pedagogical theory.

For A., there are some elements of pedagogical doctrine in I.S. In order to clarify them, he first concentrates on what I.S. tells us about his own education (in his autobiography). Then, he examines I.S.'s particular emphasis on the necessity of logic in the formation of the mind, paying attention to I.S.'s notions of remembrance and intuition. Finally, he discusses I.S.'s doctrine of the acquisition of good education as well as its impact.
An honest, but primarily introductory study.

(22) NASSR, M., Soul according to Ibn Sinā: in Ḥadīṣyāt Kulliyāt al-shari'a, 1 (80), 79-99 (Ar) (N.C.).

Reprint of AHDLMA. 21 (54), 21-98.

(24) PORTELLI, J., The ‘Myth’ that Avicenna reproduced Aristotle’s “Concept of Imagination” in De Anima, in: Scripta Mediterranea, 3 (82), 122-134.
A. compares I.S.'s concept of imagination with Aristotle's. Acc. to A., I.S. declares imagination to be an independent internal sense, which has in its own right the power to combine and separate images. For A., Aristotle believes that imagination occupies a mediative function between sensation and thinking, but having no creative power whatsoever. Because of this basic perspective, A. rejects Rahman's and Wolfson's interpretations of the Avicennian theory of imagination as too Aristotelian. A.'s thesis looks defensible, but is clearly in need of stronger textual evidence.

A. basically characterizes I.S.'s notion of the soul as Aristotelian-based, notwithstanding the presence of a strong Neo-Platonic superstructure. Hereafter, he briefly reviews the central issues of I.S.'s psychological doctrine, i.e. the substantiality of the soul; the internal senses; the theories of abstraction and of intellection; the survival of the soul and prophethood.
A valuable, albeit classical, survey of I.S.'s main psychological ideas.

Acc. to A., I.S. located the pneuma between the heart and the brain cellules, to which he linked a direct cognitive function. As to mystical experience, he, in accord with Orphic sources, based it on a corporealized illumination. So, I.S. established a perfect mediation between thought and matter, the human body being a matter animated by vital forces.
A highly compressed paper, including some interesting features, but highly questionable as to its basic assumption of a unified view of spirit and matter in I.S.

(27) TÜRKER-KÜYEL, M., Le problème de (la) personnalité chez Ibn Sinā, in: Uüssl. I.S. Semp., 53-73 (Tu); 74-75 (Fr S.).
Acc. to S., I.S. has anticipated the pantheistic philosophical systems of Fichte and Hegel, insofar as he destroyed the very personification of the individual subject by letting it be absorbed into the world-soul.

A. deals with some major issues of I.S.'s psychology, e.g. the proofs for the existence of the soul; the external and the internal senses; perception and intellection (A.'s account is based on various works of I.S., and on secondary Arabic sources).
A valuable, but introductory study.

A. structures the text under consideration very well. By way of illustration, we may select the following items:
– The presence in I.S. of a real grasp of the human 'ego', although he considers it to be more of a contemplative than of a creative kind;
– The absence in I.S. of a critical discussion of the exact nature of each of the soul's faculties. I.S. merely fixing a criterion (i.e. the distinction between primary and secondary activity) in order to decide whether a particular activity justifies the acceptance of a separate faculty;
– For I.S., sensation includes some abstraction of matter, but never of material accidents; moreover, abstraction never leads to real intellection, which in fact can only be reached by an illumination of the separate Agent Intellect.
A very fine introduction.
(30) YAKIT, İ., L'évolution de l'âme humaine chez Avicenne (Ibn Sinâ) et sa contribution à la pensée biologique moderne, in: *Ural. I.S. Semip.* 287-295 (Tu); 296-305 (Fr).

From the (very bad) French translation, one gets the impression that A. distinguishes between two kinds of psychologies in I.S.: an empirical psychology, related to the natural sciences, and a rational psychology, related more specifically to metaphysics. A. concentrates in his paper on the former. He illustrates it by analyzing the different faculties I.S. attributes to the soul. He also tries to show that I.S. is a predecessor of contemporary evolutionary biology.

As far as the French version concerns, a very confused, and in many details, incorrect work.


A. wonders whether I.S. presents a coherent view of man both in his philosophical and in his medical works? In order to settle this question, A. first develops a very succinct, but significant synthesis of I.S.'s philosophical, and medical concepts of the nature of man. At first sight, a contradiction seems to exist between them. As a matter of fact, I.S., the philosopher, posits a spiritualistic human ego, while I.S., the physician, conceives of man as a fundamental part of the natural world. However, acc. to I.S.'s own view, philosophy and medicine cannot contradict each other, in view of their both belonging to the natural sciences. And indeed, as soon as one takes into account I.S.'s theory of the two 'faces' of the soul, the above-mentioned (apparent) contradiction clearly disappears.

A very valuable paper, sketching a first, but fundamental orientation for a thorough study of I.S.'s conception of man.

Chapter IX

Politics and Ethics

See also:
L, C - ab
XIV, A-III, 9
(1) AHMAD, I., Ibn Sīnā and the Philosophy of Law and the State, in: *Jurnal Undang-Undang*, 7 (80), 175-199. A. believes that I.S., in his political philosophy, links the ideal state of Islam with the ideal state of Plato's philosopher-king (with references to both the *Republic* and the *Law*). However, A. observes that I.S. shows more reliance on the law than Plato, who had stressed above all the influence of morals. A. also offers a brief analysis of I.S.'s theories on the intellect (based on *De Anima*, V, 6), on prophecy (in its intellectual and law-giving functions), and on different aspects of proper politics. A. presents many basic text-fragments concerning I.S.'s political theory but his exegesis of them is very limited in scope as well as in contents.

(2) ANAWATI, G.C., Aristote et Avicenne. La conception avicennienne de la cité, in: TH. ZARONE (Ed.), *Individu et Société. L'influence d'Aristote dans le monde méditerranéen (Actes du Coll. d'Istanbul, 1986)*. Istanbul, Paris, Rome, Trieste, Ed. Isis, 1988, 143-157. After a brief survey of I.S.'s *autobiography*, A. concentrates on I.S.'s theory of the division of the sciences, especially that of the practical sciences. For I.S., politics is one of the practical sciences. From a basic analysis of the final chapters of the *Metaphysics* of the *Shifā*, A. concludes that I.S.'s political theory is Islamically inspired, and reveals no direct Aristotelian influence (except for a few details, e.g., the topic of slavery). It may be noted that A. rejects the idea of a "esoteric Oriental philosophy" in I.S. Useful, but in need of further development.

(3) AYDIN, M., Ibn Sīnā’s Ethics, in: *Uluş. I.S. Semp.*, 117-128 (Tu); 129-130 (Engl S.). Acc. to S., a general, but accurate analysis of the major themes of I.S.'s ethics.

(4) ID., Morality and Human Prosperity in Avicenna's View, in: *Kayseri-Kongr.*, 241-253 (Tu).

(5) BARDAKOĞLU, A., Understanding Morality according to Avicenna, in: *Kayseri-Kongr.*, 254-258 (Tu).

(6) BUTTERWORTH, CH., Medieval Islamic Philosophy and the Virtue of Ethics, in: *Arabicca*, 34 (87), 221-250. A. first outlines Plato's and Aristotle's theories of ethics - stressing that both agreed about the subordination of ethics to virtue, but that they differed about the kind of opinion or knowledge needed for right conduct. Then A. examines the ethical theories of the two major representatives of medieval Islamic
philosophy: al-Fārābī and I.S. The former unconditionally adheres to the idea of the subordination of ethics to virtue, while his affirmations (and silences) suggest that virtue must ultimately be considered to be knowledge or correct opinion. As to I.S., he clearly deviates from his Arabic predecessor in several respects, i.e.:
1. By subordinating politics to prophecy;
2. By not perceiving all the virtues to be intellectual or to be grounded in sound intellectual understanding;
3. By starting from human need, when dealing with the subject of law-giving;
4. By accepting the possibility of the acquisition of the virtues of temperance, courage, and practical wisdom without theoretical wisdom, even if it is superior to them!

So, I.S. seems not to accept the subordination of ethics to virtue (in this point also deviating from his Greek predecessors). A. also affirms that there exists in I.S. a deep-rooted, and never resolved tension between the demands of political life and the lure of the life to come. Let us finally note that A.’s analysis of I.S.’s thought is mainly based on Shī‘a, Mat., X, but that A. also refers to a few other texts, among them the R. if T-Akhlaq, On Morals (but he does not examine the R. T-Ahad. On the Pact, which might constitute the second part of the very same treasur). If this is true, then some of A.’s secondary remarks are in need of revision, but his basic thesis is not directly threatened.

A very valuable paper, a useful complement to 7, which A. seems to be unaware of.

Based on a close inspection of Metaphysics, X, c. 2-5 of the Shī‘a, A. ascribes to I.S. a realistic theory of politics. It represents a fundamental departure from Plato (esp. the Plato of the Republic, as usually understood in the Middle Ages), and, at the same time, from his immediate predecessor al-Fārābī, who defended a political utopianism. In order to prove her interpretation of I.S.’s political realism, A. evokes the following:
1. The virtuous individual (and not city) functions in I.S. as the highest goal of practical philosophy;
2. The just city replaces the virtuous city as the ultimate concern of political science;
3. Political action has to assure above all physical survival (hence I.S.’s particular attention to codified law, and the legal caliphate, and, in general to practical wisdom). A. concludes that the departure of I.S. from his famous predecessor al-Fārābī, is profound, and most interesting paper, not in least for its offering clear evidence of a radical departure by I.S. from his famous predecessor al-Fārābī.

(8) ISMĀ‘IL, M., Philosophy according to I.S., in: Al-fikr al-‘arabī, 7(10-11) (82-83), 152-159 (Ar).
A. tries to specify I.S.’s political and social ideas by establishing a more or less systematic comparison with the thought-systems of Ibn Khaldūn, E. Durkheim and K. Marx. Significant for A.’s (extreme) Marxist interpretation is his view that the link which I.S. defends between the political, social and economic dimensions (sic!), sometimes prefigures the procedures of historical-materialistic dialectics. In this same spirit A. states that I.S.’s interest for the shari‘a comes from his involvement in the study of the unity of the community.

An utterly Marxist analysis.

(9) MAHDI, M., art. Avicenna, Practical Science, in: Enc. Ir., 84-88. A. states that I.S.’s account of practical science is laconic. I.S. offers two (at first sight incompatibly) views of practical science. The first view emphasizes ethics, and subordinates practical life to theoretical life; the second view has as its point of departure “human governance” (divided into the single individual, the household and the city). So, what the philosophers meant by nomos in political philosophy is precisely the shari‘a, in other words political science can justify some of the characteristics of the Law and of prophethood. Alongside the practical science proper, one also finds many practical things inside the theoretical sciences. Moreover, the subsidiary divisions of the theoretical sciences can be seen as applied for practical arts, e.g. the science of return, a subdivision of the divine science, shows that true divine Law complements what reason cannot know, i.e. the resurrection of the body, and the existence of bodily rewards and punishments in the hereafter. A. concludes that I.S. abandoned the Platonistic and Aristotelian theories of political science as the architectonic practical science (if not the architectonic science simply). Instead, I.S. revived the Aristotelian division of wisdom into theoretical and practical science. Moreover, I.S. contrary to his predecessors, placed the main accent on private perfection, subordinating practical science to theoretical knowledge. A somewhat provocative, but, no doubt, stimulating and most valuable contribution.

A. observes a great similarity between I.S. and Shi‘i kalam as far as it concerns the concept of divine sovereignty, although there exist two important points of divergence: I.S. accepts that the leading imām may have some vices, provided he satisfies the basic requirements, and he also makes the choice of the imām dependent upon philosophical principles. But on many points, they both agree. A. evokes inter alia the following necessary characteristics of the imām in both’s view: an ability to let people live together in peace; renunciation of personal desires; unconditional adherence to a code which secures equality and justice. Moreover, A. pays special attention to the relationship between politics and religion in both systems - in this respect, he stresses that I.S.’s theory on the revolt against the corrupt imām is utterly Shi‘ite, and that for I.S. politics is comprehended in religion - a point of view which comes close to the Shi‘ite opinion.
A. may be right when he claims a Shi‘ite counterpart for some of I.S.’s political
ideas, but a qualified judgment in this respect requires a proper analysis of I.S.’s texts in their own right!


A. declares justice the very foundation of I.S.’s theory of legislation, but I.S. derives this theory from divine Providence, not from the *sanus communis* as in Mu’tazilism. Moreover, A. observes a clear-cut distinction in I.S. between legislation and morality. Furthermore, he points to I.S.’s defense of prophecy as an expression of universal, not specifically Islamic religiosity, and as a *conditio sine qua non* for the education of the masses. Finally, he discusses the influence of I.S.’s ideas on later thought.

It has to be noted that the English summary is a confused translation of A.’s conclusion, taken from the original Arabic text. A valuable paper, containing interesting insights.


(13) SAID (AL-), R., Ibn Sinâ as Political and Social Thinker, in: Al-dînîr, 131-155; also in: Al-fikr al-arâbî, 1981, nr. 22, 331-332; and in: M. al-Wâhida (Beirut), 6 (80), 52-66 (Ar).

Having noted that the expression that the human subject is “social by nature”, A. emphasizes that for I.S. the Law is necessary in order to keep the human community together. Hence, I.S. accepts that the Law (shârî‘î) is *sunnâ*, tradition or norm. But he seems not to have considered it as a kind of structural Law in Plato’s sense. Moreover the lawgiver is identified by him with the prophet of the Islamic-Arabic tradition - although I.S.’s understanding of prophecy is not genuinely Islamic (acc. to A., most probably under Farabian influences). Nevertheless, he admits, and even stresses that I.S. clearly splits with Greek thought, when he follows up al-Amârî and rejects the existence of universal rules needed to control the city. Finally, with respect to the problem of the *imânât*, A. places it generally in a pure Islamic context, and more particularly points to some Shi’ite influence. In his conclusion, A. stresses the fact that the scope of I.S.’s political views is fundamentally Islamic.

A. enumerates the different possible sources of I.S.’s main political ideas very well. But one may wonder whether he does not underestimate the involved rupture with Plato (and al-Fârâbî), esp. in the light of 6 and 7.


A. first deals with I.S.’s personality (A. stresses I.S.’s great vanity). Then he concentrates on I.S.’s political theory, which he rightly presents as an integral part of I.S.’s comprehensive system of thought. Acc. to A., I.S.’s ideal of the political state well reflects the actual state of his time.

Finally, A. pays some attention to I.S.’s socio-political writings.

It has to be noted that the order of the pages has been inverted. Rather introductory.

(18) ID., Introduction to the Study of the Political Thought of Ibn Sinâ, in: Al-bâbîh, 12 (78), 50-69 (Ar).

A. first recalls I.S.’s political achievements, and points to the fact that they were of a practical rather than of a theoretical kind (contrary to Plato). Nevertheless, I.S. did elaborate a political doctrine, especially in the last chapters of the *Metaphysics* of the *Shîa* and the *Nâjâh*, of which A. offers a rather detailed survey. In this special attention is paid to the explanation of the structure and the origin of the state, and also to social ethics. As to I.S.’s sources, A. indicates Greek philosophy as well as Islamic religiosity, and even mentions the possibility of some Persian influences. A. concludes that I.S.’s political theory has to be characterized in the final analysis as ‘theocratic’.

A. offers a comprehensive, and well prepared introduction to I.S.’s political theory.
Chapter X

Metaphysics

See also:
I, C-I, 3 (Meyer)
V, B 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10
VI, A 20; VI, C 3
XI, B-II, 11
XII, 1, 2, 5, 6, 12
XIII, 7, 11, 14, 20, 27, 28, 29, 35
XIV, A-I, 11, 16, 17;
XIV, A-II, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 17
XIV, A-III, 10, 11; XIV, A-IV, 13
(1) ADUSZKIEWICZ, A., The Problem of Existence in the Metaphysics of the Dānesh-Nāmeh d’Ibn Sīnā, in: A. ADUSZKIEWICZ and M. GOGACZ (Eds.), Avicenna i średniowieczna filozofia arabska. Warszawa, Ak. Teol. Kat., 1983, 302-338 (Pol); 364-367 (Fr S.). Acc. to S., A. considers existence as an accident in I.S.’s theory of being. A. feels it a necessity to introduce a distinction between an essential and an existential perspective in order to understand I.S.’s metaphysics of the modes of being. A. categorically rejects the essentialistic interpretations of Gilson and Goichon stressing e.g. that the participation of the individual beings in God must be explained in the existential perspective, more precisely in terms of love as an existential goal. A. concludes that the existential perspective superposes itself upon the essential one. The French summary is not always clear. Therefore, a critical judgment cannot be made on this basis alone.


Having outlined a structural overview of the different books of the Metaphysics of the Shifā, The Cure. A. makes some critical remarks about its contemporary editions, the medieval Latin translation as well as Horten’s German translation. Moreover, A. offers some particular observations concerning his own translation - promising an index of technical terms at the end of the second volume (but, in fact, such an index is not present). Finally, A. points to I.S.’s major influence in the domain of metaphysics both upon authors in the East (e.g. al-Ghazzālī, Sohravardī, Mir Dāmād and Mullā Sadra Shirāzī) and in the West (esp. Thomas Aquinas).

This introduction offers valuable insights, but one misses a detailed analysis of I.S.’s own metaphysics.

(4) APARÍCIO SUÁREZ, M., Avicena: circunstancia y base ontológica de su filosofía, in: Mayeutica, 13 (87), nr. 35, 73-93.

After a very general introduction, A. concentrates on a few basic ideas of I.S.’s metaphysics, i.e. the necessary-possible and essence-existence distinctions, the theory of emanation and the existence of God. A. also outlines I.S.’s influence on the West. Introductory—mainly based on secondary sources.


A. first points out that some Aristotelian texts seem to understand the copula “is” inside a categorical proposition in an existential way - a fact naturally stressed in Arabic, where the copula, which was mostly omitted, was used explicitly, by ma‘na al-‘ad - meaning existent or present. Notwithstanding this fundamental fact, al-Fārābī held the common predicational interpretation of Aristotle, as I.S. sometimes does (e.g. in the Şhīb). But I.S. seems to contradict this point of view in some other places (some of these are also part of the Şhīb).[1] According to them, the copula refers somehow to existence, either in re or in intellectu. By this interpretation, I.S. points to the distinction essence-existence, and, moreover makes clear that the metaphysical investigation has first to concern itself with the focal meaning of the copula.
Very valuable. A. shows the reader I.S.’s historical dependences and personal contributions regarding the fundamental matter of the copula.


After a few remarks on I.S.’s life and his influence on the Latin Middle Ages, A. develops a general framework for the interpretation of I.S.’s concept of matter, formulating a harsh criticism of the orthodox Marxist materialistic approach of I.S.’s theory. A. highlights I.S.’s definition of prime matter as substance (excluding any identification with pure possibility). Further, A. affirms that I.S.’s system is basically monistic, and enumerates the causes, which are responsible for the becoming of bodies in the substancia relata (A. rejects any “Prinzipspezialismus”, dualism of principles). Moreover, A. offers a classical analysis of matter as (source of) evil and of the human soul as directed towards two worlds.

For A., I.S.’s “Oriental philosophy” is his real philosophy. So, A. does not hesitate to ascribe to I.S. an extremely negative theology (which he would have derived from the mu‘tazilites). A. concludes that I.S.’s concept of God corresponds nicely to the Qur’anic one.
Interesting, but this problem has to be settled in a much more qualified way. Moreover, A.’s interpretation of I.S.’s Oriental philosophy is highly questionable, see Religious Themes and Mysticism, C 11.

Acc. to S., like Aristotle, holds that generation must be referred to a self-caused entity. This enables him to derive all possible Beings from that entity, and at the same time to consider them different from it as well as from all other possible Beings.

Acc. to A., I.S. brought al-Fārābī’s Neo-Platonism to full bloom. A. believes that two distinctions lie at the basis of I.S.’s proof for God’s existence:
1. Between essence and existence (A. offers a rather complete survey of the main theses which have been expressed hitherto on the accidentality of existence); 2. Between necessity and possibility (A. notes that I.S. anticipates the ontological argument, insofar as he defines the necessity of Being also as a logical necessity).
This basic assumption is exemplified by a concrete case, i.e. I.S.’s proof for God in his R. al-arshiyya, Tr. on the Throne. A. concludes that I.S.’s argument proves the need for an efficient cause of the existence of contingent Beings (as proposed by Afnan), rather than the Leibnizian idea of God as the sufficient reason for the world (as claimed by Rahmon).
Very valuable, but limited to I.S.’s proof for God from contingency.

A. starts with a succinct survey of ontological and cosmological proofs for God in Modern philosophy. He then concentrates on the difficult ibhārāt-fragment, where I.S. states that the consideration of the “nature of Being” suffices to prove God. In sharp contradistinction to Badawi (see: General Stud., B 2) A. detects in

METAPHYSICS

Valuable, but not really innovative. One regrets that A. uses the 1495-ed. of the Avicenna Latinus instead of the critical edition (which she knows).

Good, but not really innovative. One regrets that A. uses the 1495-ed. of the Avicenna Latinus instead of the critical edition (which she knows).

Valuable, but not really innovative. One regrets that A. uses the 1495-ed. of the Avicenna Latinus instead of the critical edition (which she knows).
it a cosmological proof - although a genuine one. A. does not deny that I.S.
himself conceives of it as a purely metaphysical proof, and an attempt to sur-
pass Aristotle's physical proof from motion. But here I.S. did at most develop some
suggestions of the Stagirite.
A. presents solid grounds for his interpretation, but his argument has only
convincing force if one accepts that the Ishārāt-proof is of the very same nature
as the one offered in the Naqdī.

(15) ID., Avicenna’s Proof of the Existence of a Being Necessarily
Existential by Virtue of Itself, and: Averroes’ Critique of Avicenna’s
Proof, in: H. DAVIDSON, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the
Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy. New
By way of preliminaries, A. states that for I.S. Aristotle’s proof for God from
motion does not in itself suffice to establish the first cause of existence (see also
14), and that a ‘proof’ (not demonstration, since God has no cause) for God
belongs to the proper discipline of metaphysics. Therefore, I.S. elaborated his
own proof, which requires at least one datum from the external world, i.e. the
very fact that “there is no doubt that something exists” (A. points out that this
proof includes Aristotelian, Procean and Farabian elements). I.S.’s well-known
proof is analyzed in great detail by A. Among A.’s many observations, we may
cite:
1. I.S.’s distinction that only two categories of actual existence are conceivable,
i.e. the necessary existent by virtue of itself, and the necessary existent by virtue
of another (but possible existent by virtue of itself);
2. The existence of a close resemblance between I.S.’s analysis of the concept of
the necessary existent by virtue of itself and al-Fārābī’s analysis of the First (the
element of necessary playing no significant role whatsoever);
3. The certainty that I.S. in his cosmological proof could have dispensed with
the impossibility of an infinite regress (but, in fact, I.S. did not realize he was
able to do so);
4. The necessity to understand I.S.’s procedure in his proof as working from a
definition (otherwise there is no way to defend the proof);  
5. I.S.’s failure to consider that the totality of possible beings might exist not by
reason of a single component but by reason of all the components together.
Regarding Ibn Rushd’s criticism of I.S.’s proof, A. notes that the former did not
have at his disposal all the works of I.S. Moreover, Ibn Rushd obviously
misunderstood I.S.’s proof, not at least because he mistakenly supposed that
“possibly existent” designated a category of actual existence for I.S. (and hence
took I.S.’s twofold division of actual existence to be a threefold division).
Finally, the one serious and pertinent objection that Ibn Rushd did raise, i.e.
there being an incompatibility between possible existence and eternal existence,
leads him through a chain of puzzles back to the position of I.S. himself: One
cannot construe - as I.S. did - the celestial realm as eternal, yet in itself only
possibly existent. So, the failure of Ibn Rushd’s critique is striking. A very fine
study - although one again may wonder whether I.S. in his Ishārāt, Remarks and
Admonitions, does not elaborate a completely new proof?

(16) DINORSHOEV, M., Ibn Sīnā’s Ontology, in: Avicenna/Ibn Sīnā, I,
61-77 (Rul); also in: Rev. Filoz., 27 (80), 769-778 (Roum transl.);

(17) FAHKIRI, M., The Object of Metaphysics in Ibn Sīnā and in his
Forerunners, in: Al-disker, 103-129 (Arz).
A. stresses the genuine Aristotelian (and Farabian) character of I.S.’s definition
of metaphysics as the study of being qua being. However, A. estimates that I.S.’s
conception of causality (the second main theme of his metaphysics) is largely
in debt to Plotinus (and al-Kindi). A. also discovers some totally non-
Aristotelian elements, such as I.S.’s theories of providence, evil and resurrection.
Finally, A. points out that some aspects of I.S.’s metaphysical doctrine, e.g. the
statement that an accident may subsist in a subject, are closely linked with
theological doctrines of his time.
Very valuable. A. opens interesting perspectives for further investigation.

(18) FARUQ, A. (JOHNSON ST.), A Fourth Ontological Argument in
Ibn Sīnā’s Metaphysics, in: Hamdard Isl., 7 (84), 3-16; also in: Islam
and the Modern Age, 15 (84), 115-122, and, almost unmodified, but
differently entitled: Ibn Sīnā’s Fourth Ontological Argument for God’s
Existence, in: Muslim World, 74.4 (84), 161-171.
A. uses the “transcendental Thomistic methodology” in order to illuminate a
fourth ontological argument. Morewedge (see infra. 43) having described the
third version of the ontological argument, this fourth argument is couched
within a cosmological argument, which resembles Aristotle’s argument of the
Unmoved Mover. However, I.S.’s mystical doctrine of the intuition of Beings
enabled him to construct a coherent, not naïve proof - an epistemological
progression being also implicit in it, whereby I.S. moves from finite to the
infinite and offers an existential validation of Leibniz’ premises of the
ontological argument.
This paper includes some interesting features, but is A. not developing a personal
ontological argument rather than giving an analysis of I.S.’s argument?

(19) FILIPPANI-RONCONI, P., I concetti di ‘quiddità’ e ‘esistenza’ in
al-Fārābī ed Avicenna, in: R. TRAINI (Ed.), Studi in onore di F.
Gabrieli nel suo ottantesimo compleanno. 2 vol., Roma, Univ. La
From I.S.’s distinction between existence in se and existence in mind (based on
the Ishārāt, Remarks and Admonitions, with reference to Tīsā), and from I.S.’s
acceptance of the notion of existence as being primary, A. (in agreement with the
common interpretation of I.S. in the hitnass-school) arrives at the affirmation of
the metaphysical primacy of existence over essence, and, conversely, of the
logical primacy of essence over existence. Moreover, A. believes that al-Fārābī
understands the 'accidentality' of existence both in a mental-subjective and an extra-mental real sense - using the theological paradigm of God-Creator (but A. refers to the spurious Fāsitā, Gemistus of Wisdom). Acc. to A., I.S. holds a very similar view, but he explicitly distinguishes between three gnostiocentric levels on which one may consider "essence".

Some interesting ideas, but A.'s analysis highly leans on later Iranian thought.

A. considers I.S. to be a fundamentally Avistostolian thinker, notwithstanding his Qur'ānic belief and his Neo-Platonic affinities. Among the most striking features of I.S.'s doctrine of Being, A. advocates:
- I.S.'s acceptance of a 'superior' science, divided into three branches: metaphysics, universal science and divine science;
- The twofold division of mawjūd, Being: one according to form (expressed in the division between substance and accident); another according to finis (exemplified in the binaries essence-existence, one-multiplicity, etc.);
- The predominancy of the doctrine of potency and act in I.S.'s construction;
- The absence of any confusion in I.S. between metaphysical and logical order;
- I.S.'s special understanding of the "accidentality" of existence (in this respect A. heavily leans on Ṭūsī's Commentary on the Ishārāt, Remarks and Admonitions).

Other items, such as causality, substantiality, possibility, etc., are discussed by A. in a conventional way (mainly based on the Shīfā, The Cure, although A. also makes use of other writings, esp. the Maṭāfī al-Mashriqīyīn, Logic of Orientalism).

It is noteworthy that A. (over-)schematizes many doctrinal points. The work includes interesting insights, but A.'s interpretation seems to be based on an unclear distinction between 'to be' and 'Being', on the one hand, and 'existence' and 'existent', on the other.

(21) ID., Philosophy of Being in Ibn Sinā, in: Qudāya 'arabīyya, 91 (82), 79-105; also in: Al-turāth al-ʻarabī, 254 (81), 60-99 (Ar).
Almost a summary in Arabic of 20.

(22) GAMARRA, D., Esencia, Posibilidad y Predicación: a proposito de una distinción avicenniana, in: Sapiencia, 41 (86), 101-120.
A classical development on I.S.'s doctrine of the distinction between necessary and possible, and of his famous "triplex respectus essentiae". A. charges I.S. with totally confusing logical and ontological order. A. also discusses I.S.'s influence on Thomas Aquinas.
A.'s analysis still reflects in some essential points the "Thomistic" spirit of the beginnings of this century.

In fact, a reprint of A.'s well known paper, entitled: En l'honneur du millénaire d'Avicenne. L'importance d'un texte nouvellement traduit: les gloires d'Avicenne sur la pseudo-Théologie d'Aristote, in: Revue Thomiste, 51 (51), 333-345.

(24) GOGACZ, M., Avicenne et les plus importantes interprétations de sa théorie de l'existence, in: Stud. Philos. christ., 18 (82), 129-150 (Poi); 150-151 (Fr. S.).
Acc. to S., A. seriously criticizes Geicke's and Gibson's interpretations of I.S.'s theory of existence. In his view, the concrete existence of creatures is understood by I.S. out of God as final cause - science having to be replaced by love.

Includes pp. 5-58 a general outline in Polish of I.S.'s metaphysics.


A. points out the existence of three major positions in Islamic, Jewish and Christian medieval thought regarding the possibility-necessity problematic:
1. The theological point of view, which affirms a radical contingency of the world;
2. An attempt to harmonize Scripture with philosophy, which states that God is the cause of the necessary laws governing the world;
3. The acceptance of Aristotle's position, i.e. that the world is governed by necessary laws.

Only in the last (minor) part of the paper, A. concentrates on I.S., who for him illustrates the harmony model. A. stresses I.S.'s metaphysical approach in these matters, and briefly deals with I.S.'s distinctions between essence and existence, and possible and necessary. Moreover, A. summarizes I.S.'s theory of causality.
Valuable, although not really innovative.

(28) INATI, S.H., An Examination of Ibn Sinā's Theodicy-Dissolving
the Problem of Evil, in: New Scholast., 58 (84), 170-186.
A. ascribes to I.S. the thesis that God does not concern Himself with anything outside Himself. From it, A. concludes that I.S.'s God is incapacitated by his very nature to deal with evil, and is therefore free from blame.
Interesting, but is the Avicennian context not more complex than suggested?

A. points out two matters of matter in I.S.:
1. Matter as a mere receptacle of forms;
Only the former kind is knowable, but the latter kind has the advantage of making possible the location of a peculiar form of human freedom.
A very original paper. A.'s interpretation deserves a close analysis.

(30) JOLIVET, J., Aux origines de l'ontologie d'Ibn Sînâ, in: Études sur Avicenne, 19-28; also in: Pensée arabe... 581-562.
A. takes into consideration I.S.'s concept of essential structures (conceived in a non-Platonic way!), by discussing I.S.'s notions of shay', thing and mawjûd, existent, and also by analyzing I.S.'s theory of the relationship between the universal and the particular. Although not contradicting Aristotle, the ontology presented by I.S. in this context is clearly non-Aristotelian, insofar as it introduces a logic-based problematic, i.e. the focus imaginarius of an essence-free essence. Having shown this in a very convincing way, A. points to the fact that no such theory was present in Arabic philosophy before I.S. He then demonstrates that in mazâzîlî theology, on the contrary, some similar considerations had been developed (a fact, which Shâhrastânî and F.D. Kâzî had already pointed out). Moreover, the relationship between thing and existence also functioned in the sunni theology of I.S.'s time as a central issue of debate.
A very fine paper. Compare also: Annuaire. École pratique des Hautes Etudes, (V. Section-Se. Rel.), Vol. 88 (Comptes rendus 79-80), 401-405.


(33) MACIEROWSKI, E., Does God have a Quiddity according to Avicenna?, in: The Thomist, 50 (88), 79-87.
Acc. to A., there exist two opposite views about whether or not I.S. ascribes a quiddity to God. The one (present in Verbeke, see 65-66) states that the

Necessary Being does not have an essence that is distinct from its existence. The other (adopted by Judy (see Influences, A. II, 10) and Gilson) holds that God has no quiddity. Correcting some fragments, and translations of Judy, A. concludes that, at least, in a preliminary way, one may accept with Verbeke that for I.S. the essence of God is the same as His being in the sense of anity. However, A. notes that Gilson's position can be rescued, insofar as I.S. adheres to the principle that everything which has a quiddity other than anity is caused. From this principle, and from the fact that the First has a quiddity - namely, to be necessary of Being - I.S. concludes that God has no quiddity. It is worth mentioning that A. in an appendix gives an English translation of a few passages of the Isagoge of the Shîhâb.
Very interesting, but in need of further elaboration (especially regarding the involved notion of anity).

Turkish translation of A.'s famous introduction to the Arabic edition of the Metaphysics of the Shîhâb.

A. generally characterizes I.S.'s system as a climatic development of medieval Islamic Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic thought (closely related to al-Fârâbî), being in part also a response to doctrines encountered in Islamic theology. Moreover, A. brings to the fore not only I.S.'s acute sense for analytical distinctions, but also the rationalist spirit. Finally, A. presents in a very clear way some basic ideas of I.S.'s metaphysics, i.e. the proper subject matter of metaphysics (I.S. heavily leans on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics); the essence-existence distinction (A. shows its importance both on the logical and on the metaphysical level); God's existence and the world's emanation (with some special attention to I.S.'s proof for God's existence); divine knowledge and providence. Since I.S. devotes the last section of his metaphysics to political philosophy, A. also deals with it.
Valuable, a serious basic outline of I.S.'s major metaphysical ideas, although one may wonder whether A. does not overestimate the relationship between I.S. and al-Fârâbî?

A. provides a detailed analysis of ch. I of B. IV of the Metaphysics of the Shîhâb (for the offered translation, see Works, A. II). This chapter deals mainly with ontological priority. Aristotle's Categories is the main source for the two types of ontological priority that one finds in I.S., although I.S. derives his doctrine of the essential efficient cause from Aristotle's Metaphysics. For A., I.S.'s theory
emerges as a counterposition against Ashʿarite criticisms of (Aristotelian) causality. Very valuable, a clarifying analysis of a complex basic text.


As in 36, an analysis of a particular chapter, it being now ch. 5 of B. I. Having given a summary outline of the chapter, A. offers a critical translation (see Works, A II), intertwined with brief, but significant comments. Among others, A. discusses the problem of the impression of primary concepts, the relationship of I.S.'s doctrine of thing and existence to Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism; and I.S.'s belief that what has ceased to exist can be brought back into existence. In general, A. detects an ultra-rationalism in I.S.'s positing of primary concepts, and hereby points to its Muʿtazilite underpinnings. Very significant, although one may wonder whether the qualification of I.S.'s rationalism as an "ultra"-rationalism is totally justified?


This time, A. concentrates on ch. 10 of B. III (for its translation, see once more Works, A II). A. stresses that I.S.'s theory of relation is basically Aristotelian (notwithstanding the presence of some Neo-Platonic and Stoic elements). In fact, I.S. commits himself explicitly to a substance-accident ontology. Of particular significance is A.'s observation that a fundamental ambiguity is involved in I.S.'s position, on the question whether relations exist in objective reality, or whether they exist only in the mind? A serious basic outline.


A. states that in a proof from existence for God's existence in the Shīfā. Acc. to A., the Shīfā-formulation has even some advantages over similar versions of the proof in the Nūjāh, The Salvation, the R. al-ʿarshīyya, Tr. on the Throne and the Ishbāṭ. Remarks and Admonitory sources (A. accepts Goichon's interpretation of the Ishbāṭi-proof). Acc. to A., three points are presented better in the Shīfā, i.e.: the a priori nature of the proof; the necessity of the effect of the essence of the efficient cause, and the finitude of a series of causally connected contingent existents. A. points out that I.S.'s proof from contingency, but one may wonder why I.S. himself did not formulate it in a more systematic way in the Shīfā?


A. shows how al-Fārābī, in his Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione, arrives at defending God's foreknowledge without eliminating human freedom. But al-Fārābī makes no reference whatsoever to God's causality. Hence, he evades the crux of the problem, especially since he seems to sustain an emanative doctrine of creation. Contrary to al-Fārābī, I.S. makes such an explicit reference in the very same context. Now, however interpretation one offers of I.S.'s theory of the divine knowledge of particulars, a (pro-)determinism, always seems to be present, which is difficult to reconcile with the affirmation of man's freedom of will. At least, a solid paper. A. indicates the real crux of the problem: God's causality.


A. remarks that I.S.'s theory of efficient causality, notwithstanding its basic Aristotelian character, has characteristics all of its own. This is best shown by I.S.'s strong emphasis on the otherness of cause and effect in his physical and metaphysical writings. In so doing, I.S. probably tried to avoid pantheism. A. also confronts I.S.'s theory of causality with the occasionalism of the Ashʿarite school, esp. that of al-Bāqillānī, one of I.S.'s younger contemporaries (compare in this respect, 37). A very fine paper-clarifying in a significant way I.S.'s historical sources as well as his own input in his philosophical system.


This paper completes 44. Having developed the two versions of the ontological argument as presented by Malcolm (and the most important arguments against them), A. presents what he considers to be I.S.'s specific formulation of Malcolm's second version - which is so special that it deserves to be called a third version. Its point of departure lies in the 'self'. A. refers to I.S.'s famous "lying man" argument (however, A. himself affirms that I.S. does not make any allusion to the existence of God in this argument). Adopting with Zachener and Houben a (natural) mystical interpretation of I.S., A. states that for I.S. man's main task consists in uniting himself with nature i.e. God, and that the
conception of all actual existent realities in the world is included in the
conception of the Necessary Existent.
Undoubtedly, a very personal interpretation of I.S.'s thought. A. uses the tools of
analytical philosophy (there is no objective a priori objection against doing so
but no scholar will doubt that such a procedure requires extreme care in its
application).

(44) ID., Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) and Malcolm and the Ontological
Argument, in: *The Monist*, 54 (70), 234-249.
A. demonstrates those features of I.S.'s essence-existence distinction which
preclude the formulation of the first version of the ontological argument.
Hereafter, A. states that I.S. offers a second version of the ontological argument,
as distinguished by Malcolm, but arrives at a concept of God, which is quite
different from Malcolm's. While for the latter the Necessary Existent is the God
of ordinary language. He is for I.S. the principle of sufficient reason.
The same evaluation as used in 43 suggests itself. Compare also 13, which
opposes the interpretation that I.S.'s God is the principle of sufficient reason.

(45) ID., Ibn Sīnā's Concept of the Self, in: *Philos. Forum*, 4 (73), 49-
73.
Based on the Dāneš-Nāmeh, Book of Science, A. discovers two paradoxes in
I.S.'s metaphysical system:
1. Although for I.S. all actual entities are either substances or accidents, the
Necessary Existent, albeit an actual entity, is neither a substance nor an
accident;
2. No substance can be united with any other entity, but there exists a union
between the self-person and the Necessary Existent in the so-called mystic
state.
Further, A. repeats some basic elements of his 47.
It has to be noted that A. adheres to a process-language type interpretation of
I.S.'s concept of God.
Very interesting. There are indeed serious problems involved in I.S.'s denial of
God as a substance, whichever interpretation one defends.

(46) ID., Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sīnā's "Essence-Existence"
A. agrees with Rahman that existence is not an accident of essence in I.S.'s
system. In order to demonstrate this, A. develops an empirical interpretation of
I.S.'s theory of the distinction between essence and existence, and calls for
special attention to be paid to I.S.'s concept of Being-hast (based on the Dāneš-
Nāmeh, Book of Science).
Very valuable, insofar as A. shows that I.S. in his Persian terminology clearly
distinguished between existence and being (the Arabic offering him no such
opportunity), but A.'s empirical approach seems questionable.

A. first observes that there are several basic similarities between I.S.'s and
Aristotle's metaphysical theories. But, as far as I.S.'s cosmology is concerned, its
anti-Aristotelian, and, at the same time, rather anti-Islamic bias cannot be
dismissed. However, A. stresses that I.S. is well aware of the difference between
analytical and ontological contingency, and hence does not confuse
logical and ontological order in the elaboration of his Neo-Platonic-based theory
of emanation. Acc. to A., I.S. did not succeed in combining Aristotelianism and
Neo-Platonism. A. also detects elements of Zoroastrian and mystical influences
in I.S.
The major part of A.'s comment is devoted to I.S.'s concept of the Necessary
Existent. First of all, A. distinguishes three groups of terms which I.S. uses to
describe the Necessary Existent, i.e. ontological, epistemic and normative concepts.
Then he focuses on the Necessary Existent as the cause of the entire realm of
entities (I.S. hereby adhering to a Procean rather than an Aristotelian view of
causation). Further A. concentrates on the problem of God's knowledge in its
two-fold aspect of Self-knowledge and of knowledge of things outside of Himself.
In this context, A. introduces three fundamental ways by which I.S. considers the
Necessary Existent, and relates each of them to one specific major philosophical
work by I.S. So, he ascribes to the Dāneš-Nāmeh, Book of Science, a basically
ontological approach, while he links with the Shifā, *The Cure a religious view
and with the Ishārāt, Remarks and Admonitions*, a phenomenological (mystical)
interpretation. Finally, A. points to a paradox, raised by I.S.'s contention that
God is not a substance (see also 45).
Interesting, but does A. not introduce a too great distinction between I.S.'s three
major philosophical writings? Regarding the use of tools of analytical
philosophy, cf. supra, 43.

Avicena*, 89-99.
A. starts with a detailed analysis of Ishārāt, Remarks and Admonitions, p. II, N.
4, subdiv. 9-15. A. compares the argument, involved in it, with Thomas Aquinas' tertia via. For a confrontation with Anselm, however he uses another subdivision
of the same part of the Ishārāt, i.e. subdivision 29 (A. briefly discusses its
interpretation by such well-known authors as Badawi, Cruz Hernandez, Gardet
and Gaez) Acc. to A., the two fragments form in fact one single argument. A.
concludes that I.S. offers a real ontological argument, but not in the way of
Anselm. I.S.'s proof being a simulacrum. A.'s (very personal) reconstruction of I.S.'s argument for the existence of God is
totally convincing. Why were the 2 fragments not put together by I.S.
himself?

Acc. to A., I.S.’s description of God’s necessity and unity (and also His other attributes) is largely indebted to al-Fārābī. Monotheism and transcendence constitute the two major bases of I.S.’s concept of God (there existing a possibility to equate I.S.’s God with Plotinus’ One). Regarding I.S.’s cosmology, A. affirms that it is infected by an angelology (in the line of Corbin), but that it is radically different from the religious doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (following Morewedge, see supra, 47). Then A. insists that I.S. does not succeed in reconciling his ontological scheme with his cosmological scheme. Finally, after a brief discussion of I.S.’s proofs for God’s existence (A. accepting the presence of an ontological proof in the Isḥāqīya, Remarks and Admonitions), A. concentrates on I.S.’s mystical philosophy. For A., it is obvious that I.S. has much in common with sufism, especially regarding his concept of love. A. concludes that I.S. holds a double theology (God as necessary and God as love) – allegory as mirror functioning as a structure for this theology. In order to illustrate this conclusion, A. offers a brief analysis of Ḥāyy ibn Yaqūḏ, according to some principles of Barths’s semiology.

Some interesting ideas, but A.’s basic approach - esp. the introduction of modern semiotic means - appears risky (as already mentioned regarding the use of modern analytical philosophy by Morewedge, see supra, 43).


(51) RADWANSKI, W., The Idea of Efficient Causality in the Necessary Existent, according to the Metaphysics of Avicenna’s Najāt, in: ibid., 229-301 (Pol).


A. further elaborates on his Essence and Existence in Avicenna, in: Med. and Rel. Stud., 4 (58), 1-16. He pays special attention to the concept of contingency. In analyzing the form-matter relationship, he points to I.S.’s introduction of a third principle which bestows existence on everything (an idea, which is not present in Aristotle, but I.S. remains basically inside an Aristotelian framework). In the light of this element, form appears as a contributory cause of matter - and as such its priority over matter is safeguarded. Now, whereas the form-matter composition entails a real contradiction between existence and non-existence, this very same contradiction does not follow in the case of a pure essence-

existence composition (as present in the transcendental Intelligences). Nevertheless, once actualized, these higher Intelligences also never rid themselves of their fundamental contingency.

This paper strengthens the plausibility of A.’s basic thesis!


A. discusses Nasr’s thesis that “Western philosophy failed to distinguish between intellect and reason, in sharp contrast with truly Islamic philosophy”. I.S., at least in his Peripatetic writings, is considered by Nasr to be among the historical sources of the positivism, so characteristic for the former. However, A. notes that I.S. in his Peripatetic De Anima (Shīfā) explicitly distinguishes between single intellect and discursive reason - the former helping man to grasp reality by offering an intuition of the necessity in Being. As to I.S.’s esoteric writings, A. agrees with Nasr (and Corbin) that they include a pure symbolic vision (A. remarks that for Nasr only a vision such as this leads to the true insight regarding the difference between intellect and reason).

The paper includes valuable features, but is it not dealing with Nasr rather than with I.S.?


Having offered an analysis of the absolute primacy of esse in I.S. (in full agreement with Thomas Aquinas’ interpretation), A. discusses I.S.’s proper theory of possibility and necessity. A. brings to the fore the distinctions between logical possibility and real possibility, respectively logical necessity and real necessity. Moreover, he points to I.S.’s identification between possible in se and necessary ab alicui, and states that it constitutes a clear proof of I.S.’s holding the real distinction between existence and essence. As to the posibilitas essendi, A. understands it realistically as an accident of the universal substratum, i.e. the hylo. In his conclusion, A. affirms that he is tempted to identify this hylo with Being (dem Sein; et ente).

A. develops a highly personal interpretation which is built up along a very logical line of thought, but which may also be seriously questioned (esp. on the basis of I.S.’s clear rejection of the muta’aziliite theory of non-being).


Acc. to A., I.S. is a remarkable philosopher of Being, albeit that he had no feeling for the “Vocabulary of Being”-problem as did his predecessor al-Fārābī. A. pays special attention to the essence-existence distinction in I.S. With respect to the accidentality of existence, he distinguishes between a logical sense and a
metaphysical sense. The former implies that existence is not part of the essence of the subject, while the latter underscores the contingency of created things. Further A. believes that I.S.'s logical sense of essence in itself always refers to essence as essence of something - the 'in itself' status indicating a mode of being, but not meaning an independent mode of existence. A. also observes a sharp distinction in I.S.'s between existence, as analytically implied in the idea of substance, and existence, as being part of the nature of caused things (and, as such, evoking their contingency, and hence their being 'accidental'). So, it becomes evident that existence can never be external to God, who is sheer existence. For A., the main reason for I.S.'s refusal to call God a substance, is most probably given by the fact that a substance may not exist. However, A. wonders why I.S. did not therefore declare God as infinite substance? A very valuable contribution, although there might have been other reasons for I.S.'s denial of substantiality in God than the one suggested (e.g. the material reference which always seems to be implied in the Arabic notion of jawhar substance).


In this booklet, A. deals with three major items:
1. The relationship between I.S. and some of the most important Arabic and Persian thinkers subsequent to him;
2. The sharp distinction between God and the sensible world in I.S.;
3. Three religious themes of I.S.'s metaphysics, i.e. his doctrines of the divine One, of prophecy and of resurrection.

A. concludes that I.S.'s system became highly appreciated in the Latin Middle Ages (A. notes that there is no explicit condemnation of any of I.S.'s theories).

A very valuable complement to 65-66. A. clarifies I.S.'s own input in the development of metaphysics in a significant way.


(59) TÜRKLÜYEL, M., May one indicate the "Kur" source of the Agent Intellect in al-Fārābī and Ibn Sinā? in: Ibn Sinā. Doğumsunun..., 489-590 (Tu).

Note: "kur" is an old Turkish term, derived from Sumerian and Babylonian sources, and meaning: 'Holy Spirit' or 'Favour of the Heavens'.

(60) ID., The Sources of I.S.'s Agent Intellect, in: Ibid., 591-670 (Tu).

(61) ID., Fārābī's Politics, a Step towards Ibn Sinā's Agent Intellect, in: Ibid., 671-706 (Tu).

(62) ID., Ibn Sinā and the Agent Intellect, in: Ibid., 707-748 (Tu).

(63) ID., Ibn Sinā and Mystical Ideas, in: Ibid., 749-792 (Tu).

59-63: Taken together these papers seem to constitute one large monograph on the problematic of the Agent Intellect, both in its historical sources and in its actual significance inside I.S.'s own philosophical system. From the very outset, one gains the impression of dealing with a very fundamental study. Unfortunately, one's ignorance of the Turkish language obliges one to withhold any critical evaluation.


A summary of 65-66, but it offers a few important additions. A. presents I.S. as the first philosopher who has really systematized Aristotle's disparate metaphysics, in three ways:
1. The explicit positing of Being qua Being as the proper object of metaphysics;
2. The adhering to not only a categorial, but also a transcendental analogy of Being;
3. The introducing of the idea of creation into the very heart of metaphysics.

A. concludes that I.S.'s system became highly appreciated in the Latin Middle Ages (A. notes that there is no explicit condemnation of any of I.S.'s theories).

A very valuable supplement to 65-66. A. clarifies I.S.'s own input in the development of metaphysics in a significant way.

(65) ID., Le statut de la Métaphysique, in: S. VAN RIET (Ed.), Avicenna Latinus Liber de philosophia primae sive scientia divina, I-IV. Louvain, Peeters; Leiden, Brill, 1977, Intro. doct. 1*-122*.

(66) ID., Une nouvelle théologie philosophique, in: Ibid., V-X. Louvain, Peeters; Leiden, Brill, 1980, Intro. doctr. 1*-80*.

65-66: These two doctrinal introductions together outline in a masterly way the general structure of I.S.'s very complicated Metaphysics of the Shi'ā. From A.'s analysis, let us select a few salient features:
Chapter XI

Religious Themes and Mysticism

A. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
B. RELIGIOUS THEMES
   I. Prophecy
   II. Life in the Hereafter
C. MYSTICISM,
   QUR'ANIC EXEGESIS,
   ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY

See also:
   III. 19
   V, B 6; V, C 28, 53
   VIII, 17
   IX, 9, 11
   X, 11, 45, 47, 53, 63
   XIV, A-I, 2
   XV, D 4; XV, E 5
A. Philosophy and Religion

A. concentrates on I.S.’s proofs against atomism (especially in the Dānash-Nāmeh. Book of Science). He also brings to the fore I.S.’s rejection of the existence of a Void, and his theory of motion. Finally, he presents some basic ideas of I.S.’s metaphysics. A. concludes that for I.S. the Islamic doctrine is fundamentally correct, but that one has to use rationality in solving problems involving faith.
Good, but somewhat preliminary, and not always very accurate.

After a brief presentation of al-Kindī and al-Fārābī, A. fully concentrates on I.S. A. presents the latter as a philosopher who consciously tries to bring philosophical insights more into harmony with the data of revelation. The high points of this effort by I.S. are his attempts to arrive at a more genuine idea of creation - out of the distinction between necessary and possible existence, and at a more orthodox doctrine of God’s knowledge of particulars - by stressing that God knows them insofar that He is their cause. But the very limit of this harmonizing tendency is, acc. to A., shown by I.S.’s clear rejection of the resurrection of the body.
A good, but rather conventional paper. For a much more critical evaluation of I.S.’s doctrine of resurrection, see however infra, B II, 11.


Muslim philosophers had to face two major difficulties:
1. The already existing all-encompassing corpus of knowledge, based on the Qur'ān;
2. The most evident contradiction between some philosophical theories and some data of Revelation.

Now, A. detects two tendencies inside the falsafā in order to overcome these difficulties. The first tendency rejects any fundamental disagreement between Greek philosophy and Islamic thought, and, in its first great representative, al-Khālidī, is based on two principles:
1. The truth becomes only known through the collaboration between all men (implying that the individual has to contribute to the acquisition of truth);
2. Philosophy, in as much as it is the science of divine sovereignty and unity (an essential Neo-Platonic definition), does not contradict religion. The second way out of the problem consisted in limiting the utility of religion to its social value.

It was clearly more preoccupied with pure philosophy. It arose in al-Fārābī, and found its apogee in Ibn Rushd. As to I.S., he seems to adopt the kindian line of thought. In fact, in his philosophy one comes across many themes derived from religion (their presence in late antiquity philosophy is fully recognized by A.; however, he sharply remarks that there the framework was polytheistic). As to I.S.'s theory of creation, A. points to its extreme complexity (and its sensible difference with both al-Fārābī and al-Khālidī's views on this matter). Finally, A. most emphatically declares that I.S. derives his essence-existence distinction from the kalam, esp. the mu'allātul kalam.

A remarkable, and most interesting paper, especially for its showing the extreme importance of the kalam with respect to some Avicennian doctrines.

(7) KIRCA, C., Interrelation between Islamic and Positive Science according to Avicenna, in: Kayseri-Kongr., 299-317 (Tu).


In this introduction, A. limits himself to the problem of the relation between philosophy and religion in I.S. For A., I.S. sustained al-Fārābī's view of religion, but without its original formulation and political framework. Instead of discussing the relation between philosophy and religion, I.S. tried to offer a philosophical interpretation of religion. Therefore, his philosophy was appreciated by a large number of educated Muslims. So, notwithstanding the development within philosophical circles of an anti-Avicennian tradition, many later authors, as e.g. al-Ghazzālī or Al-Sahristānī, almost identified philosophy with I.S.'s doctrine.

A valuable contribution, but clearly in need of some further development.

B. Religious themes

I. PROPHECY


A. studies the different aspects of I.S.'s theory of prophecy, mainly based on I.S.'s major works, al-Shī'ā, Najāt and Ishārāt. He insists on the necessary character of prophecy in the Avicennian system. However, A. affirms I.S.'s doctrine to be superogatory with respect to the original Qur'ānic conception of prophecy.

A rather superficial account of I.S.'s theory of prophecy.


For A., I.S. is a religious believer, but also, and, above all, a scientific spirit. This is shown through the fact that I.S. incorporates religion within the practical sciences, and venerates God as being the sumnum of rationality and creative power. A further indication for this, A. discovers in I.S.'s acceptance of human beings as being primarily a cogito (interpreted by A. as the ability to know everything by one's own intellectual forces). Moreover, I.S. emphasizes the possibility for all wise men (hence not just the prophet!) to possess a special power of intuition, and even the power of performing miracles. Consequently, in the prophet, although still natural, this power is somehow greater.

A rather classical analysis, albeit coloured by an outspoken rationalistic (Marxist-inspired) interpretation.


A. believes that there exists a close relationship between I.S.'s hierarchical structuring of the animal faculties in the De Anima, IV-V (powers of perception and motion, and the intellect) and his three-fold division of prophecies (by imagination, by motion and by the activity of the Agent Intellect). So, the possibility for the soul to have real images without any relations to the sensible objects opens large perspectives for a real foundation of the kind of prophecy by imagination. In associating the functions of imagination in dreams with Aristotle's chapter on imagination in the De Anima, I.S. even asserts a predominance of the concept of prophecy. In fact, the prophet is, through his imaginary power, linked with the suprasensible world as well as with particular
forms - hence he seems to be the only person capable of having at the same time universal knowledge and knowledge of singulars. As to prophecy by motion, it is based on an almost similar ground as the prophecy by imagination. It concerns once more the opportunity for the soul to act without undergoing any influence from the sensible realm, i.e., its capacity to act efficiently on the sensible things in a way totally independent of any material causality. As to the third kind of prophecy, the intellectual one. A. only mentions its formal side - an immediate, intuitive knowledge, free of any discursivity. The paper contains some interesting ideas, but one may wonder if A.'s interpretation is not based on a somewhat too narrow basis?

A. mainly deals with I.S.'s theory of prophecy (pp. 30-91), and, to a lesser extent of intellect (pp. 14-20).

II. THE LIFE IN THE HEREAFTER

Reprint of Revue du Caire, 141 (51), 68-94.

(2) ASHRAF, S., Avicenna's Explanation of Destiny, in: Indo-Iranica, 34 (81-82), 70-74.
A. briefly summarizes I.S.'s R. fi sīr al-qadar, Tr. On the Secret of Destiny. He considers I.S. to be an extreme rationalist, who rejects religion insular as it is not in congruity with his own thoughts.
Almost insignificant!

In this introductory part, A. focuses on the concept of ma'ād in its different prephilosophical meanings (esp. in common language, Qur'ān and hadīth-literature), before he turns to I.S.'s particular interpretation of it. As to this latter, A. briefly evokes its spiritualistic overtone, its moral foundation (the life in the hereafter being directly dependent upon this life), as well as Ghazzālī's and Ibn Rushd's discussions of I.S.'s theory. He, moreover considers the work as authentic, but dating of a later period of I.S.'s life - an earlier dating, on the contrary, is defended in 10 and 11 (and this in a most convincing way, since it is based on doctrinal grounds!).
A rather superficial introduction.


Having summarized I.S.'s theories of the soul and of emanation, A. proceeds with a description of I.S.'s doctrine on the perfection of rational soul, especially in view of his concept of resurrection (mainly based on Shīfā, Mēz., IX, 7). Some special attention is also given to the perfection of the soul, attained by the 'ārif, "he who knows" (out of the Ishārāt). Acc. to A., in all this I.S. is giving a metaphysical foundation to a religious doctrine, and so his theory continues to maintain a link with the latter.
A good paper, but clearly in need of much more development in order to justify the final claim.

some Islamic input, insofar as for I.S. each human soul individually survives. But, in fact, the revealed work of the Qur’an is primarily an educative nature - Revelation being destined to the common people, the full, i.e. philosophical, truth being only accessible to a small elite. Of course, revelation expresses the same truth as philosophy, but it does so on a purely allegorical level. A. declares that I.S., due to his Platonism, rejects any kind of bodily resurrection, although he seems to search for a satisfactory solution for the imperfect souls by accepting the eventuality of an imaginary projection by means of a celestial body.

Valuable, although one may wonder if A. is not over-Platonizing I.S.’s views? For other possible objections, see also 10 and, mostly of all, 11.


(11) ID., La destinée de l’homme selon Avicenne. Le retour à Dieu (ma’ād) et l’imagination. Académie Royale de Belgique, Classe des Lettres. Fonds Draguet, V. Louvanii, Aed. Peereters, 1986, 240 pp. The theme of ma’ād, resurrection, is placed and studied by A. in its larger psychological and metaphysical contexts. A choice is made out of a wide variety of Avicennian texts (of most of them, A. offers for the first time a (always critical) translation into French). A’s interpretation appears highly innovative, although it is clearly based on such ancient “commentators” as Ghazzâlî, Shahristânî, F. D. Râzî, Ṭâ’fî and Mullâ Sadîr Shîrāzî. Among the major insights of this book, we may mention: I.S.’s acceptance of a bodily resurrection, but understood as being realized on an ‘imaginably’ (in the Corbinian sense) level; a plurality of worlds (in the metaphorical realm), explained by I.S.’s rather extreme formalism and his theory of divine epiphany; the influence of the celestial souls on the practical intellect; the ‘idealism’ of sensation; the existence of two kinds of human persons - the elite and the masses, and consequently the existence of two kinds of resurrection - purely intellectual, and imaginal; I.S.’s adherence to a rhetorical rather than a symbolic approach of the Qur’anic Revelation. Moreover, a tentative chronology of some of I.S.’s most important works is established by A. - who provides strong evidence to date the R. adhawiyya fi l’ma’ād, Tr. On Resurrection, in a rather early period of I.S.’s thought (precisely based on the way in which I.S. expresses his idea on resurrection in this treatise - a clear evolution towards a more pronounced acceptance by I.S. himself of the reality of an ‘imaginably’ resurrection being detectable in the latter’s different works).

Special mention has to be made of the well-documented bibliography, esp. where editions and translations of Avicennian texts are concerned, both authentic works and spuria (both categories of works are clearly distinguished by A.). A very fine monograph, highly innovative and extremely rich in documentation as well as contents.

C. Mysticism. Qur’anic Exegesis, Oriental Philosophy


(2) ALSI, M., Al-tafsîr al-Qur’âni wa ʿl-nâshir ʿl-ṣûfîyya fi fâlafaṣif Ibn Sînâ. (Qur’anic Exegesis and Mystical Language in Ibn Sînâ’s Philosophy). Beirut, Al-mu’assasat al-jâmi’iyya li-l-dirâsât wa ʿl-nâshur wa ʿl-tawziʿ, 1983, Part I: Exegesis and Mysticism, 11-74. The first chapter of this part (which serves as an introduction to the texts, edited in the second part - see Works, C, passim) is devoted to the examination of the signification of I.S.’s Qur’anic exegesis. For A. it is evident that I.S. consciously limited his exegetical efforts to only a few surâs and verses - since no evidence exists that such a kind of work by I.S. has been lost. Moreover, I.S.’s exegesis reveals itself as being of an outspoken intellectual kind. I.S. interprets religious terms by way of his own philosophical concepts (in order to illustrate this fact, A. makes a comparison between I.S.’s exegesis of some verses and that by al-Jawzî and Ibn Taymiyya of the very same verses). A. closes this first chapter with a useful lexicon of the main Qur’anic terms, analyzed by I.S. They are arranged in alphabetical order, and the exact reference of their occurrence(s) in I.S.’s works is given (according to the text- editions of the second part). In the second chapter of the first part, A. concerns himself with I.S.’s mysticism. He stresses that I.S. was not a practicing sufi - as is witnessed by the biographical data. Introducing a distinction between ‘mystical state’ and ‘mystical knowledge’, A. states that I.S.’s system is incompatible with the former, but compatible with the latter. Similar to his method in ch. I, A. maintains that I.S.’s mysticism is of a philosophical nature (re-interpreting some mystical themes in a philosophical way (A. compares these interpretations by I.S. with that of some renowned sufi-masters). Also this time A. adds an alphabetically ordered lexicon, extended by a comparative lexicon (using for this purpose Qushayri and Ibn ‘Arabi). Moreover, A. presents a table of comparison between I.S.’s original philosophical concepts, and their specific denomination in each of his symbolic tales as well as in the Poem on the soul.

A useful introduction, but is the given interpretation not too unitarily rationalistic?

Acc. to A., I.S. uses different methods and sciences in the study of nature - thus illustrating the peculiar Islamic theory of the unicity of Nature. But in this paper, A. concentrates on the methodology which is used by I.S. for the study of nature in his “Oriental Philosophy”. This kind of philosophy basically expresses a journey in the realm of light, which symbolizes knowledge, related to man’s own consciousness or being (these latter two being in fact identical). In it, nature no longer represents an object of investigation, as was the case in Peripatetic thought. On the contrary, it becomes an interior reality so that natural phenomena support no other than a symbolic interpretation. Moreover, man needs a journey through the Universe in order to attain what lies beyond it. By way of illustration of this general theory, A. offers a summary of the three recitals of the Avicennian cycle.

However interesting this kind of doctrine in itself may be (following clearly the Corban-Nasr “tradition”), its relevance for the historical I.S. is highly questionable. See *infra*, 11.


A. describes in detail the major differences in the methodology, the contents, and the aim of Occidental and Oriental wisdom. Suhrawardi functions as his principal source, esp. when clarifying the specific concept of Oriental wisdom. As to I.S., A. briefly evokes his concept of theoretical science, as expressed in the *R. Aqām al-'uldam, Tr. On the Division of the Sciences*, thus illustrating the Occidental way of thinking.

A good study, but of rather preliminary kind. It might be useful for eventual comparative studies between I.S. and Suhrawardi (and the *Ishidaj*t-tradition after him).


A. starts with a most accurate and most complete overview of all the important editions of, and studies on I.S.’s *Tr. On Love*. Then he presents to the reader a summary of the treatise, by specifically focusing on the very notion of *ishg, love*. Finally, he analyzes the different aspects of the concept of love in this treatise, but does not consider the proper philosophical argumentation. In fact, he consciously limits himself to indicating the possible parallels in the non-philosophical tradition. Out of A.’s detailed analysis, it appears that I.S.’s theory of love, although in most of its facets unacceptable for the scripturalists, is clearly not incompatible with the tradition of Islamic mystical writings on love. So, A. indicates the close resemblance between I.S.’s and al-Hallaj’s conceptions of essential love, I.S.’s acceptance of a static definition of love, and also the reflection of the tradition of chaste love (including the “refractory ideal”, *zard*)

in his conception of the love for beautiful faces - to cite a few examples out of this rich and extensive material. One has to observe that A. leaves open (but does not examine himself) the possibility of a common Neo-Platonic heritage as an explanation for these striking similarities.

A well-documented study, although one may wonder to what extent A.’s conclusion remains valid when one takes into account the basic philosophical character of the treatise which A. himself recognizes?


A. presents I.S.’s mysticism according to Gardet’s interpretation, and paraphrases the chapter on the ultimate mystical stage of the *Ishidaj* (based on Geichen’s translation). Not scholarly (intended as such by A.), but rather honest.


Reprints of both the original and the English translation of this study.

(8) DEMIRICI, A., Islamic Mysticism according to Ibn Sīnā, in: *Kajseri Kongr.*, 259-262 (Tu).


In I.S.’s ‘Oriental Philosophy’, A. detects a movement towards a logic of experience - induction becoming more and more important. But above all, he discovers in it a revival of the Greek Orient (Plato, pt-Theology, Ne-Pythagorism and Pt.-Empedocles), mediated however by a Muslim assimilation. Out of all this, I.S.’s mysticism appears as a natural mysticism of the Platonic, and still more Plotinian kind. Further, his intellectualist gnosic per se emerges in a fold of esoterism although being of an essentially philosophical order. Finally, I.S.’s exegesis reveals the transmutation executed by him on Revelation out of his Hellenistic sources - while they demonstrate at the same time the anxiety to remain loyal to the problematic of Revelation. A. concludes by establishing a comparison with Suhrawardi. It has to be noted that A. explicitly states that there is no real rupture inside I.S.’s entire work.

A fine paper by a leading authority on I.S., but for some fundamental criticism on his acceptance of a natural mysticism in I.S., see 11.

(10) GÓMEZ NOGALES, S., El misticismo persa de Avicena y su influencia en el misticismo español, in: *Milenario de Avicena*, 65-88.