Sa’dí speak, but failing to catch his remark, asked, “What does the Sheykh say?” Another learned man who was present instantly interposed: “May I be thy sacrifice! it was naught but a quotation from the Holy Book—‘fa-kál’i-kafrin, ‘Yā’ laytām kantu turidh!’” (“and the infidel said, ‘O would that I were earth!’”) Sa’dí had made use of the quotation, forgetting for the moment whose mouth the words were placed. His rival had not forgotten, and, while appearing merely to justify Sa’dí, succeeded in applying to him the opprobrious term of kaffir (infidel).

‘Obeyd-i-Zákání was another celebrated poet, chiefly noted for the scathing satires which flowed from his pen. Even when he was on his death-bed his grim humour did not desert him. Summoning successively to his side his two sons and his daughter, he informed them, with every precaution to ensure secrecy, that he had left behind for them a treasure, which they must seek for, on a particular hour of a certain day after his death and burial, in a place which he indicated. “Be sure,” he added in conclusion, “that you go thither at that hour and at no other, and above all keep what I have said secret from my other children.” Shortly after this the poet breathed his last, and when his body had been consigned to the grave, and the day appointed for the search had come, each of his three children repaired secretly to the spot indicated. Great was the surprise of each to find that the others were also present, and evidently bent on the same quest. Explanations of a not very satisfactory character ensued, and they then proceeded to dig for the treasure. Sure enough they soon came on a large parcel, which they eagerly extracted from its place of concealment, and began to unfold. On removing the outer covering they found a layer of straw, evidently designed to protect the valuable and perhaps fragile contents. Inside this was another smaller box, on opening which a quantity of cotton-wool appeared. An eager examination of this brought to light nothing but a small slip of paper on which something was written. Disappointed in their search, but still hoping that this document might prove of value, either by guiding them to the real treasure, or in some other way, they hastily bore it to the light, and read these words—

“Kuwaq dínad, a man dínam, a té hám dínâ
Ki yâh tubâs na-dárâd ‘Obeyd-i-Zákânî!”

“God knows, and I know, and thou too knowest,
That ‘Obeyd-i-Zákânî does not possess a single copper!”

Whether the children were able to appreciate this final display of humour on the part of their father is not narrated by the historian.

Satire, though, for obvious reasons, cultivated to a much smaller extent than panegyric, did not by any means cease with the death of ‘Obeyd-i-Zákânî, which occurred about the year A.D. 1370. The following, composed on the incapable and crotchety Ḥājī Mīrzâ Āḵāsí, prime minister of Muhammad Shâh, may serve as an example:

“Na-g’zâbít dar mulk-i-Shâb Ḥājî diram;
Kard khâr-i-ḵandil ʿū tāp hâr bâsh ʿū kandî;
Na murgâr-i-dast-râ râ ʿū in kandâ mart;
Na khâhâr-i-dast-râ râ ʿū in ghanî.”

“The Ḥājî did not leave a single dirham in the domains of the king;
Everything, small or great, he expended on kandis and guns—
Kandis which conveyed no water to the fields of his friends,
And guns which inflicted no injury on his enemies.”

The wasteful and useless extravagance of Ḥājī Mīrzâ Āḵāsí here held up to ridicule was unfortunately far from being his greatest or most pernicious error. It was he who ceded to the

1 A kandî is an underground channel for bringing water from those places where its presence has been detected by the water-finder (mukând-i-bâsh) to towns or villages where it is needed. The horizontal shaft is made by first sinking vertical ones and connecting these with one another by tunnelling. The cost of these kandis (which abound in most parts of Persia) is very great. They are generally made by a rich man at his own risk and expense, according to the advice of the mukând-i-bâsh. The water is then sold to those who use it. The object of this satire was celebrated for his passion for trying to invent new guns, and making kandis which proved worthless. (See Gobineau, Religion et Philosophie dans l’Asie Centrale, p. 163.) The last line, containing, as it does, a crude but forcible Persian idiom, I merely paraphrase.
Russians the sole right of navigating the Caspian Sea, remarking, with a chuckle at his own wit, "Mā marghābē nisīm kī dā-i-shār lāzīm dāštā bāshām," "We are not waterfowl that we should stand in need of salt water," to which he presently added the following sage reflection:—"Bārdīy muṣṭī dā-i-shār nā-mī-shawād kām-i-shirin-i-dāst-rād tālk namūd" ("It wouldn't do to embitter the sweet palate of a friend for the sake of a handful of salt water").

Readiness is a sine qua non in a Persian poet. He must be able to improvise at a moment's notice. One day Fath-Ali Shāh was riding through the bazaars surrounded by his courtiers when he happened to notice amongst the apprentices in a coppersmith's shop a very beautiful boy, whose fair face was begrimed with coal dust.

"Bi-gird-i-'drēz-i-mīs-gar nisbātā gard-i-zughāl"
("Around the checks of the coppersmith has settled the dust of the coal"), said the king, improvising a hemistich; "now, Sir Laureate" (turning to his court-poet), "cap me that if you can!"

"Ṣadd-i-yi mī bi-falāk nīr-rāwād kī māb girfāst"
("The clang of the copper goes up to heaven because the moon is eclipsed"), rejoined the Laureate, without a moment's hesitation. To appreciate the appositeness of this verse the reader must know that a beautiful face is constantly compared by the Persians to the moon, and that when there is an eclipse of the moon it is customary in Persia to beat copper vessels to frighten away the dragon which is vulgarly supposed to have "eaten" it. This rhetorical figure (called "-hash-i-tā'ī") whereby an observed effect is explained by a fanciful cause, is a great favourite with the Persian poets. Here is another instance of a more exaggerated type, in a verse addressed by the poet Rasūlīh to his sweetheart—

"Hash-i-mab-rā bā tā angīdan bi-maftūn-i-kāyās: Palle-i-mub bar falāk shind, ā tā mūdālī bar gāmēn!"
("I weighed thy beauty against that of the moon in the balance of my judgment:
The scale containing the moon flew up to heaven, and thou wilt rest on the earth!")

Could a neater compliment, or one more exaggerated, be imagined?

It is the fashion with some scholars to talk as if literary and poetical talent were a thing of the past in Persia. No mistake could possibly be greater. Everyone is aware of that form of hallucination whereby the Past is glorified at the expense of the Present; that illusion which is typified both in the case of individuals and nations in the phrase, "the happy days of childhood." Men not only forget the defects and disagreeableness of the past, and remember only its glories, but they are very apt to weigh several centuries of the Past against a few decades of the Present. "Where," the enthusiastic admirer of older Persian literature exclaims, "are the Rūdāgīs, the Firdawsīs, the Nizāmīs, the ' Omar Khayyāms, the Anvarīs, the Sa'dīs, the Ḥafīz, the Jāmīs, of the glorious Past? Where are such mighty singers to be found now?" Leaving aside the fact that these immortal bard's ranged over a period of five centuries, and that when, at certain periods, the munificent patronage of some prince collected together a number of contemporary poets (as at the so-called "Round Table" of Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazni), posterity (perhaps wisely) often neglected to preserve the works of more than one or two of them, it may confidently be asserted that the nineteenth century has produced a group of most distinguished poets, whose works will undoubtedly, when duly transfigured by the touch of antiquity, go to make up "portions and parcels" of the "glorious Past." Of modern Persian poets the greatest is perhaps Kā'ānī, who died about A.D. 1854. In panegyric and satire alike he is unrivalled; and he has a wealth of metaphor, a flow of language, and a sweetness of utterance scarcely to be found in any other poet. Although he lacks the mystic sublimity of Jāmī, the divine despair of ' Omar Khayyām, and the majestic grandeur of Firdawsī, he manifests at times a humour rarely met with in the older poets. One poem of his, describing a dialogue between an old man and a child, both of whom stammer,
is very humorous. The child, on being first addressed by the old man, thinks that his manner of speech is being imitated and ridiculed, and is very angry; but, on being assured and finally convinced that his interlocutor is really afflicted in the same way, he is appeased, and concludes with the words—

"Ma-ma-man ham gu-gu-gang-o ma-ma-mah-i-tu-tu-ta,
Tu-tu-ta ham gu-gu-gang-i ma-ma-mah-i-ma-ma-ma."  

"I also am a stammerer like unto thee; Thou also art a stammerer like unto me."

The best poets at present living are Mirzá-í-Farhangí and Mirzá-í-Yezdání, both of whom I met at Shiráz. They are the only two surviving brothers of Mirzá Dāvārī, also a poet of great merit; their father, whose nom de guerre was Wišāl, was widely famed for his poetic talent; and their sons already manifest unmistakable signs of genius.

The conversation of my kind friends, who desired that I might become acquainted with everything calculated to illustrate Persian life, did not, however, confine itself only to the masterpieces of national poetry. Nursery rhymes and schoolboy doggerel also came in for a share of attention. As a specimen of these I may quote the following:—

"Tabbat yaddi Ābī La"—1
Ākhūd bi-kash taurla;
Kābat bi-dīb bi-mirī,  
Jumāsh bi-dīb na-mirī."  

Which may be paraphrased thus:—

"Ābī Labah's pride shall fall 2
Put the master in the stall;  
He will die, if chaff you give,  
Give him oats and he will live."

1 Mirzá-í-Farhangí, I regret to say, is no longer alive. The news of his death reached me a few months ago. [This was written between 1890 and 1893.]
2 The first line is a mutilated fragment of the first verse of the 11th surah of the Korán—"Tabbat yaddi Ābī Labahā na talāb." "The hands of Abū Labah shall perish and he shall perish." This chapter, being one of the shorter ones at the end of the Korán, is the earliest learnt by Persian children.

I have already alluded to practical jokes, and described one perpetrated by a wit of the fourteenth century. Let me add another of the present day, which, if rougher than that of Ōbeyd-ī-Zākānī, was at least intended to convey a salutary lesson to the person on whom it was practised. Amongst the dependents of the governor of a certain town was a man who was possessed by the desire to discover some means of rendering himself invisible. At length he had the good fortune (as he thought) to meet with a dervish who agreed, for a certain sum of money, to supply him with some pills which would produce the desired effect. Filled with delight at the success which appeared at length to have crowned his efforts, the would-be dabbler in the occult sciences did not fail to boast openly before his comrades, and even before the governor, that on a certain day he would visit them unseen and prove the efficacy of his new acquisition. On the appointed day, having taken one or two of the magical pills, he accordingly came to the governor's palace, filled with delightful anticipations of triumph on his own part and envious astonishment on the part of his friends. Now the governor was determined, if possible, to cure him of his taste for the black art, and had therefore given orders to the sentries, servants, and other attendants, as well as to his own associates, that when the would-be magician arrived they were all to behave as though they were unable to see him. Accordingly, when he reached the gate of the palace, he was delighted to observe that the sentries omitted to give him the customary salute. Proceeding farther, he became more and more certain that the dervish's pills had produced the promised effect. No one looked at him; no one saluted him; no one showed any consciousness of his presence. At length he entered the room where the governor was sitting with his associates. Finding that these too appeared insensible to his presence, he determined to give them a proof that he had really been amongst them in invisible form—a fact which they might otherwise refuse to credit. A kalvān, or water-pipe, was standing
in the middle of the room, the charcoal in it still glowing. The pseudo-magician applied his lips to the mouth-piece and began to smoke. Those present at once broke out into expressions of astonishment. “Wonderful!” they exclaimed, “look at that ka'fīd! Though no one is near it, it is just as if some one were smoking it: nay, one can even hear the gurgle of the water in the bowl.” Enchanted with the sensation he had caused, the “invisible” one became bolder. Some lighted candles were in the room; one of these he blew out. Again exclamations of surprise arose from the company. “Marvellous!” they cried, “there is no wind, yet suddenly that candle has been blown out; what can possibly be the meaning of this?” The candle was again lighted, and again promptly blown out. In the midst of fresh expressions of surprise, the governor suddenly exclaimed, “I have it! I know what has happened! So-and-so has no doubt eaten one of his magical pills, and is even now present amongst us, though we cannot see him; well, we will see if he is intangible as well as invisible. Ho, there! bache-ha! Bring the sticks, quick! Lay about you in all directions; perhaps you will be able to teach our invisible friend better manners.” The farrāshes hastened to rain down a shower of blows on the unfortunate intruder, who cried out loudly for mercy. “But where are you?” demanded the governor. “Cease to be invisible, and show yourself, that we may see you.” “O master,” cried the poor castigated magician, “if I be really invisible, how happens it that all the blows of the farrāshes reach me with such effect? I begin to think that I have been deceived by that rascally dervish, and that I am not invisible at all.” On this, amidst the mirth of all present, the sufferer was allowed to depart, with a recommendation that in future he should avoid the occult sciences; an injunction which one may reasonably hope he did not soon forget.

1 Bache-ha means “boys,” “children”; but the term is also commonly employed in summoning servants, in this case the farrāshes, whose duty it is to administer corporal punishment.
Arabian prophet swept across Irán, overwhelming, in their tumuluous onslaught, an ancient dynasty and a venerable religion, a change, apparently almost unparalleled in history, was in the course of a few years brought over the land. Where for centuries the ancient hymns of the Avesta had been chanted, and the sacred fire had burned, the cry of the mu'azzin summoning the faithful to prayer rang out from minarets reared on the ruins of the temples of Ahura Mazda. The priests of Zoroaster fell by the sword; the ancient books perished in the flames; and soon none were left to represent a once mighty faith but a handful of exiles flying towards the shores of India, and a despised and persecuted remnant in solitary Yazd and remote Kirmán. Truly it seemed that a whole nation had been transformed, and that henceforth the Aryan Persian must not only bear the yoke of the Semitic “lizard-eater” whom he had formerly so despised, but must further adopt his creed, and almost, indeed, his language.

Yet, after all, the change was but skin-deep, and soon a host of heterodox sects born on Persian soil—Shí'ites, Su'fis, Ismá'ilis, philosophers—arose to vindicate the claim of Aryan thought to be free, and to transform the religion forced on the nation by Arab steel into something which, though still wearing a semblance of Islám, had a significance widely different from that which one may fairly suppose was intended by the Arabian prophet.

There is, indeed, another view possible—that of M. Gobineau, whose deep insight into Persian character entitles his opinion to careful consideration—viz., that from the very beginning there were latent in the Muḥammadan religion the germs of the most thorough-going pantheism, and that Muḥammad himself did but revive and formulate somewhat differently the ancient beliefs of Mesopotamia. Whether this be true or not (and the point is one which, in my opinion, cannot be regarded as altogether settled until the history of Ṣūfism amongst those of Arab race shall have been more carefully studied), there is no doubt that certain passages in the Kur'án are susceptible to a certain degree of mystical interpretation. Take for instance, the 17th verse of the 8th chapter, where God reminds Muhammad that the victory of Bedr was only in appearance won by the valour of the Muslims:—"Fa lam takfūlūhum wa lakjmn'llāhā katalabum; wa md rameya idh rameya, wa lakjnm'llāhā rama",—"And thou didst not slay them, but God slew them; and thou didst not shoot when thou didst shoot, but God shot." Although there is no need to explain this otherwise than as an assurance that God supported the faithful in their battles, either by natural or (as the commentators assert) by supernatural means, and although it lends itself far less readily than many texts in the New and even in the Old Testament to mystical interpretation, it nevertheless serves the Persian Ṣūfis as a foundation-stone for their pantheistic doctrines. “The Prophet,” they say, “did not kill when men fell by his hand. He did not throw when he cast the handful of stones which brought confusion into the ranks of the heathen. He was in both cases but a mirror wherein was manifested the might of God. God alone was the Real Agent, as He is in all the actions which we, in our spiritual blindness, attribute to men. God alone is, and we are but the waves which stir for a moment on the surface of the Ocean of Being, even as it runs in the tradition, ‘God was, and there was naught but He, and it is now even as it was then.’ Shall we say that God’s creation is co-existent with Him? Then are we Manichaéans and dualists, nay, polytheists; for we associate the creature with the Creator. Can we say that the sum of Being was increased at the time when the Phenomenal World first appeared? Assuredly not; for that would be to regard the Being of God as a thing finite and conditioned, because capable of enlargement and expansion. What then can we say, except that even such (who alone is endowed with real existence)
was in the Beginning and will be in the End (if, indeed, one may speak of 'Beginning' and 'End' where Eternity is concerned, and where Time, the element of this illusory dream which we call 'Life,' has no place) alone in His Infinite Splendour, so also, even now, He alone is, and all else is but as a vision which disturbs the night, a cloud which dims the Sun, or a ripple on the bosom of the Ocean?"

In such wise does the Šufi of Persia read the Kur'ān and expound its doctrine. Those who are familiar with the different developments of Mysticism will not need to be reminded that there is hardly any soil, be it ever so barren, where it will not strike root; hardly any creed, however stern, however formal, round which it will not twine itself. It is, indeed, the eternal cry of the human soul for rest; the insatiable longing of a being wherein infinite ideals are fettered and cramped by a miserable actuality; and so long as man is less than an angel and more than a beast, this cry will not for a moment fail to make itself heard. Wonderfully uniform, too, is its tenor: in all ages, in all countries, in all creeds, whether it come from the Brahmin sage, the Greek philosopher, the Persian poet, or the Christian quietist, it is in essence an enunciation more or less clear, more or less eloquent, of the aspiration of the soul to cease altogether from self, and to be at one with God. As such it must awaken in all who are sensible of this need an echo of sympathy; and therefore I feel that no apology is required for adding a few words more on the ideas which underlie all that is finest and most beautiful in Persian poetry and Persian thought.

To the metaphysical conception of God as Pure Being, and the ethical conception of God as the Eternally Holy, the Šufi superadds another conception, which may be regarded as the keynote of all Mysticism. To him, above all else, God is the Eternally Beautiful—"Jinda-i-'Iðkái," the "True Beloved." Before time was, He existed in His Infinite Purity, unrevealed and unmanifest. Why was this state changed? Why was the troubled phantasm of the Contingent World evoked from the silent depths of the Non-Existent? Let me answer in the words of Jāmi, who, perhaps, of all the mystic poets of Persia best knew how to combine depth of thought with sweetness and cleanness of utterance. Poor as is my rendering of his sublime song, it may still suffice to give some idea of the original. The passage is from his Yāsuf u Zulaykha, and runs as follows:—

"In solitude, where Being signless dwelt,
And all the Universe still dormant lay
Concealed in selflessness, One Being was
Exempt from 'I-' or 'Thou-' ness, and apart
From all duality; Beauty Supreme,
Unmanifest, except unto ItsSelf
By Its own light, yet fraught with power to charm
The souls of all; concealed in the Unseen,
An Essence pure, unstained by aught of ill.
No mirror to reflect Its loveliness,
Nor comb to touch Its locks; the morning breeze
Ne'er stirred Its tresses; no collyrium
Lent lustre to Its eyes; no rosy cheeks
O'ershadowed by dark curls like hyacinth,
Nor peach-like down were there; no dusky mole
Adorned Its face; no eye had yet beheld
Its image. To ItsSelf It sang of love
In wordless measures. By ItsSelf It cast
The die of love.

But Beauty cannot brook
Concealment and the veil, nor patient rest
Unseen and unadmired: 'twill burst all bonds,
And from Its prison-casement to the world
Revel ItsSelf. See where the tulp grows
In upland meadows, how in balmy spring
It decks itself; and how amidst its thorns
The wild rose rends its garment, and reveals
Its loveliness. Thou, too, when some rare thought,
Or beauteous image, or deep mystery
Flashes across thy soul, canst not endure
To let it pass, but hold'st it, that perchance
In speech or writing thou may'st send it forth
To charm the world.

1 The passage in question is the 11th section of the poem. It will be found on pp. 11-12 of the Lucknow edition, and on pp. 16-17 of Rosenweig's edition.
Wherever Beauty dwells
Such is its nature, and its heritage
From Everlasting Beauty, which emerged
From realms of purity to shine upon
The worlds, and all the souls which dwell therein.
One gleam fell from It on the Universe,
And on the angels, and this single ray
Dazzled the angels, till their senses whirled
Like the revolving sky. In divers forms
Each mirror showed It forth, and everywhere
Its praise was chanted in new harmonies.

Each speck of matter did He constitute
A mirror, causing each one to reflect
The beauty of His visage. From the rose
Flashed forth His beauty, and the nightingale
Beholding it, loved madly. From that Light
The candle drew the lustre which begets
The moth to immolation. On the sun
His Beauty shone, and straightway from the wave
The lotus reared its head. Each shining lock
Of Leyla's hair attracted Majnun's heart
Because some ray divine reflected shone
In her fair face. 'Twas He to Shirin's lips
Who lent that sweetness which had power to steal
The heart from Parviz, and from Fehisid life.

His Beauty everywhere doth show itself,
And through the forms of earthly beauties shines
Obscured as through a veil. He did reveal
His face through Joseph's coat, and so destroyed
Zuleykha's peace. Where'er thou seest a veil,
Beneath that veil He hides. Whateve're heart
Doth yield to love, He charms it. In His love
The heart hath life. Longing for Him, the soul
Hath victory. That heart which seems to love
The fair ones of this world, loves Him alone.

Beware! say not, 'He is All-Beautiful,
And we His lovers.' Thou art but the glass,
And He the Face: confronting it, which casts
Its image on the mirror. He alone
Is manifest, and thou in truth art hid.

1 So it is written in the Kur'an, "Kullu shay’t in kalika illa waflaa-ba,

"All things shall perish save His Face" (Kur’an, xxviii, 89).

But is this the sum of the Sâ‘î’s philosophy? Is he to rest content with earthly love, because he knows that the lover’s homage is in truth rendered, not to the shrine at which he offers his devotion, but to the Divine Glory—the Shekinah—which inhabits and irradiates it? Not so. Let us listen once more to the utterance of Jami—

"Be thou the thrill of love; make this thine object;
For this one thing seemeth to wise men worthy.
Be thou love's thrill, that thou mayst win thy freedom,
Bear on thy breast its brand, that thou mayst breathe.
Love's wine will warm thee, and will steal thy senses;
All else is soulless stupor and self-seeking;
Remembrances of love refresh the lover,
Whose voice when lauding love e'er was found loudest,
But that he drained a draught from this deep goblet.

In the wide worlds not one would wot of Majnun.
Thousands of wise and well-learned men have wended
Through life, who, since for love they had no liking,
Have left nor name, nor note, nor sign, nor story,
Nor tale for future time, nor fame for fortune.
Sweet songsters 'midst the birds are found in plenty,
But, when love's lore is taught by the love-learned,
Of moth and nightingale they most make mention.

Though in this world a hundred tasks thou triest,
'Tis love alone which from thyself will save thee.
Even from earthly love thy face avert not,
Since to the Real it may serve to raise thee.
Ere A, B, C are rightly apprehended,
How canst thou con the pages of thy Kur'an?
A song (so heard I), unto whom a student
Came craving counsel on the course before him,
Said, 'If thy steps be strangers to love's pathways,
Depart, learn love, and then return before me.'
propose to speak, save incidentally, as occasion arises; neither is this the place to treat systematically of the various schools of philosophy which have sprung up in Persia. Of the earlier ones, indeed, one may say generally that they are adaptations of either Aristotle or Plato, and that they may most fitly be described as the scholasticism of Islám. Of two of the later philosophers, however—Mullá Śadrá of Shíráz, and Hájí Mullá Hádí of Sáb-zawár—I shall say a few words, inasmuch as they mark a new development in Persian thought, while at the same time they are less known in Europe than the Avicennas, the Ghazzáls, and the Fársíbs of earlier days.

Mullá Śadrú’d-Din Muḥammad ibn Ibráhím ibn Yahyá, commonly known as Mullá Śadrá, flourished in the latter half of the seventeenth century. He was the son of a rich merchant of Shíráz, who had grown old without being blessed with a son. Being very desirous of leaving an heir to inherit his wealth, he made a vow that if God would grant him this wish he would give the sum of one ṭáman (about 6£) a day to the poor for the rest of his life. Soon afterwards Mullá Śadrá was born, and the father faithfully accomplished his vow till his death. When this occurred, Mullá Śadrá, who had already manifested an unusual aptitude for learning and a special taste for philosophy, decided, after consulting with his mother, to bestow the greater portion of the wealth which he had inherited on the poor, and to go to Iṣfahán to prosecute his studies.

It was the time when the Šafáví kings ruled over Persia, with their capital at Iṣfahán, and the colleges of that city were famed throughout the East. Mullá Śadrá enquired on his arrival there who were the most celebrated teachers of philosophy, and was informed that they were three in number, Mír Ābá’l-Ḵásim Fandaraskí, Mír Muḥammad Bákír, better known as Mír Dámad, and Shéykh Behá’u’d-Dín ‘Amíl. He first presented himself before Mír Dámad, and asked for advice as to his studies. The latter replied, “If you want inward meaning only, go to Mír

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1 These two translations are reprinted, almost without alteration, from my article on “Ṣūfism” in Religious Systems of the World (Swan Sonnenschein and Co.), where I first published them.
Fandarasi; if you want mere outward form, go to Sheykh Behá; but if you desire to combine both, then come to me.” Mullá Šadrá accordingly attended the lectures of Mír Dámdád regularly, but did not fail to profit as far as possible by the teaching of the other professors.

At length it happened that Mír Dámdád desired to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca. He therefore bade each of his pupils compose during his absence a treatise on some branch of philosophy, which should be submitted to him on his return, in order that he might judge of the progress they had made. Acting on this injunction, Mullá Šadrá wrote his first great work, the Shawáhid-i-Rübábiyyé (“Evidences of Divinity”), which he presented to his teacher on his return from the pilgrimage.

Some time afterwards, when Mullá Šadrá was walking beside Mír Dámdád, the latter said to him, “Šadrá ján! Kitáb-i-merá az mejin bardá!” (“O my dear Šadrá, thou hast taken my work out of the midst!”—meaning that he had superseded it by the work which he had just composed). This generous recognition of his merit by his teacher was the beginning of a wide celebrity which has gone on increasing till this day. Yet this celebrity brought him into some danger from the fanatical Mullás, who did not fail to detect in his works the savour of heterodoxy. It was during his residence at Kum especially that his life was jeopardised by the indignation of these zealots, but on many occasions he was subjected to annoyances and persecutions. He lived at a time when the clerical power was paramount, and philosophy in disrepute. Had he lived later, he might have been the recipient of favours from the great, and have enjoyed tranquillity, and perhaps even opulence: as it was, his was the glory of once more bringing back philosophy to the land whence it had been almost banished.

Mullá Šadrá gained numerous disciples (some of whom, such as Mullá Muhsin-i-Feyz, attained to great fame), and left behind him a multitude of books, mostly in Arabic, of which the

Shawáhid-i-Rübábiyyé already mentioned, and a more systematic and voluminous work called the Asfár-i-arba’á (“Four treatises”), enjoy the greatest reputation. The three points claimed as original in Mullá Šadrá’s teaching1 are as follows:—

1. His axiom “Báisfál-i-bāšjkart kullá‘-l-ashyá wa leysa bi-sheyiná miná ‘allá”—“The element of Real Being is all things, yet is none of them.”

2. His doctrine that true cognition of any object only becomes possible by the identification of the knower with the known.

3. His assertion that the Imagination is independent of the physical organism, and belongs in its nature to the world of the soul; hence that not only in young children, but even in animals, it persists as a spiritual entity after death. In this point he differed from his predecessors, who held that it was only with the development of the Rational Soul that immortality became possible.

I must now pass on to Hájí Mullá Hádí of Sabzawár, the greatest Persian philosopher of the nineteenth century. He was the son of Hájí Mahdí, and was born in the year A.H. 1212 (A.D. 1797–8). He began his studies when only seven years old, under the tuition of Hájí Mullá Huseyn of Sabzawár, and at the early age of twelve composed a small treatise. Anxious to pursue his studies in theology and jurisprudence, he visited Mashhad in company with his teacher, and remained there for five years, living in the most frugal manner (not from necessity, for he was far from poor, but from choice), and continuing his studies with unremitting ardour. When in his seventeenth year he heard of the fame of Mullá ‘Allí Núrí, who was then teaching in Isfahán, he was very anxious to proceed thither at once, but was for several years prevented from so doing by the opposition of his

1 A further account of Mullá Šadrá, differing in some points from that which is here given, will be found in Gobineau’s Religions et Philosophies dans l’Asie Centrale, pp. 80–90.
friends. Ultimately, however, he was enabled to gratify his wishes, and to take up his residence at Isfahán, where he diligently attended the lectures of Mullá ‘Ali Núrí. He appears, however, to have received more advantage from the help of one of Mullá ‘Ali’s pupils, named Mullá Ismá’íl, “the One-eyed.” In Isfahán he remained for seven years, devoting himself with such avidity to the study of philosophy that he rarely slept for much more than four hours out of the twenty-four. To combat slothfulness he was in the habit of reposing on a cloak spread on the bare brick floor of the little room which he occupied in the college, with nothing but a stone for his pillow.

The simplicity and indeed austerity of his life was far from being his chief or only merit. Being possessed of private means greatly in excess of what his simple requirements demanded, he used to take pains to discover which of the students stood most in need of pecuniary help, and would then secretly place sums of money varying from one to five or even ten tumán (six shillings to three pounds) in their rooms during their absence, without leaving any clue which could lead to the identification of the donor. In this manner he is said to have expended no less than 100,000 tumán (about £30,000), while he was in Isfahán, leaving himself only so much as he deemed necessary for his own maintenance.

Having completed his studies at Isfahán, he made a pilgrimage to Mecca, whence he returned by way of Kirmán. There he remained for a while and married a wife, whom he took back to his native town of Sabzavár. Soon after his return he paid another visit to Mashhad, and remained there ten months, giving lectures on philosophy, but soon returned thence to settle in Sabzavár, whither his increasing renown began to draw students from all parts of Persia. During the day he used to give two lectures, each of two hours’ duration, on Metaphysics, taking as his text either some of the writings of Mullá Şadrá, or his own notes. The rest of his time was spent for the most part in study and devotion. In person he was tall of stature, thin, and of slender frame; his complexion was dark, his face pleasing to look upon, his speech eloquent and flowing, his manner gentle, unobtrusive, and even humble. His abstemiousness was such that he would never eat more than the limited number of mouthfuls which he deemed necessary, neither would he accept the invitations which he often received from the great. He was always ready to help the widow, the orphan, and the stranger, and ever exemplified in his demeanour the apothegm of Bú ‘Ali Siná (Avicenna): “Al-dirfi bâshbân, bâshbân, basâmân; wa kefî la, wa huwa farhân” bi’il-bakîj wa bi-kullî shey?” (“The gnostic is gentle, courteous, smiling; and should it be otherwise, since he rejoices in God and in all things?”) The complete course of instruction in philosophy which he gave lasted seven years, at the end of which period those students who had followed it diligently were replaced by others. Many, of course, were unable to complete their education; but, on the whole, nearly a thousand satisfactorily accomplished it. Till within three days of his death ʻ Hájí Mullá Hâdî never disappointed his eager audience of a single lecture, and he was actually engaged in teaching when struck down by the disease which terminated his life. The eager throng of students surrounded him in a circle, while he was speaking of the Essence and Attributes of God, when suddenly he was overcome by faintness, and laid down the book which he held in his hand, saying, “I have so often repeated the word ‘Há,’ ‘Hâ’” (“Há,” i.e. God; in which sense only the Arabic pronoun is used by the Persians) “that it has become fixed in my head, and my head, following my tongue, seems to keep crying ‘Há,’ ‘Hâ.’” Having uttered these words, he laid down his head and fainted, and two days later he peacefully passed away in the year A.H. 1295 (A.D. 1878), sincerely mourned by those to whom he had been endeared alike by his learning and his benevolence. He was buried, according to instructions contained in his will, outside the Mashhad gate of Sabzavár.
A handsome tomb has been raised over his grave by orders of the Grand Vizier, and the spot is regarded as one of great sanctity, and is visited by numerous pilgrims.

So died, after a noble and useful life, the Sage of Sabzawár. His major works amount to about seventeen in number, including an elementary treatise on philosophy, written in Persian, in an easy style, at the request of the Sháh, and entitled Asróm-l-Hikam (“Secrets of Philosophy”). He was a poet as well as a metaphysician, and has left behind him a Diván in Persian, as well as two long and highly esteemed versified treatises in Arabic, one on logic, the other on metaphysic. He had three sons, of whom the eldest (who was also by far the most capable) survived him only two years; the other two are still [1893] living at Sabzawár, and one at least of them still teaches in the college on which his father’s talents shed so great a lustre.

The pupils of the Sage of Sabzawár entertained for him an unbounded love and veneration. They even believe him to have been endowed with the power of working miracles (korámát), though he himself never allowed this statement to be made before him. My teacher, Mírzá Asadulláh, informed me, however, that the following was a well-known fact. Hájí Mullá Háfíz’s son-in-law had a daughter who had been paralysed for years. One night, a year after the Hájí’s death, she saw him in a dream, and he said to her, “Arise, my daughter, and walk.” The excessive joy which she experienced at seeing him and hearing these words caused her to wake up. She immediately roused her sister, who was sleeping beside her, and told her what she had dreamed. The latter said, “You had better get up and try if you can walk; perhaps there is more in the dream than a mere fancy.” After a little persuasion the girl got up, and found

1 All these details I obtained from my teacher, Mírzá Asadulláh of Sabzawár, who compiled the original memoir, not only from his own recollections of his venerated master in philosophy, but from information supplied by one of Mullá Hádí’s sons. It is chiefly by reason of the good authority on which they rest that I have decided to give them almost in full.

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to her delight that she really was able to walk quite well. Next day she went to the Hájí’s tomb to return thanks, accompanied by a great crowd of people, to whom her former affliction was as well-known as her present recovery was obvious.

Another event, less marvellous, however, than the above, was related to me as follows. When a detachment of the army was passing through Sabzawár, a soldier, who had been given a requisition for corn for the horses drawn on a certain mulá, brought the document to Hájí Mullá Háfíz and asked him in whose name it was drawn, as he himself was unable to read. The Hájí looked at it, and, knowing that the mulá who was therein commanded to supply the corn was in impoverished circumstances, and could ill support the loss, replied, “I must supply you with what you require; go to the storehouse and take it.” Accordingly the soldier carried off as much corn as he needed, and gave it to the horses. In the morning, however, on entering the stable, the soldiers found that the corn was untouched. Enquiries were made whence it came, and on its being discovered that it was the property of the Hájí, it was returned to him. This story soon gained currency and credence amongst officers and men alike, and added not a little to the Hájí’s reputation, notwithstanding that he himself continued to make light of it, and even to deny it.

It may not be amiss to give some details as to the course of study which those who desired to attend the Hájí’s lectures were expected to have already pursued, and the subjects in which they had to produce evidence of proficiency before they were received as his pupils. These preliminary studies were as follows:—

I. Grammar, Rhetoric, etc. (Edhíyí, also called “Preliminaries” (Mukaddamát).—Under this head is included a competent knowledge of Arabic and its grammar, with ability to read such works as Jámí’s commentaries, Sughí, and the Mutawwáli.

II. Logic (Manzín), as contained in such treatises as the Káhid, the Sham-áyyi, and the Sharh-l-Madhli.

III. Mathematics (including Euclid and Astronomy), which is studied puri-passu with Logic.
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IV. Elements of Jurisprudence (Fiqh).
V. Scholastic Theology (Ilm-i-Kelâm), as set forth in the following works:

1. The Hidîeq of Meybûdî, a concise but knotty compendium of the elements of this science in Arabic.
2. The Tajrid of Násiru'd-Dîn of Tûs, with the commentary of Mullâ 'Ali Kûshîjî.
3. The Shâwarîj of Mullâ 'Abdu'r-Razzâk Lâhîjî, the son-in-law of Mullâ Šadrî.

Those students who were able to show that they had acquired a satisfactory knowledge of these subjects were allowed to enroll themselves as the pupils of Hâjî Mullâ Hâdî, and to commence their study of Metaphysic proper (Hikmat-i-Yllî), as set forth in his works and in those of Mullâ Šadrî.

I trust that I have succeeded in making it sufficiently clear that the study of Persian philosophy is not a thing to be lightly undertaken, and that proficiency in it can only be the result of diligent application, combined with good natural capacity. It is not a thing to play with in a dilletante manner, but is properly regarded by its votaries as the highest intellectual training, and the crown and summit of all knowledge. It was not long ere I discovered this fact; and as it was clearly impossible for me to go through a tenth part of the proper curriculum, while at the same time I was deeply desirous of becoming, in some measure at least, acquainted with the most recent developments of Persian thought, I was fain to request my teacher, Mirzâ Asadu'llâhî, to take compassion on my infirmities, and to instruct me as far as possible, and in as simple a manner as possible, concerning the essential practical conclusions of the doctrines of which he was the exponent. This he kindly exerted himself to do; and though any attempt at a systematic enunciation of Hâjî Mullâ Hâdî's philosophy, even were I capable of undertaking it, would be out of place here, I think that it may not be uninteresting if I notice briefly some of its more remarkable features—not as derived from his writings, but as orally expounded to me, with explanations and illustrations, by his pupil and disciple.
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Man finds himself in the lowest of these grades—the Material World; but of that world he is the highest development, for he contains in himself the potentiality of re-ascent, by steps corresponding to those in the “Arc of Descent,” to God, his Origin and his Home. To discover how this return may be effected, how the various stages of the Kausv-i-Su'd ("Arc of Ascent") may be traversed, is the object of philosophy.

“The soul of man is corporeal in origin, but spiritual in continuance” ("An-nafsu fi'il-handithi jismu niyya, wa fi'il-bahda'i tekhmu rihim niyya"). Born of matter, it is yet capable of a spiritual development which will lead it back to God, and enable it, during the span of a mortal life, to accomplish the ascent from matter to spirit, from the periphery to the centre. In the “Arc of Ascent” also are numerous grades; but here again, as in the “Arc of Descent,” seven are usually recognised. It may be well at this point to set down in a tabular form these grades as they exist both in the Macrocosm, or Arc of Descent, and in the Microcosm, or Arc of Ascent, which is man:

I. Arc of Ascent.
   Seven Principles in Man
   (La'taf'if-i-tab'a).
   1. The most subtle principle (Akhfa).
   2. The subtle principle (Khafid).
   3. The secret (Surr).
   4. The heart (Qalb).
   5. The spirit (Ruh).
   6. The soul (Nafs).
   7. The nature (Tabi).

II. Arc of Descent.
   Series of Emanations.
   1. Exploration of the World of Divinity
      (Syr dar 'alam-i-Lahii).
   2. The World of Divinity
      ('alam-i-Lahii).
   3. The World of the Intelligences
      ('alam-i-Jabarti).
   4. The World of the Angels
      ('alam-i-Malakati).
   5. The World of Ideas
      ('alam-i-Meta).
   6. The World of Form
      ('alam-i-Si'rat).
   7. The Material World
      ('alam-i-Tabi'at).

A few words of explanation are necessary concerning the above scheme. Each stage in either column corresponds with that which is placed opposite to it. Thus, for instance, the mere matter which in the earliest stage of man’s development constitutes his totality corresponds to the material world to which it belongs. In the material world the “Arc of Descent” has reached its lowest point; in man, the highest product of the material world, the ascent is begun. When the human embryo begins to take form it rises to the World of Soul, thus summing up in itself two grades of the Arcs. It may never ascend higher than this point; for, of course, when the upward evolution of man is spoken of, it is not implied that this is effected by all, or even by the majority of men. These “seven principles” do not represent necessarily co-existing components or elements, but successive grades of development, at any one of which, after the first, the process of growth may be arrested. The race exists for its highest development; humanity for the production of the Perfect Man (Insad-i-Khdii), who, summing up as he does all the grades of ascent from matter—the lowest point of the series of emanations—to God, is described as the Microcosm, the compendium of all the planes of Existence (bargat-i-jdmii), or sometimes as the “sixth plane” (bargat-i-sidra), because he includes and summarises all the five spiritual planes.

It has been said that some men never rise beyond the second grade—the World of Soul or Form. These are such as occupy themselves entirely during their lives with sensual pursuits—mark two different phases in the experience of the soul—an attaining unto the World of Divinity, and a journeying therein. My impression is that they should be replaced thus:—1. The World of Divinity (i.e. the Divine Essence, 'alam-i-Lahii); 2. The World of the Attributes ('alam-i-Rahii). This corresponds to the views given in the commentaries on the Fasz of Sheikh Moly'd-din ibnul-'Arabi and other similar works, where the “Five Planes” (bargat-i-khamii), which coincide with the first five grades given here (i.e. those which belong to the Spiritual World), are discussed. I have not, however, considered myself justified in making any alteration in Mirza Asadu'llah’s scheme.
eating, drinking, and the like. Previously to Mullâ Šadrâ it was
generally held by philosophers that these perished entirely after
death, inasmuch as they had not developed any really spiritual
principle. Mullâ Šadrâ, however, took great pains to prove that
even in these cases where the “Rational Soul” (Naṣf-i-naṣīka)
had not been developed during life, there did exist a spiritual part
which survived death and resisted disintegration. This
spiritual part he called “Imaginations” (Khiyâlît).

Yet even in this low state of development, where no effort
has been made to reach the plane of reason, a man may
lead an innocent and virtuous life. What will then be the con-
dition after death of that portion of him which survives the body?
It cannot re-enter the material world, for that would amount to
Metempsychosis, which, so far as I have been able to ascertain,
is uncompromisingly denied by all Persian philosophers. Neither
can it ascend higher in the spiritual scale, for the period during
which progress was possible is past. Moreover, it derives no
pleasure from spiritual or intellectual experiences, and would
not be happy in one of the higher worlds, even could it attain
thereto. It desires material surroundings, and yet cannot return
to the material world. It therefore does what seems to it the next
best thing: it creates for itself subjective pseudo-material sur-
rroundings, and in this dream-dwelling it makes its eternal home.
If it has acted rightly in the world according to its lights, it is
happy; if wrongly, then miserable. The happiness or misery of
its hereafter depends on its merit, but in either case it is purely
subjective and absolutely stationary. There is for it neither
advance nor return: it can neither ascend higher, nor re-enter
the material world either by Transmigration or Resurrection,
both of which the philosophers deny.

What has been said above applies, with slight modifications,
to all the other grades, at any rate the lower ones. If a man has
during his life in the world attained to the grade of the spirit
(the third grade in order of ascent) and acquired rational or

intellectual faculties, he may still have used these well or ill. In
either case he enters after death into the World of Ideas, where
he is happy or miserable according to his deserts. But, so far
as I could learn, anyone who has during his life developed any
of the four highest principles passes after death into a condition
of happiness and blessedness, since mere intellect without virtue
will not enable him to pass beyond the third grade, or World of
the Spirit. According to the degree of development which he
has reached, he enters the World of the Angels, the World of the
Intelligences, or the World of Divinity itself.

From what has been said it will be clear that a bodily resurrection
and a material hereafter are both categorically denied by the
philosophers. Nevertheless, states of subjective happiness or
misery, practically constituting a heaven or hell, exist. These,
as has been explained, are of different grades in both cases. Thus
there is a “Paradise of Actions” (Jannât-i-A'}}'}}}蒲d), where the soul
is surrounded by an ideal world of beautiful forms; a “Paradise
of Attributes” (Jannât-i-Sifâtî); and a “Paradise of the Essence”
(Jannât-i-db-Dhârî), which is the highest of all, for there the soul
enjoys the contemplation of the Divine Perfections, which hold
it in an eternal rapture, and cause it to forget and cease to desire
all those objects which constitute the pleasure of the denizens of
the lower paradises. It is, indeed, unconscious of aught but God,
and is annihilated or absorbed in Him.

The lower subjective worlds, where the less fully developed
soul suffers or rejoices, are often spoken of collectively as the
‘Alam-i-Mihdî (“World of Similitudes”), or the ‘Alam-i-Barqâkh
(“World of the Barrier,” or “Border-world”). The first term
is applied to it because each of its denizens takes a form corre-
sponding to his attributes. In this sense ‘Omar Khayyâm has
said—

"Râđî kí jâdî-yâ-bar sifât khowâhid bid
Kâdâr-i-tâ bi-kâdâr-i-mâ-râfât khowâhid bid;"

Thus a greedy gluttonous man takes the form of a pig, and it is in this sense only that metempsychosis (tanahshkh) is held by the Persian philosophers. On this point my teacher was perfectly clear and definite. It is not uncommon for Sufis to describe a man by the form with which they profess to identify him in the "World of Similitudes." Thus I have heard a Sufi say to his antagonist, "I see you in the World of Similitudes as an old toothless fox, desirous of preying upon others, but unable to do so." I once said to Mirzá Asadulláh that, if I rightly understood his views, hell was nothing else than an eternal nightmare: whereat he smiled, and said that I had rightly apprehended his meaning.

Although a soul cannot rise higher than that world to which it has assimilated itself during life, it may be delayed by lower affinities in the "World of the Barrier" on its way thither. All bad habits, even when insufficient to present a permanent obstacle to spiritual progress, tend to cause such delay, and to retard the upward ascent of the soul. From this it will be seen that the denizens of the "World of the Barrier" are of three classes: two of these being permanent, and abiding for ever in the state of subjective happiness or misery which they have merited, and the third consisting of souls temporarily delayed there to undergo a species of probation before passing to the worlds above.

On one occasion I put the following question to Mirzá Asadulláh:—"Two persons, A and B, have been friends during their lifetime. The former has so lived as to merit happiness hereafter; the latter, misery. Both die and enter the 'World of the Barrier,' there receiving forms appropriate to their attributes; the one, moreover, is happy, the other wretched. Will not A have cognisance of B's miserable condition, and will not this knowledge tend to mar his felicity?"

To this question my teacher replied as follows:—"A's world is altogether apart from B's, and the two are entirely out of contact. In A's world are present all things that he desires to have in such form as he pleases, for his world is the creation of his Imaginative Faculty freed from the restraints of matter and the outward senses, and endowed with full power to see what it conceives. Therefore if A desires the presence of B as he knew him formerly, B will be present with him in that form under which he was so known, and not in the repulsive form which he has now assumed. There is no more difficulty in this than in a person dreaming in ordinary sleep that he sees one of his friends in a state of happiness when at that very time his friend is in great pain or trouble."

Such, in outline, are the more remarkable features of this philosophy as expounded to me by Mirzá Asadulláh. That it differs considerably from the ideas formed by most European scholars of the philosophy current in Persia, as represented in the books, I am well aware. I can only suppose that Gobineau is right as to the extent to which the system of "kātmān" (concealment of opinions) prevails in Persia—a view which my own experience strongly tends to confirm. He says, for example, in speaking of Mullá Sadád (Religions et Philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale, p. 88), in whose footsteps Hájí Mullá Hádí for the most part followed:—

"Le soin qu'il prenait de déguiser ses discours, il était nécessaire qu'il le prît surtout de déguiser ses livres; c'est ce qu'il a fait, et à les lire on se ferait l'idée la plus imparfaite de son enseignement. Je dis à les lire sans un maître qui possède la tradition. Autrement on y pénètre sans peine." Such a system of concealment may seem strange to those accustomed to the liberty of thought enjoyed in Europe, but it is rendered necessary in the
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East by the power and intolerance of the clergy. Many a philosopher like Sheyykh Shihabu’ll-Din Suhravardi, many a Sufi like Mansur-i-Hallaj, has paid with his life for too free and open an expression of his opinions.

For the rest, many of the ideas here enunciated bear an extraordinary similarity to those set forth by Mr. Sinnett in his work entitled Esoteric Buddhism. Great exception has been taken to this work, and especially it has been asserted that the ideas unfolded in it are totally foreign to Buddhism of any sort. Of this I am not in a position to judge: very possibly it is true, though even then the ideas in question may still be of Indian origin. But whatever the explanation be, no one, I feel sure, can compare the chapters in Mr. Sinnett’s book, entitled respectively, “The Constitution of Man,” “Devachan,” and “Kama Loca,” with what I have written of Haji Mullá Hádi’s views on the Nature of Man and his Hereafter, without being much struck by the resemblance.

Certain other points merit a brief notice. The physical sciences as known to Persian philosophy are those of the ancients. Their chemistry regards earth, air, fire, and water as the four elements: their astronomy is simply the Ptolemaic system. Furthermore, they regard the Universe as finite, and adduce many proofs, some rather ingenious, others weak enough, against the contrary hypothesis. Of these I will give one only as a specimen.

“Let us suppose,” they say, “that the Universe is infinite. Then from the centre of the earth draw two straight lines, diverging from one another at an angle of 60°, to the circumference, and produce them thence to infinity. Join their terminal points by another straight line, thus forming the base of the triangle. Now, since the two sides of the triangle are equal (for both were drawn from one point to infinity), therefore the angles at the base are equal; and since the angle at the apex is 60°, therefore each of the remaining angles is 60°, and the triangle is equilateral. Therefore, since the sides are infinite in length, the base is also infinite in length. But the base is a straight line joining two points (viz. the terminal points of the sides); that is to say, it is limited in both directions. Therefore it is not infinite in length, neither are the sides infinite in length, and a straight line cannot be drawn to infinity. Therefore the Universe is finite. Q.E.D.”

This theorem scarcely needs comment. It, along with the endless discussions of a similar nature on the “Indivisible Atom” (Jambar-i-fard) and the like, is an inheritance from the scholastic theology (Ilm-i-Kalâm), the physics of which have been retained by all Persian metaphysicians up to the present day.

A few words may be said about the psychology of the system in question. Five psychic faculties (corresponding to the five senses) are supposed to exist. These, with their cerebral seats, are as follows:

1. The compound perception (Hisat-i-muhhtarab), which has the double function of receiving and apprehending impressions from without. It is compared to a twofaced mirror, because on the one hand it “reflects” the outward world as presented to it by the senses, and on the other, during sleep, it gives form to the ideas arising in the Mutasarrifa, which will be mentioned directly.

2. The Imagination (Khayal), which is the storehouse of forms.

3. The Controlling or Co-ordinating Faculty (Mutasarrifa), which combines and elaborates the emotions or ideas stored in the Vadhmi, and the images stored in the Imagination. It is therefore sometimes called the “keeper of the two treasuries.”

4. The Emotional Faculty (Vadhmi), which is the seat of love, hate, fear, and the like.

5. The Memory (Haji), which is the storehouse of ideas.

All these faculties are partial percipients (Madrikat-i-jumza), and are the servants of the Reason (Akh-i-kull-i-insani, or Nafs-i-nastiḳa), which is the General Percipient (Madrikat-i-kull). Of these faculties the Imagination would appear to be regarded as the highest, since, as we have seen, in those cases in which the Reason or Rational Soul (Nafs-i-nastiḳa) is not developed, it
constitutes that portion of the individual which survives death and resists disintegration. Indeed these five faculties are better regarded as different stages in the development of the Reason. Nothing below the plane of the Imagination, however, survives death: e.g. in the lowest animals, whose culminating faculty is a sense of touch (like worms), death brings about complete disintegration.

Finally, a few words may be added concerning the view taken of the occult sciences. I was naturally desirous to learn to what extent they were recognised as true, and accordingly questioned Mirzá Asadu’lláh on the matter. His reply (which fairly represents the opinion of most thoughtful Persians of the old school) was briefly to this effect:—As regards Geomancy (‘Ilm-i-raml) and Astrology (‘Ilm-i-najám) he had no doubt of their truth, of which he had had positive proof. At the same time, of the number of those who professed to understand them the majority were impostors and charlatans. Their acquisition was very laborious, and required many years' patient study, and those who had acquired them and knew their value were, as a rule, very slow to exhibit or make a parade of their knowledge. As regards the interpretation of dreams, he said that these were of three kinds, of which only the last admits of interpretation. These three classes are as follows:—

I.—DREAMS DUE TO DISORDERED HEALTH.—

1. Blood. Red things, such as fire, etc., are seen.
2. Bile. Yellow things, such as the sun, gold, etc., are seen.
3. Phlegm. White things, such as water, snow, etc., are seen.
4. Melancholy. Black things, such as ink, etc., are seen.

Due to predominance of—

II.—DREAMS ARISING FROM IMPRESSIONS PRODUCED DURING WAKING HOURS.

III.—DREAMS NOT ARISING FROM THE EXTERNAL OR INTERNAL CAUSES ABOVE ENUMERATED.—These are reflections obtained during sleep from the World of Similitudes (‘Alam-i-Mithal). In some rare cases they indicate events as they actually will occur. Generally, however, they show them forth in a symbolical manner, and require interpretation. Just as every man has his appropriate "form" in the World of Similitudes, so also has everything else. Knowledge, for instance, is symbolised by milk; an enemy by a wolf, etc.

I discussed the occult sciences with several of my friends, to discover as far as possible the prevailing opinion about them. One of them made use of the following argument to prove their existence:—"God," he said, "has no bukhál (stinginess, avarice); it is impossible for Him to withhold from anyone a thing for which he strives with sufficient earnestness. Just as, if a man devotes all his energies to the pursuit of spiritual knowledge, he attains to it, so, if he chooses to make occult sciences and magical powers the object of his aspirations, they will assuredly not be withheld from him."

Another of my intimate friends gave me the following account of an attempt at conjunction (‘Ighár-i-jinn) at which he had himself assisted:—"My uncle, Mirzá ———," he said, "whose house you may perhaps see when you visit Shiráz, was a great believer in the occult sciences, in the pursuit of which, indeed, he dissipated a considerable fortune, being always surrounded by a host of magicians, geomancers, astrologers, and the like. On one occasion something of value had disappeared, and it was believed to have been stolen. It was therefore determined to make an attempt to discover the thief by resorting to a conjunction, which was undertaken by a certain Seyyid of Shiráz, skilled in these matters. Now you must know that the operator cannot himself see the forms of the jinni whom he evokes: he needs for this purpose the assistance of a young child. I, being then quite a child, was selected as his assistant. The magician began by drawing a talismanic figure in ink on the palm of my hand, over which he subsequently rubbed a mixture of ink and oil, so that it was no longer visible. He then commenced his incantations; and before long I, gazing steadily, as I had been instructed to do, into the palm of my hand, saw, reflected in it as it were,
a tiny figure which I recognised as myself. I informed the magician of this, and he commanded me to address it in a peremptory manner and bid it summon the ‘King of the jinnis’ (Malku‘l-jinni). I did so, and immediately a second figure appeared in the ink-mirror. Then I was frightened, and began to cry, and hastily rubbed the ink off my hand. Thereupon another boy was brought, and the same process was repeated till the ‘King of the jinnis’ appeared. ‘Tell him to summon his vazir,’ said the magician. The boy did so, and the vazir also appeared in the ink-mirror. A number of other jinnis were similarly called up, one by one, and when they were all present they were ordered to be seated. Then the magician took a number of slips of paper, wrote on each of them the name of one of those resident in the house, and placed them under his foot. He then drew out one without looking at it, and called out to the boy, ‘Who is here?’ The boy immediately read off the name in question in the ink-mirror. The same process was repeated till the name of one of the servants in the house was reached. ‘Well,’ said the magician, ‘why do you not tell me what you see in the mirror?’ ‘I see nothing,’ answered the boy. ‘Look again,’ said the magician; ‘gaze more fixedly on the mirror.’ After a little while the boy said, ‘I see no name, but only the words Bismi‘llahi‘r-Rahmanir-Rahim’ (‘In the name of God, the Merciful, the Clement’). ‘This,’ said the magician, ‘which I hold in my hand is the name of the thief.’ The man in question was summoned and interrogated, and finally confessed that he had stolen the missing article, which he was compelled to restore.”

In this connection it may not be out of place to give the experiences of another experimenter in the occult sciences, who, although at the time sufficiently alarmed by the results he obtained, subsequently became convinced that they were merely due to an excited imagination. My informant in this case was a philosopher of Ishâhàn, entitled Aminu‘s-Shar’at, who came to Teherân in the company of his friend and patron, the Bandu‘l-

Mythick, one of the chief ministers of the Zil’i‘s-Sultan. I saw him on several occasions, and had long discussions with him on religion and philosophy. He spoke somewhat bitterly of the vanity of all systems. “I have tried most of them,” he said. “I have been in turn Musulmân, Shi‘i, Shékhi, and even Báb. At one time of my life I devoted myself to the occult sciences, and made an attempt to obtain control over the jinnis (Tâshkhr-i-jinn), with what results I will tell you. You must know, in the first place, that the modus operandi is as follows:—The seeker after this power chooses some solitary and dismal spot, such as the Hazâr-Déré at Isfahân (the place selected by me). There he must remain for forty days, which period of retirement we call chilî. He spends the greater part of this time in incantations in the Arabic language, which he recites within the area of the mandâl, or geometrical figure, which he must describe in a certain way on the ground. Besides this, he must eat very little food, and diminish the amount daily. If he has faithfully observed all these details, on the twenty-first day a lion will appear, and will enter the magic circle. The operator must not allow himself to be terrified by this apparition, and, above all, must on no account quit the mandâl, else he will lose the results of all his pains. If he resists the lion, other terrible forms will come to him on subsequent days—tigers, dragons, and the like—which he must similarly withstand. If he holds his ground till the fortieth day, he has attained his object, and the jinnis, having been unable to get the mastery over him, will have to become his servants and obey all his behests. Well, I faithfully observed all the necessary conditions, and on the twenty-first day, sure enough, a lion appeared and entered the circle. I was horribly frightened, but all the same I stood my ground, although I came near to fainting with terror. Next day a tiger came, and still I succeeded in resisting the impulse which urged me to flee. But when, on the following day, a most hideous and frightful dragon appeared, I could no longer control my terror, and rushed from the circle,
renouncing all further attempts at obtaining the mastery over
the jinnis. When some time had elapsed after this, and I had
pursued my studies in philosophy further, I came to the con-
clusion that I had been the victim of hallucinations excited by
expectation, solitude, hunger, and long vigils; and, with a view
to testing the truth of this hypothesis, I again repeated the same
process which I had before practised, this time in a spirit of
philosophical incredulity. My expectations were justified; I saw
absolutely nothing. And there is another fact which proves to
my mind that the phantoms I saw on the first occasion had no
existence outside my own brain. I had never seen a real lion
then, and my ideas about the appearance of that animal were
entirely derived from the pictures which may be seen over the
doors of baths in this country. Now, the lion which I saw in the
magic circle was exactly like the latter in form and colouring,
and therefore, as I need hardly say, differed considerably in aspect
from a real lion.”

In Tcherânic I saw another philosopher of some reputation,
Mirzâ Abû’l-Hasan-i-Jilvé. The last of these names is the tak-
ballûs or nom de guerre under which he writes poetry—for he is a
poet as well as a metaphysician. Unfortunately I did not have the
advantage of any prolonged conversation with him, and even
such as I had chiefly consisted in answering his questions on the
different phases of European thought. He was greatly interested
in what I told him about the Theosophists and Vegetarians, and
was anxious to know whether the Plymouth Brethren were
believers in the transmigration of souls!

Although, as will have already appeared, I acquired a con-
siderable amount of information about certain phases of Persian
thought during my sojourn in Tcherân, there was one which,
notwithstanding my most strenuous efforts and diligent en-
quiries, had hitherto eluded all my attempts to approach it. This
one was Bábûism, of the history of which I have already had
occasion to speak more than once, and to which I shall have to
refer repeatedly in the course of subsequent chapters. Although
I exerted to the utmost all the skill, all the tact, and all the
cautions which I had at my command, I was completely foiled
in my attempts to communicate with the proscribed sect. I
heard something about them, it is true, and what I heard served
only to increase my desire to know more. I was told tales of
their unflinching courage under torture, of their unshakable
faith, of their marvellous skill in argument. “I once met one of
them,” said a man of great learning to me, “as I was returning
from Kerbelâ, and he succeeded in drawing me into a discussion
on religious matters. So completely was I worsted by him at
every turn, so profound was his knowledge of the Kurân and
Traditions, and so ingenious was the use he made of this know-
ledge, that I was finally compelled to effect my escape from his
irresistible logic by declaring myself to be li-maddâbah (a free-
thinker); whereupon he left me, saying that with such he had
nothing to do.”

But whether my friends could not give me the knowledge
I sought for, or whether they did not choose to do so, I was
unable during my stay in Tcherân to become acquainted with
any members of the sect in question. Some, indeed, of those
with whom I was acquainted at that time were, as I subsequently
discovered, actually Bábís; yet these, although at times they asked
me about the course of my studies, commended my devotion
to philosophy, and even tantalised me with vague promises of
introductions to mysterious friends, who were, as they would
imply, endowed with true wisdom (ma’rifat), would say nothing
definite, and appeared afraid to speak more openly. After arousing my curiosity to the highest pitch, and making me fancy
that I was on the threshold of some discovery, they would
suddenly leave me with an expression of regret that opportunites
for prolonged and confidential conversation were so rare.

I tried to obtain information from an American missionary,
with similar lack of success. He admitted that he had fore-
gathered with Bábi, but added that he did not encourage them to come and discuss their ideas, which he regarded as mischievous and fanciful. I asked how he succeeded in recognising them, since I had sought eagerly for them and had failed to find them. He replied that there was not much difficulty in identifying them by their conversation, as they always spoke on religious topics whenever an opportunity presented itself, and dwelt especially on the need of a fuller revelation, caused by the progress of the human race. Beyond this I could learn nothing from him. Once, indeed, I thought that I had succeeded in meeting with one of the sect in the person of an old Shirází merchant, who, to my astonishment, launched forth before several other Persians who were present on the excellences of the new religion. He declared that of their sacred books those written in Arabic were more eloquent than the Kur’ân, and those composed in Persian superior in style to the writings of Sa’dî. He spoke of an Arabic book of theirs, of which a copy, written in gold, and worth at least 500 thimâns (£150), existed in Teherân. This, he added, he might perhaps some day take me to see. All the time he was talking he kept looking at me in a peculiar way as though to watch the effect produced by his words. I met him once again when no one else was present, and easily induced him to resume the topic. He spoke of the numerous signs and wonders which had heralded the birth of Mirzá ‘Ali Muhammad, the Báb; of the wonderful quickness of apprehension manifested by him when still but a child; and of the strange puzzling questions he used sometimes to put to his teachers. Thus, on one occasion when he was receiving instruction in Arabic grammar, he suddenly demanded, "Hawa’ kist?" ("Who is ‘He’?"). My informant further declared that the Franco-German war and other events had been foretold by the Báb’s successor some time before they actually occurred.

1 i.e., Mirzá Husayn ‘Ali Behá’u’lláh, now deceased, who was regarded by most of the Bábis as ‘He whom God shall manifest.’ See my first paper on “The Bábis of Persia,” in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for July 1889, p. 492, and pp. 348-5 infra.

On another occasion, in my eagerness to acquire knowledge on this matter, I committed a great indiscretion, and, I fear, caused considerable pain to my teacher, Mirzá Asadu’lláh. I had been informed that he had some time previously been arrested as a Báb, and though he was released almost immediately on the representations of the English Embassy, it was hinted to me that possibly this powerful protection, rather than any clear proof of his orthodoxy, was the cause of his liberation. I therefore determined to sound him on the matter, and, unable to control my impatience and await a favourable opportunity, I approached the subject as cautiously as I could the very next time that I saw him. Alluding to a previous discussion on the finality attributed by Muhammadans to the revelation of their prophet, I said that I had recently heard that there existed in Persia a number of people who denied this, and alleged that a subsequent revelation had been accorded to mankind even within the lifetime of many still living. Mirzá Asadu’lláh listened to what I said with a gradually increasing expression of dismay, which warned me that I was treading on dangerous ground, and made me begin to regret that I had been so precipitate. When I had finished, he continued silent for a few minutes, and then spoke as follows:—

“I have no knowledge of these people, although you have perhaps been informed of the circumstances which give me good cause to remember their name. As you have probably heard some account of these, I may as well tell you the true version. Two or three years ago I was arrested in the village of Kúlahák (which, as you know, serves the English residents for a summer retreat) by an officer in command of a party of soldiers sent to seize another person suspected of being a Bábí. They had been unable to find him, and were returning disappointed from their quest when they espied me. ‘Seize him!’ said the officer; ‘that he is devoted to philosophy every one knows, and a philosopher is not far removed from a Bábí.’ Accordingly I was arrested, and the books I was carrying, as well as a sum of money which
I had on me, were taken from me by the officer in command. I was brought before the Nâdim's-Saltana and accused of being a Bábí. Many learned and pious men, including several mullâs, hearing of my arrest, and knowing the utter falsity of the charge, appeared spontaneously to give evidence in my favour, and I was eventually released. But the money and the books taken from me I never recovered; and then the shame of it, the shame of it! But though, as you see, I have suffered much by reason of these people of whom you spoke just now, I have never met with them or had any dealings with them, save on one occasion. I was once returning from Sabzawâr through Mâzandarân, and at each of the more important towns on my way I halted for a few days to visit those interested in philosophy. Many of them were very anxious to learn about the doctrines of my master, Hájí Mullá Hádí, and I was, as a rule, well received and kindly entertained. One day—it was at Sârî—I was surrounded by a number of students who had come to question me on the views of my master, when a man present produced a book from which he read some extracts. This book, he said, was called 'Hákíqat-i-Bâsîya,' and, as this was a term used by Hájí Mullá Hádí, I thought it bore some reference to the philosophy I was expounding. I accordingly stretched out my hand to take the book, but the man drew it back out of my reach. Though I was displeased at his behaviour, I endeavoured to conceal my annoyance, and allowed him to continue to read. Presently he came to the term, 'mardîb-i-ahâdiyyat' ('degrees of the Primal Unity'). Here I interrupted him. 'I do not know who the author of the work you hold in your hand may be,' I said, 'but it is clear to me that he does not understand what he is talking about. To speak of the degrees of Primal Unity, which is Pure and Undifferentiated Being, is sheer nonsense.' Some discussion ensued, and eventually I was permitted to look at the book. Then I saw that it was very beautifully written and adorned with gold, and it flashed upon me that what I held in my hand was one of the sacred books of the Bábîs, and that those amongst whom I stood belonged to this redoubtable sect. That is the only time I ever came across them, and that is all that I know about them."

And that was all—or nearly all—that I knew about them for the first four months I spent in Persia. How I came across them at last will be set forth in another chapter.
CHAPTER VII

FROM TÊHERÂN TO İSFÂHÂN

"CHR.—'But what have you seen?' said Christian.
"MÉN.—'Seen! Why, the Valley itself, which is as dark as pitch; we also saw there the Hobbolins, Satyrs, and Dragons of the Pit: we heard also in that Valley a continual Howling and Yelling, as of a People under utterable misery, who there sat bound in affliction and Irons; and over that Valley hung the discouraging clouds of Confusion; Death also doth always spread his wings over it: in a word it is ever whit dreadful, being utterly without Order.'"—(Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress.)

ALTHOUGH, owing to the kindness of my friends, life in the capital was pleasant enough to make me in no hurry to leave it, nevertheless the praises of beautiful Shiráz and the descriptions of venerable Persepolis which I so often heard were not without their effect. I began to grow restless, and to suffer a kind of dread lest, if I tarried much longer, some unforeseen event might occur to cut short my travels and to prevent me from reaching what was really the goal of my journey. After all, Persia (Fârs) is really Persia, and Shiráz is the capital thereof; to visit Persia and not to reach Fârs is only a degree better than staying at home. Therefore, when one morning the Nawwâb came into my room to inform me that he had received instructions to proceed to Mashhad in the course of a week or two, and asked me what I would do, I replied without hesitation that I would start for the South. As he expected to leave Têherân about 10th February, I determined to arrange my departure for the 7th, which, being my birthday, seemed to me an auspicious day for resuming my travels.

'All the Turk having gone South with H——, I was for a time left without a servant. Soon after I had become the guest of the

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Nawwâb, however, he advised me to obtain one, and promised to help me in finding some one who would suit me. I was anxious to have a genuine Persian of the South this time, and finally succeeded in engaging a man who appeared in every respect to satisfy my requirements. He was a fine-looking young fellow, of rather distinguished appearance, and a native of Shiráz. He made no boast of any special accomplishments, and was satisfied to receive the very moderate sum of three tūmâns a month while in Têherân, where he had a house and a wife; he proved, however, to be an excellent cook, and an admirable servant in every respect, though inclined at times to manifest a spirit of independence.

Hâjî Şafâr—for that was his name—received the announcement that I should start for the South in a few days with evident satisfaction. A Persian servant has everything to gain when his master undertakes a journey. In the first place his wages are raised fifty per cent. to supply him with money for his expenses on the road (jîr). In the second place he receives, before starting, an additional sum of money (generally equivalent to a month's wages) to provide himself with requisites for the road, this allowance being known as pîl-i-chejmî va shalâdr ("boots and breeches money"). In the third place he has more chance of making himself indispensable to his master, and so obtaining increased wages. Last of all, there is probably hardly a Persian to be found who does not enjoy travelling for its own sake, though in this particular case the charm of novelty was lacking, for Hâjî Şafâr had visited not only Mecca and Kerbelâ, but nearly all the more important towns in Persia as well.

Four or five days before the date fixed for my departure, he brought me a formidable list of necessaries for the road—cooking-pots, with all the appliances for making pîlāw; saddle-bags, sponges, cloths, towels, whips, cups, glasses, spits, brooms, tongs, and a host of other articles, many of which seemed to me unnecessary, besides quantities of rice, onions, potatoes, tea,
sugar, candles, matches, honey, cheese, charcoal, butter, and other groceries. I struck out a few of what I regarded as the most useless articles, for it appeared to me that with such stores we might be going to Khiva, whereas we should actually arrive at the considerable town of Kum three or four days after leaving Teherán. On the whole, however, I let him have his own way, in consequence of which I enjoyed a degree of comfort in my future journeyings hitherto quite unknown to me, whilst the addition to my expenses was comparatively slight.

Then began the period of activity and bustle which inevitably precedes a journey, even on the smallest scale, in the East. Every day I was down in the bazaars with Haji Safar, buying cooking utensils, choosing tobaccos, and examining the merits of saddle-bags, till I was perfectly weary of the bargaining, the delays, and the endless scrutiny of goods which had to be gone through before the outfit was complete. Indeed at last I nearly despaired of being ready in time to start on the appointed day, and resigned the management into Haji Safar’s hands almost entirely, only requesting him not to invest in any perfectly useless chattels or provisions.

Another and a yet more important matter still remained, to wit, the discovery of a muleteer possessed of a small number of reasonably good animals, prepared to start on the day I had fixed, and willing to take the stages as I wished. This matter I regarded as too important to be arranged by deputy, for, when one is travelling by oneself, the pleasantness of the journey greatly depends on having a cheerful, communicative, and good-natured muleteer. Such an one will beguile the way with an endless series of anecdotes, will communicate to the traveller the weird folk-lore of the desert, will point out a hundred objects of interest which would otherwise be passed unnoticed, and will manage to arrange the stages so as to enable him to see to the best advantage anything worth seeing. A cross-grained, surly fellow, on the other hand, will cast a continual gloom over the caravan, and will throw difficulties in the way of every deviation from the accustomed routine.

Here I must speak a few words in favour of the much-maligned chetawudir. As far as my experience goes, he is, as a rule, one of the best fellows living. During the period which elapses between the conclusion of the agreement and the actual start, he is, indeed, troublesome and vexatious beyond measure. He will invent endless excuses for making extra charges; he will put forward a dozen reasons against starting on the proposed day, or following the proposed route, or halting at the places where one desires to halt. On the day of departure he will rouse one at a preternaturally early hour, alleging that the stage is a long one, that it is eight good farisakhs at least, that it is dangerous to be on the road after dark, and the like. Then, just as you are nearly ready, he will disappear to procure some hitherto forgotten necessary for the journey, or to say farewell to his wife, or to fetch one of those scraps of sacking or ropes which supply him with an unfailing excuse for absenting himself. Finally, you will not get off till the sun is well past the meridian, and may think yourself fortunate if you accomplish a stage of ten miles.

But when once he is fairly started he becomes a different man. With the dust of the city he shakes off the exasperating manner which has hitherto made him so objectionable. He sniffs the pure exhilarating air of the desert, he strides forward manfully on the broad interminable road (which is, indeed, for the most part but the track worn by countless generations of travellers), he beguiles the tediousness of the march with songs and stories, interrupted by occasional shouts of encouragement or warning to his animals. His life is a hard one, and he has to put up with many disagreeables; so that he might be pardoned even if he lost his temper oftener than he usually does.

For some time my efforts to discover a suitable muleteer were fruitless. I needed only three animals, and I did not wish to attach myself to a large caravan, foreseeing that it would lead
to difficulties in case I desired to halt on the way or deviate from the regular track. A very satisfactory arrangement concluded with two young natives of Kum, who had exactly the number of animals I required, was broken off by their father, who wished to make me hire his beasts by the day instead of for the whole distance to Isfahan. To this I refused to agree, fearing that he might protract the journey unduly, and the contract was therefore annulled. At length, however, two days before I had intended to start, a muleteer who appeared in every way suitable presented himself. He was a native of the hamlet of Gez, near Isfahan, Rahim by name; a clumsy-looking, weather-beaten young man, the excessive plainness of whose broad, smooth face was redeemed by an almost perpetual smile. The bargain was concluded in a few minutes. He engaged to provide me with three good animals, to convey me to Isfahan in twelve or thirteen days and to allow me a halt of one day each at Kum and Kashan, for the sum of ten tımdinı (nearly $f.3$).

All was now ready for the journey, and there only remained the always somewhat depressing business of leave-taking, which fully occupied my last hours in Teheran. Finally the day of departure came, but (as indeed invariably happens) endless delays arose before I actually got off, so that it was determined that we should that day proceed no farther than Shah ‘Abdu’ll-‘Azim (situated some five or six miles to the south of the metropolis), whence we could make a fair start on the morrow. One of my friends, a nephew of my kind host the Nawwab, announced his intention of accompanying me thus far. This ceremony of setting the traveller on his way is called badraka, while the converse—that of going out to meet one arriving from a journey—is called istıkba. Of these two, the former is more an act of friendship and less a formality than the latter.

Persian servants having often been described as the most sordid and rapacious of mankind, I feel that, as a mere act of justice, I must not omit to mention the disinterested and generous conduct exhibited by those of the Nawwab’s household. The system of “tips” being extremely prevalent in Persia, and conducted generally on a larger scale than in Europe, I had, of course, prepared a sum of money to distribute amongst the retainers of my host. Seizing a favourable opportunity, I entered the room where they were assembled, and offered the present to the major-domo, Muḥammad Ṭiqā Khān. To my surprise, he refused it unhesitatingly, without so much as looking at it. When I remonstrated, thinking that he only needed a little persuasion, he replied, “The master told us when you came here that you were to be treated in every way as one of the family: we should not expect or desire a present from one of the family; therefore we do not expect or desire it from you. You have been welcome, and we are glad to have done what we could to make you comfortable, but we desire nothing from you unless it be kindly remembrance.” In this declaration he persisted, and the others spoke to the same effect. Finally, I was compelled to accept their refusal as definite, and left them with a sense of admiration at their immovable determination to observe to the full their master’s wishes.

At length all was ready. The baggage-mules had started; the last cup of tea had been drunk, and the last khasba smoked; and the horses stood waiting at the gate, while Haji Safar, armed with a most formidable whip, and arrayed in a pair of enormous top-boots, strutted about the courtyard looking eminently business-like, and evidently in the best of spirits. As I was just about to take my last farewells, I observed the servants engaged in making preparations of which the object was to me totally mysterious and inexplicable. A large metal tray was brought, on which were placed the following incongruous objects:—A mirror, a bowl of water with some narcissi floating in it, a plate of flour, and a dish of sweetmeats, of the kind called shakar-panır (“sugar-cheese”). A copy of the Kur’an was next produced, and I was instructed to kiss it first, and then to dip my hand in the
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however, hardly begun to admire it when forth from some hidden recess came two most ill-looking custodians, who approached us in a threatening manner, bidding us begone.

My companion remonstrated with these churlish fellows, saying that as far as he was concerned he was a good Musulmán, and had as much right in the mosque as they had. "No good Musulmán would bring a Firangi infidel to gaze upon the sacred building," they replied; "we regard you as no whit better than him. Hence! begone!" As there was nothing to be gained by stopping (and, indeed, a fair prospect of being roughly handled if we remained to argue the matter), we prudently withdrew. I was much mortified at this occurrence, not only on my own account, but also because the good-nature of my companion had exposed him likewise to insult. I feel bound to state, however, that this was almost the only occasion on which I met with discourtesy of this sort during the whole time I spent in Persia.

On returning to the caravansaray we found that Hâji Şafar and the muleteers had arrived, the former being accompanied by a relative who had come to see him so far on his journey, and at the same time to accomplish a visit to the shrine from the precincts of which we had just been so ignominiously expelled. As it was now getting late, and as most of the gates of Țeherân are closed soon after sunset, my friend bade me farewell, and cantered off homewards, leaving me with a sense of loneliness which I had not experienced for some time. The excitement of feeling that I was once more on the road with my face fairly turned towards the glorious South soon, however, came to my relief, and indeed I had enough to occupy me in attempting to introduce some order into my utterly confused accounts. Before long Hâji Şafar, who had been busy ever since his arrival with culinary operations, brought in a supper which augured well for the comfort of the journey, so far as food was concerned.

I had finished supper, and was ruminating over tea and tobacco, when he re-entered, accompanied by his relative, who