27. Tomb of Imam Na, former Yunnanese Ahong of Ban Ho Mosque, Chiang Mai

28. Preparing the tomb of Ma Pinxing at Chiang Mai Cemetery (26 March 2004)

29. Shroud with the head of the deceased in the direction of Mecca, Chiang Mai

30. Yunnanese mosque, Mandalay, Burma (August 2004)

31. Pearl, a Yunnanese Ho at her 'halal' restaurant in Chiang Mai (life-story Chapter 5)

32. Preparation of marriage banquet at Chiang Mai Mosque (27 March 2004)
Chapter 3

Hui Identity and Modernity

Chinese Muslims: Identity and Modernity

Before considering the subject of acculturation and modernity it seems useful to know how the Hui identify themselves. In this twenty-first century, the search for identity is commonplace and touches all ethnic groups including minorities such as the Hui, Chinese Muslims at a crossroads between modernization and Sinicization.

Most of China’s Muslims are Sunni. The majority are members of the old school Laojiao, also called Gedimu (from the Arabic qadim, “ancient”). In Yunnan, they call themselves “Old Heads,” Laotou, a qualifier that only the Muslims of this province understand. The greater part of the Hui belongs to the orthodox Hanafite School; few of them recognize Abu Hanifa (c. 696–c. 767). This jurisprudential school of Iraqi origin goes back to Abdullah Ibn Masud, a companion of the Prophet, and is characterized by the Sunna Muslim tradition, inductive and legal reasoning, and consultation before taking a religious or political decision.

In China, Muslims, particularly the Hui, have Chinese family names (xing). These names have an Arabic origin such as Ha, Na, Sai, and Sha. The most widely used by far is Ma (“Horse”). The most common patronymic, Li, also exists but it is less frequent among Hui than among Han.

For Gustav von Grunebaum (1909–72), Islamic cultural identity raises a question about the relationship between Muslims and the Western world: “In accepting Western influence, the Muslim elites aimed not at renewing a heritage but at eliminating marks of inferiority.” This question leads to our quest for accultura-
Islam in China

tion and modernization. The transformation of minorities in China, including the Muslims, is being achieved through the acculturating filter of Sinicization. This Sinicization is called “internal colonialism” by authors such as Michael Hechter (Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development) and in particular Dru Gladney in his recent book Dislocating China (2004) on Muslims, minorities, and other “subaltern subjects.”

This study follows the methodology I elaborated for the Dong minority, which did not touch the question of colonialism (Sinisation 1998). The Hui are similarly confronted with Westernization and modernization through Chinese culture and the official education system in particular. The Chinese state, following a type of Durkheimian education system, sticks to state education linked with order and social peace. Acculturation (implemented in particular via the education of the youth) for the Hui is double, Chinese and Islamic. Is it necessary to replace fundamental values coming from family education by the values of the Chinese school? In fact, politics and laws count more than religion. Muslims living in an Islamic country think of the state through the sharia; the Hui, a minority, are Chinese citizens who cannot come under the control of Koranic laws.

Ibn Battuta, each time that he encountered a Chinese Muslim, had the impression of encountering his own family or a close friend. Is this still true? Six hundred years after the long voyage of the celebrated traveler from Tangiers, the Hui, having been greatly altered due to Chinese influence, do not necessarily resemble other Muslims. However, one of their principal references remains the Koran, which is a compulsory subject of study for all Muslims. Arabic is “axial,” says Massignon, but it is difficult in China to attain Islamic universality through Arabic, the Koranic language. The Hui majority read the Koran only in Chinese, and Chinese citizenship distinguishes them from the Arabs.

Some Muslims of the Old Religion (Gedimu) believe that the reformers of the nineteenth century were not orthodox. In Linxia (Hezhou), for instance, those of the old school consider that the “New Religion,” Ikhwani Al-Muslimin (Yihwani in Chinese) or the Muslim Brotherhood, has little to recommend it, for it developed in 1936 Salafism (Salafiyya) under the patronage of Republican warlords in Gansu and Qinghai, the ancient Kuku Nor. This Brotherhood expressly favors education in Arabic, which poses problems in China.

The communal life of the Hui, however, reinforces the existence of the community. The code of Muslim life imposes the five pillars: belief (kalima, in Chinese kalimat), prayers, fasting, charity (zakat), and the pilgrimage to Mecca, which is the unique act of total membership in the umma. It is a duty for all Muslims to go to the mosque on Friday, which is sometimes called libaidian or the day of prayer. Chinese people have often found it unusual that Hui and Uyghurs meet together; their devotional prayers are strange for the Chinese.

Dali in Yunnan Province, in majority Muslim, which was ruled by Du Wenxiu from 1856 to 1873, was a Muslim state. It finally collapsed. One cannot say how deeply Islamic culture was rooted in this community, but when assistance was requested from Tibet to fight the Manchu, Muslim identity was stressed.

The umma is above all transnational, for Muslims throughout the world belong to one community. Belonging to this community means going to Mecca at least once. After following a seminar in the mosque on Oxen Street (Niujie) in Beijing, the pilgrims accepted by the Islamic Association leave for Mecca; they become an integral part of this community without frontiers. A Yunnanese named Ma, the celebrated Admiral Zheng He (1371–1435), was one of the first Chinese pilgrims to go to Mecca with the Muslim sailors from his fleet accompanying him. In the beginning of the twentieth century, pilgrims used the Yunnan railway from Kunming to Hekou toward Hanoi, because it considerably reduced the length of the trip. Before the Second World War, others embarked at Shanghai, a “Treaty Port.” Since the normal resumption of Chinese pilgrimages in the 1980s, the trip is normally made by plane from Beijing or Shanghai. Kunming is now linked by air to Bangkok, and a visa must be obtained in Thailand based on the rigid limits of the Saudi quota. The more adventurous go in pilgrimage via Pakistan from Xinjiang. The Koran is central in defining official religious acts, in particular during this pilgrimage.

Koranic Teaching

Hui who can read the Koran in Arabic are called Ahong, a term of Persian origin; this term is also used to designate imams in China as is the term yimama (imam). The Islamic Association’s practice of lowering the age of the imams is also seen among the rare female Ahong who teach the Koran. Since the 1990s one finds a constant practice: the imams fifty to sixty year-old, or the elderly female Ahong are replaced by young Ahong who are politically more reliable. This lowering of the age of imams is part of Sinicization.

Young imams are happy to find a job. Even ardent believers are concerned with their professional survival. They have not known the stresses of the Cultural Revolution. They closely follow what has been taught to them under the auspicious control of the Islamic Association. They know the limits imposed on religions,
Islam in China

particularly on Islam, but never speak of Sinicization. They cannot even imagine what acculturation means. The search for employment or an administrative post occurs through the building of good family or professional relations (guanxi). The most Islamized young Hui elite sometimes seek to study abroad. The guiding organization, the Islamic Association, helps motivated students enter an overseas Islamic university; the family can also play a major role. The most famous Hui scholars have graduated from Al-Azhar, the prestigious Egyptian university. Before the Second World War, dozens of Ahong studied in Egypt, they became the elite of the Chinese Islamic thinkers and researchers. New generations of Chinese imams also try to study in Egypt. Others, after two years at Chiang Mai’s Chinese madrassa, study at Medina University.

While a good knowledge of the Koran is an essential preliminary, for an imam in China the first criterion—a profound knowledge of Chinese—is crucial. This seems paradoxical, but it must be remembered that in China, Koranic Arabic is learned via Chinese. The Uyghurs, whose language uses an Arabic-Persian alphabet, have an advantage in studying Arabic when they start. However, the Islamic Association in Beijing prefers to train Hui than Uyghurs. However, Uyghurs also join the National University for minorities in Beijing.

In 1989, there were more than 200,000 imams in China. The older ones have a better knowledge of the Koran and have experienced the religious crises of the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution. For them Islam is a community. The Party is linked to the Islamic Association, and most imams are affiliated with it and thus linked to the state. The Association currently prefers young imams who receive only small gifts (zakat) from neighboring Muslims. Imams are never rich.

The Muslim belongs to a community. What are the questions a Chinese Muslim can ask in a reformist socialist country? Islam thinks of the other world after death. A belief in metempsychosis also gives to Buddhism a popular platform in the face of Taoism.

One can rightly hold that the Marxist ethic is no longer what it once was, and this is one reason for the increase in Christian belief in China since Deng’s reforms. In the 1980s the correct and novel desire to become rich altered radically the Chinese ethic of the period 1949–76. How to live an honest life and have an upright spirit? Islam places responsibility for the person above the collectivity but allows the community to designate the route to follow. Muslim education centers on family values and purity.

Purity

Without considering Muslim ablutions as a ritual preparation for prayers and respecting the obvious necessity of cleanliness, belonging to the Muslim community means also respecting certain dietary rules and clothing habits. The purity of food (halal in Arabic, a synonym of “legal”) is from a semantic point of view identical with the concept of “purity and truth” (qingzhen) of the mosques. For the French Ollone Mission qingzhen was the official name of Islam since the fourteenth century, from which arose the characters Qing and Zhou, placed above entrances to Muslim place of worship.

The Chinese Islamic community defines itself by purity and truth (qingzhen). Dabry de Thiersant mentions that Xian’s main mosque, at first named “The Temple of Pure Religion” (qingjiaosi) was renamed qingzhen in 1315, like all other mosques. For the Chinese, qingzhen designates, above all, a product manufactured by the Hui minority. But for Chinese Muslims qingzhen signifies that which is Islamic. The term Qingzhen ("Temple of Purity") is not well known by the Han, except by the literati and those living in Muslim areas.

Related to purity is the well-known prohibition on pork as part of Muslim dietary taboos. Butchered cattle and sheep in China as in the Islamic world must have the throat cut according to Koranic ritual. Since the beginnings of Islam in China, this question aroused tensions with the Han because for them pork is a “Great Meat” (daran). For Gladney, the consumption of pork marks a “frontier” between Chinese and Hui culture. For Gillette, many Muslims consider the Han as having no dietary ethic. “They eat everything,” Hui say of the Han. It is difficult to find an area of difference more sharply defined between these two “nationalities.”

During the 1970s, in the middle of the Cultural Revolution, the Vice-president of the Islamic Association, Mohammed Ali Zhang Jie, overemphasized that the government perfectly respected the Hui. However, this high-ranking cadre during a revolutionary and anti-religious period only said that “Hui do not eat pork. That is why special canteens have been installed by the Muslim authorities.” Elsewhere, in December 1982, the publication in Shanghai of an anti-Islamic article in Youth News was enough to fire the editor who published “Why Muslims . . . do not eat pork” (Gladney 1996: 188). The prohibition against pork is a strict rule for Hui men married to Han women. University students often admit to having friends for years without knowing that they were Muslims until the day when, dining together,
they realized that their friends were not eating pork and then understood that they were Hui.

Disputes concerning pork are frequent. For example, at the end of 2000, in Shandong Province, a fight occurred between Han and Hui caused by a Han merchant insulting some Muslims in a Han market.

While traveling, Muslims have special food requirements. Except in the north, the northwest, and in the Muslim quarters, it is difficult to obtain pure food, qingchen. This is one of the reasons why in the past, few Muslims have traveled to Western countries.

In the south, in Yunnan, meals eaten in common, such as those in the mosque on feast days (at Shunchengjie Mosque in Kunming for example), have not varied very much from those served in Kunming in 1904 (Courtellemont): fish, vegetables, boiled beef, mushrooms, roast or boiled poultry, dried beef (often from Zhaotong in the east), steamed sweetbreads (huajian), vermicelli, pears cut into quarters, slices of watermelon, and tea. Pure food is not only a major preoccupation for Hui and Uighur residents but also for the Islamic associations, which want to promote the purity of the Muslim minorities of China.

**Muslim Associations**

Under the Republican regime, a Muslim association was founded in 1912, primarily in reaction against the dominant ethnic group. Cordier (1927) describes the desires of the Chinese government of that time, which favored the creation of associations: “The Muslim population, weakened... aspirred only to effacement and oblivion. Each group, each family asked only to reconstitute itself, to recover its possessions, and to take up its daily occupations.” It is difficult to distinguish Hui from the Han. Muslim associations follow Chinese norms and the political-administrative structures created by the state. The omnipresent Chinese Islamic Association (Zongguo Yislianjiao Xiehui) was founded on this model in 1953. Its links with the Communist Party are not advertised.

Muslims have participated in and still participate in the building of modern China, and Islamic associations play an important role in the modernization process of Muslim minorities. Owen Lattimore notes in a report of 1937 (published only in 1970) that non-Communist Muslims had two regiments in the Red Army, and that they were always considered dependable. The Islamic Association is pro-Han, but numerous Chinese Muslims belong to it; it has always supported a position of unification. It was only on 20 December 1979 that the principal local committee, the Islamic Association of Beijing, was born. This followed the resumption of pilgrimages to Mecca interrupted between 1964 and 1979. On 19 October 1979, the first large official delegation of the association visited Saudi Arabia, and, in particular, Mecca and Medina.

The purpose of these associations is in accord with the official Chinese political dialectic, as clearly demonstrated by one of its spokesmen, Professor (Haji) Ma Tong, a researcher at the Institute of Minorities in Lanzhou, Gansu. He is a specialist in Sufism and believes that it is necessary to realize “the unity of all Muslims without distinction of sect (Order).” In southern Yunnan, in the Dai Autonomous Prefecture, on the door of the new mosque at Jinghong, the characters tuanjie are inscribed so as to remind Muslims that union, the antithesis of Sinicization, must be respected to maintain the established order.

**Chinese Islam and Modernity**

The history of modern China is a systematic account of the country’s struggle to implement modernization. Rare attempts have been made to understand the incompatibility of the concept of modernization with the existing Chinese social structure. However, modernization as part of China’s social and cultural transformation is omnipresent in the post-Deng era, and this affects all Muslims in the country. Modernization means “to reduce and eventually eliminate the cultural and economic differences among them” (Fei 1981: 86). We will see that this is not always the case.

Modernization was a Great Evil in early twentieth-century China, and so it is even more difficult for the Hui, especially the older generation, to reconcile this concept with religious belief. The Hui are at the crossroads of two cultures, Islam and Confucianism. However, it seems that the Hui cannot deny the Confucian principles of (1) loyalty as being true to one’s own conscience, and (2) a passionate belief in education. The PRC leadership looks at modernization in material terms, with technology as the main index. Chinese Muslim elite use instruments of modernity daily such as portable telephones, CDs, and the Internet.

My purpose here is not to ask primarily if some Chinese Muslims and in particular the youth are “modern.” They are certainly modern, especially in the cities. The problem of modernity of the Hui is not directly linked with these cultural markers of modernity, especially if we speak of religion.
Islam in China

What is modernity?

Mayfair Yang (1994: 37) defined particular points of modernity: (1) the rationalization and mechanization of production and economic exchange; (2) growing urbanization and more efficient transportation; (3) the secularization of social and religious life; (4) vast shifts of population and mass social movement; (5) the increased scope of the mass media; (6) more refined technologies of individual surveillance; and (7) discourse about a “new epoch.”

The Harvard-Stanford Project on Modernization (1974) found that among Chinese students the degree of change from traditional to modern attitudes toward the family was highly uneven. The modernity of minorities, such as Chinese Muslims, is developed through Sinicization, and this degree of change is also probably highly uneven. Modernity did not come to China’s minorities directly from Western countries. Deng Xiaoping played an important role when he launched his reforms called the Four Modernizations (2004 is the 100th anniversary of Deng’s birth). From 1982 onward, Chinese official discourse spoke of this set of modernizations in the following terms: agriculture, defense, economy (industry), and education (science and technology).

Often the Hui are close to the Han on the subject of secular modernity. As concerns marriage, as Maris Gillette has shown in the city of Xian, the Hui want to be resolutely “modern.” For a dozen years, the gowns of brides have been white or rose as in Hong Kong. The only difference is that in Hong Kong brides change gowns and color twice a day, probably to display family wealth. Being Muslim means having several days of marriage ceremonies, whereas the Han generally marry on a single day. In China, since the 1990s, both Han and Hui brides must wear makeup.

Sometimes, tradition and modernity are in opposition. Islamic tradition and the Koran are not “modern.” Since the events in New York of September 2001, there has been a certain increase of Islamic traditionalism, and recent events in Iraq do not push the Islamic world toward modernizing Islam. This is also true for the Muslims in China. However this traditionalism allows the use of modern technologies such as mobile phones, satellite television, and other devices currently used in everyday life. The counterpoint of Western modernization may be jihad.

Jihad Movement

How do the Hui react to the important issue of jihad? Is it a bellum justum for Muslims? Majid Khadduri of John Hopkins University distinguishes four ways to fulfill the duty of jihad: by the heart, the tongue, the hand, and the sword. Fighting is intended as a defensive or offensive measure when Islam is in danger, an exceptional means of action when the community is under attack.

The concept of jihad is differently interpreted from one place to another. For many, Muslim terrorism is a nightmare and it receives various interpretations depending on the commentator. For the Nepalese Maoist, Baburam Bhattarai, terrorists “are those who do not believe in the people’s power.” So, what reasons are there to act violently or to impose “people’s power” by terrorist actions? Arthur Miller equates the events of 11 September 2001 to a revolutionary action. For Mohammed Sliti, tried in Brussels for orchestrating the assassination of Commander Massoud (9 September 2001), there are two sorts of jihad, one “familial, personal” (of honor?), and the other “defensive” when an Islamic state is menaced. The French writer Kepel goes further and speaks of an “offensive” aspect. Truly voluntary or not, it is a sacrifice, an individual or collective effort, the will to die as a hero, “in selling his life to God,” as Massignon says. For Niaz Zikria, the concept of jihad is “a religious and social duty because of the confusion of religion and social laws for all believers, who are obliged, in conscience, to do the maximum to insure the defense and the triumph of Islam.”

Other slogans exalt the blood of the “martyrs,” such as the remarks reported by Chipaux in Herat in early 2003: “the Mujahidin is the flower of liberty.” As the United Nations special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi recently pointed out in Iraq: “It is a little bit too easy to call everybody a terrorist... There are people who are not terrorists but respectable and patriots.” When asked about jihad, Hui and Uyghurs in general support Islam, Arafat, Saddam Hussein, and Ossama Ben Laden. They express an opinion that is neither pro-American nor pro-Han.

National Chinese political viewpoints equally play a role in shaping the opinion of Muslims in China. When they go to Mecca, they are also informed of the viewpoint of the Islamic world and spread this information when they return home. Other Hui and Uyghurs, very modern, are aware of events by means of the Internet.

Cultural Traits

In order to affirm its identity and to differentiate “us” from “others,” each organized human group has visible distinctive cultural traits. It is the same for Muslims in China. Very often Chinese traditions do not distinguish Muslims from others. For
example, in the 1900s the Chinese custom of small bound feet for women spread among the Muslim elite.

Fashionable clothing since the 1980s, such as blue jeans or neckties—a New Year’s gift—does not constitute a criterion of distinction. The Mao suit, sometimes blue, sometimes green, became almost improper and started to disappear in the 1980s. Some Muslims wear beards in Xinjiang and among the Islamic republics of Central Asia such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In neighboring Gansu, the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia or even in Qinghai, the beard is also a distinctive sign of a Muslims aged forty or older. The headaddress retains a symbolic and religious value. A hat is often the insignia of the leader. The white skullcap (baimao) is the most prominent and not normally worn outside the mosque except in Muslim villages, in the northwest, Gansu, Henan, and in Yunnan. In Yunnan, the baimao is often worn under a cap. The color of the skullcap can vary across ethnic groups or brotherhoods, being white, black, red, or ornamented with calligraphy around the name of Allah. Fashionable turbans are found among young imams. Sufi brotherhoods also distinguish themselves from others by using different headgear.

Sufi faith, of a rather mystical cast, gives access to a non-rational order and attempts to achieve unity with the godhead. Sufis have greatly contributed to the development of Islam in China. The central question of the Sufi’s love of the godhead would merit a study itself. Though Chinese Sufism seeks intensity of faith more than success, they nevertheless show an inflexible belief that they will succeed, based on the faith of repeated proofs of divine support.

Sufi brotherhoods persecuted for centuries survived. The Naqshbandiya is probably the strongest Sufi order in Central Asia and in Afghanistan. It is truly an “order” (ordo of the Roman type) which the historian Marc Bloch has defined as a “division of temporal society as well as ecclesiastic.” But order is also a synonym of “command,” and the Shaykh has absolute control over his Sufi disciples. The deprecatory Chinese term mênkuan is commonly used to designate these brotherhoods and often translated as “sect.” In China, the Jahariya Order is sometimes called Naqshbandi, a term accepted by the Shaykhs. Except in Xinjiang, there are no disciples of the Bukhari Baha’uddin Naqshband (1318–89), the founder of the Naqshbandi Order.

Kashgar is the second center of the Order on the Tianshan Nantu (the main road “South of the Tianshan to Urumchi and Hami”). The choice of Kashgar is not surprising, at the crossroads of the two northern and southern roads of the Taklamakan Desert, immense lowland. This oasis is connected to Samarkand and

Bukhara, on the one hand, and to Gilgit and India, on the other. A branch of this route also leads to Afghanistan by way of the Pamir Mountains.

At present, it is easier to construct a network of research on Sufism in the Ningxia, Gansu, eastern Xinjiang, and Yunnan than to try contacting Sufis in Kashgar. This confirms the work of Thierry Zarcone on the preservation of secrecy among Xinjiang brotherhoods, based on a study of Uyghur ethnologists in the 1990s. The Order of the Black Mountain makes one think of a secret symbolic link, not confirmed, with Mojiang (“Black River” City in Yunnan) where the tomb of the son of Ma Mingxin, Ma Shunqing, is found. This tomb, the old sandalwood plantation and Mojiang’s mosque, have a remarkable place in Jahariya tradition in Gansu and Yunnan. In Central Asia as well as in southern China, the Silk Road also played a symbolic and historical role.

Sufism

The term Sufism could come from suf, the wool of the clothing of its practitioners, or from sufa, safa, the purity of beliefs. Sufism is a “non-official” Muslim organization in China. Sufism characterized the second wave of Chinese Islamization in the seventeenth century. It has been shown that the knowledge and the expansion of the mystical orders were not linear. Periods of recruitment followed periods of questioning. The influence of Sufism is strong in Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai, northern Tibet, and Yunnan. Sufism is mystical and follows the central current of the Revelation of Islam. Sufism is opposed to rationalism and helps to promote Islam. Roy argued that neo-fundamentalism could be linked to anti-Sufism but did not exclude a shift from Sufism to anti-Sufism (1998: 52).

More than two million Hui are Sufis, and there are four great Sufi schools (turuq, tariga) in China: the Jahariya, Khufiya, Qadiriya (Kadiriyya), and Kubrawiya Orders. Gladney (1996: 61) characterizes the first two as “militant” because of their strong dynamism, and the latter two as “dualist.” The first two prospered for centuries thanks to their commercial networks organized around the tombs of Masters called Shaykhs (Shaiks, Shafe in Chinese). Powerful religious, social, and commercial networks are still centered around these tombs. These Masters are often linked by familial or spiritual affiliation with the order’s founder. Disciples have a strong attachment to past and present masters and to the sacred tombs of
the founders, which strongly links them to history. Sometimes initiation reinforces the master's moral dominance. More than 10% of the Hui belong to the Jahariya brotherhood. Deep attachment to the masters is certainly not in agreement with Sincization, an acculturating discourse.

The Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region has nearly 2,000 mosques, more than 500 Jahariya. In this region, there are approximately 400,000 traditional Muslims (Gedimu) and hundreds of Qadiriya followers. Fewer than 600 Hui belong to the Khairiya order, and another 600 Hui are Wahhabite (iyehwani) who often opposed Sufism. Sometimes quarrels occur. The depth of Sufi mysticism averse fear among orthodox Muslims, generating hostile criticism.

The tombs of masters and saints, Gongbei, are major places of worship for the Sufi orders. As Ibn Battuta, sympathetic to Sufism, has remarked that Shaykh's cult is a distinctive mark of each congregation. These cults are criticized by traditionalists. In the past, between the twin cities of Macao and Zhuhai (a new city originating from the dynamism of the Special Economic Zones inspired by Deng Xiaoping) a celebrated Muslim must have been buried, from which the place called Gongbei, which comes from Arabic. Not too far upstream, the tomb of another ancient Arab dignitary, in the cemetery of Guangzhou near the main railway station, constitutes a major landmark pointing out southern China's Islamization.²

Villages play also a role in the Jahariya Order’s expansion. Nowadays, this order includes nearly a million faithful of whom nearly 600,000 are resident in Gansu and 300,000 live in Xinjiang, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Yunnan. However, in his study Ma Tong (1983) has fewer members in the Sufi orders (Sufi Menhuaan). Since the nineteenth century, Jahariya masters have possessed triple power: religious, political, and economic.

The Jahariya Order

The founder of the Jahariya Sufi Order, Ma Mingxin (1719–81), came from Gansu and was initiated in Yemen. He lived in the Arabian Peninsula for more than fifteen years. At Banqiao, near Lanzhou, the mausoleum of this master was pillaged several times. His tomb, ruined before the Cultural Revolution, has been reconstructed at Lanzhou in the Nongminhang quarter. Ma Liesun initiated the building of a small Kaaba, a copy of the Black Stone of Mecca, which represents the “official” tomb of Ma Mingxin in the capital of Gansu Province. One might ask the reason for such a universal symbol (Kaaba) of the umma in Lanzhou. Luo Changhu a 35-year-old imam is responsible for this sacred place. Haji Ma Tong (born in 1929, living in Lanzhou), who has written much on Chinese Sufism, so far did not visit this site, which annually draws many Jahariya pilgrims from Gansu, Qinghai and even from Xinjiang.

Ma Hualong (1810–71) was the son of Ma Datian, student of Ma Mingxin. After the founder himself, he was one of the masters who gave the greatest impetus to his tariqa. He was killed by troops of General Zu Zongtang (1812–85), after his voluntary surrender in Xinjiang. Ma Tenghai (1921–91) was the last Shaykh recognized by nearly all Jahariya followers; he died in his native city, Wuzhong (Ningxia). His branch is called Banqiao.

In December 2000, Imam Luo Changhu wrote an article for Yisilan Tongxun journal entitled “Analysis of the Itinerary of Ma Mingxin during his Pilgrimage.” It is a disguised criticism of Ma Tong’s studies on Ma Mingxin who in his early youth went to Mecca with his uncle, around 1729. Concerning Ma Mingxin’s voyage, Imam Luo believes that these two pilgrims went to the Middle East via Ava (Burma), and Indonesia. Ma Tong, and Jin Yijiu, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, on the contrary, believes that the future founder of the Jahariya followed the ancient Silk Road. Later, Ma Mingxin was initiated into Sufism in Yemen. The Order of the Black Mountain (qarathagilq in Uyghur, Heishan in Chinese) perhaps contributed to his initiation. This order prospered in Central Asia, Yarkand, and in eastern (that is, Chinese) Turkistan during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Hezhou (now Linxia) and Kashgar were on the itinerary of Ma Mingxin toward Mecca and Yemen.

Militants are often energetic. Nothing stops Jahariya adepts, not even Khufiya Sufis who waged a pitless war against Jahariya followers in the nineteenth century. During the fifth generation of the masters, a restructuring of the brotherhood occurred, concentrating religious, political, military, and economic authority in the hands of masters. Ma Hualong’s troops followed their master until the end in Gansu. They were killed by the treachery of the imperial armies.

Despite these events, the Jahariya brotherhood survived and prospered in Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Yunnan. The tariqa is hierarchical and secret. It draws its strength from the effective socio-economic management of its human and financial resources. It is divided into four or five branches. Ma Liesun is considered the most powerful in Gansu and Ningxia. Yunnan has its own branch. There is a general analogy among Sufi orders. In his thesis on Sufism in the Sahara, Rahal Boubrik explains the centrality of the master, the genealogy of saints and
charismatic powers (*baraka* in Arabic). Genealogies imply a sense of “biological” descent but equally a spiritual and mystical power. Ties of blood may also exist. Genealogical and mystical manipulations may be noticed, but personal charisma plays a significant role in the transmission of hereditary power.

Sufi orders remain unconditionally faithful to their founders. All members of the community pledge the deepest veneration to the successors of Ma Mingxin and to high-ranking delegates. Disciples, *murid*, are faithful and disciplined. The hierarchy includes assistants and novices. Nowadays there is no formal initiation. Within all secret societies, probation time varies. Secrecy, a firm religious belief, and a thirst for truth characterize the order. These qualities have permitted the survival of Jahariya Sufism despite persecution. Although partially contested in Gansu and Ningxia, the charisma of the Yunnanese master will probably prevail. Along with Ningxia, Yunnan and Gansu are two key provinces for the Jahariya Order.

Following Deng’s reforms, the Chinese government has been relatively tolerant of structured *tariqa* but excludes politico-religious sects such as the Falungong. As might be suspected, the Jahariya Order does not formally belong to the Islamic Association. During the Cultural Revolution, Sufism was under constant surveillance by the Bureau of Religious Affairs. However, in Ningxia, some cadres belong to both Jahariya Order and the Islamic Association, as did the late Ma Tengai.

The Sufi liturgy typically consists of mystical songs, group recitations of the vocal remembrance of Allah, *dhikr* (*di'er* in Chinese), or litanies of the divine names. Mosques are important, but Sufis do not require a solemn place to pray. This was the case in Kunming during the construction of the new Jahariya mosque during 2003–04. The Order is in some ways ingenious and flexible; a room in a home or at the back of a shop is sufficient. The Prophet liked perfumes and the Sufis use much incense to enter into meditation.

The term Sufi existed before Islam. On the front of the new mosque of Ruili, Yunnan, the characters “Mosque Pure and True” do not appear as they do everywhere else in China but *Chaozheng Dian* (“Temple of Meditation”), a Taoist (Daoist) term, is inscribed. Thus, there is sometimes a temptation among Chinese specialists of religion to mix Taoism and Sufism for purposes of Sinicization. Although no link exists between these two religious currents except for the fact that philosophy and religion can be combined to start a dialogue.

Israeli in a study entitled *Muslims in China* (1978) does not find a particular relation between Islam and Taoism. At Xian, a tombstone (c. 1545), discovered by Madeley and reproduced by Broomehall (1987: 101), mentioned the Prophet Mohammed, praised God, and asked to pilgrims to circumambulate the tomb. Sufism (as this state of Shaykh Badruddin) is centered on God, whereas Taoism is centered on the *Way* (*Dao*). Former Indonesian President Wahid wanted to use Confucianism, not Taoism, to improve links between Islam and the Western world. A Japanese author, Sachiko Murata, goes further in his work on Taoism and Islam. Murata deals with *yin* and *yang* “philosophy” that, unfortunately, does not concern Sufism at all.

The Afghan Sufi Abdallah al’Ansari Al-Harawi (1006–89), made known by Lautier de Beaurecueil’s translation of 1895, gave a structure of journeys toward God which is probably acceptable for many Chinese *tariqa*: “In the beginning is the awakening, a return to God, introspection, how to reform oneself, reflection, meditation, asceticism, and awakening of the hearing . . . . These principles are divided into eight main sections: obedience, resolution, will, comportment, certainty, intimacy, *dhikr* (the remembrance of God), and passivity.”

Sufis cultivate the art of secrecy. Meditation (fikr) is essential for them. They also know how to isolate themselves to resist oppressors. The Jahariya Order fought against the Manchu, resulting in the tragic end of the founder. After the execution of Ma Mingxin, the immediate family and the sister of the master were obliged to flee to Yunnan. Only the tombs of his wife and son, Ma Shunqing, remain in Mojiang, Yunnan. Today a small mosque is being reconstructed, and sandalwood trees in Mojiang surround the holy tombs.

To survive, the community led mule caravans to Burma until 1950. Except for the always-crowded bus station, Mojiang, between Kunming and Sipsong Punna (Xishuang Banna) suffered some economic decline when trade was cut with Burma. Hui lost control over this road in 1950, and the Jahariya Order also abated. Trucks and buses have replaced mules and caravans. Few Sufi members are currently involved in this modern transportation business.

The lack of unity among the Jahariya is another problem, but the *tariqa* is still able to enlist numerous disciples. Jahariya followers never belong to any other party than that of God. This did not prevent Shaikh Haji Ma Tengai (1921–91), who was born and died in Wuzhong, Ningxia, from being a diplomat of the Islamic Association of China. He was vice-president of the Autonomous Region of Ningxia for a decade before the Cultural Revolution, and again in 1980. He visited many Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, and Pakistan. His successors were Ma Guoquan and Ma Tengni, but their charisma is eclipsed by Ma Tengai’s. The Banqiao sub-order includes 500,000 practitioners, a figure
some authors contest. East of Kunming is another Banqiao branch, near the Hui Autonomous District of Xundian.

Another master aged sixty, Ma Songli, made two short stays in Yunnan and teaches in the small city of Xiji, in southwestern Ningxia. He is a well-known imam, but enlists his disciples only close to the family of Shaykh Ma Liesun (born in 1925). His disciples claim that Ma Liesun is a descendant of Ma Mingxin. Ma Liesun was arrested in 1993 and will probably be liberated soon. He founded an important Islamic center in Ningxia, and in the 1990s at least a hundred students were learning the Koran and the Jahariya doctrine there. Now, there are barely ten young disciples, plus the older ones, under the direction of Ma Songli.

Another group is called Nanchuan (River of the South).

Numerically the Shagou sub-order is the second Jahariya group; it recognizes Ma Mingxin and Ma Hualong as the most famous masters.

There is another sub-order in Yunnan. Two members made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 2001, and five in 2003. A medical doctor, Haji (2001 and 2003), with a family line related to Ma Mingxin’s sister, is responsible for the local tarifa. The principal places of worship of the order in Yunnan Province are Mojiang, Kunming, Tonghai, Simao, Puer, Shadian, and Qejiu.

Other Sufi Orders

The Khufiya Order (Khufiyah) was founded in China by Ma Laichi (c.1680–1766).

The Qadiriya, probably the most ancient Sufi brotherhood, represents less than 1% of Hui. In the twelfth century, its founder, Abdul Qadir Al-Jilani (or Pir Dastagir) from Persia, lived in Baghdad, where his tomb is to be found. Al-Jilani was Hanbali not only by education, but also by the nature of his work. His literary works are summarized in the Order’s history book, Al-Qadiriya. Alexander Bennigsen believes that from Baghdad this tarifa extended toward Kazan in the twelfth century and later prospered in Herat and Bukhara. In 1672, Khufiya Sufism became known in China at Xining, in Qinghai. (K)hoja Afaq established the main branch in Kashgar. In 1674, an Arabic Shaykh, (K)hoja Abdalla, taught in Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces and was targeted by Ma Zhu who fought Sufism.

Qadiriya doctrine has spread as far as East Java (including Kupang, West Timor) where, according to Clifford Geertz, it is orthodox, for it respects the five pillars of Islam (belief, prayers, fasting, charity, and pilgrimage). However, the Kyrgyz historian Mametalyev, cited by Bennigsen, described Sufis as a closed community, “feared and despised” by other Muslims. In the Valley of Ferghana (Tashkent and Bukhara), they practiced chants and dances at night. The Chinese founder of the Qadiriya brotherhood, Qi Jingyi taught the power of personal will and meditation.

Contrary to Jahariya followers, Khufiya did not fight against the Qing Dynasty. The tomb of the founding master, Hua Gongbei, is one of the most venerated in Linxia (Hezhou) and was restored after the Cultural Revolution. In January 2003, contrary to our reception in Urumchi by Khufiya, I was given a good welcome by the imams at the mausoleum. Some were descendants of Ma Laichi. In Linxia, the Qadiriya Holy Tomb of Qi Jingyi (1656–1719) is guarded by an imam and his students; although called Da Gongbei (“The Great Mausoleum”), it has few visitors. Like the Jahariya practitioners at the tomb of Ma Mingxin at Lanzhou, numerous Khufiya disciples pray daily at the site of the Khufiya mausoleum. The tomb of the founder’s father, Ma Laiwan, is found there next to his son’s. The latter is also called Ma Shiwang, to recall the relation with his progenitor, who name contains the auspicious character wan (ten thousand). The recitation of religious hymns is an intimate part of the ritual, and at the tomb of Ma Laichi small pebbles instead of ordinary rosaries are used to count the litanies (Photo 18: third murid on the left). Modernization has introduced counters elsewhere (as used by airline personnel to count the number of passengers).

To have an idea of the liturgy, it may be useful to note the Qadiriya ritual proposed by Imam Rabbani, in Kupang, Indonesia: (1) Istigfar: five or ten times (2) Rabithah-Muuyid (3) Fatihah (Prologue of the Koran): seven times (4) Shalawat-Nabi: 100 times (5) Hauqalal: 500 times (6) Fatihah: seven times (7) Shalawat-Nabi: 100 times (8) Doa (9) A formula from the Koran.

Sufis seek to enter into direct relation with God. Dhikr invocation can either be aloud or silent. For Shaykh Mohammed Amin al-Naqshbandi, as cited by Eva de Vitray-Meyerovitch, dhikr displays a profound unity among different orders. Prayer includes the recitation of the Fatihah once (Qadiriya prefer seven recitations) and of Sura 112 of the Koran three times. The eyes must be closed, lips tightened, and the tongue placed against the palate. The image of the master is retained in the mind. All senses are directed toward concentration.

In China, no Sufi order is contrary to Sunni dogma, although some traditionalists complain about particularities. As a result, Sufis have few friends. Theologians do not like them much, and Sufis are sometimes considered non-conformists.
The Muslim scholar Ma Zhu had an excellent knowledge of Chinese and Arabic thanks to his mother’s education. He wrote his first work at an early age, but his whole life revolved around his Guide to Purity (Qingzhen Zhinan), published in 1683. It is still a classic work of Chinese Muslim orthodoxy. The third part of the eleventh and last chapter on “heterodoxy” is aimed principally at the Sufis in Yunnan. The name of another Sufi order is not mentioned clearly, but the attack in this book caused much harm because it was well written. This Order was only referred to using the Chinese abbreviation Landai, from the Persian Qalandar (Kalandar), an ascetic order of the Sufi Dervishes. In reality, by his references to Buddha, Sakyamuni, and to the Confucian Mengzi, Ma Zhu, who traveled extensively in China, simply wanted to become a Lao Zi of Islam. But he failed in his mission to purify Islam in his country. His masterpiece, a bridge between Islamic and Chinese culture, is continuously reprinted. The concept of purity, Qingzhen (so prominent in his work), appears on the front of all mosques and on restaurants managed by the Islamic Association of China.

The Kubrawiya is a Sufi order (Sunnī) with the fourth largest membership in China. The origin of this tarīqa is Iranian and the founder’s name (eponym) is Najmudin Kubra, a Shia sympathizer (b. 1145–d. c. 1221) in Khvāna Urgench, east of Khiva. The Shāykh Kubra came from Khiva, south of the Aral Sea. He studied in Tabriz, in Egypt, and in northwestern Persia. The Qaraqalpaq-association with the Kubrawiya Order-are also a small Naqshbandi minority in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan (Karakalpaq et Autres Gens, French Central Asian Institute [IFEA C], 2002: 189).

Kubrawiya doctrine was taught in Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Gansu and Qinghai in the seventeenth century. The founder of this order was an Arab named Mohidin (Muheyidin), who died in Dawantou, Gansu, in the Dongxiang region, where his tomb is located, enlisting many Dongxiang disciples. The location of this saint’s mausoleum raised the prestige of the Dongxiang. They are converted Mongols who call themselves descendants of the Prophet (the name of the Kubrawiya’s founder is a close homonym of Mohammed). Dongxiang are, in fact, strongly influenced by Chinese culture.

“The Golden Star,” which in 1909 became Xidaotang (“The Western Mosque”), is not a Sufi Order. This essentially Chinese brotherhood seeks synthesis, harmony, and a high level of education in both Chinese and Arabic. Recognized as a legal Muslim institution in 1919, at the crossroads of six provinces, it integrates the modern notion of nation-state of its founder Ma Qixi (1857–1914), a scholar from Gansu who was originally Sufi. This quite modern order insists on the total compatibility of Chinese and Muslim cultures. Its religious, political, and economic successes, achieved by means of Ma Qixi’s communal organization, attracted enemies. He was assassinated along with sixteen of his disciples (including one of his sons) by members of his former Sufi brotherhood. This religious group (“New Teaching”) counts at present more than 10,000 members, mostly in Gansu Province.

Chinese Sufis generally wear the white skullcap (baimao) as other Muslims. Members of the Jahariya Order wear an octagonal white or black bonnet. Islam in China is tolerant, and there are no burqa. The headscarf (hijab in Arabic) may be a response to a Muslim code. In the northwest, Muslim women often wear the swn scarf. The modern veil is tied under the chin and hides the hair. This style seems inspired by a new modernity also in fashion among Islamists.

The color of the veil varies according to the age of the women: young girls wear white, married women often wear green, and older women black. In Qinghai scarves are often black (in other regions they can be white or might not be worn at all). In brief, Hui women rarely wear the headscarf, except in Gansu and Xinjiang or, since the 1990s, for feasts. No Koranic commandment requires that women must veil the face, and this is a question of local tradition. The headscarf is not a big issue in China except perhaps in Xinjiang where many Chinese cadres dislike this distinctive cultural marker.

Chinese Muslim Women

From the beginning, the important role of women in the development of Islam has been ignored. However, women’s educative role continues to be fundamental in the Muslim world and among Hui families. Historically, without the wise advice of his wife Khadija, Mohammed would have had difficulty being acknowledged. She enabled him to emerge successfully from the confusion into which his first revelations had plunged him. Later, it is believed that at least one of the Prophet’s wives mastered reading and writing.

Islam is concerned with the bipolarity woman/man, from whom life is born, and the Chinese concept of yin and yang is replaced by an analogy on masculine and feminine clothing. Traditionally, among the Hui, the woman is a mother, daughter, or wife. Her principal mission in life is to bear children. It is difficult for the Muslims...
of South Asia to understand that women work hard in China, Chinese and Muslim alike. No one dares contest an egalitarian juridical statute. Women have the right to divorce and to remarry in China, and it is also unthinkable to stone an adulterous Muslim woman.

However, in the nineteenth century, as reported in the following story, Hui women in China were allowed to marry and remarry only with Muslims. In December 1872, Rocher related the execution in Xuyi (Xinjing) of two women found guilty of complicity in abducting a young Hui widow of eighteen who wanted to marry a Han. The two women were condemned to be buried alive. The Han lover succeeded in fleeing on horseback. The Muslim widow was arrested the day after her hasty departure, near Anning, west of Kunming, more than 50 kilometers from her point of origin. The young widow remained under her brother-in-law’s control but was not condemned. She most probably remarried a Hui or remained under her in-law’s control. “The victim buried alive” of Sura 81:8 alludes to pre-Islamic customs of burying girls alive, which is nevertheless condemned by the Koran.

The Koran praises the father of many daughters, as was the Prophet. In the eighth century, a female ascetic, Rabia al’Adawiya, introduced the Sufi concept of mystical love. One does not find the equivalent in Chinese Muslim history. In China, women contributed to the development of Islamic culture and Koranic teaching. In Baoshan, Yunnan, the mother of Ma Zhu (1640–1711) on her husband’s sudden death, a scholar, decided to educate her young son. First, he learned the Chinese characters and then Arabic. Thanks to his mother, he became a recognized scholar at sixteen and obtained a post in the Ming administration under Yongli at an early age. Ma Zhu lost his mother two years later, and in 1661, his protector, the emperor, was executed in Kunming.

Later, in Yunnan and Gansu, women were involved in the renaissance of Islam after the slaughter of their husbands and brothers between 1820 and 1875. This historic period has been recognized in China since 1949 as a model for anti-feudal struggles. Muslims fought against Manchu imperialism rejected by Communism. This model reinforces the current state concept of minzu.

Would it be possible to apply to China what Napoleon said to his soldiers before leaving for Egypt: “The people where we are going treat women differently than we do”? Contrary to the documented difficulty for Arabs to find a spouse in China, Ibn Battuta noted that in the fourteenth century it was easy for Muslim merchants to marry in China. However, he did not tell us the initial social status of these spouses and mentioned that it was easy to acquire female slaves. According to the Jesuit Le Compte, it was no longer easy for a Muslim to marry a Chinese woman after 1680. He reported that the Hui marry among themselves, as is the present case.

In the seventeenth century, as at present, the Hui kept a low profile in society and did not attempt to convert Han or other minorities. Since the period of openness and reforms of the 1980s, there have been no official restrictions on issuing marriage certificates to mixed Hui-Han couples. Acculturation is so common that authorities believe that a Han wife always Sinicizes her Muslim husband. However, despite the evolution of Islamic culture in China, Hui families do not easily marry their daughters to Han.

Gladney, following Charles Keyes, notes that ethnic identity is shaped by “structural ethnic oppositions of interacting ethnic groups, often expressed in marriage exchange.” This explains why it is difficult to have legal unions between Hui and Han. Muslim women are sometimes unjustly characterized as feudal by some young Han, who find that, in a modern society, their skirts are not short enough. In fact, Muslims cannot look at Muslim women other than in an indirect manner. Students of the two sexes encounter each other in the universities, but that does not break customary taboos; it is extremely rare for a Muslim woman to marry a Han. But it happens that some Hui men marry Han women. Traditionally, a Muslim woman does not marry of her own choice, but today she expresses a preference and can refuse a suitor proposed by her family. Gladney argues that, like Han women, there is a high probability that Hui women will live in their husband’s family or in a patrilocall neighborhood. Hui endogamy and purity are still accepted Islamic norms. Hui women continue to marry Muslims, particularly in rural settings. Muslim women’s qualities are patience and decency. To maintain their ethnic identity, Hui and Uyghurs practice strict ethnic endogamy and thereby protect their ethic of purity.

According to the Portuguese researcher, Maria Silva, author of books on Morocco, the masculine version “of female friend” does not exist for Moroccan women. Without going too far concerning a comparison with Africa, a definite separation exists between the sexes in China. Man-woman contact in public is much more restrained among Muslims than among other Chinese. Even in villages, Hui women are not segregated, but a separation still exists in all Muslim society between the sexes. The case of a woman doctor of Kunming, married to an imam, always reserved but polite with her guests is significant. A devout Pakistani Muslim
guest claimed that she did not keep a proper distance with male guests. She had, however, followed the Islamic etiquette of deference, courtesy, and cordiality. The premier quality of patience found among Moroccan women is also found among Chinese Muslim women.

Although Ningxia had Koranic madrasa before 1949, the education of girls in Arabic is still rare. Cherif explains that in the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia, in the isolated village of Weizhou, more than a hundred kilometers from the regional capital, there are two Koranic schools for women, which opened in 1985 and have about 300 students (Cherif 1994: 158–60). The female teachers at these schools studied Arabic in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. In that particular region, women are rather well educated in Arabic; however, Chinese, naturally, is always preferred. The government has agreed to promote education among minorities, but the preeminence of the Chinese language cannot be challenged. This preeminence is an imperative for advancing the country toward modernization. From the government’s viewpoint, “unity” aggregates minorities with the Han majority. This is part of the management of minorities that unites them in a kind of melting pot. There are positive aspects: ten years ago, female illiteracy in Ningxia was nearly 80%, and thus, the private initiative to create two schools for young girls is a large step forward.

The number of Chinese Muslims going to Mecca has increased every year since the end of the 1980s. It is interesting to note that the initiative for going on pilgrimage can also come from women, and that they are undertaking this pilgrimage more often than before. In general, they travel with their husbands. It is not uncommon for children who are successful in business to offer a plane ticket to their mother who wants to go to Mecca. Numerous Hui women in Yunnan are rich enough to become Hajjah.

Muslim women in China are often ignored, even in Hui genealogies. It is perhaps one of the reasons for the scant information about mosques reserved for women. There were few pro-Manchu Muslim militants, members of the “New Religion” (Xinjiao) who supported the Qing Dynasty. Without the crucial perseverance of Muslim women, Islam, forgotten after this period of repression, would not have been able to revive as well as it has. Women have been active in reforms, and this fact is unknown. Allès only recorded four women’s mosques in the “New Religion” Ikhwan. For Gladney, there are no women’s mosques in the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia (I did not observe any in 2003). This may indicate a certain lack of modernity.

Mosques for Women

The Muslim community is centered on the mosque, but this is less true for women. In China, the first mosques reserved for women date to the eighteenth century. The development of education for women led to the creation of a greater number of religious sites for women during the Republican period, particularly between 1911 and 1930, before the Japanese invasion, and during the Second World War. In the mid-1980s, following Deng’s reforms, the Bureau of Religious Affairs wanted to assure the social promotion of Muslim women by constructing or reconstructing mosques for women. Elisabeth Allès mentions thirty such mosques in Shandong Province and twenty-nine in Henan in 1997. For less than half, no proof of an earlier existence can be guessed at. In Shanghai, a mosque for women, constructed in 1993, is symbolically situated beside the headquarters of the Islamic Association, Xiaotaoysuan (the Peach Garden). In the northwest, in Harbin, women would like a mosque for themselves, but it seems that they have only a small section in the city’s main mosque.

Mosques for women are smaller than other Muslim sites; women have often been forgotten as far as learning the Koran. Because of the separation of the sexes, obtaining an Islamic education for women requires great personal determination, for they rarely receive a structured education in a madrasa.

Imams of the Islamic Association dominate the Islamic community. Women are exceptionally Ahong but cannot be imams; they do not preach and cannot celebrate marriages or preside over burials. In Jinan, the capital of Shandong Province, there is only one female Ahong, an imam’s granddaughter, and she is responsible for two mosques for women. However, in the state educational system, female citizens have the same rights as men. In numerous areas, for example in foreign languages, educated women dominate. The study of Koranic Arabic is difficult for it occurs the most often through Chinese, which is itself complex. Koranic education is not well organized for women. The building of mosques for women will probably continue to be limited, but a balance currently exists on gender issues, the ideology of the Party, and male religious rigidity. The Islamic Association attempts to promote young female Ahong, but the women frequenting these mosques are often elderly.

The creation of mosques for women is an interesting social phenomenon. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Broomhall does not mention any Muslim feminine congregations or mosques for women. In Yunnan, over fifteen years of
Islam in China

research, I have not seen any mosques for women. The two mosques of Guilin I visited are not reserved for women. Islamic Associations vary by province with respect to the building of mosques for women.

An isolated case, cited by Allès is the Wangjia Mosque at Kaifeng in Henan Province. This mosque was constructed in the nineteenth century for a daughter of a merchant, learned and faithful to the memory of her deceased husband. The two cultures, Chinese and Muslim, praise the conjugal devotion of women.

The Islamic Association of Henan, like that of Shanghai, places importance on women. Islamic purity and the practical knowledge of family medicine are well rooted among Hui women. These women are affected by the problems of birth control in China. Because Islam is traditional, it is necessary to have descendants. The Prophet himself insisted that virtuous women are those who love young children. Hui women raise children until they enter socialist schools, and it is also painful for women not to have children. Chinese birth control policies are applied to Muslims, and, like other villagers, Muslims living in the countryside have two children. In remote villages, family planning is less strict. In the cities, all citizens are limited to one child per couple. Fines are heavy when quotas are not respected, reaching 10,000 yuan (Renminbi) per child or more than 1,000 Euro.

Muslim Villages

For various religious, political, military, and economic reasons, Muslims, especially city-dwellers and merchants, have been obliged to take up residence in villages. The Hui are omnipresent in nearly all provinces, especially in the northwest, north, northeast, and southwest. Small and homogeneous rural communities, different in each region, are still the predominant way of life. The Muslim ethos, a system of ideals and values, a sober and prudent Islamic morality is generally more closely followed in villages than cities.

Many Hui villages have been created on the sites of former camps for Muslim troops, such as Changying, near Beijing. Rural Xinjiang supports at present more than 10 million Uyghurs and Kazakhs and slightly less than a million Hui. Islam is the main religion there. Jonathan Lipman describes Muslim villages in the northwest and Gansu as being of variable size. The Han/Hui relationship tends to be harmonious, although Sinicization has caused some social disharmony. Chinese are the majority in the cities. This has caused the Chinese government to displace populations, Chinese from Hunan and elsewhere toward Xinjiang, and forced migration of Uyghurs from Chinese Turkistan toward Hunan.

Less favored minorities, such as the Dong, were obliged to leave their best lands. These rice-growers who lived in the plains, took refuge in the mountains of three southern provinces, Guizhou, Hunan, and Guangxi. Similarly, in Yunnan, at the end of the nineteenth century, when the Qing Dynasty repressed the rebellion, Hui became farmers and settled down.

The marriage strategy of the Hui contributed to the success and strong identity of Muslims in China. The ethnologist Fei Xiaotong has great admiration for the Muslim merchants of Gansu. The Hui have perhaps better resisted Sinicization than Dong from Guizhou and Guangxi, because their commercial networks were powerful. Under the Yuan (1279–1368) and the Ming (1368–1644) Dynasties, the Imperial State took advantage of disciplined Muslim troops.

Twenty kilometers from Beijing, a Muslim village, studied by Gladney (1996: 229–59), Changying (“Large Camp”) has become an autonomous Hui hamlet, with greater administrative autonomy since 1986. Endogamy preserves the Islamic community. In 1980, to maintain Hui purity, around 80% of the daughters among the 5,000 inhabitants of Changying were marrying Muslims from the neighborhood. Twenty percent of the men were taking their spouses from more than 40 kilometers away. Maris Gillette during her interesting study of Muslims in Beijing and Xian found only a single case of intermarriage involving a Hui woman having married a Han residing in Hong Kong. For this Muslim woman, the former British colony was Eldorado. The incompatibility of the Chinese cuisine and Muslim halal food creates a barrier to mixed marriages, which are highly praised by the administration and Party cadres. Sunni Hanafite law, founded by Abu Hanafi, the most current in China, stipulates that to be married a woman must consent. Even if families often arrange Hui marriages, this acceptance of the bride is required. Communist China forbids polygyny, which has virtually disappeared among urban and rural Muslims.

Another old Hui village community, which lived through good and bad periods during the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) and the Japanese invasion of 1937, has been studied by Elisabeth Allès (2000: 71–89). The region has mosques for women. The village of Sanpo is located on the north bank of the Yellow River, in central Henan Province. Pang Shiqian, a villager from Sanpo, studied in Cairo for nine years before the Second World War and then wrote his memoirs in the 1950s. A population of
nearly 5,000 Hui and only four Han women live there. Religion is a major issue, and Hui endogamy is still strong. Social change has marked the last twenty years. The village of Sanpo is also a prototype of the success of reforms of the PRC’s second Great Leader, Deng Xiaoping. Between 1950 and 1980 this hamlet, under Mao’s Marxist commune system, centered on agriculture. At present, the ancient pelt industry has been revived and modernized. Beginning in 1981, the community rapidly became wealthy, and there are now banks in the village. The Muslim Xueyang Company (“Sheep of the Snows”)—established in 1983—has provided the production of furs and carpets and already has twenty local branches. Muslim Taiwanese capital possibly boosted local enterprise.

Feasts and Funerals

Feasts are visible cultural traits assuring community cohesion and motivating cooperation. They are part of Muslim rites of passage and currently enter into a modern type of consumerism. During feasts, Hui mosques and neighboring streets are jammed with people. The three great religious festivals are the Feast of the Prophet, the Feast of the Sacrifice (Guerban), and the End of Fasting (kaizhai). The state instituted a holiday (fangjia) for Muslim minorities for these events. The date of the Feast of the Prophet varies from place to place. Thus, in Kunming it was decided in 1988 that 19 October would be the day of celebration; in the rest of Yunnan Province, the celebration falls on a different date. Prayer at mosques occurs in the morning and is generally followed by a meal for all attending.

The lunar New Year that marks the beginning of the Chinese year is also a festive moment for Muslims. Sincere Hui watch television throughout the night, as do most other Chinese households. It is not possible to resist the lively, popular joyousness. Except perhaps in Xinjiang, Muslims enjoy these traditional Han feasts. Muslim restaurants and merchants also take advantage of the dynamic economic boost created by the lunar New Year celebrations.

For Muslims, the lunar New Year does not have the pomp of the grand Aid banquet, Idul-kebir, the Muslim calendar’s most important date. I was in Kashgar where, during the preceding days, one saw many sheep being sold in town. Sheep have their throats cut according to Islamic rituals. Apricots are also bought in quantity. Han who question prices during that period are insulted. In Kashgar on that day all Uyghurs go to pray at the crowded main mosque, where it is difficult to find a place.

For the Feast of the End of Fasting, men and women go to the mosque at eight o’clock in the morning. As for other Muslim feasts, the people eat beef and mutton soups, stews of mutton and green beans in the north, hot pepper beef in Sichuan and Yunnan, and cakes (gaodian). Youxiang (fragrant cakes fried in oil) are a traditional food for the end of Ramadan and for funerals. Muslims introduced these traditional items during the thirteenth century, and they are part of the rites for nearly all feasts. They are offered to family and friends and represent an Arab custom also transmitted during the former Islamization of India under the name puri. These cakes are still fried by all castes in the Indian sub-continent, as well as by Muslims in Indonesia. Maris Gillette (2000) noted that the cooking of youxiang, which involves much work, had been abandoned in Xian, but I observed that Yunnanese Hui had kept up this tradition. Modernization and Sincerez recently replaced these cakes in Shaanxi Province by Chinese steam-twisted rolls (huajuel).

For funerals, more formal gifts are also offered to attendees after prayers in the mosque. The family gives envelopes containing small sums, meant to assure peace for the deceased. Ahong recite passages from the Koran. The body is washed in the morning and placed in a casket. Large mosques possess two coffins. A bowl of mutton soup in the north or a beef soup in the south is served to each attendant by the family of the deceased, accompanied by cakes fried in oil (youxiang).

A procession then goes to the cemetery on foot, by bus or in trucks. The deceased, enveloped in a white shroud, is taken from the casket and buried (photos 4, 6, 28 and 29). The body is placed on the back, the head facing north, the feet south, and the face turned toward Mecca. The imam or one of his representatives faces the family and the attendants and recites four Takbirs (Ta’kebier in Chinese). The formula “God is Great” (Allahu Akbar) is pronounced aloud and prayers follow. The grave is then filled with earth and closed. If a stone has been prepared in time, it is placed at the head of the grave. In the whole Islamic world, Muslims never delay the burial of their deceased. In Albania, the sooner the funeral rites are performed, the sooner the soul reaches heaven.

Socialism and Islam

As is sometimes mentioned, a Muslim cadre in China can be Marxist in his mind and Muslim in his heart (Gladney 1996: 128). A short article by Elira Lami, published by Peter Clarke in 1998, describes Islam in Albania under the Communist regime. Although the percentage of the Muslim population (60%) is much higher in Albania,
the number of Muslims in China, more than ten times greater than the number in Albania, justifies a comparison between these two countries.

In both Albania and China, Sufi brotherhoods (Qadiriya, Naqshbandi among others) are present and have contributed actively to the development of Islam. The years 1966–67 marked a common official hostile attitude toward religion in both countries. All faiths and religious practices were banned. In 1976, an atheist influence was seen in laws such as Article 37 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Albania. In 1982, China abolished these restrictions in Document 19. By comparison, in 1993, the Albanian Parliament had not yet established and codified freedom of conscience. However, following reforms, both countries reintegrated a legal religious framework into their societies to fill a vacuum in the people’s spiritual life, and they promoted harmony by avoiding discord among faiths.

China reopened its mosques before Albania, which did not authorize religious services in the main mosque of Tirana until January 1991. Just the same, the events of 1989 slightly cooled the relations between the Chinese state and Islam. China, like Albania, uses Islam to reinforce relations with Muslim countries. The Muslims of these two countries are thus useful for understanding the Middle East and Central Asia. After the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, this type of Chinese geopolitical influence is even more important than it was for Mao in the 1960s. Thanks to Edgar Snow, one understands that some Muslim leaders receive special attention from the Communist Party because they are trustworthy.

*Umma*, a local vision of the Muslim society linked with the universal faith, and the family certainly play a central role in promoting ethics. One also observes the importance of the family; it has played a role in preserving Islam in China and Albania. Religions disrupted by the Cultural Revolution found the family as a unifying factor for the preservation of beliefs. The family bonds to the community and prevents individualism. Muslim feas contribute to the faith. For youth, without being able to give statistics as precise as Laman, it is certain that during their student lives many do not want to reveal their religious identity. In 1966, an Imam in the main mosque of Xian confided to Jacques Guillermetz that the youth no longer came to pray. Koranic Arabic cannot officially be studied before age sixteen, and this reduces religious zeal.

In a short chapter entitled “God and the Party,” Edgar Snow insisted on “rather floating” Muslim orthodoxy. It is clear that in periods of repression, such as that between 1960 and 1976, it was impossible to disclose one’s faith in public. From 1950 to the beginning of the 1980s, the *laogai* rehabilitation camps forced numerous believers from all religions to work alongside political prisoners.

---

**China and the Former Soviet Union**

According to Vincent Monteil, the four important ordeals that the Muslims in Soviet Union endured were forced settlement, war, deportations, and purges. Deportations, purges, and the Uyghur transmigration to Hunan were the work of Republican China. Hunanese generals in Xinjiang used banishment to solve their political and military problems in that remote province. The Second World War also caused its share of suffering for the Hui. The famines of the “Great Leap Forward” (1958–62), in particular in the heavily populated cities of Sichuan, Shandong, Xinjiang and Gansu Provinces, also affected Muslims. China’s nomadic Muslim peoples were compelled to abandon their traditional ways of living for settled villages. Consequently, a massive emigration of Kazakhs toward Kazakhstan occurred in the 1950s. This completely disrupted their nomadic life. Kyrgyzs, in particular, were forced to settle.

For Marxism, religions are ideologies. Only Communism can eradicate religion and thus create acceptable working conditions and rational relations for man: “Religion is the opium of the people.” In 1936, in the Soviet Union as in China, the constitutions proclaimed freedom of conscience. In fact, original Communism wants to reduce the power of religion, and a certain incompatibility therefore exists with Islam. Islam was the most attacked religion in the Soviet Union and presented as one of the world’s most conservative faiths. Ramadan and women’s headscarves were judged anti-scientific and anti-hygienic. Anti-religious propaganda was abolished in 1982, and religious faith is no longer considered as disloyalty to the Party. In Russia, legislation relating to religious associations underwent profound modification in 1929. Despite the existence of the Islamic Association, reforms in China came late, in 1982, and Islam is tolerated. Religion must not interfere with state-directed social and cultural development for Muslim nationalities. “Patriotic” imams are preferred.

The question of the compatibility between Islam and Communism is fundamental. These two doctrines have a supranational character, and the concept of social justice is comparable in both ideologies. Chou Enlai opened the way to reconciliation with Egypt by saying that cordial relations were possible without the propagation of a Communist ideology. Muslim socialists in Ningxia insist on similarities between Islam and Communism. For Niaz Zikria, the two doctrines cannot be compared. Individual goals must be sacrificed for a common Communism. Islam insists, on
Islam in China

the contrary, on the importance of individual piety and the *umma*, the community. Marxist Communism sacrifices individual freedom, but Islam respects men’s individual liberty and human dignity. As often in China, there is an accommodation between politics and religious activities. Gladney argues that “involvement of Party members in religious activities, state support of mosque reconstruction, and recent visits by foreign Muslims and guests to the historic mosque have been interpreted by some Hui as the Party’s encouragement of religion.” The main question is the policy manipulation of official Islam by the state. It remains to study which entity is winning in the long term-Islam or the state? A return to original Islamic purity is currently being seen in Central Asia and is probably influencing Xinjiang.

In Muslim countries the politico-economic system is often modern but it is always concerned with the Koranic vision of the world. Under Communist political rule, the current Chinese socio-economic system is modern and untroubled by religion except when state security is established. These two ideologies are in principle anti-capitalist. However, after Deng’s reforms, a new socialist economy appeared and transformed China drastically. In June 2002, in a remote village of western Yunnan, near Changning, a Haji leader of the Muslim community displayed unashamed joy about his mini-bus, trucks, and prospering enterprise. Elsewhere, near Chenggong, near Kunming, a Hui village was entirely reoriented toward land transportation of goods in the 1990s.

Acculturation of the Hui follows on their modernization. In the framework of Lewis Morgan, Marx and Engels, there is only a slight hope for Muslims for the support of their religion by the socialist state. Han are also “the centrifugal force of unification.” As a result, given their level of culture and technology, industrial projects in minority regions must be placed in their hands. Yunnan has drastically modernized in the last twenty years thanks to cross-border trade with Southeast Asia and in particular through close links with Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam. Yunnanese Hui have benefited only indirectly from this modernization.

Chapter 4
Hui in Yunnan

The most important Muslim population of southern China is in Yunnan. By its relations with Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand and Burma, this province maintains close contact with Muslims in bordering countries (see Chapter 5). Since the 1980s, numerous Burmese Muslims have come to live in the west and southwest, in Ruili and Jinghong.

Contrary to Canton, where Islamization occurred during the eight and ninth centuries via the maritime route—thanks to monsoon winds—the ancestors of Yunnanese Muslims entered over the land route as merchants and, in 1253, actively participated in the military conquest of Dali. Despite the presence of Muslim merchants and missionaries prior to the thirteenth century, this province recorded no impact of Islam before this date. The powerful Kingdom of Nanzhao was centered round Dali Lake, Erhai.

The landscape and Islamic presence in Yunnan fascinated Marco Polo, Rocher and Cordier and, for a long time, amazed thinkers and travelers. As Gerald Reitlinger (South of the Clouds, the Chinese name for Yunnan) poetically noted: “to follow the courses of the great rivers of the province is to cross the history of humanity.”

Yunnan is composed of a high plateau linked to neighboring Guizhou (Yangui), inclined to the less elevated southwest, and divided into numerous fertile valleys surrounded by mountains (bazi) that make communications difficult. In addition to the Black River, three of the greatest rivers of Southeast Asia cross Yunnan: the Mekong (Lancangjiang), Salween, and Red Rivers. The province’s geographical situation facilitates cultural and economic integration with Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, highways brought modernity and transformation at a rapid pace. In addition to its incomparable beauty and its
Islam in China

Mediterranean climate (except in the tropical south), Yunnan possesses the largest variety of ethnic groups (minzu) in China

Alice Wei, who studied the excellent work of Bai Shouyi, in a thesis on Muslim rebellions (1855–73), defended at the University of Chicago (1974), believed that Hui in that province are not a “homogeneous” minority as their co-religionists in northwest China. They are divided into different groups centered at Dali and Weishan, Kunming and Yuxi in the center, Zhaotong in the northeast, Kaiyuan in the south, Yanshan in the southeast, and Simao in the southwest. Despite many years of research and diplomacy in Yunnan, Cordier did not mention the lack of homogeneity among these Muslims and distinguished the Hui from the Chinese with difficulty, especially as they do not wear their skullcap (baimao) in the street. Cordier spent a quarter of his life in the region, and Hui scholars such as Sha Dezhen recognized the scientific value of his study *The Muslims of Yunnan* (in French 1927), which was translated into Chinese.

According to Grosvenor, who did research and traveled with Colborne Baber in 1878, Hui in Yunnan are “intelligent, courageous, and generous with foreigners.” Dr Gervais Courtellemont (1904) noted that Muslims in the region were “honest, laborious, and hardly.”

Muslims reached a higher social position under the Yuan Dynasty, since they occupied the second rank among China’s ethnic groups. They were called *Semuren*. The Yuan divided the peoples of China into four categories: Mongols, Semuren, Chinese, and Peoples of the South (*Nanren*). Sun Yatsen and the Republic reorganized all Muslims in China under the name Hui. Only Islam distinguished them from the Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, and Tibetans. These ethnic classifications were much simpler than the present *minzu* system of fifty-six nationalities. Numerous Hui and 2–3,000 Uyghurs live in Yunnan.

**Hui in Yunnan and their History**

Yunnan consists of 380,000 square kilometers and its population is nearly 50 million. Five million Yunnanese people and Sichuanese immigrants live in Kunming, a city founded around 2,000 years ago. Ho Ping-ti has noted the province’s demographic growth (Harvard University, 1959). His study indicated that there were 300,000 inhabitants in the fourteenth century (a contestable figure), 3.5 million in 1787, 5.4 million in 1812, and 7.3 and 14.7 million, respectively, in 1850 and 1953. Kunming (Jaci or Jachi for Marco Polo) was predominantly Muslim at the close of the thirteenth century. Its ten mosques (six were still standing in 2004) reflected Islam’s brilliant past.

After the Second World War, Frank Lebar and Embree estimated the number of Yunnanese Hui at 220,000. The 700,000 Hui officially occupy a preeminent position at present among the twenty-six minorities in Yunnan but receive no publicity. Thus, during the Universal Exposition of 1999 in Kunming, President Jiang Zemin praised Dongba culture without mentioning the Naxi. The Uyghurs who had sent dancers and singers did not play “a starring role” but promoted “unity” (*tuanjie*) for all China’s minorities.

Muslim autonomous administrative units are fewer than in northwest China. Since 1956 and 1979, respectively, Yunnan has had two Hui autonomous districts, Weishan in the west, and Xundian in the east. The Hui are numerous along the Yunnan-Guizhou border, a major communication axis. A rather large number are also found in Kunming, Zhaotong, Dali, Shadian, Tonghai (Hexi), Kaiyuan, Mengzi, Wenshan, Cangyuan, Eshan, Lunan, and Nanjian. Without mentioning the Han, everywhere present, the Yi are still the dominant minority in many districts.

In 1876, Anderson mentioned a legend found among Yunnanese Muslims concerning their origin. He argued that the first 3,000 Muslims were not able to return to their country of origin because of their contact with pork-eaters. They could be the ancestors of Yunnanese Hui who courageously contributed to the maintenance of law and order in the province. How did these “Arabs” arrive in southern China? Did they enter via Gansu, Shaanxi or Henan, and Sichuan? The story does not say. However, the studies of Zhang Rinming, published in French in 1980 and in Chinese (Ningxia) in 2002, give some details. These Arabic Muslims were integrated into the cavalry of the Tang Dynasty. Their ancestors were descendants of the Arabs (*Dashi* in ancient Chinese) who helped Emperor Xuan Song (712–56) of the Tang Dynasty to push the barbarians from the western provinces. In the mid-eighth century, frequent Muslim diplomatic missions were sent to Changan (Xian) to meet the emperor.

In 758, the port of Canton (Guangzhou) was marked by Arabic-Chinese confrontations. In the nineteenth century, another breakdown of relations between Hui and Han occurred in northwest China and Yunnan. Excluding these two periods, the implantation of the Hui in China was harmonious throughout the centuries.

Annual records by district and annals dealing with these Muslims are rare. In principle, the history of the Hui in Yunnan dates to the eighth century. Unfortunately, the ancient steles of Zhengyi Mosque in Kunming have disappeared. Arabic documents on these origins still existed in Yunnan at the beginning of the last century.
Islam in China

but they are now unlocated. The official thesis, a very restrictive one, states that the first Muslims came with the armies of Kublai Khan and in 1253 participated in the conquest of Dali. During the Yuan Mongol Dynasty, Islamization reached its summit in the province, especially under the impulsion of Governor Ajall Sai Dianchi of Bukhara. He had five sons and nineteen grandsons. He was buried in Songhuaqua in 1279, near a large water reservoir, constructed north of Kunming by him and still in use. His tomb, demolished during the Cultural Revolution, was reconstructed in the 1980s.

Ajall’s oldest son, a famous general, Nasruddin or Nasr ad-Din, was the commander-in-chief in Yunnan from 1281 to 1291. He was responsible for the Mongol campaigns in Burma, marked by the capture of Pagan in 1287. Marco Polo reported in detail the success of Nasraddin’s cavalry (Nescadin) facing Burmese elephants. His brother Husein succeeded to this military post in Kunming, from 1297 to 1305. In the beginning of the fourteenth century, a Persian historian, Rashid al-Din Fadlullah (1247–1318), named Yunnan, Karajan or Karajan. It is better known under its ancient name, the Kingdom of Nanzhao. During 1345–46, Ibn Battuta confirmed Islam’s high glory throughout China, but he never reached Yunnan.

In China from 1271 to 1295, Marco Polo mentioned a large number of Hui, without giving their Chinese names. During that period, many authors judged the Yunnanese Hui and Han populations equal in number. Underestimating the dynamic impact of Governor Ajall, many authors reported fewer Muslims.

Admiral Zheng He (c.1370–1435), a celebrated Ming Dynasty Hui from Yunnan (his Muslim name is Haji Ma, and his mother was born Wen), was of Persian and Arab origin. He was the son and grandson of a famous Haji and could be a descendant of Governor Ajall. In addition to maritime Southeast Asia, India, the Middle East (Mecca), and northeastern Africa formed part of his maritime voyage, during his eight state expeditions (1405–33).

Yunnan during the period of splendor of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1795) remained at peace. Muslims were integrated into the Sino-Islamic Manchu system. Many Hui, such as Ma Zhi (c.1600–c.1730) from Nanjing, who traveled to Yunnan, linked Confucianism and Islam. This writer is known for his forceful formulas such as: “Allah, religion, and man (ren) are pure and true (qingshen).” Chinese culture indirectly influenced many imams. It is enough to notice the importance of Chinese characters among the Hui to understand their cultural impregnation. A Yunnanese Hui, Ma Ruwei became an historian in 1702. His Chinese biographer, Bai Shouyi (1909–2000), also Hui, classified him as a talented doctor in literature. Like his father, Ma Fu (1642–1715) became vice-president of an administrative tribunal. His works are published in the “Collection of Texts about Yunnan” (Yunnan congshu).

Another Hui, Sai Yu (1697–1795) from Shi Ping, at the age of twenty-one, published “Travel Notes in the South” (Nanyou cao). In 1752, he became subprefect in Hong, in neighboring Sichuan. He died in his native county and remains a celebrated Yunnanese writer. Ma Zhu from Baoshan, already mentioned, was a famous Chinese author and traveler (Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, Henan, Hebei, Guangdong, Shandong, and Beijing among other places). Later, Ma Dexin, who had an excellent command of Arabic, Persian, and Chinese, received the title Baba (“father” in Farsi, the Persian language). He is distinguished from the previously mentioned authors by his superior knowledge of Arabic and Islam.

Confucianism touched the Manchu as well as the Hui, but for a Muslim could not match orthodox Islam. Sufism (the third wave of Islamization) was perhaps indirectly in conflict with Confucian thought; consequently in the nineteenth century, Sinicization became more evident. When one compares Miao and Dong with Hui, under the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing Dynasties, the length of the Muslim uprisings was shorter and limited to the second part of the nineteenth century.

This last century was marked by the internal and external decline of the imperial Manchu Dynasty, punctuated by numerous anti-imperial revolts. The most important, the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) in Guangdong, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Jiangsu (capture of Nanking, 1853), destroyed nearly 600 cities. The Muslim uprising, mainly affecting Yunnan, the north, and northwest has to be analyzed as a consequence of Manchu administrative weaknesses rather than as a jihad. Du Wenxiu seized power by using the pride of Dali residents, descendants of the powerful Kingdom of Nanzhao, coupled with a feeling of injustice among Hui.

The past recalled tusi, the Yunnanese Muslims’ land rights. Luo Zhongxu and Gong Yin have carefully studied these chieftainships. In the thirteenth century under the Mongols but also during the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing Dynasties, until nearly 1873, the Hui were hereditary chiefs (tusi) in Yunnan in three districts. Muslims thus had good reasons in their fight against the Manchu. Civil war was mainly a consequence of the Qing Dynasty’s administrative weakness, particularly in distant provinces such as Yunnan and Gansu.

The “tusi chieftainship” helps to understand the politico-administrative context. Near Dali, halfway to Baoshan, the power of Ma Suofei was confirmed in 1380 in the seventh volume of A History of the Ming Dynasty. In Kunming, under Ma Sulama existed also the Tusi of Chishuijeng. Ma Dan was chief there in 1386. In
Dahe, near Dali, Ma Huiding was *tusi* in 1404; his adherence to Islam cannot be questioned, although it is not noted in *The Annals of Yunnan*. Yongping had another Muslim chieftainship. Hui were particularly sensitive about their prerogatives, and Dali became engaged in a civil war lasting eighteen years.

**Troubles**

Discrimination and failures of justice were frequent against the Hui. The first confrontations occurred with Han miners in 1819. It is difficult to say which group started the troubles. According to a report of the Viceroy of Yunnan, the dispute concerned the lands of a mosque contested by Han. In the nineteenth century, Thiersant, French Consul and author of *Le Mahoméétisme en Chine* (1878), confirmed the responsibility of the Qing bureaucracy. Émile Rocher (1879) accused the Mandarin in charge of the mines of Linan (Kaiyuan) of abandoning his post and returning to Yunnanfu (Kunming).

**Causes of the Civil War**

The most frequently admitted cause of problems was imperial weakness. Conflicts were basically religious, cultural, and socio-economic. The Muslim taboo on pork is often mentioned. Civil wars and the Opium War were linked to each other (Taiping) and fuelled frequent tensions between Han and Hui. Conflicts were badly handled by imperial justice, with regard to mines and properties. The Hui commercial network in the province brought about a certain bureaucratic opposition. When Muslims made a request, competent tribunals refused to hear it.

Chinese secret societies, not Sufi orders, were responsible for the beginning of turmoil in Yunnan. We have no proofs of a Jahariya armed conflict against the Manchu in Tonghai. However a Sufi fortress was razed in 1872. The local aristocracy was no longer able to maintain law and order. Pillage became endemic during 1850–75. Yunnan, like Guangdong and Guangxi, welcomed the partisans of the Ming Dynasty and outlawed the Incense Brothers (*Xiangbuhui*). Bai Shouyi believes that they participated in the 1845 events against the Muslims of Baoshan. Corruption of the imperial administration by secret societies existed in South China and Yunnan. Jean Chesneaux (1965) argues that: “Confucian order and social conventions are vigorously opposed by secret societies. . . . They also proposed to construct their own system of rules and political conventions. Thus . . . for centuries, they established a political opposition and participated in religious dissonance.”

Triads such as *Sanianhui* were powerful in southern China (He Pin, *Zhongguo Dola Heishen* [Secret Societies in China]; 218). This common triad name (used for separate brotherhoods) was later simplified into “The Three Dots Society.” Jade and opium were major exports involved in trade disputes. In Yunnan, these triads fought “Barbarians” (*fan*) as well as Yunnanese Muslims. When tension existed, it was common to blame Muslims; conversely, those who did not embrace Islam were considered unbelievers (*kaif*, the one who hides the truth). Secret societies often provided a framework for peasant revolts. In Yunnan, they fought against Hui who controlled cross-border trade and caravans. Kunming was far from Baoshan, and at that time, it took twenty days on horseback to reach the capital from that city. Even before 1985, this route required two days travel by bus. No great improvement in transportation occurred prior to 1990.

Disputes between triads and the Hui concerned caravans but also mines. Mas- sacres of Muslims were reported in 1821 at Yunlong, north of Baoshan. These events accelerated in 1826, in Yong Chang, on the Burma Road in the fertile Baoshan Valley, between the Mekong and Salween Rivers. On 2 October 1845, a fight broke out in the marketplace between Muslims and Chinese. Armed militias gave support to secret societies, and many Hui were killed. This massacre lasted most of the night, and the mosque was destroyed. Outlawed triads were hostile to Muslims, and competed with them in the borderlands. For these societies, the control of this commercial route was essential. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Scott O’Connor mentions in Bhamo, Upper Burma, a triad branch called “The Club” by the British.

Following these events, an imam, Baba Yusuf Ma Dexin (Ma Fuchu) (c.1794–1874), became a religious leader in Yongping and Dali. He demanded reparations for all Muslim properties destroyed in Baoshan region; the local authorities rejected it. Muslims numbering in the thousands started a revolt, causing Han counterattacks. A series of massacres followed between Muslims and Han. Kunming was besieged. Relative peace obtained in March 1847 in exchange for a Muslim pardon. During 1847–49, a truce was concluded thanks to the celebrated Mandarin Lin Zexu (1758–1850), a former adversary of English opium in Guangdong. In Yunnan and Guizhou (Yungui), this prominent governor calmed social tensions, but in Yunnan a tempest followed. From 1855 to 1873, to demand reparations for previous Chinese attacks, a Muslim rebellion ravaged the province. It was a civil war comparable to the Taiping and Miao-Dong rebellions.

In 1854–55, another clash broke out between Chinese and Hui in the region of Chuxiong, in the silver mines of Banghong, near Nanan. Hundreds of Hui families
drew their livelihood from the mines. The local authorities took no preventive measures against ethnic and religious turmoil. This again degenerated, and a massacre of innocents and pillages were reported. Han miners were jealous of Muslim extraction-techniques and of their commercial networks. Hui were not the only ones targeted; in 1868 and 1875, the British officers Sladen and Brown also came under Chinese pressure because of cross-border competition between Yunnan and Burma.

The business centers on the Burma Road were Dali and Xiguan (“The Lower Custom”). The city of Dali was known since ancient times for its annual horse fair. Until 1950, this fair attracted many buyers from Burma, Tibet, Shanghai, Chengdu, and Lanzhou.

Pi Luoge from Weishan and his son Ge Luofeng (d. 779) were the monarchs of the Kingdom of Nanzhao, later called Dali, who gave glory to this kingdom, a prestige recognized in Tibet and Sichuan. Between 750 and 1253, this powerful kingdom was able to defeat the Tang armies in 750 and 754. Thus, Du Wenxiu, a Chinese and Arabic scholar, was tempted to establish an independent state in October 1856, probably fascinated by the Nanzhao’s history. This young chief was later called sultan.

The Hui Autonomous Districts of Weishan and Dali are linked to both Dai and Muslim history. In 1257, the Islamization of Weishan came four years after that of Dali. Mengshe (then Menghua) was a former Nanzhao military center, dominated by the Tai. Until the Second World War their descendants, the “Dai,” also liked to have gold teeth. The toponymic root Meng or Muang is Tai, and there are still seven villages called Qimeng or “the seven Meng.” Weishan (Menghua) was later included in the strategy of territorial and the ethnic unity of Du Wenxiu. ADN research in Weishan and the region would confirm the link between Islam and the Dai. When General Du later sent his ambassador to England, he called himself a “tumble native of the Country of the Golden Teeth.” It is interesting to note the rhetoric of Du Wenxiu based on the term “Kingdom of the Golden Teeth” by which he designated his state, using an ancient Tai name of Nanzhao.

General Du Wenxiu, Ma Xian, and Ma Dexin

General Du took advantage of the weaknesses of the Qing Dynasty, which was obliged to sign the “unequal treaty” of Tianjin in 1858. To provide logistical support for his armies, nearly 400,000 men, Du Wenxiu regained control of business between Dali and Burma. Communications were thereafter cut with Kunming, which no longer received products from Mandalay and Bhamo. During that period, the financial situation of the state of Dali was prosperous. Xiguan and Dali became a single city-state. Du controlled three of the most important Yunnanese salt mines, an imperial monopoly on Yunlong (west of Dali), Yongchang, and Tengyue on Burma’s border. The fourth less productive mine, near Lijiang, could not communicate with Kunming without passing through Dali. In times of war there was a substantial exploitation of these mines. The miners, like the peasants, were also enrolled in militia. Trade with Burma and Sichuan was another source of revenue for General Du who controlled commercial activities on Mogok Burmese rubies.

In the beginning, the three main ethnic groups, Hui, Han and Yi (Lolo), were unified by Du Wenxiu who did everything possible to consolidate his program of unity, a key point for the longevity of his state. Du well understood the main causes of Muslim revolts in all of China, that is to say Han and Hui disunion, and tried to bring harmony to their relationship.

General Du Wenxiu argued: “One must not use force, but persuasion. The Han are more numerous than the Muslims. Collaboration is necessary and Han must keep their prominent position in Chinese society.” Some nationalities, such as the Yi, viewed this differently. Subversive imperial actions aimed to break the morale of Du’s army and Chinese defections were reported. The good understanding between General Du and his Chinese military chiefs unfortunately did not last. The final defeat was linked to a lack of really talented military leaders in Dali. Weaponry of the imperial armies, particularly the artillery, was modernized in the course of encounter with Westerners during the “Opium Wars.”

The following short biographies explain the progress of this civil war and describe the main parties. Beginning in 1860, Ma Xian (later Ma Rulong) became de facto one of Du Wenxiu’s principal opponents. During a particularly difficult year for the Qing Dynasty with the fall of Tianjin and the signature of the Treaty of Beijing, Ma Rulong’s treachery was particularly important for the imperial army in Yunnan. Ma Rulong was born to a well-to-do Hui family, and became, at first, an unsuccessful disciple of Ma Dexin but respected his master throughout his life. According to Rocher, the robust and healthy Ma Xian was better at sports and military discipline than at Arabic. He had his first experiences as a leader in silver mines and became foreman in the Chuxiong region. He represented Hui interests in the stocking and sale of minerals. This requires energy, in which he was not lacking. As a man of decision and an opportunist, he seized his chance during
disputes between Han and Hui that caused the death of his brother. He decided to seek revenge, and became a condottiere. He left the mines, and, with other Muslims, audaciously attacked Hui long near present-day Kaiyuan. Finally, he decided to retreat and save a large part of his troops. He was later appointed Imperial Military Commander. Ma Xian rapidly found himself at the head of 20,000 men, mainly of Hui and Yi, against the Chinese.

Ma Xian and his troops, making the best use of the terrain to avoid alerting the enemy, attacked Amizhou, near Kaiyuan (Linian). The Yi in the city had been informed by messenger that no harm would come to them; however, contradictory internal information prevented them from believing this. Later, when the city was conquered, the Yi residents were spared and only Han killed. Hui and Yi surrendered and their local chiefs, tusi, then collaborated. Ma Xian launched his troops against Mengzi to the south. But the rainy season prevented constructing strong tunnels for sapping the walls. The diversion by the neighboring rich mines of Gejiu unfortunately cost the capture of Mengzi. Later, having replaced his losses, Ma Xian reconstituted his army and audaciously continued toward Kunming. His army no longer encountered opposition during its march northward, and the people cooperated in supplying troops. Kunming was attacked but resisted; however, the provincial economic and social situation continued to deteriorate, and insecurity increased.

The year 1858 proved to be a turning-point. Ma Xian and his troops seized the rich mining city of Chuxiong, between Dali and Kunming, at a crossroads toward Sichuan and Burma. Thanks to the construction of tunnels more helpful than at Mengzi, a large breach was made through the walls and an assault successfully carried out. Many inhabitants were massacred, and pillage followed. The Prefect Song Yanchun escaped with his life disguised as a peasant. His son fell into the hands of Ma Xian, who some years later having changed camp, returned him to his father Song Yanchun, a high ranking administrator. The Muslims who held Dali joined forces with those who took Chuxiong. Du Wenxiu and Ma Xian (later Rulong) initially had the idea to launch an immediate attack toward Kunming. Ma Xian’s defection changed all plans. He withdrew at first to Anning to care for his wounds. He knew by experience that after the Battle of Chuxiong many would side with the winner who would rightly expect to have followers.

In 1860, the famous imam Ma Dexin, Ma Xian’s master, had just taken Jinning (Kunyang) and Chenggong around Lake Dian, south of Kunming. If other Muslim troops joined their efforts with those involved in conquering Chuxiong, the capital could have been taken in a vise. In November 1860, the provincial mandarins, understanding the imminent danger, suddenly bestowed the rank of general to Ma Xian and awarded his men handsome gifts. He entered Kunming with his troops in good order, and the frightened citizens were quickly reassured. Trade, however, continued to suffer for thirteen years. General Ma Xian formally became Ma Rulong and was involved in the campaign against his co-religionist Du Wenxiu. Ma Dexin gallantly refused all honors offered to him and did not participate in the anti-Muslim war. He, however, accepted the charge of trying to convince Du to stop fighting against the imperial dynasty.

Du Wenxiu, a man of honor who believed in his fate, was less pragmatic than Ma Rulong. Both were former Koranic students of Imam Ma Dexin (Ma Fuchu). The orphan, Ma Dexin (born c. 1793 near Dali) very early showed his intelligence and studied Chinese until the age of 17. He then passed his Koranic examinations and completed his knowledge of Islam in Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan Provinces. He was an orthodox Gedimu. In 1839, having put aside a little gold, he began his travels on foot to Mecca with caravans, continued by boat, and finally on camelback like the first Muslims. He returned eight years later.

Ma Dexin during his long pilgrimage went to Jingdong, Puer, Simao in south Yunnan, toward the Golden Triangle. He passed Bhamo and Rangoon in Burma where he encountered Burmese Muslims, Hanafites (the majority) and also Shafeites. He boarded a boat and sailed for more than forty days, landing in Ceylon, where he followed the footsteps of Ibn Battuta. Later, he went to Cochin, Malabar, and finally to Yemen. In Jedda and Mecca, he waited for some days before beginning his pilgrimage. The Kaaba and Medina greatly impressed him. After Mecca, Haji Ma went to Egypt and then visited Turkey, staying in Constantinople (Istanbul) for two years. He went to Palermo, the Dardanelles, Rhodes, and Cyprus, and visited the tomb of the Prophet’s aunt. A voyage to Jerusalem allowed him to meditate on the names of all the prophets. He revisited Egypt, went up the Nile, and paid a visit to Sultan Mehmet Ali. In 1847, he probably returned via Alexandria, and finally reached Aceh, Penang, and Singapore and met Malay friends. He returned to China via Canton and Nanning before returning to his province by way of Baise, near the Guangxi-Yunnan border. He then settled at Kaiyuan (Linian), where he taught the Koran and earned a large reputation. In 1857, he became increasingly engaged in the political and military conflict against the Manchu Dynasty.

Ma Dexin (Ma Fuchu) recollected his travels in Arabic. His disciple, Ma Anli, translated his memoirs into Chinese and published them in 1862 as Chaojin Tuji
Islam in China

[Logbook]. The dramatic incidents in Yunnan obliged him to discontinue his research. He is the first translator of the Koran into Chinese.

In 1860, massacres took place in Kunming. Rich merchants left the city for Sichuan; those who were not killed were robbed. Some settled in Dali to save their lives. The same year, the Yunnan government took the opportunity to enforce diplomatic and military measures. They permitted the desertion of Hui military chiefs, in particular returned Imam Ma Dexin and General Ma Xian (Ma Rulong). The latter does not figure in the *Chinese Encyclopaedia of Islam* (1996), but Rocher defended General Ma in *The Chinese Province of Yunnan* (in French, 1880). Ma Rulong’s betrayal considerably weakened the state of Dali.

**Du Wenxiu: Resistance and Defeat**

Is it possible to assimilate Du Wenxiu’s struggle in the framework of Max Weber’s thesis of a conquering Islam? It was probably more a civil war than an attempt at conquest. The military recruitment of soldiers-laborers (*minbing* or militia) was the rule. Sharia law was never imposed in Dali.

In 1865, perhaps inspired by the universal knowledge of Master Ma Dexin (Ma Fuchu), General Du’s first diplomatic action was directed toward Lhasa. A document written in Arabic evoked the Caliphs Abu Bakr (c. 570–634) and Ali (c. 599–661) and aimed to provide military and logistical support from Tibet.

Muslim fightets besieged Kunming (1868–69). However, the imperial armies became more powerful by the end of the Opium War. Du Wenxiu saw the difficulties of Dali’s position. At the end of 1871 he sent his son Hasan under military protection to Baoshan and Bhamo, and then from Burma to Turkey and England. A relative, a Malay English interpreter, and soldiers accompanied Du’s son. Du Wenxiu received no support from the international Muslim community. Burmese Muslims from Tengyue, Mandalay, and Rangoon furnished some help. In London, the principal destination of this long mission (1872–3), the English crown did not respond favorably, and no official aid came from its Burmese protectorate.

Franco-British rivalries appear behind the scenes. An incident occurred in Dali in March 1868. Du possibly believed that Francis Garnier was a spy. The French officer, who carried out topographic surveys in the region, was finally forced to leave Dali and to return to Kunming. Garnier had obtained a letter of recommendation from Du’s teacher, Ma Dexin (Ma Fuchu). Unfortunately, the imam became unpopular when he supported the imperial troops and especially because he had asked General Du to surrender. Dali was supported by fifty-three cities, not counting territories in neighboring Sichuan Province.

The end of the Opium Wars reinforced imperial morale and accelerated Du Wenxiu’s defeat. In 1872, four army corps commanded by Yang Yuguo besieged Dali. The former strong ethnic union was not so in the end. Furthermore, Du lacked skilled officers and modern weaponry. It is paradoxical that earlier Muslims such as Ala Al-Din (d. 1313) contributed to improving the Chinese artillery that basically caused Du’s defeat. One of the main causes for his defeat was the four cannons sent by road through passes and mountains from Kunming. Only three reached their destination, but Dali was never able to purchase modern cannons to defend the city. After the fall of Xiaguan, Dali itself fell in January 1873. Carnage resulted from the imperial cannons’ barrages, and extensive pillage ensued.

Ma Hualong tragic death (he was assassinated in southern Ningxia) caused General Du to reflect. Du Wenxiu perfectly understood the imperialist treachery. He was a conscious fatalist, and did not believe in a pardon. He swallowed a bowl of opium, after first having forced his three wives and his daughters to take poison. Kublai Khan had been more merciful in 1253 when he captured Dali, marking a turning-point in the Islamization of Yunnan. General Du head was cut off and exposed, but it was preserved in honey and sent to Peking as proof of pacification, accompanied by 10,000 pairs of Muslim ears (“to kill” in the coded language of the secret societies was to “wash the ears.”) In the mid-twentieth century the decapitation of enemies was still practiced, as occurred to Ma Diti in 1924. Du Wenxiu’s body was taken away and finally placed in a tomb, but it did not escape the destruction of the Cultural Revolution. This tomb in the village of Xiaodui, southeast of Dali, was recently reconstructed.

Like King Solomon, Sulaiman Du Wenxiu insured the fortune of his state by a caravan trade protected by fortresses, but its decline was more brutal than his namesake’s. In 1873, the victory banquet became an ambush; nearly all Muslims present in Dali were massacred. The same year, when the diplomatic mission to England returned to Rangoon, the son of Du Wenxiu was informed of his father’s death and the dramatic capture of Dali.

General Ma Xian (Ma Rulong)-the Hui deserter-finally commanded a part of the imperial troops marching toward Tengyue (Momien), a stronghold in the mountains bordering Burma. In 1874, western Yunnan was reconquered after long Muslim resistance. In Tengyue, the strategy of the imperial armies failed (re-routing the river to drown the besieged Hui). After the battles, five mosques, the walls of the city, and the residential quarter were razed. No mosque stands except that in a
neighboring village. At the end of these events the British established a consulate and customs post there. After the long blockade of Dali, the Burma Road was quickly secured. In August 1877, John Macarthy crossed Yunnan on foot without difficulty, reaching Bhamo.

Initially Ma Dexin secured a compromise with the imperial armies to avoid bloodshed. As we know, he was offered honors and the position of supreme military commander in Yunnan, which he refused. He withdrew and did not participate in the military operations against Du Wenxiu. Ma Dexin was finally killed without a trial, being decapitated on 25 May 1874. Yunnanese authorities took advantage of the departure of Ma Rulong, who remained faithful to his master (despite his morale of dishonesty). Thus has ended the life of a distinguished scholar. After his return from Mecca, he devoted himself to Koranic teaching, and thanks to his energies and efforts, Yunnan is still an important center for the study of Koranic Arabic.

In contrast, after this civil and religious conflict, Ma Rulong's descendants and relatives obtained honors thanks to his opportunism and staunch orthodox Muslim sentiments (Gedimu). Famous imams such as Haji Na of Mengzi and Ma Minglun of Zhaotong owed their posts to these circumstances. In northeastern Yunnan, the district of Zhaotong prospered and a hundred years later still had an important Muslim population. This region was not involved in the civil war. General Ma Rulong's family lived in a palace surrounded by three courtyards in Kunming containing "beautiful lacquered furniture, precious coffers, bibelots, and embroidered curtains" (Courtellemont, 1904). H. R. Davies's book on Yunnan (1909) describes these events and condemns General Ma.

Jihad never concerned General Du. The fall of Du Wenxiu was rarely analyzed as a confrontation between the "Old" Orthodox (Gedimu) Religion and Wahhabism, the "New Religion." The Manchu Dynasty tried in every way to divide Yunnan's Muslims, in a move to pardon in the beginning and to obtain desertion and betrayal afterwards. Lipman (1998) recognized "Wahabbi" as the "ally of Chinese nationalism" fighting equally Sufis and orthodox Hui. It seems that many writers have underestimated the extent to which the disciples of Ma Wanfu (1849–1934) were sometimes manipulated by the declining dynasty.

Using the four volumes of the Hui researcher Bai Shouyi on Muslim Uprisings, Alice Wei draws a rather clear picture of General Du Wenxiu. However, many sources have been missed. The importance of Sufism during this uprising has not been detailed, but played a less important role than in Gansu. The death of the grandson of Ma Mingxin in Tonghai was one of the rare proofs of the Jahariya participation in the Muslim civil war. Du Wenxiu, a good administrator, was not really a lesser warlord than Ma Hualong, but he participated personally in the struggles at Dali in 1856 and in the last resistance during 1872–73. He possessed no modern and powerful cannons. On the other hand, the Qing Dynasty inherited Western military technology.

General Du had extraordinary organizational capacities. He succeeded in mobilizing his men despite weak human resources. Sharia law did not apply to Muslims in his state, which he called "The Pacific Country of the South" (Ping-nanguo). Strict discipline was imposed on the combatants. The artisans and-in particular-arms makers accused of treachery were punished by death. The state of Dali functioned for many years despite the lack of specialists. Money came from taxed cities, cross-border trade, and the exploitation of salt mines. The other key elements of Du Wenxiu's logistics were military labor, coolies, and the supply of food and arms. In the beginning, a better understanding existed with minorities oppressed by the Qing Dynasty.

The Manchu, to better control far off Yunnan, sent Han immigrants in large numbers. Du Wenxiu knew how to use popular discontent; however, his ethnic program had weaknesses. Yi, Miao, and Lisu, complaining after some years that Hui and Han monopolized too much power, became less zealous. Harmony was partly disrupted at the beginning of 1871 because imperial military pressures had become strong. The Naxi or Moso, close to the neutral Tibetans, did not seem to be concerned despite General Du's diplomatic efforts. On the other hand, the probable presence of Malay armament specialists was one of the rare examples of international aid from the Islamic community at this time.

Because of the repressions following rebellions, there was a significant decrease in the number of Muslims. This considerably reduced the Muslim community; approximately a fifth of China's Muslims, from a population of four million, were still there just before the end of the famous rebellion. In addition, it resulted in fratricidal divisions among the Hui, with one section taking the Manchu Dynasty's side. One can inquire into the influence of Wahhabism and Manchu Dynasty support for this movement.

The Devastations of War

Yunnan was devastated as civil war ravaged the region. Never again did Islam recapture its position as the province's principal religion, and it took years to recover its commercial, mining, and agricultural prosperity. Rocher mentions a "precarious" situation among functionaries. "Everything reflected the mess; here
and there, however, were still traces of ancient splendor,” as in Ma Rulong’s family. Land registration no longer existed in many districts, and other complaints were reported.

For more than twenty-five years, from 1854 to 1880, Yunnan was in a state of permanent chaos. Outlaw attacks were frequent on its roads. The arms used by caravan leaders, as Rocher noted, consisted of a leather harness holding two sabers or cutlasses, small pairs of knives as well as pistols, or even “primitive” arms such as lances.

Francis Garnier in 1873 and Augustus Margary in 1875 were killed by miscreant Yunnanese elements. In 1868 and 1875, leaving the Irrawaddy and Bhamo, British officers Edward Sladen and Horace Brown, with military and diplomatic protection during two missions and despite all their efforts, never reached Dali. They only succeeded in consolidating economic interests in Tengyue (Momien), which turned out to become a British commercial and diplomatic base. As Victor Purcell (1896–1965) has correctly observed these events had “disastrous” local and regional impacts for Yunnan and the whole of Southeast Asia.

At the beginning of 1871, epidemics and famines were frequent and did not spare Hui in Dali. After the fighting, a new epidemic ravaged Yunnan. Dr Louis Pichon mentions that, in 1893, plague (yangziwen) was endemic and spread to Guizhou but was not as dangerous as the Black Death, often fatal. In general, only 5% of the population became infected. At other times, entire districts were decimated. In May and June epidemics prevailed, attaining a peak in September after the monsoon rains. Not even buffaloes, cattle, or goats were spared. The last epidemics in Yunnan were recorded in 1938 and during 1947–50.

Caravans were late to resume their activity. Fewer Muslims were associated with cross-border trade. An Indian Muslim, Shaykh Abdullah was signaled in Jinghong (Xiang Hong) by Lefevre-Pontalis, a member of the Pavie Mission (1879–95). Cultural and economic relations with Burma and Thailand were never broken; however, Islam suffered from this civil war and would certainly have had a more brilliant future if the Dali massacres had not occurred.

**Ancient Caravans and Modern Evolution**

The first Muslims on the Silk Road were travelers and merchants, and it is not surprising that they long held on to this tradition. The networks of Islamic merchants were frequently developed in cities through a framework of mosques in Kunming, Dali, Simao, and Mengla. Temporary migrations occurred from Yunnan toward Burma and Thailand. Large networks of associated businesses developed, and one could ask whether the present-day rich Muslims running restaurants in Kunming are the descendants of caravan owners from before the Second World War.

The time of the year to travel was during the dry months—thus avoiding the monsoon. The Muslims went back and forth to Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Tibet, and Guizhou. The Yunnanese mules were prolific and part of Chinese exchange gifts to the kings of Burma. They traveled in daily stages of around 30 kilometers and carried 70–100 kilograms. Vegetation along the roads provided their nourishment. No transport animal in Southeast Asia could be compared for resilience, endurance, and sure-footedness on mountainous terrain. Elephants as long-distance transport animals—carried smaller burdens over shorter distances, but they require rest periods and also have to carry their own food in order to survive. No other domestic animal is comparable for travel across jungles.

In 1939, in the mountainous regions of Yunnan and Tibet, Pierre Guillaud, during his first trip from Dali to Lijiang, poetically explains how the caravans functioned:

We were roused at four in the morning. There was a hasty breakfast, followed by much shouting and sounding of the gong. The loads, securely tied to wooden frames, were spread out in the courtyard. Struggling mules and horses were presently led in, with many unprintable curses. Each load, lifted by two men, was speedily clamped onto the wooden saddle, and the horse was permitted to trot out into the street. My hand baggage was quickly tied to a similar frame, the bedded spread in the form of a cushion, and the whole contraption hoisted onto a horse. I was then lifted bodily on the top and the animal was shoved outside, the man shouting to me to mind my head when passing through the gate. Outside, other contingents of the caravan were pouring out of neighboring houses. To the sounding of the gong, the leading horse, gaily bedecked in red ribbons, pompons, and with small mirrors on its forehead, was led out. The caravan’s leading horse moved forward, and, having looked back to see that everything was ready, began walking down the road at a brisk pace. At once, the assistant leader, less gaudily decorated, but likewise full of authority, followed. The whole caravan immediately sprang after them, forming a file as they went along. The caravan men, in vivid blue jackets and wide pants, rushed after the horses.

A hundred years ago, the number of mules and horses, in the hands of “turbaned” Muslims, gave an indication of these commercial movements. Mules, being more resistant, were preferred. The wooden structure on which the loads and sacks
were attached are typical and adapted to fit a small wooden saddle according to the animal’s shape. This structure **tuon** (bâa in French) is still used in Yunnan. It remains in equilibrium on the mount and rests on four legs when it is not an animal’s back. It is adapted for horses, mules, and oxen. According to Dr Louis Pichon who traveled extensively between Hanoi and Yunnan, there were 56,000 pack animals in 1890 and 76,000 a year later, shuttling from Kunming toward the Red River, Hekou (Yunnan), and Laocai (Vietnam). Yunnanese horses have always been highly appreciated in Burma, and, in 1900, a thousand of them were exported annually.

In 1901, the railroad from Kunming to Hanoi, which employed many Hui, shortened mule traffic along the Red River. Once with a Hui in a train going to Kaiyuan, he spoke to me about **Kafir** Chinese (that is, non-Muslims or infidels). Suddenly, a Han policeman told me that it was forbidden for foreigners to take this train. The Muslim disappeared; I found myself alone with this Chinese officer but learned nothing more about the Chinese from a Hui’s viewpoint.

In 1985–95, there were still many mules in the province owned by Yi farmers. In the twenty-first century, aside from mountain tracks, the growth of highway traffic has made these formerly common and useful animals rare. Even Dai pack-oxen on the Burmese frontier (Mangshi-Ruili) are disappearing. Caravans are part of the Yunnanese past. Modernization and highways entice quite a few Hui to become truck-drivers, and they thus once again take up their traditional profession in long-distance trade.

On his return from Mecca ten years ago, a Haji of Changning, near Baoshan, initiated a transportation business consisting of trucks, mini-buses, and taxis. This enterprise prospered and enriched his large extended family. His social relationships (**guanxi**) made this success possible and secured “special privileges” for opening and managing this type of business. The Haji is also a local cadre. This prosperous Muslim company is not unique.

Some use the new north-south axis, the highway from Jinghong to Kunming, which is nearly terminated. On Tuesday, 18 June 2002 at noon, a truck and its crew, all Hui, passed Yuanjiang. Near Kunming, in Chenggong, a whole Muslim village has converted to road transportation, keeping alive old traditions. This small village, close to the highway, still exists. The new mosque has a small minaret, and its Middle Eastern style does not annoy the powerful Islamic Association of Yunnan, which favors this architecture and the new enterprises. But, in counterpart to modernization, the mules have disappeared. The same day, in June, our bus encountered only two groups of Yi, one with two mules and the other with eight. They no longer come in large numbers even for the traditional big market (**gankai** in Yunnanese) held every five days in Tongguan, a pass on the highway. Modern Muslims travel by bus.

**Professions, Muslim Culture, and Cultural Evolution**

In 1904, Courtellemont mentioned there being 2,000 Muslim families in Kunming. They were found in all professions: honorary and military mandarins, wholesale merchants, jewelers, artisans, veterinarians, butchers, bakers, and pastry-makers, animal dealers or caravan leaders. Today, they are professors, researchers, bureaucrats, teachers, merchants, restaurant owners, or artisans.

A hundred years ago, they wore robes and vests like the Han. Before 1980, they all wore the blue or green costume of Mao Zedong (**Zhongshanzhuang**). Now, they prefer Western suits. One cannot distinguish them from the Chinese. Contrary to Gansu and Xinjiang, where Muslims often wear a full beard as in Pakistan or Afghanistan, Yunnanese Hui resemble the Han (with a beard or discreet mustache). Following the majority, in this way they display their longevity after fifty.

Regarding Hui-Han similarities, education progressed under the impulsion of Mao and Deng. State education is now modern and open to all, male and female. Until the Second World War, Muslim girls did not attend school. Sha Dezhen, Director of the French School in Kunming until its closure in 1950, is Muslim, and his daughter was well educated. This contrasts sharply with previous generations of women. However, in addition to Chinese, Mr. Sha speaks English and translates Arabic and Persian. He is the first Yunnanese to have successfully passed his baccalaureate at the Lycée Albert-Sarraut in Hanoi (a year or two after the future General Vo Nguyen Giap). His father, Sha Pingan, spoke fluent French and Arabic and was an interpreter during the construction of the Hanoi-Kunming railway line. Sha Pingan became imam of the Zhenyi Mosque in Kunming and taught the Koran for many years. Among his former students are an excellent Arabic speaker and a translator of the Koran.

The Hui are Chinese citizens as regards their education, culture, and professional life. For Maris Gillette, their modernization is a key element in contemporary China. Many Muslims lived in Kunming in the thirteenth century. Outside the main city, many villages still remain traditional. Hui have become farmers, for instance in Eshan and Tonghai, south of Kunming. Although almost all households own a television set, the Koranic and Arabic language tapes available in Beijing and Xian (Shanxi) are not sold in Yunnan.

76
Contrary to certain provinces like Henan in which the women’s mosques are numerous, in Yunnan one rarely encounters places of worship reserved for women. At best, there exists a reserved space, and a female Ahong able to read the Koran, who leads prayers.

Over the centuries, many women have contributed to the development of Islam. Thus, at the end of the seventeenth century, the mother of the Muslim scholar, Ma Zhu, author of the famous Guide to Purity (The Compass) (Qingzhen Zhiyan), educated her son so that he could be a scholar in Chinese and in classical Arabic. After the rebellion in the nineteenth century, and the slaughter of males, it was women who maintained Islamic traditions in many families that lacked fathers, husbands, and brothers.

Yunnan follows the present line of the Islamic Association that, in relations with the municipality, directs the criteria of cleanliness in the cities. Gillette (2000) also noticed in Xian that housing and mosque reconstruction are subject to official intervention. In itself, the principle corresponds to the Muslim ethic, but this social change and modernization also means Sinicization. The Association’s current line of action corresponds very well with Hui notions of modesty and is not generally seen as a symbol of the decline of traditional Islam. In Weizhou, Autonomous Region of Ningxia, one of the most beautiful of China’s mosques was demolished during the Cultural Revolution. Ding Hong calls this “existing in China’s vast ocean” in his book Minority Studies and Modernization (Minzu xue ya Xiandaixua, 1994).

In Kunming, four out of six mosques were reconstructed: Shunchengjie Mosque, Nancheng (“The South City”) Mosque in Zhengyi Street, Yixiong Mosque, and the Jahariya Mosque (Dongmen or Dongsi). A wall of Yongning Mosque in Jinbi Street disappeared during the widening of the street, and the mosque was partly reconstructed, leaving less space for the Muslim community. As of 2003, Jinniu or Xiaoximen (“The Golden Ox”) Mosque, an ancient, tiny mosque, still existed.

In the thirteenth century, Sayyid Ajall marked the history of Islam in Yunnan. Many mosques were constructed. The Muslim governor succeeded in maintaining harmony among the province’s various nationalities and religions. In the 1950s, the work on the frontiers (Yunnan Biandi Wenti) mentioned a certain lack of harmony with the Muslim community.

Without studying other epochs or situations, in our time, the wall of a mosque was knocked down in Kunming to transform a street into an avenue. The ancient mosque of Zhengyilu has been reconstructed, and its demolition effaces history. The renovation of Kunming’s center, begun in the 1990s, caused the destruction of a third of Shunchengjie Street, followed by the construction of large modern buildings such as Beihuodalou Superstore. Many Hui were forced to move, and had only three weeks in which to do so. In a building across from this superstore, a handicapped Hui unsuccessfully resisted moving, finally being obliged to live far from the city center. The Hui succeeded for some more than 600 years in remaining in Shuncheng Street, with the landmark of the 1950s, a museum in the Stalinist style. Hui and Han restaurant owners, increasingly numerous, who had the chance to remain in this typical street, again prospered, but the future conservation of the historical heritage of this street is jeopardized. However, these important modernization works drew foreign tourists and Chinese travelers to the province. Shuncheng Street still partly retains its traditional Muslim charm, although the quarter has currently become more Chinese. Investors will be tempted to continue modernization in order to attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDI).

Yunnanese Mosques

Yunnan is known for the value of its Koranic teaching. Many imams of the neighboring provinces, Guangxi and Guizhou, were trained in Kunming, Yuxi, or in northwest Yunnan. There are still numerous mosques despite an omnipresent Sinicization and a secular socialization.

Republican work on the question of the Yunnanese borders (Yunnan Biandi Wenti) advocates the Islamic community by saying that it “helps to form groups.” Yunnanese mosques are a backbone and the crossroads linking cities, provinces, and Southeast Asia. Before the 1950s there were no paved roads, but Muslims (longtime masters of caravans) traveled continuously, and their places of worship were havens, assuring protection and fraternity on difficult roads.

The long history of Islam in Yunnan is also based on its architecture. Unfortunately, the Chinese do not seem to like old historic mosques. However, there is one at Guangzhou, a place of worship dating to the tenth century, Guangta or Huaiasheng Mosque (The Mosque of Holy Memory). The Ming Dynasty is well represented, in Jianshui, Weishan (Huihuideng), and elsewhere. The fashion is currently for the modern Middle Eastern style, without much artistic value, whereas the variety of the Sino-Arabic combinations of the Chinese pagodas made China a country with a unique Islamic architecture.

Sinicization reconstructs Chinese history. In 1966, the Red Guards destroyed the thirteenth-century tomb of the respected Muslim governor, Ajall. The tomb was reconstructed in the 1990s, but his bones have disappeared. Later, in 1995,
the ancient central Zhengyilu Mosque in Kunming was the issue of long discussions lasting for several months. The local secretary, who defended the Islamic Association, proposed the pure and simple displacement of the mosque after its demolition. He fell seriously ill and was hospitalized, and the discussion resumed when he returned from hospital several months later. Eventually, the 400-year-old mosque was replaced by a modern place of worship in the Middle Eastern style. It is marked with Chaoshen Dian, the three characters that in 1998 replaced the ancient name of Chinese mosques in Yunnan: Qingzhenxi.

This “extreme” Sinicization also marked the end of the year 2002 in Kunming’s oldest street, Shunchengjie. The mosque of an ancient foundation was razed to the ground. The first place of worship constructed on this location dated to 1425. It was renovated in 1856 and 1927, and after the Cultural Revolution. The historical charm of its pagoda style will disappear forever in a quarter grouping together more than 10,000 Muslims. It was claimed that renovation would have been too costly. This was also the main argument for demolishing Chengdu Mosque, a masterpiece of wooden construction in People’s Street (Renminnanlu), now replaced by a modern place of worship. In January 2003, the new young imam of Shunchengjie declined comment on these matters. During the past fifteen years, his predecessors never refused an interview. The noise of the machines digging in a sacred place does not induce confidence. Nevertheless, we have to recognize that the new Shuncheng Mosque was beautifully reconstructed in less than a year.

Muslim women, and in particular the improvement of their Koranic knowledge, will boost the new mosque’s popularity. Shunchengjie Mosque, conjointly with Kaiyuan and Shadian Mosques, is, in fact, one of the rare places of worship favoring teaching of the Koran to women in Yunnan.

Shunsheng Mosque, being the headquarters of the Islamic Association of Yunnan, deserves to be described. This part of Shunshengjie Street retains a Hui flavor with its Muslim pastry shops. One is owned by a Jahariya Sufi. The old door still exists after reconstruction of the mosque during 2002–03 and leads to a narrow passage with a shop selling Islamic items and religious books. At the end on the right is the entrance to the courtyard. Sometimes Muslims from other regions sell their province’s products in order to be able to continue their travels.

The room for ablutions is situated on the left after entering the courtyard. The boiler is in the next room. To the right on the ground floor in the old courtyard is the new imam’s apartment. Students studying the Koran live upstairs in small rooms. Old Imams keep their accommodations to the left in the courtyard. The mosque’s new stele of the 1980s replaced the old one destroyed by the Red Guard—in the middle of the courtyard (photo 26). When approaching the new mosque, on the left is a gate leading to a small market; a nearby room is used to clean the deceased. The mosque’s two coffins are stored in the back.

The demolished mosque was red like Chinese pagodas. The new mosque is spacious, modern, and elegant, and yellow and gold paint predominate (photos 8 and 9). To the left is the part reserved for women. The huge prayer hall, called Chaoshen, is cleaner than before. The traditional name Qingzhenxi has disappeared, a distinguishing trait of modernity and Sinicization. Two Chinese jars also stress this point. The minbar is also modern as are the inscriptions in Chinese and Arabic.

Western Yunnan

Western Yunnan is a historical region. In 1253, the future Kublai Khan entered into Yunnanese legend in Dali and Xiaguan by seizing the Kingdom of Nanba, formerly considered impregnable. Following the Mongol victory, Islam made a strong appearance in the province, because there were Muslims in Kublai Khan’s armies. Later Islam dominated the region for eighteen years under Du Wenxiu.

There are now more than ten mosques in Dali Prefecture. The most prominent mosques are: Zhuhua, constructed in 1906 and restored in 1983; Shangxingzhuanhuang dating from 1881 and repaired in 1992 with a budget of 250,000 yuan (around 30,000 Euro); and Kelizhuang, the oldest, built in 1856. Muslim villages are numerous near Erhai Lake, and most have their own mosque.

The Koran, under the prompting of Weishan’s Koranic center, is taught to hundreds of students each year. Ahong courses last for four years. At five o’clock in the morning, large numbers of students pray (al-Fajr prayer).

Dali in particular, and its satellite, Xiaguan, are halfway points between Kunming and the Burmese border, Ruili. Muslims have always been numerous here. Baoshan is said to be the birthplace of Du Wenxiu, and Reitinger reported a prophecy by a geomancer, saying that Baoshan Mountain is “a king without a throne” and, at Du Wenxiu’s death, that Dali was “a throne without a king.” Until the end of the Second World War, most merchants in Dali were Hui, now most are Chinese.

Baoshan, on the road to Burma, has a small pagoda-mosque in the old style. It was a staging city for mule caravans, replaced in modern days by cars, trucks, buses, and mini-buses. The recent improvement in traffic is due to construction in 1998 of the Kunming–Dali Highway prolonged toward Ruili at the Burmese border (predicted for 2004). A railroad now links Kunming to Xiaguan, and Lijiang has an airport. Hui always live on the main communications axes.
Islam in China

In Baoshan, Imam Ma Pinde, only fifty years old, was obliged to leave his post to a young and inexperienced imam. The Islamic Association prefers young imams. It is said that they interpret the Koran in a more modern way, but they have also not known the difficult period of the Cultural Revolution.

At other times, the Burma Road passed more to the north toward Tengyue, now rebaptized Tengchong, in the Baoshan District, near the border and Myitkyina more than 1,500 kilometers from Rangoon. Myitkyina on the Irrawaddy River is the northernmost point of the Burmese railway. In March 1942, the railway was cut (between Myitkyina and Mandalay). All the former capitals were constructed along the Irrawaddy River, the main communication axis.

Luxi (Mangshi) and Ruili have a mosque. The access by Ruili to Lashio and Bhamo is less troublesome than the 2,500-meter pass situated on the old road. The small cities of Namkham and Bhamo thus channel the movements of Burmese Muslims. They are jade traders, mainly in Ruili, where a few Chinese Muslims are resident. In 1984, in Dehong, there were 2,000 Hui out of a population of 800,000.

Center and South of the Province

The Jahariya Sufi Order is centered on sacred tombs and mosques. The Gongbei cult is essential. The tomb of Ma San, the preferred disciple of Master Ma Mingxin (d.1781), dominates the Tonghai Valley. His son, Ma Shunqing is buried in Mojiang in a sandalwood forest. According to Bai Shouyi, Ma Mingxin passed through Yunnan via Sichuan, but his itinerary outside Gansu and Xinjiang is not well documented. The grandson of the master-founder, Ma Shilin (1814–71), was also Yunnanese. He was killed near Tonghai. Considering the existence of these former Jahariya masters, this order is very dynamic in Yunnan, particularly in Tonghai. By fidelity to Master Ma Hualong (d. 1871), Ma Yuanchang (1853–1920), son of Shykh Shunqing, saved his two grandsons, the only descendants of the fifth Shaykh Ma Jinxi, who maintained the Nanchuan sub-order in Gansu.

Ma Yunpeng is better known as Imam Yuanzhang, which recalls his Yunnanese origin. He devoted his life to the Jahariya Order’s survival, founding the Shagou spiritual line. He died during an earthquake in 1920. His tomb is in Zhangjiachuan, near Xi’an, Ningxia Region. A Treatise on the Road (Daotonglun) is attributed to him.

In Yunnan’s other cities are the Sufi disciples: in Gejiu, Kunming, Puer, Shadian, Simao, Lancang on the road to Kengtung, and Honghe by the Red River. Most Jahariya members in Yunnan follow Shaykh Ma. Discipline and esprit de corps strengthen community. There was a slow down at the end of the nineteenth century, with the eradication of Islam on the road linking Dali, Tengyue, and Myitkyina. Mojiang’s sandalwood forest and its mosque controlled the ancient Muslim route of Dali by Simao-Jinghong-Menghai-Kengtung. The network of disciples is currently very dynamic.

Near Menghai, a thousand non-Sufi Muslims were also part of the ancient caravans to Kengtung (formerly Xieng Tông). This city, called Jingdong in Chinese, was cut off from Xishuang Banna in 1949. Two Muslim villages have the privilege of being bicultural, Hui and Dai, and they assisted the former Sufi caravans from Mojiang. This bilingual ability is also common among Hui in Dali Prefecture who speak Bai and Chinese (Yunnanese dialect and/or Putonghua), contrary to the claim made by Michel Gilquin (Les Musulmans de Thailande 2002: 23). Since the 1950s, most of these Muslim farmers when the Burmese border was closed have settled and become paddy farmers. Menghai is now surrounded by Dai rice-fields; the small city is also known for its tea factory.

On another road, Dahuicun is a Hui village 20 kilometers to the west of Tonghai. There are approximately 3,000 farmers, all Jahariya. The majority recognizes Ma Liesun, but in Yunnan his followers are a minority compared to the Yunnanese subgroup. A tenth of Jahariya members do not wear the hexagonal conic black bonnet but white headgear like the Yunnanese master, a distant descendant of Ma Mingxin. These two groups, however, live in harmony in Dahuicun, share the doctrine of Ma Mingxin, and pray together but are different. For example, a Koranic student from the village, interviewed on 24 January 2003, never goes to the mosque in his own village because he studies in Najiaying’s mosque, 30 kilometers distant. This student is faithful to Kunning’s master and does not want to encounter Ma Zhiliang, the imam of Dahuicun. The latter, very cordial, proposed to lodge us in the village. On leaving his mosque, however, the imam advised us to avoid ethnological research: “That serves no purpose!” he declared with a preemptively. He wanted to avoid speaking of internal divisions in his Order in Gansu, Yunnan, and the Hui Autonomous Region of Ningxia.

Orthodox Sunni Muslims prefer a more homogenous Islam and are not educated about Sufism. However, in Yunnan, many orthodox believers follow, without knowing it, Jahariya traditions and practice. They are unaware of the Sufi cult of incense and know little about Sufism.

In the southwest, mosques marked former stages on the southern Silk Road. The Jahariya Order used them to promote its doctrines, which many other Muslims
envy. Before the Second World War, it took more than a month to travel from Kunming to Simao by caravan. During the 1980s, two days and two nights by bus were enough for the journey that now lasts just a day. Since the eighteenth century, the mosques at Mojiang, Puer, and Simao were parts of a network of Muslim caravans traveling between Yunnan and Burma. Simao mosque was rebuilt before the death of Imam Ma Wensi in 1998. An imam from Jingdong replaced him. He has no interest in Sufism but is tolerant. The Simao community is partly orthodox (Gedima) and partly Sufi, and the communities harmoniously share the same mosque. The Islamic Association has built a restaurant in Simao, and the Jahariya Order recently established another. Jinghong in Sipsong Panna (Xishuang Banna) shelters the second community of Burmese Muslims and has a new mosque, the largest in the region.

**Eastern Yunnan**

Xundian is a Hui autonomous district, the second after Weishan, known for its numerous mosques. It is a region of transit linked by train to Kunming and the neighboring provinces of Sichuan and Guizhou.

Qujing, more to the east, is located near the new highway toward Guiyang and Guizhou. The Shuanghe ("Two Rivers") Mosque in Qujing was built in 1893. This city has currently a population of 10,000 Hui.

Zhaotong, northeast of Kunming, has produced highly appreciated dried beef from the thirteenth century. This district now houses nearly 15,000 Hui. Daying Mosque at Songming was built in 1851 and restored in 1983, after the Cultural Revolution. This city and its nearby suburbs have five mosques, the oldest, Baxian (Eight Immortals) Mosque, dates to 1730. Courtellemont visited the region in the 1900s and encountered an imam, a relative of General Ma Rulong, who went to Mecca, Imam Ma Minglin (1898–1938?).

The pelt trade, tanning, and saddle-making form the traditional Muslim trade in northwest China along the Silk Road and along the Yellow River. Yunnanese Muslims were renowned for pelt-processing. Hui in Henan near Zhengzhou (Sanpo called “Small Mecca” for its religiosity) are also involved in this pelt trade (Allès 2000: 85–91).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, in these provinces, this typically Muslim industry prospered, but it was suspended from 1950 to 1980. It has resumed in Henan, perhaps thanks to the economic dynamism of Shanghai and Beijing. In Zhaotong, this is not the case. One no longer finds jackals, civets, and panthers, as a hundred years ago. There are, of course, sheep and goats, which formed the greater part of Muslim exports, but the Hui in Zhaotong have abandoned tanning and the pelt industry. Even in neighboring provinces, as in western Hunan, north of Xinhuang, Muslims no longer raise sheep but now devote themselves to agriculture and small business. In Mao’s province, the pelt industry has declined. In the 1980s, numerous fur traders from Tibet came to Kunming, but they disappeared during the 1990s. The Hui have converted to dried beef small industry. Although Zhaotong is near Sichuan and Guizhou, almost all its products go to Kunming, and the transformation of Shuncheng Street during the 1990s was a new blow to the Yunnanese Muslim economy.

In Wenshan District, there are nearly 30,000 Hui and more than 10,000 in Yanshan. Since 1985, Wenshan City has boasted a pagoda-style mosque. It occupies an old Chinese dwelling. Matang, in a forested neighboring region, also has a place of worship constructed during the 1980s, Huanglong’ba (“Valley of the Yellow Dragon”) Mosque. Hongdian, also in Wenshan District, has two mosques.

In Yanshan, Zhuang Autonomous Prefecture, north of Wenshan, the Hui are cadres and Sinicize the Zhuang. Out of a population of more than four million inhabitants in this prefecture, a fourth belong to the Zhuang minority. The Hui dominate local political life and have built seven mosques. There are seven Ahong for a population of a thousand Hui. The most important is Maodichong Mosque, built in 1980.

From 1974 to 1979, a protest following reprisals against Hui became an armed uprising and was severely repressed in Shadian, north of Menzi in southern Yunnan. Later the destroyed Muslim village, as well as its mosques, was rebuilt.

All of south and southwestern Yunnan’s cities currently have links with Southeast Asia, and China has many socio-economic interests in the region. From Indonesia, numerous Hua ren Chinese returned to China in 1965. These specialists, like the Hui, help China to understand Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Yunnan is a part of continental Southeast Asia and plays an important role in linking China to its neighbors. In exchange, the cities of Ruili and Jinghong, each of which has a new mosque, cordially welcome Burmese Muslims. In Chieng Rai and Chieng Mai, many Yunnanese Muslims, who had left China in the nineteenth century and before 1949, contribute to the revival of Islamic history in this part of Southeast Asia. Yunnanese Hui are still resident in Thailand and Burma.